G-2 ESTIMATE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT AN INVASION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030076-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: January 25, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030076-5
25 January 1952
STAFF W.-17RAWTM W. 183
SUBJECT : O--2 Estimate of Chinese Communist Capability to Sup??ort
An Invasion of Southeast Asia
REFERS"ICEa 0-2 Memo for AD/ONE, Chinese Communist Capabilities
against Indochina," 17 January 1952
1. 'NIE-55, dated 7 December 51, gave the Chinese Com-
munists the capability to support logistically approximately 100,000
men in an invasion of Indochina and 50,040 in an invasion of Burma.
The Ch'.nese Communists were not given the cpability to su! port
logistically s ich ground operations in Burma and Indochina con,
currently as long as the Korea- war continued, NIE-35, published
in June, l951,.also contained the 0?2 estimate that the Chinese
Communists could support 100,,000 men in an invasion of Indochina.
2. On b January 1952,1
Inueried this estimate of Chinese Communist capabi tyo
sw~ CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTTIATj~S
3, In responsel ONE queried 02
on 10 January 1952,. 0-2 replied,in a memorandum of 17 January
1952 that the Chinese Cnists now had the capability, to support
logistically 150,000 troops for an invasion of Indochina, and.
50,000 troops for an invasion of Burma, and that such operations
could be conducted concurrently even though Korean operations 25X1
on the present or an intensified,scsle continued.
1. To determine the re on for this rather substantial
increase in estimated capability, inter-
viewed Cola Duesenberry, Lto Colo Bailey, an CAP to c an of
0-2, Eastern :Bra---cho The substance of this discussion followst
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a. O-2 stated that they were presently completing
their contribution for NIE-35/l, and that this document would
present in detail such documentary evidence as 0-2 had in su-port
of their now estimate. -This contribution is due in ONE, lonely,
28 January.
b. 0-2 stated that since December they have received
information (1) of a significant irnproveiaent in the effectiveness,
vigor, and coordination of recent Viet Minh attacks in Tonkin;
(2) of an increase in Chinese Communist troop strength along the
Indochina border; and (3) (most imrortant in terms of the matter
under discussion) of a substantial Chinese Commaanist logistical
buildup and significant improvement In supply routes and facil-
ities into Indochina, in particular the improvement of railroads
leading south from Kwangsi Province to the Indochina border. 25X1
c. In addition, 0-2 gavel a co of a
mgrno of a Pentagon conference of 1I January 3.9521 1
Although c , esen r 25X1
stated that.-the extreme y pessimistic . remarks
should be treated with reserve and that 0-2 did no shars the
present "excitement" over the Indochina situation, 25X1
remarks clearly influenced 0-21s new estimate of Chinese Con=n.
niet capabilities4 The key points of the I I conference 25X1
are as follo at
(1) who had briefed
US G-2 in November, 19 1, had been justifiably optimistic.
But later information on Chinese Communist aid in October
indicated that this assistance had "suddenly" increased
"by ten times that given previously ha this occurred
all at once."
(2) There was an explantion in some detail of
of Improvements in south China supply routes and facsl-
ities.
(3) The buildup of supplies in Indochina was
not far above the needs of the Viet Minh and was suf-
ficient to supply "100,000 additional _4Troop7 O A .
for a period of two months."
(b) "150s000 Chinese Communists could enter Indo-
china In one month and 50,000 could enter in one to
two weeks."
Slig=
CONFIDENiAl
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6o Another reason for 042?s six-week change of line may
stem from the fact that there has been a known gradual improve-
ment in Communist capabilities in south China since June 1951,
when G'2 prepared its contributi.,n for N!E-350 t'2 did not take
cognizance of this improvement in the preparation of NIE-55
(November-December 19513, and mfr have taken, the present occa-
sion to revise their existing estimate, which in fact dates bick
to June, 19510
70 We believe that the revised O.2 estimate more accurately
reflects current Chinpse Cormwmist, ca abilit es than did the one
presented in NIEQ55n
25X1
a3-
CONFIDENTIAL
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