EFFECT OF A BLOCKADE ON COMMUNIST CHINA IF PORT ARTHUR AND DAIREN ARE NOT INCLUDED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030082-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: January 10, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030082-8
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53890
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTfIATES
NAVY DECLASS IFICATION/F ELEA E
I N S T R U C T I O N S ON FILE
STAFF I?1EMORANDUM NO. 179
27
10 January 1952
SUBJECT: Effect of a Blockade on Communist China if Port Arthur
and Dairen Are Not Included
The Board of National Estimates has approved the following
estimate:
-1. If a blockade of the China coast did not include
Port Arthur and Dairen, the effectiveness of such a blockade
would probably be limited. In the follotring assessment, we are
indebted to the Office of Naval Intelligence for data in para-
graphs 2,, 3, and 4.
2. Cunist'China imported a minimum of 20,000 long
tons a day by ship during 1951. The port capacity oif Dairen is
estimated at approximately 39,000 long tons per day. The present
level of imports into Dairen is not known, but ORR has estimated
that it is probably considerably less than 10,000 tons per day.
Thus, surplus unloading capacity at Dairen r. y be as much as
29,000 tons a day.
3, If Chinese Communist imports were maintained at
estimated present levels (approximately 20,000 tons) and were
shipped to Dairen in the face of a blockade of the rest of the
China coast, the Office of Naval Intelligence has estimated that
all this tonnage could be unloaded and transported from the port
by rail, road, and Junks. Junks could carry packaged cargo to
Taku and other ports west and north of the Shantung Fromontory
without serious interference from blockading vessels.
~. The Communists would face a problem, however, in
moving large ,amounts of material overland from the north to
central and southern China since there are only two main north-
south railroads each with an estimated total capacity of 4,000
tons a day. Thus, although the entire level of imports could
probably be delivered to the Peiping-Tientsin area, less than half
could be moved south, even assuming the rail capacity was devoted
exclusively to movinj imported items. LOOM NT NC.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLA$S#IED
CLASS.. QHAMGED TO: TS S(C)
TAT` NEWtT f EV4W DATE:
CCNFIDENTi 1 "'38,0 WM:
'
Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030082-8
 Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030082-8
CONFIDENTIAL
SIT
5. The already heavily burdened rail system of China
would almost certainly be further strained as.a consequence of
this blockade. However, whether Chinese Communist capabilities
to launch large-scale military operations against either Burma
or Indochina would be decisively decreased as a result of this
strain can only be tentatively estimated at this time. We
believe thaw the blockade will probably have no direct or
Indirect decisive effect on Chinese Comemist capabilities to
invade Burge) or Indochina for the following reasons: there are
arsenals in Kunming and Chungking which produce substantial amounts
of small arms and munitions; Szechwan province is a rich rice-
producing area; there have been reports over the past several
months of stockpiling activities in the south China area, Further-
more, the supply and equipment requirements for Chinese Communist
attacks on Burma or Indochina would by no means be so great as
those for operations In Korea in terms of both the number of n
which would be. involve (an timated 50,000 in Burma fIE-36, or
100,000 in Indochina E-33Z and heavy equipment used. Additional
data on Chinese Communist stockpiles and on other factors of
importance to the logistic situation in south China, is required
to make a more positive estimate. This has been requested of G-2.
6. Aside from the loopholes that Port Arthur and Dairen
would present to any blockade, there would appear to be an impor.
tent policy problem (admittedly outside our area of responsibility)
with respect to a contemplated blockade of Hong Kong (an ally) and
no blockade of Port Arthur and Dairen (a cold t-aar energy),
x9peaffim
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030082-8