DEBRIEFING OF AMBASSADOR LUCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000400010020-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 15, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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state Dept. declassification
release i nstructi ons on fi le
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTZDdk-TES
15 June 55
Internal O/NE Distribution Only
STAFF )U~116ORANDUM No 0 2,~~~
SUEJECTs Debriefing of Ambassador Luce
~, o On 9 June lq ~ j~ of 0 attended
a debriefing of Ambassador Luae at the tats apartment. his memor~
andum is a summary of certain of her remarks.
20 Status of Forces Agreement, Ambassador Luce attributed the
delay in parliamentary approval of the SOF agreement to such factors
asp (a) general resistance of Italian government leaders to pushing
legislation regarded as pro?US for fear of being called "US stoogesn9
(b) the Italian desire to retain a gaud bargaining counter vis~~vi.s
the USg and (c) a possible reluctance to raise a matter in Parl3.ament
xhich xas likely to provoke a strong Communist reactions
3a According to Ambassadoz? Luce, the ~,uestion is becoming acute
'because of the problem of redeploying US forces Hour in Austria. Thus
far the Pentagon has maintained that passage of SOF legislation b9'
Italy should be a precondition to redeployment of such US forces to
Italy. She believed that the US noW needed to apply no pressure for
sppraval of SOF ether than through this potential redeplaymento Nith
US farces out of Austria, the large US military establishment at
Leghorn, xhich xas primarily designed to serve as a US line of commun?
icatian to Austria, xould have little reason for existanceQ In the
final analysis, the Italians far both economic and security reasons
would probably prefer to have more rather than fexer US traaps in
Italy. She thought, therefore, that following a clarification of the
goverxamental situation durimg the next fe~rxeeks, the Chamber of
Deputise xould probably pass the SOF legislation already approved b9
the Italian Senate,
or~c~-M~NO. ~ L -
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1a. Neutralism. Ambassador Luce remarked that 104 percent of
Italians axe probably "neutrality-minded", in that they mould prefer
not to get involved in any struggle between the great powers. Haw~ever,
that dose not necessarily indicate that a very high percentage of
Italians think that neutrality is possible. she one third which is
left~axianted could probably fallow the Communist line if it preached
neutrality; another third might be inclined to follrnr a strong leader
an this issue. But the real queat3.on is whether Italian leaders are
neutra].ity~indad. At present these leaders seem to consider neutrality
a gams with which they can trifle, probably hoping to worry the tIS
a bit, Fet two basis conditions fox maintaining neutrality success
fully are not present in Ttalya the defense capabilities of Italy
are not sufficiently great; and Italyea internal stability is uar~duly
limited with about one third of its electorate substantially s~mpa?
thizing with many policies of the ~remlino As a result, Italian leaders
probably regard it iaapasaible to follow a policy of .neutralism without
in turn being "neutra.7.izad" and eventually dropping behind the Iron
Curtain.
5o Ito, ~ CCommunist Party (PCB. At the present time Italian
Canmuniats are in a gh~~y can used state of mind, due at least in
part to these faetarsa (a) the Trieste problem, final resolution
of ~ehieh required the PCI to ~hrhirl like a dareiah"; (b) the Soviet
mission to elgrade; (c) Togliatti~a health (according to Ambassador
Luceea bast information, his recant attack v~s-s a cerebral hemorrhage,
"unfortunately not fatal") whioh may presage a power struggle ~r3.thin
the P'CI; (d) the PCT?s lass of prestige as ~ result of the victories
of free unions in certain plant elections (eog, Fiat); (e) some lase
of appeal to young people because the ~'CI has bean assuming less of
a revolutionary character than in the past; and (f) the effect on morale
of the Kremliaoe overtures to Adanauer, a figure ao often castigated
by the PCI. 6-mbassador Luce thought that, under these circumstances,
a new intelligence estimate on the intemtiona and capabilities of the
Italian Caanmuniata would be particularly usafulo
6. Cffehore Procurementq The US ~nbaeay had based its antib
Communist caaupa gn in taly at least partially an the 4rithholding of
tlS defense contracts from Italian plants until the pa"ner of the
Co~omunist-dominated Ct~TI+ in those plants had been brokeno ~rhia policy
had been predicated, ha~rever, on the assumption that the offshore
procurement program would be continued by the USo Hut as a result of
the recent curtailment in US offshara procurement, ~.th leas contracts
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being allotted to Italy, the situation is somewhat difficult. .Naar,
after many plants have been "cleansed'" of CQiIL dominance mater of the
"pure" arorkars remaining may have to be fired because of a lack of
ardears for the planto
?o Triastea The Italians have done little to remedy the economic
crisis in rid estea, and, in general, seem to have handled the situation
poorly. Probably the Italians believe the ideal solution would be
"for me to call on ldre Humphrey"o
$a Italian Political. 53.tuation. In the course of a conversation
with her, talian assador Hrosio had expressed the hope that the
coalition can stay together. Hae~ever, it would be more difficult now
as the Christian Democratic gains in the Sicilian elections were made
to a considerable extent at the expense of the sma11 parties who belong
to the aoaaitiano Hrosio thought that he would in canacience have to
resign if the CD"s moved to the left before Nenni made a clean break
with the Ca~unists, including a public renunciation of the Nenni Socia-
lists" unity of cation pant frith the PCIo
q, pne possible formula for the composition of a new governments
which ~nbassador Line believed might lend. more stability to the poli-
tical situation, would be a coalition of CD?s with the Monarchists and
Liberals. The other center parties in the present aoa].ition might
then go into a "loyal opposition" and any leakage of votes from the
center grouping presumably would go to them rather than to the Nen~.
Socialists or PCTo It had been suggested also that this arrangement
might not be so ab~ectionable to center parties remaining out of the
neR coalition since, in times such a govertmterrt coalition of the CD"s with
the right might be able to '"take care" of the Casmtiunists and their allies
after which the stage would be set for a moderate left oriented govern?
menta
10, Ambassador Yvice ventured that such aright-oriented govern-
ment probably would not be as catastrophic as many people ims~gined.
It would be better than a CII "manocolore" government trying to pick
up votes "like a floating kidney". Tn feat, the CD"s probably oould not
govern long without a firm coalition with the right or left and the
logic of events is leading them to a choice4 Such a right oriented
gavernment might isolate the Neo-Fascists, wane going to the PCI and
others becom~.ng "respectable", She noted, incidentally, that an Fanbassy
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tabulation of parliaments-ry noting had disclosed that the Monarchists
and Neo~asaiste had supported virtually all legislation of particular
importance to the ifi3.
ll, The sawn center parties Rill probably continue to etRindln
in strength and influence as long as they remain within the coalition4
chile Rithin the coalition they must abandon their oen position on cerm
fain issues and also awy suffer some~rhat from being aligned Kith the
CD's, since many people associate that party Kith "clericalism".
Thus, to continue to exist, they may have to leava the coalitiorY and
go into opposition to the CD's.
12? as an interesting sidel3.ght, ~nbassador Luce referred brief],y
to amnahi, the nearly-elected President of Italy. In the wake of much 25X6
speculation about his leanings to the left and only three days after
a speech in which he suggested, in effect, that labor Ras se o
poser. he disnatahed an intermediar5r to the US Embassva
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