OUTLOOK FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300190001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1955
• Content Type: IM

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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
OUTLOOK FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1955
CIA/RR IM-412
15 July 1955
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.
793 AND 791+, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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FOREWORD
This memorandum is a preliminary analysis of the condition of
growing crops in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is based on information
available as of 15 June 1955. As a qualitative statement, it reflects
the prospects for the food supply of the Bloc for the consumption
year from 1 July 1955 through 30 June 1956. It should be noted that
Sino-Soviet Bloc crops are in the making and that the final outcome
will depend on developments during June and July. Should. weather
conditions fluctuate, the food situation in the Bloc would become
worse or improve correspondingly. After the weather conditions
during June and July are known, a further statement on crop conditions
will be issued -- probably in September -- and will be followed later
by estimates of quantitative production based on acreage as well as
yield.
The memorandum also indicates the general effect that, pressures
exerted by current governmental programs and policies may have on
agriculture developments in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
The USSR and China sections of this memorandum have been coordinated
with the Department of Agriculture.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Weather and Crop Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Outlook for Agricultural Production . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 6
2. "New Lands" Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Corn Program . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 11
4. Livestock Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B. Weather and Crop Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Rumania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C. Outlook for Agricultural Production . . . . . . . . . . . 23
III. Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix
Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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CIA/RR IM-412
(ORR Project 21.744)
OUTLOOK FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC*
1955
Summary
Crop prospects in the Sino-Soviet Bloc indicate that agricultural
production in the Bloc will not rise substantially above the mediocre
1951+ levels. Although the agricultural outlook in the USSR is somewhat
more favorable than it was in June of 1954, the European Satellites
face another year of below-normal food availability, and Communist
China's agricultural production will be no better than it was in 1954,
a year of near starvation in many areas.
In the USSR the failure of the "new course" to raise agricultural
production led Soviet officials to launch two rather hazardous pro-
grams -- the expansion of grain acreages on "new lands" in which both
soil and climate conditions are marginal and the expansion of corn
acreages in the Ukraine and in other areas of the USSR not well suited
to the production of corn.
The first program involves an increase in 1955 of about 16 million
hectares, seeded largely to spring wheat and millet. It is probable
that this new acreage will increase the 1955 gross production of grain
above the prewar average, but on a per capita basis grain availability
will remain below that of the prewar base year 1938-39.
The second program, raises the corn acreage in 1955 to almost 17
million hectares, a nearly fourfold expansion over the 1954 corn
acreage. Production from the additional acreage will increase supplies
of grain and fodder somewhat, but unless weather conditions are unusu-
ally favorable during June, July, and August, the effect of this
increase on the average per capita availability of meat, milk, and
other livestock products during 1955-56 will not be large.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum repre-
sent the best judgment of ORR as of 15 June 1955.
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The European Satellites are facing the prosp4ct of another below-
normal harvest for 1955, with no hope of improving food availabilities
over the poor 195+-55 food consumption year. Ad erse weather conditions
affecting crop growth are primarily responsible or the unfavorable
outlook for agricultural production.
The factors ne,~essary to he:Lp alleviate the
weather -- improved agrotechnics, mechanization,
the peasant's ince:ative to raise agricultural pr
materialized under the new course." The presen
uing to socialize agriculture will continue to d
it has in the past.
In Communist C:aina, drought conditions repor
of the country threaten the harvest of early ric
and winter wheat ccops in the north. Unless the
fall harvests in 1955, the planned 6-percent inc
of food crops over the low levels of 195+ may no
because the Chinese Communists have failed t
of food production during the first 2 years of t
Plan (1953-57), thay have found it necessary to
goals downward. An additional plan failure in 1
result in harsher rural policies. These policie
in order for the regime to fulfill its indus.tria
quirements for agricultural products through inc
from the countryside.
I. USSR.
ffects of adverse
fertilization, and
duction -- have not
policy of contin-
press production as
ed throughout most
crops in the south
e are above-normal
ease in the production
be attained.
meet planned goals
e current Five Year
evise their 1957
55 probably will
would be necessary
and export re-
eased procurements
A. General.
Unless seriously unfavorable drought or other conditions develop
before the harvest is completed, the USSR will garner somewhat more grain
in 1955 than in 1954. The prospects as of 1.5 J e indicate that small-
grain yields will average higher than those of 1,5)+. There are also
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indications of an increase of some 16 million hectares, 17* largely
spring wheat and millet, on new lands. There has been, furthermore,
an increase of at least 12.5 million hectares of corn, 2J chiefly to
produce silage. The corn crop got a late start, and conditions for
early growth in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus areas were not
favorable. It is therefore improbable that the contributions made
by corn as grain will add materially to the advances made by small
grains. Although the quantity of grain produced in the USSR in 1955
may exceed the prewar production of 1938, it is improbable that per
capita availability of grain will reach the prewar level.
There has been a small increase in sugar beet acreage, and
production of sugar in 1955 may exceed the low 1954 level, but the
increase will not be sufficient to affect per capita availability
materially.
Cotton has run into difficulties this year. Cold weather
killed sprouting plants and necessitated considerable replanting
in certain important areas. Danger from insect pests is also
reported. The 1955 cotton production may be expected to be about
the same as that of 195+
Soviet officials are stressing the need for increase of
livestock numbers and productivity. The corn expansion program
is directed toward this end. The program initiated this year, if
successful, cannot be expected to increase to any material degree
the availabilities of meat, milk, and other livestock products
during the 1955-56 consumption year.
B. Weather and Crop Conditions.
On the basis of information available as of 1 June 1955,
Soviet crop prospects'for the current year are judged to be relatively
favorable. As yet there are no indications of droughts such as
plagued the Ukraine and the Volga area in the summer of 195I.. The
new lands area of West Siberia and Kazakhstan had favorable fall
and winter precipitation, but the spring rainfall has been somewhat
less than that of 195-.
* For serially numbered source references, see the Appendix.
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In the fall of 1954, most of the USSR had "relatively favorable
weather for the sowing and growth of fall-sown grains for harvest in
1955. There were, aowever, some areas in the southern Ukraine and
North Caucasus where rainfall was light -- a cont nuation of the 1954
summer drought. Temperatures were above normal ii most areas, the
first frosts coming much later than they did in t~e fall of 1953. The
plan for seeding fall-sown grains was reported to have been overful-
filled by October 1.0. 3/ A slight increase in thI p total acreage of
fall-sown grains WE.S also reported. J a
The precipitation for the winter months was normal or above normal
for almost all areas of the USSR, some of the ma4or grain areas receiv-
ing especially favorable amounts. There have been several recent Soviet
press articles referring to the favorable fall aid winter precipitation
in portions of the new lands area of West Siberi' and Kazakhstan.
The only winter kill report to date has come from an observer in Moscow
who indicates that "severe winter kill of fall-sawn grains was noted
along the route traveled in the western oblasts of the central black-
soil region. Many fields were being partly or entirely replanted to
spring grains."
March precipitation was generally somewhat below normal in the
southern half of the European USSR and in some areas of the region of
grain expansion in West Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. In April the
rainfall in most areas was greater than it :aad teen during the previous
month. Most of the important agricultural areaq I of the European USSR
received near-normal or above-normal precipitation. In the new lands
area of West Sibe:^ia and Kazakhstan, wide variations in precipitation
continued through April, and many stations in Kazakhstan reported below-
normal rainfall. It should be noted, however, ghat even normal precip-
itation in this area'in March and April is scanty. Rainfall and tem-
perature in May, June, and July are far more crcial in determining
crop yield potential. j
Rainfall data for May are incomplete, b~t preliminary estimates
indicate relatively light precipitation in some; regions of the Ukraine,
the North Caucasus, and the new lands area of West Siberia and northern
Kazakhstan. In.e:arly May there were press reports from two regions of
the new lands area urging that. spring sowing be done promptly because
warm steppe winds were rapidly drying the soil YI/
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Field work in the Transcaucasus this spring began almost a
month earlier than in the spring of 1954. / In much of the USSR,
however, spring field work was delayed by cold weather. In the
cotton-growing regions of Central Asia the cold weather necessitated
some replanting of cotton, and in the central and northern regions
of the European USSR there were complaints about delays in sprang
seeding. In May, however, considerable progress in the sowing program
apparently was made. In a speech at the All-Union Conference of
Industrial Workers on 18 May, Khrushchev stated: "Despite the fact
that spring is late this year, spring sowing is progressing consid-
erably better than last year. By May 15 the collective and state
farms had sown 16.3 million more hectares to grain than by the same
date in 1954." 91 Later in the same speech, Khrushchev commented on
the moisture situation: "Climatic conditions in most districts this
year are good, and there is sufficient moisture everywhere. Should
no unforeseen circumstances arise -- however, nature often acts
unexpectedly -- there is every reason to expect a good harvest this
year." 10 In mid-June, Khrushchev reported that the total. sown
area on collective and state farms had increased 21 million. hectares
over 1954. ll
During the first half of May, observers in Moscow made a
trip through part of the Ukraine and reported crop conditions "mostly
good to excellent," soil moisture being marginal or slightly submar-
ginal in the southern Ukraine but not yet causing serious crop damage.
Preliminary indications are that the southern Ukraine received light
to moderate rainfall during the latter part of May. Preliminary
estimates indicate light rainfall in May for the North Caucasus area,
but any shortage probably was offset by above-normal rainfall in the
previous month of April. In the new lands area of Siberia and
Kazakhstan, spring rainfall appears to have been generally below that
of last spring, and there are indications that in May the rainfall
was relatively light in many of the areas of expansion of spring
wheat and millet.
Considering the USSR as a whole,the June and July weather
has assumed greater importance this year than in previous years
because the wheat crop in the new lands area passes through its
critical stages of development at a later date than does that of the
traditional wheat areas of the USSR, and because corn, the 1955
acreage of which has been increased by more than three times the
acreage of 1954, requires substantial rainfall and warm weather if
it is to develop satisfactorily.
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C. Outlook for Agricultural Production.
1. General.
During -;he past 25 years the USSR hasIbeen unable to increase
its agricultural production to keep pace with its expanding population.
The present consump-:,ion level, in terms of averag4 per capita food avail-
ability, is below t;aat of the later years of the krecollectivization
period. J
Within the last year and a half, Sovi
on the successful development of two projects: (
largely spring wheat and millet -- on 28 million
(70 million to 75 million acres) of new crop land
River and through southern Siberia and northern
is highly precarious, and (b) the expansion of t1'e
areas not well suited to growing corn and pa:rtic
the production of corn as grain. Other crops mu
growing in the lat-.er area, both for silage and
supply:
t leaders have gambled
) the seeding of crops --
o 30 million hectares
eastward from. the Volga
zakhstan, where farming
acreage of corn into
larly not suited to
h better adapted for
rain, are ava'lable.
The USSR is faced with four major problems related to food
a. Population is increasing at he rate of about 3
million a year, and it will require ever-increasLng amounts of extra
food to feed the lopulace, even at the present low levels of consump-
tion. I
b, The people in the city and country alike - -
particularly the rapidly growing numbers of ind strial workers --
need more meat, m:,lk, and butter to maintain of iciency.
c. Food supplies withdrawn fro. stocks during both
1-953-54 and 195+-55, when the USSR was forced b poor crop yields to
dip into reserves to meet home needs, must be rplaced.
d. The USSR may require large tonnages of grain for
export to exchange for other types of goods. I. the past, Tsarist
Russia exported as much as 10 million tons of grain a year.
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At first glance the tremendous land area of the USSR would
not suggest that lack of land in itself could be a cause of continuing
agricultural problems. The crucial point, however, is the fact that
climatic features of one sort or another place critical limitations
on the profitable use of a large part of this land mass.
In the US a mountain range intervenes between the best
farming areas and the western deserts. In the USSR there is"no barrier
between the Asiatic desert and the farm lands of northern Kazakhstan,
West Siberia, the Volga drainage basin, the North Caucasus, and the
Ukraine. Grain and other crops may flourish in the spring only to be
withered by hot desiccating winds sweeping across the Caspian Sea,
up the Volga River, or north into the region east of the Ural Mountains.
Later in the season, cold air from the Arctic may flow southward, bring-
ing rain or even snow at harvest time into the northern European USSR,
West Siberia, and northern Kazakhstan. Grain often rots in the field
before it can be harvested.
Despite these and other natural limitations on land
resources, it seems certain that the USSR could provide food for many
more millions of people at present levels of consumption and could
possibly. raise food consumption, both quantitative and qualitative,
to even higher levels. The failure to attain such goals has been,
to a very large extent, the result of the system under which Soviet
agriculture has been forced to operate, with its attendant ineffi-
ciencies and general policy of complete unconcern for the plight of
the peasant.
The morale of the Soviet peasant is low, and under the
collective farm system there is little incentive for farmers to exert
themselves to more than the minimum of effort. It is difficult to
conceive of any very rapid increase in agricultural production until
adequate incentives have been provided.
The primary incentives at present apply only to the
Communist officials who are in control. They live better than their
fellows, they have more privileges, and they enjoy power and prestige
of a type.
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Beginning in the fall of 1953, -,he c;oilective farmers were
granted some so-celled material incentives, inc]4lding somewhat higher
prices for producE' sold, tax adjustments, the reluction of some delivery
quotas, and money advances during the year, andl-- most recently -- a
portion. of the corn crop has been promised as arl inducement for proper
planting and harvesting of the crop. To date, Yowever, there appears
to have been no s:_gnificant change in the peasan'ts' lack of enthusiasm
for the collectiv_zed system. l1
The oration of collective farms theoretically is in the
hands of the collective farmers themselves, but actually there has been
a tremendous amou:it of high-level centralized panning, and the farm
operations have been under the indirect, or even direct, influence of
:Local party and government officials. In March?1955 a decree was
issued calling for more local initiative and le s detailed central
1~
direction. In suosequent months the government3has insisted on a
swift implementation of this decentralized planning program which,
on paper at least, delegates greater responsibility to local officials.
This insistence on a rapid shift toward decentralized planning has
:Led to farther confusion during a season which ven normally Ls busy
and rather confused.
In Alril 1955 a decree was issued w.ich, in effect, called
for the replacement of one-third of the present collective farm chair-
men with workers from the Party, local gove:rnme t offices, an3 economic
enterprises. The large-scale turnover of farm chairmen probably is
aimed at removing not only incompetents but als those chairmen not
completely loyal to the present agricultural pr gram. The new chair-
men will take over their new duties after a tra'ning period of only
2 to 6 months. 1,ecause many of the replacements will have primarily
urban background,, it is likely that there willjbe further organiza-
tional confusion, creating another major hindrance to increasing
current agricultural output.
It is true that agriculture in the USSR has been mechanized,
but although mechanization has released manpower for the development of
industry, it has not as yet given to agriculture the definite: benefits
that have been achieved in the US.
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2. "New Lands" Program.
One of the means by which Soviet authorities hope to increase
agricultural output is by extending production to virgin and abandoned
lands.* Nothing so gigantic in the field of agricultural expansion has
been attempted before by the USSR or, probably, by any other nation.
This "new lands" program envisages expanding by 1956 the total Soviet
sown area by about 20 percent, an area larger than the total sown area
of Canada.
This new area will be seeded to "grain and other crops."
As much as 90 percent may be in spring wheat, and most of the remainder
will probably be seeded to millet. It does not follow, however, that
increasing breadgrain production is the only aim of the program.
Although some increase in the breadgrain area will result, the expansion
.of the wheat acreage on the new lands may permit a decrease of the
acreage in breadgrains on the old lands and permit the expansion of
acreage and output of feed grain, vegetable crops, roughages for live-
stock, industrial crops, and the like. In principle, these shifts
are rational. If the Soviet government could rely for a large part
of its breadgrain procurements on the sparsely populated areas of
Siberia and Kazakhstan, it could ease its pressure on collective
farms in old areas to deliver grain. The government must be aware
that its procurements took too large a share of grain production,
that consequently not enough was left on the farms to feed animals
or peasants, and that sometimes the pressure on supplies was such that
not enough remained for seeding.
Khrushchev has stated that more grain is needed for better
feeding of the people and animals as well as for reserves and export.
There can be little difficulty in demonstrating the need for greater
production. The Soviet leaders are placing great reliance on the "new
lands" program to satisfy this need.
* It should be noted that the good lands -- that is, those lands that
have been found profitable to cultivate -- are already under cultivation.
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In this program there is something ,rhich is new in degree,
if not in kind, in agricultural policy in the U SR. It must be borne
in mind that in the USSR most of the major prop uncements previously
made about agricultural policy changes have led/to little or no sub-
stantive change. This "new lands" program, however, is being imple-
mented at a fair:.y rapid rate with the necessary inputs -- labor,
machinery, petro=.eum, and transportation.
Two :finds of statements are freque tly made that imply
that the "new la:.ads" program is likely to fail First, it is argued
that two decades ago much of this land was plo Jed and seeded without
success. Second, it is stated that the climat fluctuates so greatly
around a relatively low level of moisture availability that crop
failure will occur at least 2 years out of 5.
In the last two decades there have, been substantial improve-
ments in power machinery and equipment that e it possible to farm
areas that coulc. not have been farmed earlier. The success of the
"new lands" program, as far as mechanization s concerned, depends on
the degree of e:'fectiveness with which hastil trained mechanics can
operate machine,, that are unfamiliar and are ifficult to keep in
adjustment.
The success or failure of the "neii lands" program may
also depend more on the average long-term yie ds that the USSR will
consider acceptable than on fairly frequent c op failures. This
new lands area is a relatively small par-:, of he total cultivated
area of the USER. If the USSR follows Joseph's Egyptian policy and
erects facilities for storing grain during t "fat" years, it may
be possible to maintain workers in the area despite two or more
consecutive years of crop failure -- providedd the average long-term
yield is high enough.
If this program is maintained,
contribution t3 the wheat and millet supply
high cost. Soviet officials may decide, nev
production even though the program is highly
found that the combined resources cost of a
per hectare (about 6 bushels per acre) in th
high as or even higher than that of an 8-cen
is bound to raake some
f the USSR -- but at a
rtheless, thus to augment
uneconomical. It may be
et yield of 4 centners
new areas may be as
ner yield in the old areas.
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Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that the "new lands" program will
break even with average yields no higher than l..8 centners per hectare.
For official planning purposes, however, yields of 10 centners per
hectare have been used.
In view of the inputs being placed on the new lands and
the top-level backing the whole program is receiving, it is difficult
to believe that the project will be quickly abandoned or even seriously
curtailed in the event of a serious crop failure.
Preliminary studies indicate, however, that natural limi-
tations, particularly climate, may interfere with the long-term success
of the "new lands" program.
3. Corn Program.
The Soviet plan calls for an increase in corn acreage from
3.5 million hectares in 1953 to 28 million hectares by 1960. The
increase amounts to 60 million acres, about two-thirds of the total
corn acreage of the US. For the most part, the proposed acreage lies
in an area having growing conditions similar to those in the northern
half of Wisconsin and Minnesota and in northern South Dakota. Hence
any expansion will have to occur in an area where the climate and soils
are relatively unfavorable for corn. Furthermore, only a small part
of the acreage can be relied upon to produce grain.
Khrushchev proposes to plant almost one-third of the total
planned corn acreage on land formerly sown to other grain crops, mostly
oats and barley. The remainder of the corn is to be planted on land
formerly sown to other fodder crops, root crops, and grasses; on
pastures and abandoned land; and also, presumably, on summer fallow
land. There is a strong probability that the replacement of other
grains by corn will have an adverse effect on total grain production.
Compared with other grains, corn requires more knowledge
and care on the part of the producer and involves a much greater
expenditure of labor, machinery, and fertilizers. In most countries
it has been found that the risks are less and the rewards greater in
producing other grains on what in the case of the Soviet corn pro-
gram must be considered to be more or less marginal lands.
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In order to evaluate the corn program, studies on farm
management covering parts or all of the states of Wisconsin, Minnesota,
and the Dakotas must be made. In this area the production of corn for
silage as well as for grain is important. In the USSR, much of the
proposed corn acreage will be harvested for silage
In the US as a whole, in recent years, the labor require-
ments per acre of corn have been more than three t mes the labor
required per acre of wheat. In Wisconsin, Mirneso a, and the Dakotas
the production of corn for grain required 13 man-hours of labor and
8 tractor--hours per acre. Equally if not more important is the fact
that corn growers used 14+ short tons of manure and"138 pounds of commer-
cial fertilizer per acre. Some areas also require varying amounts of
lime.
The production of corn for silage requ red almost 15 man-
hours of labor and 1J tractor-hours per acre. Each acre also received
an average of 15-1/4 short tons of manure and 169 pounds of commercial
fertilizer.
Assuming that soils and climate are similar, the Soviet
corn program, if it is to operate on a basis compazable with US per-
formance, would require 780 million to 900 millionllman-hours, draft
power equivalent to +80 million to 600 million tractor-hours., 760 mil-
lion to 830 million metric tons of manure, and 4 million to 5 million
metric tons of commercial fertilizer -- to say nothing of other farm
equipment, cribs for storing corn, and silos for caring silage.* The
availability of seed corn of any sort is also a real problem, and the
development and production of sufficient hybrid seed for such an acreage
are tasks that would require many years.
Soviet plans call for 275 centners of 4ilage per hectare.
This is ll metric tcns per acre, compared with the US national average of
about 10 metric tons and that in the US north cent al states of from 5 to 6
* It should also be borne in mind that in the USS
as much manpower is ?equired to perform a similar
the US. This would be especially true in the case
the lack of know-how on the part of Soviet farmers
corn culture.
two or three times
'arm operation as in
of corn because of
unfamiliar with
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metric tons per acre. It must be remembered that the latter yields were
obtained only through the generous application of manure and ferti-
lizer, two items which are unlikely to be available to the Soviet
farmer in any appreciable quantities.
It is likely that without major inputs of lime, manure,
and fertilizer, average Soviet yields of silage corn may be no more
than the announced 1954 state-farm average of only 80 centners per
hectare (c/ha) instead of the present planned 275 c/ha. At 80
c/ha the fodder units per hectare, according to Khrushchev's figures,
will be no more than that obtainable from an oat yield of 11.6 c/ha,
even considering the full value of both the oat grain and the straw.
Furthermore, the labor, machinery, and material input for the corn
would be significantly greater.
It is extremely doubtful that within the 1955-60 period
the corn expansion program will produce a significant increment per
hectare above that already being produced-on the same land. In
fact, it is not improbable that the whole program will fall. into
disrepute along with the previously abandoned projects such. as the
grass rotation program in dry areas.
4. Livestock Program.
The ultimate goal of the corn program is, of course, to
increase livestock production and thereby to increase the supply of
meat and milk. Without an increase in the supply of feedstuffs, the
livestock program cannot be fulfilled. Assuming, however, that a
major part of the feed program is carried out, some increase in meat
and milk can be achieved, but it is difficult to see how the live-
stock and meat goals set by the government can be attained.
The plan for pork production, for example, calls for 30
centners per 100 hectares of arable land, about 27 pounds per acre.
Pork production in the US in 1952 totaled 11.5 billion pounds, with
an arable land or crop acreage of about 409 million acres. This
is equivalent to an average of about 28 pounds of pork per acre,
and in doing this the US utilized about 90 million acres of the
best corn-growing land in the world.
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I7:. European Satellites.
A. General.
The European Satellites, as indicated b information available
as of :15 June 1955, are once more facing the p ospects of a below-normal
harvest. This IE. largely a result of spring weather conditions unfavor-
able for the seec.ing and development of crops.1 Rumania and Bulgaria
are the only European Satellites for which the 1955 outlook indicates
a slightly better grain harvest than in 1954 - primarily the result of
an expansion of breadgrain acreage.
An early spring would have enabled an
area in the European Satellites, and an increa
have made up for unfulfilled fall sowing plans
barley, but there was a 3- to 4-week delay in
This delay resulted in nonfulfillment of sprin
weather has prevailed through 1 June, retardin
of spring crops and delaying harvests. Despit
ncrease in the cultivated
e in spring sowing would
for wheat, rye, and
tarting field operations.
planting plans. Cool
growth and development
efforts to increase
mechanization and farm labor, there has been o limited success.
It is likely, therefore, that the shorter har esting period and the
lack of machineE. and men to achieve a timely Y arvest will result in
above-normal harvesting losses and will reducq total production.
The capability of the European Satellites to effect a signifi-
cant increase in agricultural production during the next 5 years
(through 1960) Is very unlikely under present ){policies. Although
there has been, and probably will continue to be, a substantial
increase in investments devoted to agriculture as a means of increas-
ing crop yields and animal productivity, the 11-important role of
the peasant will determine the effectiveness f these investments.
Despite an initial liberal approach to collet ivization with the
announcement of the "new course," recent spee hes indicate that a
shift to pre-"rew course" collectivization policy is occurring, with
officials stating that complete socializatio is the final objective.
As long as this, remains the policy, the 'peas t will not have the
incentive to increase production -- as has been so well proved in
the USSR. Low productivity in agriculture, One of the most important
sectors of the economy, will. continue to plaque the European. Satellite
governments for many years to come.
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B. Weather and Crop Conditions.
1. Albania.
Agricultural production in Albania in 1955 probably will
be somewhat lower than in 1954, which was a relatively good year.
According to reports by the Ministry of Agriculture, the
plans for sowing grain in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955 had
been fulfilled 102 percent. 12 The greater portion of the fall-sown
crops is wheat, and it is estimated that the area sown to wheat in
1955 was approximately 10,000 hectares greater than that of 1954.
There are indications, however, that this increase was made at the
expense of the spring-sown crops -- corn and spelt. 13
Reports indicate that in the spring sowing program there
have been failures which can be attributed partially to above-normal
dry weather in the spring and lack of organization on the part of
the Machine Tractor Stations. 14
Government plans for 1955 call for a 25-percent increase
in wheat production over that of 1954, a 45-percent increase in corn, -
a 61-percent increase in cotton, a 102-percent increase in sugar, and
a 12-percent increase in tobacco. 15 Because there is only a 10-per-
cent increase over 1954 envisioned for the total sown acreage, L6/ it is
to be assumed that increases in production are to be achieved by
increased yields.
Under favorable weather conditions, a slight increase in
wheat production may be attained in 1955, but corn and industrial
crops probably will remain static or -- if dry weather continues to
persist -- may be less than in 1954.
Plans for 1955 and the projected output for 1960 indicate
a continuing emphasis on agricultural production. The recently an-
nounced investment program for 1955 implied a 35-percent increase
over 1954. A large portion of this increase undoubtedly will go into
land reclamation and irrigation. The long-term outlook for Albania,
barring peasant resistance, indicates an increase in the contribution
of agriculture to the total national income. The strongest factor
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favoring a dynamic growth is the reserve of land still available for
exploitation. Continued investments for reclaining this land and
the introduction of new techniques, education, and acquired skills
of mechanized farming could improve the si-:uatibn.
2. Bulgaria.
TherE! are indications that 1955 ov
production in Bulgaria will be somewhat greater
Seeding of grain crops in the fall of 1954 for
r-all agricultural
than that of 1954.
harvest in 1955
onth later than
nd the early spring
apparently was completed in November, about 1 r9
planned, 17 but the winter was mild and wet,
condition of fal:_-sown crops was good.
Because of an early spring, 1955 fi
relative to the ;;ame period in 1954. In spite
criticized failures to meet time schedules for
and medium-ripen:ng grains. Above-normal :prec'
delayed planned .;chedules and encouraged weed
to the development of pastures. Cool weather '
below-normal rainfall during April and May pos
growth in the no:'th, but by June the harvestin
was in progress In the southern part of Bulgar'
Gove:?nment planning for 1955 indic
production appro;cimately 21.7 percent greater
A larger share of the increase is to result fr
stock program. :3ome increase in yields of the
but otherwise there has been no indication of
crop patterns -- except an expansion of perenn_
which is in line with the current emphasis on
industry. 20
._J I
Planted investments in agriculture
to be 50 percent greater than during 1954, wit
share going into the lagging livestock industr
grams.
Long-term planning in Bulgaria. thr
greatest effort being directed toward increasi
and related prodacts. Because of the existing
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eld work was advanced,
of this, the press has
the sowing of early-
pitation during March
rowth but was favorable
n early spring and
ibly retarded rapid
of early grain crops
a. 18
tes an expected gross
han that of 1954. L
m an expanded live-
major crops is planned,
change from the past
al fodder grasses,
xpanding the =_ivestock
during 1955 are expected
a proportionately larger
and afforestation pro-
ugh 1957 shows the
g livestock numbers
low ratio of ?asture
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availabilities to planned numbers of livestock, modified goals have been
projected. The dynamic planned growth of livestock numbers is further
hampered by the relatively rigid and inflexible pattern of food and
forage crops. With such limitations, it is not expected that any acreages
taken out of food crops will be able to supply the additional feed required
for carrying larger numbers of livestock.
Preliminary production estimates tend to favor a slight
increase over 1954 grain and potato production and possibly heavier
slaughter weights for livestock.. The situation of industrial crops
indicates a static level of production. Although the over-all agri-
cultural production in Bulgaria in 1955 probably will be greater than
in 1954, the planned increase of 21.7 percent is unrealistic.
3. Czechoslovakia.
The present outlook for agriculture in Czechoslovakia for
1955 indicates that the over-all production may not be any better than
the below-average production in 1954. Despite significant increases
in agricultural investments during 1954 and those planned for 1955,
weather and peasant apathy are once again working counter to the
desires of the government.
The failure of the fall agricultural campaign was well
summed up by Prime Minister Siroky when he stated on 11 February 1955
that despite favorable weather conditions the farm work in the autumn
of 1954 was not completed. Sowing of grain in the fall of 1954 for
harvest in 1955 was greatly delayed, and the plan for increasing the
acreage of arable land was not fulfilled. 21 The failure to fulfill
tall work plans is further confirmed by the fact that, according; to
the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, only 67.3 percent; of fall
sowing operations was completed by 25 November 1954, the established
deadline. 22 In addition, fall plowing by the Machine Tractor
Stations was fulfilled by only 71.4 percent by 5 December 1.954. 23
Adverse weather during December prevented further field operations,
and both sowing and fall plowing plans were drastically underful-
filled.
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An early spring would have enabled farmers to increase
spring grain acreage, but there was a late spring, and the start of
spring field operations was delayed by nearly 30 days. 24 As a
result, an abnormally larger amount of work hai to be performed in
a shorter period of time. It is estimated that because of this
situation the sewing plans for grain, potatoes and sugar beets were
not fulfilled.
The entire spring has been characthrized by below-normal
temperatures and inadequate sunshine, and the .evelopment of spring-
planted crops has been retarded. Field observers reported near-freezing
temperatures in the northern half of Czechoslovakia and heavy frost as
far south as Roznava as late as 18 May. 25J
The late spring means that the harvest of field crops will
have to be performed in a shorter than normal period of time, as was
the situation ir. 1954. In view of inadequate arm mechanization and
labor shortages, high harvesting losses may re. Is ult.
Unless exceptionally good weather prevails, the prospect
for any increase in agricultural output, especially of field crops,
over the low 1954 level is unlikely. Planned increases 26 in yields
per hectare of 20 percent for grain and more tian 30 percent for oil
crops will definitely not be attained.
In 1955-56, Czechoslovakia, a foo -deficit country
attempting to increase its level of self -suffipiency as part of the
"new course," will once again be dependen'; on imports for a signifi-
cant share of the food requirements of the urban population. Because
of the low agricultural production in 1954, coLipled with insufficient
food imports during 1954-55, Czechoslovakia is closing the consumption
year ending 30 .:une 1955 with a shortage of food supplies.
4. East. Germany.
Pre;uent indications are that the ]955 over-all agricultural
production in East Germany may be lower than ghat of the poor 1954
crop year. Any drop below the 1954 level would make even more critical
the present low availability of food.
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Although rather favorable weather prevailed in East Germany
during the fall of 1954 for the seeding of grains to be harvested in
1955 (winter grains), it is probable that plans were not fulfilled 100
percent for wheat, barley, or oilseeds. The Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry announced that as of 6 December the sowing of winter wheat
was 93.3 percent completed. 27 No mention of barley was made, which
could be interpreted as indicating an unsatisfactory situation. It is
likely that above-normal precipitation prevented the seeding of grain
any later than 1Q December. Seeding of winter rye was claimed. to have
been fulfilled by 96.5 percent 28 as of 3 November, and, therefore,
the plan probably was fulfilled. The 1955 plan, however, calls for
about 150,000 hectares less area devoted to rye than was sown in
1954. 29.
j~d
The mild winter and above-normal precipitation gave winter
grains a good start. Contrary to the situation in 1953-54, when high
losses occurred as a result of winter kill, there was no evidence of
winter kill this year. In March 1955 it was estimated that winter
grain and forage crops looked better than they did a year ago. 30
Above-normal precipitation and below-normal temperatures
during February, March, and April delayed spring field operations by
some 3 to 4 weeks. 31 This meant that an above-normal amount of field
work had to be done in a short period -- at a time when the government
was demanding a 15-percent increase in field crops. 32 It is doubtful
that spring planting plans were fulfilled. One source claimed that
only a few Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives fulfilled their spring
plans. 33
Another problem in spring planting in East Germany was
the shortage of seed. It is not known how serious the situation was,
but the agricultural press admitted that difficulties may arise in
the planting of oats, barley, and potatoes. 34
The weather during May and the first 10 days of June has
been cold. This has delayed both planting and development of spring
crops (particularly vegetables) throughout East Germany. As a result
the entire harvest season will be later than usual, causing an overlap
in harvesting of different crops. With the inadequate mechanization
and labor shortage in agriculture, this could mean high harvesting
losses.
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{
Unless there is warm weather and more sunshine, yields of
crops maybe less than in 1954. It is believed, however, that total
production of grains will be more than in 195!+ because of less loss of
acreage from winter kill in 1955 and good soil moisture reserves. Pro-
duction forecasts for potatoes, sugar beets, oil drops, and,the like
are premature at th::s date, but, assuming normal eather from 10 June
to the harvest of these crops, production could bq expected to approx-
imate 1954 levels. With more normal temperatures land sunshine, yields
of forage crops should be above average.
5. Hungary.
I
The ove:-all agricultural production in Hungary in :955
probably will be unsatisfactory even though it will be somewhat larger
than in 1.954, a drought year. The outlook for 1955 is that the govern-
merit's planned increase in production of 7.3 pert nt over 1954 probably
will not be realized. 35
Following in the wake of the serious 4ecline in grain produc-
tion in 1.954, the government announced its plan fcr sowing almost 2 million
hectares in the fal:L of 1954 for harvest in 1955, an expansion of 300,000
hectares over the previous year. 36 Reports as of March 1955 indicate
serious shortcomings in the fulfillment of this plan, especially in the
private farming secccor. 37 These shortcomings are primarily the result
of poor operation of the Machine Tractor Stations even though their
equipment had been Lncreased during the year.
On the whole, the crops sown in the fill of 1954 weathered the
winter without serious damage. There were some r ports of severe freezing,
but apparently the -proportion of winter kill was -of greater than normal.
A late and wet spring has caused additional delays in field
work, and the sowin:; of spring fodder crops was reportedly unsatisfactory.
In addition, a shortage of spring wheat seed prev nted the peasants from
filling gaps left b;y underfulfillment of fall sowng plans. 38
Field work was hampered by cold weath
rain in April, and the development of both fall-
has been retarded by the continuing cold weather
Hungary. The below-normal precipitation in May h
meat of corn, parti2ularly.
in March and excessive
d spring-sown grains
ersisting throughout
s delayed the develop-
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After the devastating experience in the agricultural sector
in 1954, the Hungarian government has allocated to agriculture 26.2
percent of all budgetary investments in 1955. 39 This artificial
stimulant comes too late, however, to offset the depressing effects
of the extremes of weather and the underfulfillment of plans because
of organizational difficulties. As of early June, the outlook for
the 1955-56 food supply, although slightly better than that of 1954-55,
is unsatisfactory, and it may become worse.
6. Poland.
Indications are that 1955 over-all agricultural production
in Poland will about approximate that of 1954 and that the 6.2-percent
increase planned for 1955 40 probably will not be achieved.
This generally unfavorable outlook in Poland is, in part,
the result of failure to fulfill the plowing and sowing plans in the
fall of 1954 for seeding and harvest in 1955. 41 Failure to fulfill
these fall plans, in turn, has increased the workload in the spring,
thus reducing the probability of fulfillment of ambitious spring
sowing plans. Over 60 percent (9 million hectares) of Poland's arable
land was to be sown in the spring of 1955, and, in addition, 160,000
hectares of fallow land were to be put into cultivation. 42/ In view
of the chronic inefficiencies of the Machine Tractor Stations --
especially low tractor productivity, which was largely responsible
for the nonfulfillment of plans in the fall of 1954 -- it seems
unlikely that spring sowing operations were fulfilled. Furthermore,
bad weather in March and April delayed sowing operations as much
as 3 weeks, L3/ and lagging sowing plans were severely criticized
in the Polish press as recently as early May. 44
Although favorable weather conditions prevailed. throughout
most of May, plant growth was set back in late May and early June by a
cold spell which in some regions resulted in killing frosts. In many
areas, grains seeded in the fall of 1954 for harvest in 1955 (winter
grains) were underdeveloped, and planting of potatoes was still in
progress in early June. 45 This increased the necessity for favor-
able weather conditions throughout June and July to insure a fair
crop.
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The chief tasks of the Polish agricul,
include increasing agricultural production by exp;
and increasing the ;yields per acre. Considerable
socialist enterprises -- collective and state fare
plated, although government hopes of
by 3,000 units annually in 195 55 are
precisely these socialist enterprises, however, w
laggards in fulfillLng government plans.
aural program in 1955
nding the sown area
expansion of the
s -- is also c:ontem-
e socialist sector
t plan. 46 It is
kith are the greatest
The 1955 agricultural program is to b financed by an alloca-
tion of 12.1 billion zlotys from the Polish budge , an increase of 21.8
percent over the alLocation in 1954. 47 As mentioned above, 160,000
hectares of fallow Land were to be put into cultivation during 1955 as
part of the government's long-range plans to increase the arable land.
Inputs of fertilizers during spring sowing alone were to increase by
130,000 metric tons over 1954. 48 It is unknown whether or not these inputs
were realized, but general availability of fertilizers should be greater
than in :L954 because of expansion of fertilizer p oduction in the newly
opened Kedzierzyn giant and the expansion of the herzow and Tarnow
plants. 49/
Increaees in livestock numbers have -been noted. Because of
the emphasis on livestock production as well as increased per capita
human grain consumption, 50 however, Poland has ecome a grain-deficit
country and has hat. to resort to imports to supplement domestic produc-
tion. In the past 12 months, Poland imported almost 1 million tons of
grain from non-Bloc; countries. 51 In view of p esent conditions, it
seems likely that grain production in 1955 will e no greater than the
11, million tons produced in 1954- 52 In that case, Poland will have
to continue to import grains to support the present livestock develop-
ment program and to maintain the present human consumption pattern.
7. Rumanil. I
The over-all agricultural production in Rumania in 1955
probably will be somewhat greater than that of 1954. In the fall of
1954 some 3.4 million hectares (chiefly wheat and rye) were seeded for
the harvest of 1955. This was approximately 300,000 hectares more than
was seeded in 1953 for harvest in 1954. 53
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Because of more favorable weather, a larger amount of field
work was performed during the fall of 1954 than during the fall of 1953.
The winter was relatively mild, with conditions about normal, and fall-
sown crops wintered well. Ground moisture was considerably increased
by above-normal precipitation during the fall and winter months.
Spring field work and sowing were delayed, however, because
of cold weather and continuous rains during March and the beginning of
April. 54 Because of reported better organization of Machine Tractor
Stations and the increase of other farming equipment, a greater part of
the spring work was completed before the end of April. 55 The rapid
development of weeds necessitated extra work in corn fields, but up to
June the development of small grains was satisfactory. Favorable weather
in May helped the rapid development of wheat, rye, and barley, 56 and
abundant ground moisture has given a good start to the corn crop.
. The announced government program to increase agricultural
production in 1955 made specific reference to grain production as the
most important factor in agricultural development. The 1955 plan calls
for a grain production of 10 million metric tons, of which 60 percent
is reflected in the expanded corn program. The 1954 grain crop was
estimated at 6 million metric tons. 57
The acreage of grain has been slightly expanded, and weather
conditions up to June have been favorable. The prospects for the 1955
grain harvest indicate a somewhat better crop than in 1954, but the
planned figure of 10 million metric tons of grain in 1955 is unrealistic.
C. Outlook for Agricultural Production.
One important problem that the European Satellites have in
common is their low agricultural production. This problem was brought
to the attention of the world with the announcement of the "new course"
policy measures in the summer and fall of 1953. These announcements
stressed the fact that agricultural production had not attained prewar
levels and in some areas was in a state of decline. Two major reasons
were given -- directly, the inadequate agricultural investments, and,
indirectly, the collectivization program.
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Investments were immediately increasd for agriculture,
and increases have continued into 1955. The investments have primarily
been channeled into machinery, fertilizer, buildings, and livestock.
As in the past, the socialized sector was favored.
The collectivization program, which temporarily cane to a
halt in some countries and was slowed down in o4ers, was revitalized
in the last half of 1954. Propaganda and possib.y economic pressures
are once again being applied in the countryside in order to increase
the membership of the collectives. Each of the European Satellite
governments has announced that eventual socialization of agriculture
is the answer to increasing both agricultural production and procure-
ment of farm produce. I
One incentive which the European Satllite governments
thought might raise agricultural production and Zielp them procure a
larger share of the production was an increase o~ the peasants' supply
of manufactured consumer goods. In 1954, produc ion in light Industry
was emphasized, and there was an increase in thesupply of consumer
goods to the rural areas. The increase, howeverl was not enough to
effect an increase in either production or procu'ement of agricultural
products in 1954. As of 15 June, no appreciable increase over 1954 is
foreseen in the 1955 availability of manufacture consumer goods for
the countryside. Phis will mean a continued shortage of incentive
consumer goods that might at least cause the pea ant to market a greater
share of his production. T
On the basis of these facts, it is estimated that no signifi-
cant increases in agricultural output (especiall livestock) will take
place in the European Satellites during the next 5 years -- to the extent
that prewar levels will be attained -- other than what may result from
excellent weather Ln any one year.
The Co>unists have failed to consid
the human element Ln agricultural production. A
knows that he will eventually have to give up hi
collective, there Is no incentive for him to mak
ments in his farm necessary to raise crop yields
A similar situation prevails in the socialist se
r the importance of
long as the peasant
land and join a
the increased invest-
and animal productivity.
tor, where the collective
and state farm members do not have the personal nterest in the tending
and caring for field crops and livestock, and th result is lower
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production than on privately held land. This has been proved by Soviet
experience. Therefore, should there be a drive toward complete collec-
tivization of the European Satellite farmers, or at least a reversion to
the pre-"new. course" collectivization policy, agricultural production
could well decline. In any event, it is estimated that the European
Satellites, in total, will not be ab1_e.to increase agricultural output
at a'rate higher than that of the increase in population and that they
will not attain prewar levels of production by 1960. Under present
Communist policies the problem of trying to establish an agricultural
production base adequate to meet requirements will be with the European
Satellites long after 1960.
Communi t;China.
Communist China is faced with new agricultural setbacks which threaten
the industrial development and military modernization programs. To counter
these threats and to maintain exports of foodstuffs, the Communist regime
has been tightening controls over food consumption in both rural and urban
areas.- Some open unrest resulting from these measures has been reported.
The production outlook for the early crops being harvested, in June
in most of Communist China is poor, but the harvest will relieve somewhat
the general food shortage and the starvation prevalent in certain locali-
ties.
The crops sown last fall, which are about to be harvested, normally
constitute about 30 percent of Communist China's annual food output. These
crops have been hit by a series of disasters -- planting problems caused
by undrained land, 58 other aftereffects of last summer's disastrous
floods, 59 a severe winter, 60 and the spring drought which has affected
all of China except Manchuria and the Yangtze Valley. 61
The Chinese Communist press has already conceded that in the North
China plains, a major wheat-producing area, there have been losses to
the. wheat crop as a result of the drought. / The drought in the South
China province of Kwangtung is said by Communist sources to have been
the most severe in more than 90 years. 63 The food situation there
is expected to remain critical until after the late summer rice
harvests. 61+ Meanwhile, thousands of refugees and destitute farmers
are reportedly fleeing to Macao and Hong Kong. 65
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As ;yet there as been no announcement o' mitigation of agricultural
taxes in kind or cf quotas for peasants' forced sales, both of which are
set on the basis cif norms. To combat the condition of general. scarcity,
the Chinese Communist government, which con-crolsl the distribution of most
of the country's food, has intensified the austerity campaign by reducing
allocations to both rural and urban markets lath this spring. / In
recent months, rationing in cities, first adopted on a wide scale last
year, has been extended to more items in more areas. 67 Recently
adopted urban austerity measures appear designed to reduce the food
rations of popula';ion groups less favored by the regime. 68
Another gover:unent action taken this spring to cope with agricultural
problems has been the strengthening of the Part Cadres, the real rulers
of rural China. 6'Tj This effort to increase Patty control over th~vests
peasants probably indicates that immediately after the 1955 fall there will be stricter procurement policies anda renewed drive for the
development of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatves, an elementary form
of collective.
To cope with food riots in the starvation fleas and with other
manifestations of hostility, the Chinese Communist regime apparently
has strengthened security forces in the country0ide. Communist control
of any appreciable area, however, apparently ha not been seriously
endangered.
Because of the disastrous 1954 floods in the Yangtze Valley, China's
"rice-bowl" area, this year's planned exports of rice to Ceylon -- about
300,000 metric tons -- have been coming from Caton, 70 despite the
critical food situation in South China. Rice exports from South China
to Macao were increased in late 1954, and ~axpoAs to Hong Kong were re-
sumed in early 1955 after an interval of sever4 years. 71 Moreover,
the Chinese Commimists continue to ship rice to the USSR. The Communist
regime has contracted to buy from Burma this y ar 300,000 metric tons of
rice, which will offset part of the Chinese Co' ist rice exports.
The Chinese Communists have often publicly! expressed the:Lr determina-
tion to export foodstuffs to pay for industria'- imports. 72 72/ They are
expected to try -"o maintain net exports at the level of previous years.
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The Communist regime has announced a 1955 food target calling for an
increase of 6 percent over last year's production. 73 This goal may
not be reached unless the fall harvests are larger than normal. As has
happened in all other years since the Communists came to power in 191+9,
food production on a grain equivalent basis again may fail. to reach the
average output of the prewar years from 1931 to 1937.
These failures, reminiscent of the difficulties experienced in the
USSR during the early years of Soviet economic development, appear to
have been a principal factor behind the acceleration of socialization
and state controls and the adoption of increasingly harsh austerity
policies in Communist China during the past 2 years. The peasant hostil-
ity aroused by the regime's actions is regarded by some observers 71+ as
constituting a major potential source of instability -- unless, of course,
the regime chooses to moderate its policies at the expense of the current
rate of industrial and military development.
There are no indications, however, that the regime is inclined toward
such a major shift in its planning. Recent official statements indicate
that the Communist regime now recognizes that the rise in food output dur-
ing the first two Five Year Plans (1953-62) will be limited because of
the low priority assigned to allocation of investment resources to the
agricultural sector of the economy. The Communist regime has clearly
abandoned hopes expressed early in the First Five Year Plan for an in-
crease of as much as 70 percent in food output by 1962.
Actually, during the first two Five Year Plans the rise in food
output probably will not exceed 9 or 10 percent and may be much less. 75
Estimated population growth during this period will almost certainly
keep pace with the rise in food production. After that it will be
impossible to maintain an equilibrium without substantial inputs of
fertilizer.
The two principal means of achieving agricultural increases in.
China -- the application of chemical fertilizer and the opening up of
new land with mechanized equipment -- will not be attempted o:n a large
scale until the Third Five Year Plan (1963-67), according to a March
1955 76 report by the Minister of Agriculture to the State Council.
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It is estimated that the supply of chemical! fertilizer in Communist
China will rise from about 500,000 metric tons ;n 1953 to only 1 million
metric tons in 1;60. At least 10 million to 15 million metric tons are
needed to achieve significant crop increases. TO
A modest plan to expand acreage during the 'next 5 to 7 years was
recently announced. The plan envisages the ad ition of only 6 percent
to Communist China's present cultivated acreag . 78
Meanwhile, Communist China plans to ccncen*rate on expansion of ir-
rigation and water conservation works as its min effort to expand
food output, and modest increases can be expected from this program. 79
In view of these unfavorable long-range prospects the rising needs
of the regime fc,r foodstuffs are to be met by ~n accelerated drive to
increase in several ways the regime's control over agricultural output.
These unfavorable agricultural prospects, the drive toward socialized
farming, and other harsh rural policies of th regime have led some
observers to conclude that during the first t o Five Year Plans there
is in Communist China a reasonable possibilit of a peasant reaction
similar to that of an important portion of the peasants in the USSR
during its First Five Year Plan. 80 Neither this possibility nor
that of a more open peasant revolt appears tolworry the Communist
regime, which has already developed effective security controls in
the countryside.
'Unless such a serious reaction occurred,Jagricultural failures
probably would have no great effect on Chinee Communist military
plans. The wo:,st food situation in the regi e's history occurred in
early 1950. Liter in the year the Chinese Communists intervened in
Korea. The fo3d situation remained poor butlwas slowly recovering in
1951, and early 1952 when the Chinese Conmuni is committed and supplied
some 700,000 Chinese Communist troops in the Korean War. 8W
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SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Doc. - Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. Army, Moscow. DA IN 147602, 18 Jun 55, WEEKA 25 AGR, C. Eval. RR 2.
2. Ibid.
3. Selskoye khozyaystvo, 14 Oct 54, U. Eval. RR 2.
Sovkhoznaya gazeta, 17 Oct 54, U. Eval. RR 2.
4. Pravda, 21 Jan 55, U. Eval. RR 2.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP791100935A000300190001-1
,Selskoye khozyaystvo, 10 and 11 May 55, U. val. RR 2.
Army, Moscow. DA IN 141660, 21 May 55, WEEK 21 AGR, C. ]Eval. RR 2.
Pravda, 6 May 55, U. Eval. RR 2.
Selskoye khozyaystvo, 13 May 55, U U. ivai. ttrc e. TT
11.. Army, Moscow. DA IN 147602, 18 Jun 55, WEE 25 AGR, C. Eval. RR 2.
12. CIA.. FDD, Summary, no 438, 1 Apr 55, p. 1, . Eval. RR 2.
13. FitAb39D, Summary, no 367, 31 Jan 55, p. 2, C. Eval. RR 2.
19. CIA., FDD, Summary, no 438, 1 Apr 55, p. 4-6, C. Eval. RR
. Eval. RR 2.
21. State, Prague. Dsp 275, 17 Feb 55, U/OFF US
~
22. CIA. FDD, Summar , no 357, 24 Jan 55, 1). 2,1C. Eval. RR 2.
27. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 384, 14 Feb 55, C. E al. RR 2.
28. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 348, 18 Jan 55, p. 5,1C. Eval. RR 2.
29.
30. State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 2l, 20 Apr '55, U. val. RR 2.
31. CIA. Current Support Memorandum 261, 23 Mar 55, C.
32. State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 821, 20 Apr 55, U. Eval. RR 2.
33.
34. State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 21, 20 Apr 575, U. Eval. RR 2.
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
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25X1X7
FOIAb3b
25X1X7
FOIAb3b
FIQ1Ab,te, Warsaw.
42. Ibid.
F)IAb~te, Warsaw. Dsp 483, 3 Jun 55, C. Eval. RR 2.
te. Warsaw. Dsp 154. 12 Oct 54. U/OFF USE. Ev
49. Ibid.
50. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 478, 4 May 55, U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
(tr from Nowe drogi, Feb 55,U)
51. State, Antwerp. Dsp 382, 3 May 55, U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
52. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 478, 4 May 55, U/OFF USE. Eva:L. RR 2.
OIAb3br frnm Nrmra rirnai Wale rr, TT1
F&Ab ' ORR Project 10.402, Probable Developments in the European
tellites through 1957 and through 1960 (unpublished S.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79TO9935A000300190001-1
59. Ibid.
6o. Ibid.
61. Army., Hong Kong. Dsp 2356, 28 May 55, JOINT IEEKA 21, C. Eval. RR 3.
F it erce, Weather Bureau. Maps, 1951+-55, C. 1 Eval. RR 2.
3.. Stage, Hong Kong. Survey of the China Mainlnd Press, no =_0
12 May 55, in:?o 11 May 55, U. Eval. RR 3.
61+. State, Hong Ko:ig. Dsp 21+17, 3 Jun 55, JOINT;IWEEKA 22, S.
Eval. RR 3.
65,. Ibid.
66. Ibid..
67. Army, Hong Kong. Dsp 21+18, 3 Jun 55, JOINT WEEKA 22, C.
Army, Hong Kong. Dsp 2356, 27 May 55, JOINTJWEEKA 21, S.
Eval. RR 2.
68. Ibid.
69. Army, Hong Korg. Dsp 21+17, 3 Jun 55, JOINT EEKA 22, S.
Eval. RR 2.
70. State, Columbc,. Dsp 515, 21 Apr 55, C. Eva1. RR 2.
1. IA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest, 3 May 55, item 10,
F~IAb Eval. RR 2.
73. Ibid. 1
71+. State, Hong Kong. Dsp 696, 21 Oct 51+, U. val. RR 3.
FQkAb3bDid.
77. Shen, T.H. Agricultural Resources of China Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 1951, p. 36, U. Eval. 4 2..
FC~~Ab3ate, Hong Kong. Survey of the China Main and Press, no 963,
T._ _..
C TT 1T_.... I M73
5
2
80. State, Hong Yong. Dsp 696, 21 Oct 54, u/00 USE. Eval. RR 3.
81. CIA. OCI, Ci:.rrent Intelligence Weekly Revi6 w, 24 Feb 55,
S. Eval. RF; 3.
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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