PROBABLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST TACTICS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE "DETENTE"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400020008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 21, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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23. aba-- 1955
STAFF I M, ",ORA? DUM NO. o
SUBJECT Probable Iat tional Communist Tactics during the Period of
the "tentef~
.MM
7Ls of_t,h oran
1o This is a paper on the tactical aspects of International. Commtmi
within the framework of the relaxation-of-tersaion campaign. It is submitted
as an informal supplement to recent estimates which concluded that the Soviet
leaders ar 3 unlikely to abandon their 'long-range objective of achieving glo-
bal victory for Ccs muniamp but that th ave "adopted the new of
more than a short term tactical shift.*Af p' teas
sver,9 in the,.,-,e s,~o estimates no
special consideration eras riven to the question of hmr the various Cun nunist
Parties would pursue its objectives through the period of the Odetent,eRn
Z, At the outsets the thesis is suggested that the use of the to m
Odetente" in connection with International ?C ,c sir is a misncgnero 'mere
is no place for a 9ietentec' in Comrunism. There are only tactical rraotrmo-
dations designed (a) to support the present Soviet pulley of 'relaxing into]
national relations to permit the Bloc to strengthen itself internal?-.* and
exyAernany,o (b) to ur]de ine the eca Wmrldes will to resist and to foster
ne? tr~O.ism in "uncommitted" nations bp obscuring the realcla iera of CcmBrnanSsms,
and. () to maf.ntaln the rescsi.ne oi' C`W+.vuraiet ,Far- 'tee f-,n,l front, or s :'izations
-v~xxe aavantage of any opening t-ut i 1gnt oceuro
i~~rv a~ad Prracticv of +Cist~?4~+
The opportunist character of Leninist methodology has never ceased
tog sire the leaders of World Cc nism. Lenin wrote in 1920 that "the
s ri ctest loyalty to the ideas of Commmism must be eomt finned with ability
to m..ks all the necessary compromisesg to make agreementay zigzags., retreats
and era one 0 o Qe If you are not able to adapt yourself 9 if you are not inclined
to crawl in the mud on your L?olly9 you are not a revolutionary but c. chatter-
box.,,,,, Also significant Is the position taken in the Thesis and Resolutions
of the VI Congress of the Comintern, held in 1928.9 in which it is statods
The peace prlicy of the proletarian state certainly does not imply that
the Soviet State has become reconciled with capitalism,..0 It is merely
This memorandum has been discussed with CCI and the International
Counim Branch., ABP
No IN CLJ1S5? Q
~uevu.~~?? D T S C
CLASS. CHANGE
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR Tat
DATE M etc gEVIEWriM
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another ands under present conditions: a more advantageous form of fighting
capitaliems a form which the USSR -has. oonetant'!y evployed since the October
Revolution In 3.90 Stalin wrote: The strategy of the PartV is not sams-
thing permanent, it changes with the--passing of the rmlution fro i am
stage to another.,.. It changes to meet historical. shifts and tvrae?..."
.,to Recent policies employed by Bloc leaders clearly tc lov the eoove
principles. The recent outbreak of Soviet "amicability" and the lessening
of Communist vituperation against Free World gorement - - is only a tactical
maneuver on a. large ocale. Ehrushohev hinseif stated that if anus ex
pacts us to forget the doctrines of Z& rz? P4ogels, Ianin,, and Stalin he is
making a tremendous mistake. Those who this will have to wait uu?-
til Raster and Whitsun fall on the sums V*Iplr(Qrt as some translations
had it, "until the shrimp whistles".) Other Soviet loaders have also
reaffirmed their faith in the eventual victory of Communism. Kaganovichs
speaking on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolutions
declared that Communism would be victorious the world over in this eentnry.
Schirdewati, the Fast German deputy to SE forty leads Ulbriohts said
"Soviet 'aoezistenoe policy will prevent warp but does not preclude thp'-.fI. It
of the working people for the eventual downfall of the capitalistic. nations. ??'/
The Communist Parties outside the Bloc have clearly accepted these
priscip'!es of opportunism as a guide. for their oun tactics. Pcw examples
Italian -r ty -chief Togliatti warned that "reactionary groups have begun
to say that the day a true relax tion of International tension has been
achieved will necessarily mark the end of the Commanu st and Socialist
rnents 0 . v a Then.. pvesumb]y s a new era viii begin and there will be no
loo gor any t:lk.a'bout Ccsmaonnist.a. But how can they imagine that would. 'AP
whei relaxavi n of international. tension signifies the triumph of. that icy
o1 coexstence a!_d peace that none -other taah . the `socialist ai nta have
been proclaiming and world;tng Chu=c uheut their entire ea i.etenae? Pima
Courtade auth itativee spokesman of the French CP., made it clear that act-
ions of the Party to emancipate the working class or to support colonial
peoples have no connection with the issue of peaceful ._coex -coexistence which he
described as a "state of peaceful relations between nations." Courtadess
statement Is pnrttcnlarly Interesting as a possible reflection of 140ecowts
thinking an domestic Communist aotio s and colonial revolutions0
21
a,
Statemeiri; in a press conference of 17 October at the occasion of the signing
of the Soviet-East Gem Treaty in Isoow
Statement of 22 August 1955 to SBD groups in Bast Berlin,
Y Cominform 'ournal of 7 October 1955.
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iirrr
Cyst Tactical Problems
6. The difficulties confronting International Communism as a result
of any prolonged relaxation of tensions are of two general kinds. First,
and probably of greater imr-ediecy, is the need to smooth over the apparent
conflict (at least in non-Communist eyes) between the Bloc promotion of
international goodwill and continued, though less publicized, determination
to achieve Communist. control of the world* To achieve this, the Communists
are probably depending largely upon the basic desire of,the peoples of the
Free World for some kind of peaceful stability in the world situation.
Second is the problem of maintaining internal discipline and maximum readi-
ness in the international apnaratus particularly if the "detente" is planned
for a lengthy period. Since, for reasons of diplomacy and peace propagandap.
the "war-and hate mongers" must become anonymous while the relaxation lasts,
the maintenance of revolutionary dynamics may become difficult. While attacks
against wimperialism" are soft--pedal3.ede while some members of Western
`governments are praised and others temporarily shelved as targets of hate,
'internal, Comm unist vigilance may decreaaen Since totalitarianism thrives
on tensibns# the lack of them may impair, or at least slacken, alertness
of many Party members'. In the words of Polish Party functionary who had
Just heard of.Adenauer$a invitation to Moscowt "These days nothing is
sacred, not even hatred."
7. however far from embarrassing the Communist Parties all over the
world, the new brand of peaceful coexistence,offere.some distinct tactical
advantages. It can be assumed that, after the initial confusion which
followed the first dramatic Soviet gestures of amicability,, Party leaders
recognized these advantages, and that this realization occurred some months
before the Simanit meeting. During the height of the cold war, the Parties
found
in.nop-Cist countries, particularly those in Western Europe, had
themselves in an awkward position. In supporting the Soviet line against
their own.governmentsg they were regarded by many of their fellow citizens
as trait, But now in the new context of "peace and relaxation* a more
subtle attack on Western preparedness could be mounted with considerable
public support. Now the Parties are trying to build up an aura of respect-
ability in order to breakout of the political isolation into which their
support of Soviet polices Suring the cold war had Inevitably driven ththen*'
This desire for 2MVeetability is noticeable in European and
areas, but it is tempered with warnings by Comtminist chieftains that the
new amicability is neither a reversal of Communist principles nor an attempt
to proceed along evolutionary rather than revolutionary lines.
TAsr+1 or~y ao~d _. tcl I
$, Thus the drive for peaceful coexistence and the temporary suspension
of the hate campaign remain won within the oonfines-.-3f doctrinal methods
Such strategems have been used before--though admittedly not quite so ex-
tensively-whenever the Communist position was not strong enough to incur
a risk of general war. Such a risk is even more unacceptable at present
.-3-
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beea w,se of the technological developments of the past decade. Probably
the .sesults of these developments have not as yet been fully digested by
Conw to nist ideologists. If Stalin had a plausible interpretation--that
1s,, plausible from the Communist point of vier. -he did not announce it,
apparently his successors have not suoceser3d in explaining in proper doetrin-
a'1 terms he relationship of the strict to international Caemmmism. Molot*T t a
;Attempt to brush aside Mstlenkov'ss frankly admitted fear of world destruction
was ineffectual and manifestly unrealistic. Gammnunist leaders, both inside
and outside the Bloc, almost certainly realize that the results of atam#e
war would not exempt Com nnist- held territory. In view of the tendency
of these leaders to use the Marxist-Leninist gospel as an unfailing 'guide
to action", the lack of such guidance in a most vital field =at be very
disconcerting. It almost certainly has contributed subatantia1ly to the
decision to inaugurate a sort of nolitioal M. Only the use of the atom
for peaceful purposes seems to have been coordinated into the Comet
doctrinal structure: it is merely an application of Lenin's electrification
theses,
go The tactic > f temporary non--violence, which is supported by the
Communist belief in the "inevitable 7. ogic of history", has been doctrinally
underlined in an editorial appearing in the October 1955 issue of the in-
fluential theoretical Soviet Party journal KOMMMT. This editorial states
that "the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide basis
means an epoch of prolonged coexistence of and economic competition between
the two systems." It also points out that "socialism, like any other now
social. order, may not be thrust on peoples by force of arms, just as it
is impossible to maintain and consolidate the old order by force of arms
if it has outlived its century." On the basis of this statement, it appears
to be the "profound conviction of Communists that the question of further
paths of developments of Communism will be decided in the final an4ysie
not by means of war but by v ious kinds of aceftis] qM- 39 ton, This
new type of "competition", directed with much app o:nb by
the R's first
salesman Ehrusshchev, is aimed initially at u psychological softening of
the free peoples, the division of anti-Counisst powers and thee! exnansion of
Co ist. control over more and more non Ccrw=tist economies, As a result,
Bloc economy would gain, Free World economy would weaken and at last head
into the long desired economic diafttegration, This approach does not show
any demonstrable doctrinal shifts, but aptly fills a methodological vacuum
which resulted from the advent of atomic weapons and the improvement of
means of their delivery. Thus, in spite of the ideological difficulties
created by the atom, it leaven plenty of room for Communist initiative,
The recent robust Soviet competition in the Middle East proves this point.
21 Italics mine.
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1.0. The Parties are currently waging a holier-than-thou campaign to
implement International Soviet salesmanship acrd, at the same time, to provide
a convenient camouflage for their real v arks meaomes taken to infiltrate
go rr .ants and labor oarganizxxtions as to ,pm;, Th ed an sfrom ti Ig
&' .. ': * The present world situation, from their point of view, offers
a* opportunity for the invigoration of the international apparatus by
tarsi ing out weak elements and for "educational" activities directed to-
waare!. estebliMt ng new confidence in Communism a is a means to world pease.
These are the indications that World Communism is getting its second wind
fcr, the coming new phase of the struggle to capture the Puree World.
Y_ro .e Gnat Tactics
A. otIve and Planes
.o The leaders of international Coemmxunienm, although confronted with
serious obst''+olea, are already adapting their thinking and techniques to
the new world situation, They realize that the new war technology has
rendered march of their tactical doctrine obsolete. They see themselves
will.itarily blocked in Europe, and to a degree in the Par East, by the Western
%;onaalida?tion of anti-Commist fare s, West Germa in included. They do not
find the desired evidence of a major eoonoaio collapse in capitalist countries.
They may even have realized the changing nature of capitalism since the
{Mmes of It= and they may also be aware of the gradual recognition by
former C+a nunist sympathizers of the real nature of proletarian dietatoe po
Pi .7t', they have probably come to the conclusion that their own system,
pertioulasly in the economic field, is not strong enough to allow them
to rradertake az,y greater risk of armed oonfliot with an aroused West. Thues
the question now is how International Co munism can be furthered against
prevailing odds, and how, in a period of better international relations,
the breathing spell can beat be used to prepare against the day when present
limitations may no longer exist,,
l2@ It is almost certain that the Communist leaders, in launching
the amicability campaign, took precautions. lest their now methods cause
a serious weakening of discipline in the international apparatus. For ..
haps the best explanation of how International Communism's quest for peace-
ful, coexistence should be used for local purposes came from Italian Communist
Party head Togliatti who demanded that the coexistence principle be applied
to domestic polities. There should be, he paid,-"equal rights for all citizens",
"Oliaardnation of (anti-Communist) disoorr3mination", and an "area of the cold
wars q By these Togliatti meant the :toleration of subversive activities
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and the unsavory financial paraoti of the Parties, and permission for
Casmanunists and fellow-travelers to take over kay positions in the govermmment$
the eoononly,, and the armed forces of their respective countries,
B. Main Sb'ateW United ?rant Tints MU
13. It is to be esxpeoted that during the period of the *detente,"
united front tactics will more and more bead one of to in inastm=enta
of Coa nuniet tactics. forts to infiltrate government and labor organs.
rations probably will proceed in a leas violent, more respectable atmosphere.
"Peaceful" seizure of power or influence has almost certainly taken the
place of violent revolutionary aactivissm, for the time being. From the
Commutiot point of view, united front governentas can be used to (a) foster
neutralism, (b) retain the initiative for international disarmament (including
control of atonic weapons )# (a) promote a Paz Sovietica an the basis of
a security pact which would end the Western security organizations, and (d)
strengthen Party influence through its overt or covert representation in
goverzental, economic, social and cultural key posts as a precondition
to "legal* seizure of power. At the same time, special efforts will be
made to consolidate the International labor movement under Communist leader-
ship. The slogan of labor Unity iss ? again on the propaganda forefront,
Uationasl campaigns for a "union of equals for the advaneep4nt of socialism
and unity agaiant the common enemy- oapitaliat empl.ayera"M goes on unabated
while international relaxation is preached. Between the pincers of the
united.fronts from above and below, the extinction of capitalism is aimed
for. he *Spiritcf Genevaaag, or vrhate i er remains of Western expectations
has in no way deterred or diminished this campaign. On the contrary: the
"detamte" has furnished the Cm-unist apparatus good opportunities for
refurbishing their somewhat shopwaau1 cold war activities.
]4o 14"'"r$ there iss evidence that the ostepsible restraint of some
Parties is not being M lowed all over the globe. The attitude of the
Breaail.iaan Party,, for example, has remained ag::resszvs; ^ th.e extremists In
the Indian Party are still influential,; the . Southeast 'Asian Coi v i isato do
not seem to be eager to contribute to i relation of tension; and the beak
Parties in the Etddlee Bust probably will be greatly encouraged to foment
violence by the oil the MM is pouring on the smoldering Arab-Israel can-
fl ict. In the meantime, special efforts probaablyr will not be maade? to recruit
mass Parties; raathers, much emphasis will be placed an keeping e:dsating member-
ship in trim. Mcxreaver, there will be increasing recognition on the part
of the Soviet leaders that ideological squabbles have been impairing the
cause, of World Gcommwism. The now Stet thesis that socialism can be achieved
in a variety of ways, according to prevailing conditions in a given country,
probably will be used to strengthen the international movement and to increase
its loyalty to ! oow,
Definition by Paalme Dutt, British Communist leader,
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92DO ision
15. In view of the fete going, the conclusions ' of Staff 1 norandvnn 33.55
of 29 anne 1955 would appear to- be still valid, namely, that:
"Cammvnism has remained an essentially oonspfratorial secular
religion. Its international organizations will almost certainly
continue to hew to the Party Lime and to help to advance Moacov's
objectives; more peaceful methods in international. relations
are not a reflection of an Ideological change but a purely tacti4 al
maneuver on a grand scale.... There is no evidence that the
will permit its ideological framework to be dismantled. It Is
still the tense of International Communism.... The foundations
of Marxism-Leninism apparently remain firmly established but it
is possible that greater latitude will be employed in developing
new methods to achieve the ultimate objectives of Communism...."
These methods almost certainly will aim (a) to promote international relaxa
designed to reduce Western awareness of the Communist threat and (b) to a gloit
local conditions by national Parties and front organizations designed to re-
duce Western determination and capabilities via-a ds Comm inismo Such policies
are far more realistic than those employed by Stalin? and capable of far.more
subtle variation, For these reasons, and because of the probable repercussions
of these methods among non-Cc ist peoples of the woorld, they will be far
more difficult for the West to counter?
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