FIELD COMMENTS ON NIE-23, "INDIA'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT"

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030070-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 8, 2006
Sequence Number: 
70
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 4, 1952
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030070-1.pdf179.54 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030070-1 140 C E 11 T R A L 111 T E L L I G .E 1 1 C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL 3,TI.,ATE9 4 February 1952 STAFF ?:tMORA11DUL NO. 190 SUBJECT: Field Oonnents on I3IE.23,, "India's Position in the Eact,& West Conflict" 1. On 3 January 1952 US Embassy New Delhi commented at length, by dispatch,, on N1IE..23j, "India?s Position in the East- -West Conflict."* Despite their considerable length, these comments do not re.'lect any basic disagreement with the estimate except on the c estion of economic deterioration a point, it mar be recalled? which was responsible for considerable fire 7orks during preparation of the est- a . The Embassy generally lines up with OIR (in its comments on NE-23) in rejecting the concept- India's ability to. support its s the Embassy in effect rejects the notion that mounting population pressure is a fundamental component of the situation. The Embassy attributes India?s present economic deterioration chiefly to such "transitory" factors as the impact of World war U,, the."calamities of partition," and the abnormal climatic conditions of the last four years, It adds, moreover,, that any continued economic decline would probably be slow in view of India's primarily agricultural character. repognized the existence of an unfavorable trend but be. ev it could be countered by an economic development program State Dept. declassification release instructions on file 25X1 * We' 'fall dispatch is available in care in the Reading Room; The moot pertinent parts are corm arized in this memorai dum. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Q X DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C . NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH; HR 70-2 +!ATE:1 es go REVIEWER Approved for Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030070-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030070-1 2m Unfortunately, very little can be said on this point without raking over the aches' of last cuimnerls arguments in the IAC representative meet .ngs. It is -'ossible that IJ'.,.E..23 nought up the Iroblem of population pressure in too mechanistic and glocm* a fashion, and, in any events c:e would thoroughly agree with the ]nbass; that any problem of economic deterioration is essentially a long-range rather than an immediate one. The facts remain that population pressure is mounting (at a rate of about 5 million persona a year) and that some serious students of the problem question India's ability to achieve greater stability even if large-scale outside aid is forthcoming, The final version of NM-23 attempted to balance off the pessimism of this school with the optimism of the ly well-qualified men in State who are committed to a pro. gram ar trying to do something to retrieve the situation. In the opinion of the staff, we can, in honesty, do no more. 3. The Eibassy?s comments on the foreign affairs sections of DIE-23 fall into two general categories: (a) those regarding India's responsiveness to future Soviet and Chinese Ca nunist pressures against South Asia and nearby areas; and (b) those calling attention to what it regarded as distortions or inade_ ?quacies in the treatment of India's current foreign affairs out- look, We Would certainly agree with the Embassy's statement that India has recently shown increasing awareness of the external Cc mmist threat, and would also go along with the Taabassyss assertion that overt Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia would require a re-examination, of Indian policy. As the Embassy apparently also believes, however, the basic caveat which we Ili- tended to convey- iould still appear valid: namely, that India's ba: is predilection for. non-.involvement makes it impossible to count on India's identifying itself more closely with the Vtestern defense effort even though India becomes more aware of the ex- ternal Communist threat, The Iinbassy made useful suggestions on two related matters, pointing out quite validly that India would regard Soviet aggression AA the 11iddle Eavt more seriously than it-would aggression in Europe and that India would wish to come to- Burma's assistance (against direct aggression) under UN aus- pices rather than directly. 49 ? Most of the remaining foreign affairs comments are in accord With the Intant if not the actual wrilin of th t g e es imate0 25X1 I It the Embassy gagged over the word "appease- In a manner which. misconstrued its intended meanings and Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030070-1 Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937AO00100030070-1 *90, ~Wd probably that e:rpreasion vrould bettcr have been omitted from the to:t. ie agree with the 2;nbaosy that the eatinato might have spelled out more fully the bases of Nehru's objections to :Tectern rearmament as a means of combatting Soviet a:? pansionism. There appears to be a contradiction between two of the Thnbaccyos comments. In line with its views on the economic future? the Anbacsy suggested that political disintegration may possibly be more potent than economic disintegration and that we might validly assert the conclusion that political disintegration might lead to Conmmict domination of India. ter, however, the Embassy states that despite friction within the ruling Congress Party there is little to justify the belief that Nehru Till be unable to hold the party and the government together during the years immediately ahead. The Staff's current view is that Nehru,?s control will probably be threatened to some extent during the next yearn a two, in part because of the basic divisions within the Congress Party and in part because of the apparently growing strength of leftist and other opposition elements in South India as a result of eco. nomic discontent, Approved For Release 2006/11/09: CIA-RDP79T00937A000100030070-1