SOVIET AVIATION GASOLINE SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00937A000100010072-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: February 28, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 20061Q@{ J F
USAF RENEW COMPLETED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
";USAF Declass/Release
Instructions On File*
MF3ANDt~! OF INF IATION Pit. .25
(L937A000100010072-1
W# #53218
28 : ek cry 1951
NO CHANGE tN CLASS.
0 DECLAS$WED
SUB TECT I Soviet. Aviation Gasoline Situation CLASS. C 4A* GED TO: Ts $ `G,J
NEXT REVWWDATE: gQ,
RUTH: HR 7?2
DATE: FF-6 O RFVJEMvm.
1, To determine the adequacy of Soviet aviation gasoline
supplies to support a global warp
2. If Soviet supplies are adequate, how *an we explain
the fact that Soviet requirements are only a fraction of those
of the United States Air Fares?
ADEQUACY OF SOVIETVGA3 SUPPI
3. If the USSR were engaged in a global we' in 1951 there
would be a stringency in the supply of aviation gasoline. This
tight supply situation, however, would not prevent the USSR
from carrying out its initial campaigns. As explained in de.
tail in the discussion, Soviet minimum essential wartime
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requirements for high octane aviation gasoline in 1951 are esti..
mated to be 1,850,000 metric tons. Availabcility from production
will be about 2,180,000. This means that some surplus exists
above the minimum wartime requirements. A larger surplus is
estimated in the lower octane ratings employed for training pur.
poses.
4. The aviation gasoline stockpile is probably the equiva..
lent of at least several months requirements.
5. General refining facilities, as opposed to the specialized
facilities for the production of high octane aviation gasoline,,
are capable of producing ample supplies of jet fuel to meet the
requirements of the number of jet planes (primarily fighters)
available to the USSR in 1951. The process of conversion of the
Soviet Air Forces to jets more than trebles the volume of fuel
required per plane for each hour of flying time because of the
greater fuel consumption of jets. In the future this would reduce
the relative dependence on aviation gasoline, brrt would increase
Soviet problems of transportation and storage.
6. Soviet aviation gasoline refineries are particularly
vulnerable to strategic air attack and are within the target aye.
tens selected by USAF intelligence. It is estimated that after
2.
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an A-bomb attack of the type suggested by the WHO none of the
surviving refining facilities would be capable of producing 100
octane aviation gasoline and the refining facilities for all
liquid fuels would be out to a scant 3.3 m1113on metric tons.
This attack, however, would not reduce aviation gasoline supplies
to the point of preventing the initial short campaigns now fare..
out for the Soviets, Air capabilities for a prolonged war
would, of course, be severely reduced,
SEARITY OF SOVIET ark aF ECUMIU=
?, Since the requirements of the US Air Force for high
octane combat aviation gasoline are estimated to be appraadmately
4 to 5 times as great as those of the Soviet Air Forcese, it in
obvious that the two air forces must be assumed "to fight two
different kinds of tears," The main reasons for this disparity
in requirements are as followst
a, It is assumed that during 1951 Soviet forces could
carry out certain of their assumed campaigns with little resistance;
b. The campaigns visualized for the Soviet forces do not
include strategic air operations as extensive as those contemplated
for US Air Forces. The large scale use of medium and heavy bombers
requires extremely large quantities of high octane aviation gasoline;
e The disparity in Set fuel requirements is even greater,
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c. The Soviet Air Forces d o not awry nearly as much
cargo nor as many personnel by air transport as do the USAF,
d. The exterior lines of oammamioatios of the Soviet
Air Forces will not be as long as those of the USAF. Moreover,
their bases of operations will be closer to the points of air
activity; and
e. The Soviet Air Forces do not carry out training pro.
grams as extensive as those of the UAF0
DISCUSSION
VAILABILS~TY_Q ?' A VIAT121
In 1951, the total production of high octane aviation
gasoline (grades 100/130, 95/130 and 95/115) for the Soviet
bloc is estimated to be about 2,180,000 metric tons.* All of
this eaooept 110,000 metric tons will be produoed.in the USSRQ
In addition, about 1,750,000 metric tons of 85 to 91 octane
(suitable for training purposes) can be produc.d.. The actual
size of the aviation gasoline stockpile is not known, although
* All of t h e f i g u r e s in this memorandum are the preliminary esti..
mates of GRit CIA, Requirement figures were derived from USAF
data, Although the research office in A-2 has t?f rm 1 i n sac-
pressed some disagreement on particular figures, it i
agrees with the general conclusions,
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it is relatively aertain that stockpiles of aviation fuel and
critical components such as alkylate and iso-oatane exist in
quantities equivalent, at least, to several months requirements.
90 General ieflning facilities, as opposed to the
apeaialiaed ibo lines for high octane aviation gasoline, are
sufficiently flexible to produce a large vole of Set fuel.
Approodmately 40 percent of a barrel of crude oil* can be con-
verted to jet fuel, From a practical viewpoint there can be no
shortage of jet fuel tmless there is a general shortage of re-
fined products. In the event of a shortage of refined products,
however, it is possible that jet fuel would be given the nooss-
eery priority over motor gaso].3ue and other fractions. There
will be ample jet fuel to supply the rents of the number
of Set planes (primarily fighters) estimated for 1951.
10, A situation similar to that for jet fuels exists in the
ease of low octane. aviation gasoline in that a large volume can
be produced by general refining facil hies. Aviation fuels ranging e
from 75 to 85 octane may be substantially the stone as good quality
motor gasoline, possibly with closer specifications on such items
as distillation and vapor pressure.
Total crude oil production for the Soviet bloc in 1951 will
probably be about 49 mi111on metric torso
50
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TABLE I
(thousands of metric tons)
100/130 600
95
Total High octane ""gam
20180
85 to 91
Tote) 85 and above
30930
11, The estimates of aviation fuel requirements given be.
low are based on the courses of Soviet military notion visualized
The composition of the Soviet Air Forces
for these campoi,-xsv including Set aircraft, were estimated ter
the USAF, The fuel requirements are direetlg related to the
types of aircraft, fuel oonat uption rates, and the duration and
frequency of missions. In addition, these estimates of fuel oon.
gumption are based on the experience of the USAF and their analyses
of the characteristics of Soviet aircraft, Aftor aotputing fuel
requirements, 10 percent was added to cover logistic losses,
60,
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2MOW2
1001130
95/115
Belau 95
MC
TABLE II
SO _ ,ors
4 ra 195,1
(thousands of metric tons)
im,
36C1
691
Total High octane Awl
1,850
Total Aviation Gasoline
* Wer beginning the last pert of the previous ya,
1,870
From a theoretical viewpoint the highest quality fuel is de.?
sired for all combat aircraft operations, am a practical
viewpoint, however, there must be a compromise between quality
and quantity, It is. considered reasonable that Soviet medium
and large bambera require the rm)dmn lean and rich ratings,
or the USSR grade 100430, The fighters and light bombers may
tolerate a sacrifice on lean ratings but probably not on rich
rating. Such a fuel is represented by the USSR grade 95430.
The attack, transport, and some advanced training aircraft t
could tolerate the sacmrifice, in both lean and rich ratings of
the USSR grade 95/115. The remaining, training aircraft give
adequate operation on.grades below 95 octane.
.SRI 0APABILITIFS
12, A coanparisaai of the aviation gasoline availability and
the aviation gasoline requirements in Table III ibelow reveals
that the supply will be sufficient for the oampaLgns listed in
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TABLE III
~,. Au 37AO00100010072-1
SO=~RE~ITT,~.,TT AA'i~L7r1
'f~t WAR THR,~ U(II JT 19
(thousands of metric tone)
Availab
From
Mont
ility Military
Require-
Mont
195/1
0 40
0
0
00
3
64
100
95/15
95
Total High Octane 2,18
.,..
0 1,850
330
85 to 95 Octane 1,075
_ - 1
,730
Total Avgas 3,93
0 1,870 2
,060
* Avmilable for reserves or civilian use as a cushion against
war damage, or for support of arses outside the present Orbit
TherrLe,.will be an unknown additional amount available from
st.
13. Table III indicates that although theme trill, be a
definite stringency in aviation gasoline suppliers, there will be
no aviation gasoline shortage sufficiently ecritic>ae l to p vevent
25X1 the fo1101dng campaigns listed
a. S ateneousl y
(1) A gn against Western DaVpe, iuoluding
(2) An aerial bombs rd1oment against the British Islas'*
(3) Campaigns against the Now and Middle Esat, In-
ol udf ng G reeoe and Turkega
8,
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(4) Campaigns in the Far But,
(8)
Air attacks against the US mod Oanuk.
Attacks against Alaska and the Aleutians,
Air offensive against Angloi.Aneioan sea
o ni1oat~ one.
Defense of the Soviet Union agsinst hostile
attack,
be As soon as possible after the ooc+upa'~.icn of the
Tchannel port areas, a faill scale air offensive :against the British
Isles.
0. As soon as feasible campaigns against 3a~ndinavia
and the Iberian Peninsula,.
d, As necessary, air attacks against Pakistan,
Vw I ux F THE LIQU D FUELS INDUSTRY TO SiBA= Ar
l1K An analysis by USAF intelligenoe* of the vulnerability
of the USSR to strategic air attack on the liquid fuels indus r
revealed the followings
a, The essentiality of a substantial voiteme of liquid
fuel, the comparatively abort production epipe lino," the limita-
tions on storm, the aomparatively high degree of oonaentration,
* Al Study Noe 21x5, *T, ar-gn& Svateans Submitted Aj r_r, 21nsi4 aUM
tc the 3trate e r Offensive in Sunt - ; of- the O " t3ves_ A
the Joint game- qy ar Pisa Flaenl
90
cQIffJDENT1AL
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the the physical vulnerability of refining faoilitiea, and the long
period of time required for reconstruction, all would make the
Soviet war eoonoW particularly susceptible to strategic air
attack on petroleum refineries,
b. Ninety atom bombs (60 for the initial attack and
30 for re-attacks) delivered within 90 days with a CEP (Circular
Probable Omar) of 3000 feet, may be expected to leave & .liquid
fuels production capacity of not more than,, and probably consider-
ably less than 3.3 million metric, two per year which would be
located in widely scattered small refineries, a large part of
the products of which could not be effectively used by the Soviet
armed farces. None of the surviving refining facilities would
be capable of producing 100 octane avgas,
co The reduction in the available supplies woyuld, for
some time, result in a decreasing rate of use of liquid fuel con-
suming machines rather than any sudden stoppage of their operation.
Planes would fly only the most vital missions and twining activi-
ties would probably be suspended. No immediate effect is to be
expected on operations involving the Soviet TII?, type bomber for
possible use in an atamio bomb attack against the US and allies,
However, use of this bomber would probably be eta'tailed by a lack
of 100 octane fuel in from 6 to 18 months. Operations involving
tanks and motor vehicles would be severely curtailed, The move.
manta of naval vessels and freighters would be selectively
10,
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curtailed, However, because of the time required to ooanplete
the initial attack on petroleum installations (90 days), and the
relatively short time needed to complete sme of the campaigns
envisaged (for emmuple, it is estimated
that the channel ports f5ro n Antwerp to Brest oauld be occupied
between D + 30 and D + 60 days and the Pyrenees reached by D f 65
to D + 75 days), it is unlikely that the initial short campaigns
now forecast for the Soviets would be significantly affected by
any shortage of petroleasa products,
15. It is estimated that U requirements for high octane
aviation gasoline for the first year of a war in 1951-52 would be
roughly nine mLlliosx tows, This is approximately 4 to 5 times as
great as those of the Soviet Air Foroee0 The &Lsparity In Jet
fuel requirements would be even greater, It is obvious that the
two air forces mast be assumed to fight two different kinds of
.wars,"* The main reasons for this disparity in requirements are
as follows s
a. It is assumed that during 1951 Soviet forces could
carry out certain of their asswed campaigns with little resist.
anoel
bo The campaigns visualized for the Soviet forces do
MOM
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not include strategic air operations as extensive as those ca -
teaapiated for US Air Foram. The large scale use of medium and
heavy bombers requires extremely large quantities of high octane
aviation gasoline;
a, The Soviet Air Forces do not carry nearly as much
cargo nor as many personnel by air transport as do the ASAP,
d. The exterior lines of canmamiaation of the Soviet
Air Forams will not be as long as those of tie USAF, t eover,
their bases of operations will be closer to the points of air
activity; and
ea The Soviet Air Forces do not carry, out training poo
grama as extensive as those of the USAF.
Evan though the factors affecting the aviation gasoline posi-
tion of the allies, Germanys and Japan in 11or2d War II are
different from those which would affect the 1YSSR in a war in
1951, the following information relating to aviation gasoline
in world War II is of related interest.
Fn a -IAN O AVD-
99 am JAPA1Th E
J SnUATISH
(thousands of metric tons)
Stocks on Hand
On Outbreak of Consumption Consumption
Hostilities Durixi 19 Dln'in 19 /AA
Allies 12,000 22,000
Japan 500 aann 42)) 1 600 1 30000
$ The allies figures are rounded to the nearest
udllion. The others are rounded to the near.
eat 100,000.
l2,
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