SURVEY OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES SINCE 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 29, 1954
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CI~-49T00935A000300050004-3
117
US OFFICIALS ONLY
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SURVEY OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES
SINCE 1952
CIA/RR IM-398
29 September 1954
WARMING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORI1ATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,. USC, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
II. International Meetings. . . .
Page
1
3
A. January-March 1953. ? ? ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 3
B. April-September 1953? . . 4
C. October-December 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 5
D. January-April 1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Bilateral Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. January-March 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. April-September 1953. . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7
C. October-December 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D. January-April 1954 ? ? ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IV. Radio Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. January-March 1953 . . ? ? . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. April-September 1953? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . . 11
C. October-December 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
D. January-May 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
V. Trade Pacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. January-March 1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. April-September 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. October-December 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. January-April 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. Level of Soviet-Free World Trade. . . . . . . . . . .
A. January-March 1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
16
22
25
29
29
29
29
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3 P
Page
B. April-September 1953 ? ? ? . . ? ? 1. ? ? . . . . . . . 35
1. Imports . . . . . . . . .
2. Exports ... . . . . . . .
C. October-December 1953. ? . .
1. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . Exports . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
35
35
......... 35
35
D. January-March 1954 . . . . . . . .
1. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Other Aspects of Special Interest. . .
A. Ministerial Reorganization . . . .
1. January-March 1953 ? ? ? ? ? ?
2. April-September 1953 . ? ?
B.
C.
D.
Maleiiicov's Speech.
Petroleum Exports. . . . . .. . . .
Soviet Gold Shipments . . . . . . .
1. October-December 1953. . . . .
2. January-April 1954 . . . . . .
1. :L953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2. January-March 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 42
F. Trade Minister's Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 43
G. Soviet Ship Procurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
H. USSR-UK Trade Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
I. USSR-West German Trade Relations . . . . . . . . . . . 47
J. Soviet Technical and Financial. Ass stance
and Loans ., . . . . . . . . . . 48
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIAI'RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Page
K. Trade Consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendixes
Appendix A. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix B. Sources and Evaluation of Sources. . . . . . . . 55
1. Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries, January-
March 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 15
2. Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries, April-
'September 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries, October.-
December 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4. Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries, January--
April 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26
5. Free World Exports to USSR, 1952-53 . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Free World Imports from USSR, 1952-53 . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. Possible Soviet Exports and Actual Bloc Exports
of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Selected Free
World Countries, 1953-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chart
39
Following Page
Frequency of Soviet Radio Propaganda on Three Topics
of International Economic Relations,1953-54 . . . . . . . . 12
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 *,,,, Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
CIA/RR IM-398
(ORR Project 42.260)
SURVEY OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITIES SINCE 1952*
Summary
Stalin's death marked a definite shift in Soviet foreign trade
tactics. The Soviet trade tactics were relatively unspectacular in
the first quarter of 1953. Although some minor tactical shifts were
noted before the new regime took power, over-all Soviet trade tactics
reflected a passive approach. Trade turnover between the USSR and
the Free World in this period decreased to about 50 percent of that
of the comparable 1952 period.
In the period immediately following Stalin's death, April-
September 1953, the USSR adopted a new approach to the Free World,
and trade tactics received considerably more emphasis. Soviet
cordiality was noted at international meetings, and conciliatory
gestures were made by the Russians in spheres which they had
previously approached with intransigence. The frequency of Soviet
radio propaganda advocating East-West trade increased sharply, as did
Soviet negotiation with Free World countries in the trade pact field.
These tactics were consistent with the international aspects of
Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in August 1953, and with
indications that the USSR was willing to import Free World consumer
goods. The apparent interest of the USSR in increasing petroleum
exports to the Free World also first became evident in this period.
Although the new regime was apparently interested in convincing
the Free World that its trade tactics were intended to promote
mutual understanding, international cooperation, and world economic
betterment, a closer examination of specific activities reveals less
altruistic motives. It appears that the motives actuating Soviet
trade tactics since Stalin's death include (1) the actual procurement
of materials and equipment,. and to some extent consumer goods, (2) the
undermining of cooperation, including trade and controls, among Free-
World nations by promoting interest in the possibility of increased
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report re
best judgment present thF
of the responsible analyst as of 15 July 1954.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
East-West trade, and (3) the achievement of greater economic political
penetration in vulnerable and underdeveloped regions.
Soviet trade tactics continued to be consistent with these
purposes durin? the last quarter of 1953. The sharp rise in Soviet-
Free World trade during this period was undoubtedly an attempt by the
USSR to implement its previously expressed delsire to increase trade
with the Free World. From the Soviet point of view, partial
implementation would serve the immediate economic interests of the
USSR, and of course would have definite -propaganda advantages both
at home and abroad. Apparently in anticipation of a balance-of-trade
problem in connection with its increased trade, the USSR exported
comparatively large quantities of petroleum,gold, and platinum in
the last quarter of 1953. The appearance of these commodities in
Western market; aroused considerable interest. The USSR thus was
afforded an opportunity not only to minimize its trade deficit with
the Free World but also to encourage interested Western businessmen
to consider the USSR's indicated desire to stimulate East-West trade
to be legitima-;e and to their advantage.
Bilateral approaches to key Western Eurooean nations were
significant features of Soviet trade tacticsiduring the first four
months of 1954. The UK was a prime target o' Soviet trade overtures.
Increased trade: activity was also witnessed 1etween the USSR and
West Germany. In January, exceptionally large Soviet offe:^s of trade
were made to Bcitish businessmen. The trade enthusiasm which the
offer aroused in British and other Western businessmen declined
somewhat when Soviet and other Bloc delegate to the East-West trade
consultations in April seemed unprepared to discuss specific ways of
actually increasing trade. Nevertheless, the sharp rise in trade
between the USSR and Free-World countries during the last ziuarter of
1953 continued in the first quarter of 1954. Other developments
noted in 1954 have been the continued export of Soviet gold and
platinum, and an effort by the USSR to procure an increased number of
ships from Western nations. A Soviet progra of technical assistance
and "loans" tc non-Communist countries apparently has also emerged.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA ;RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
I. Introduction.
In this memorandum Soviet foreign trade tactics are considered to
be those activities engaged in by the USSR in order to accomplish its
immediate international trade objectives. Although related to the
long-range objectives of economic self-sufficiency and political
advantage, these-immediate objectives sometimes shift quickly in
response to current considerations of economic, political, and
military expediency. Because the USSR approaches its international
objectives by a variety of means, trade tactics may be evidenced in
any of a multitude of Soviet activities.
This memorandum brings together in one document information con,
cerning the major aspects of Soviet trade tactics since 1952. Soviet
activities which would be most significant in assessing the Soviet
trade tactics with the Free World since 1952 were selected. Each
activity is treated chronologically, and 4 periods roughly corre-
sponding to the annual quarters are distinguished. Such a division
also conveniently distinguishes the 4 generally discernible eras of
Soviet trade tactics: (1) the pre-Malenkov period, (2) the period
during which the new approach was formulated, (3) the period of early
implementation, and (4) the current developments.
II. International Meetings.
International economic conferences have provided one of the
indications of shifts in Soviet trade tactics in the period since 1952.
By striking a more conciliatory tone and showing a greater willingness
to participate in such discussions, the USSR has attempted to achieve
greater flexibility in promoting its economic and political interests.
A. January-March 1953?
The pattern of Soviet participation in international meetings
during the first quarter of 1953 did not reflect any definite trend in
Soviet trade tactics. At meetings in the latter part of the period,
Soviet delegates evidenced greater cordiality, but their specific
proposals made no sharp break with the past. Consequently the change
in attitude may be viewed either as an attempt to maintain the status
quo in the uncertain period following Stalin's death or, with present
hindsight, as an indication of the tactical changes to come. Available
information does not conclusively establish the correctness of either
interpretation.
-3-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3 Oft
After igncring an invitation to participate in a general East-
West trade conference under the auspices of the 'United Nations Economic
'Commission for Europe (ECE) the preceding fall, the USSR unexpectedly
announced on 17 January that it was willing to take part. The meeting
was finally set fcr 13 April. At the ninth session of the United Nations
Economic C ommissicn for Asia and the Far East (EbAFE) which met in
Indonesia, 6-14 February, the USSR encountered s.arp oppositicn. A
Soviet resolution attributing Aaia's low economic level to "the domi-
nation of foreign monopolies atd colonial powers,' was voted dawn 10 to
1, and brought reluffs from Asian representative, who charged that the
USSR had done nothing to help the area. 1/
During the second regional trade conference sponsored by the
ECAFE in Manila, 23 February-4 March, the USSR again suggested.
in general terms, as at the Moscow Economic C onfarence in 1952, the
exchange of Soviet manufactured goods for Asian aw materials-and
foodstuffs. The USSR also offered to conclude deals in local
currencies. At the eighth session of the UNECE which opened at Geneva
on 7 March the USSR simply repeated earlier assurances of its support
of East-West trade. 2/
B. April-September 1953?
At the ECE East-West trade meeting, whit
April, the moderation of Soviet representatives
discernible. Soviet Bloc delegations maintained
attitude, and held attacks on the US to a minima
conference on minerals held by ECAFE, 20-30 Apri
displayed objectivity and cordiality. 3/
was in session 13-25
ecame more clearly
a businesslike
At a technical
Soviet delegates
Moscow brcke precedent by sending a delegate to the ECE
meeting of timber specialists in Geneva, 25 June-1 July. The Soviet
representative was friendly, sociable, and maintained an objective
attitude` during the deliberations. On 15 July f Dr the first time
since the inauguration of the UN Technical Assistance Program in
1950, the USSR announced that it was ready to co tribute 4 million
rubles and the services of Soviet technicians to the program. At
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Tru?teeship Council
meetings in July, Soviet Bloc delegates adhered to the traditional
Soviet position. They were strongly critical of the administration
of trust territories and blamed the lack of Eastr-West trade on the
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to
Appendix B.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-IRDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 ,w Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
US. Their tone, however, was relatively moderate and they did not
engage in invective against the US. 4/
C. October-December 1953.
During the third quarter of 1953,.Moscow continued to show
ostensible interest in cooperation with non-Communist countries in a
number of fields, including possible membership in certain specialized
UN agencies. In the latter instances, however, Soviet overtures were
accompanied by conditions and reservations which indicated that the
Kremlin sought to use these agencies to further its longstanding
objectives.
By November, the 4-million-ruble contribution which the USSR
had offered to the UN Technical Assistance Program in July had been
subjected to so many restrictions that its form was unacceptable to
the receiving agency. On 9 November the Soviet UN delegates in-New
York informed the UN, aside from other previous technical limitations,
that the 4 million rubles were not convertible and had to be utilized
within the USSR for facilities, training programs, or purchase of
equipment, 5/
At the conference for the pledging of technical assistance
on 12 and 13 November, representatives of the entire Soviet Bloc
appeared for the first time since the inauguration of the program.
The USSR persisted in its conditional pledge and made a possible
1954 contribution dependent on the handling of the 4 million rubles
pledged for 1953. On 5 and 6 November respectively the USSR expressed
interest in joining the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the
UN Educational, Social,,and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), but its
overtures were hedged. 6/
D. January-April 1954?
At the ECAFE meeting held in Ceylon 8-19 February 1954 and
at an earlier meeting of the ECAFE Committee on Trade and Industry,
the USSR declared that it was ready to consider requests from Asian
countries for technical assistance. Soviet delegates also issued
invitations to 12 Southeast Asian and Far Eastern countries to send
representatives to the USSR to study Soviet industrial and agri-
cultural methods and to discuss expansion of trade. 7/
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RPP79T00935A000300050004-3
At the ninth session of the UNECE, 9-24 March, Soviet delegates
augmented their now customary "businesslike and generally cooperative"
attitude with ind':.cations that they would parti ipate more fu:.ly in
the commission's :'uture activities. The USSR a pounced that it would
establish a permanent delegation to ECE in Gene4a and send representa-
tives to the meetings of all specialized ECE cor{unittees. At the
meeting a joint Soviet-British resolution calli, for the rev-Lva,l of
the ECE's Committee on Trade Development and locking for the removal
of "obstacles" to East-West trade was adopted u.animously. At the
ECOSOC meetings wkich opened on 30 March a Sovi' t attempt to :move
debate on "removal of obstacles" to East-West t ade to the top of the
agenda was rejected. 8/
The Soviet press announced that on 26 a,d 27 March the Council
of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) met in MosfLow, with the representa-
tives of all European Satellites attending, This session was the first
official Soviet report of a CEMA meeting since the organization was set
up in January l99. 9/
By its increased participation in intejnational meetings, the
USSR achieved soriewhat greater tactical flexibility in its economic
relations with o',her nations without making ma or concessions.
III. Bilateral Tactics.
Even before he death of Stalin, the USSR took a more conciliatory
line in some of its direct contacts with Free World nations. The number
of Soviet overtures increased after the Ma.lenk~v regime came to power.
A,. January-March 1953- 1
During the first quarter of 1953, Moscw made overtures to pave
the way for future economic and political relations with Japan,
Argentina, and Iran. In addition the Kremlin attempted to enhance
Soviet prestige abroad by making several raonet~,ry donations.
A Japanese news agency on 9 January quiiloted a Soviet official
in Tokyo who hat.. implied that the USSR might e willing to open formal
negotiations with the Japanese government forithe resumption of prewar
Japanese fishing; rights in the waters off the Soviet Kamchatka
peninsula. 10/ A month later, Stalin decided'to grant an interview on
7 February to the new Argentine Ambassador Brvo, shortly after the
latter's arriva:_ in Moscow. Soviet propagand media gave wide
-M IN _o _ t+_rri
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CII&-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
publicity to the meetingt,which marked an unusual Soviet gesture toward
the Peron government. 11/ Meanwhile, Moscow accepted Iran's decision
to terminate the Joint Soviet-Iranian Caspian Sea Fishery when the
25-year concession expired on 31 January,even though it had previously
sought to obtain an extension. 12/ Later, however, Soviet-Iranian
negotiations for liquidation of the Joint Sea Fishery's installations
were stalled after only one meeting because of the absence of a
Soviet delegate. 13/
On 19 February the USSR announced a $263,000 gift to the
Netherlands National Disaster Fund, and on 23 February the Soviet
Ambassador in Teheran placed 500,000 rials ($15,389) at the disposal
of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for assistance to earth-
quake victims. The USSR also, on 23 February,contributed $252,000 to
British flood relief. 14/
B. April-September 1953.
Meshed with other tactics, Soviet bilateral tactics from April
through September 1953 also reflected the general conciliatory approach
prevalent during that period. Moscow's attention was directed toward
many areas including the Near East.
On 1 April the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran informed'Iran that
the USSR was willing to proceed with negotiations for the liquidation
of the former joint Caspian fishery. 15/ About 3 months later,
according to the Iranian press, Foreign Minister Molbtov on 23 June
made an offer to the Iranian Ambassador to discuss the settlement of
long-standing border questions. This offer followed reports of a
similar approach to Premier Mossadeq by Ambassador Sadchikov on
11 June. Iran's purported reply in July was a request for $23.3
million in gold and dollars which the USSR had owed to Iran since
World War II. On 7 July,Molotov reportedly told the Iranian Ambassador
that for the time being the USSR was limiting its offer to the settle-
ment of the border disputes. Meanwhile, on 11 July, Ambassador
Sadchikov was replaced by Anatoli Lavrenti, who in the postwar period
has been a key trouble-shooter in the Balkans. 16/
On 31 May the USSR officially informed Turkey that the Soviet
government had renounced its territorial claims against Eastern Turkey
and deemed it possible to settle the question of Soviet security in
the Straits area under conditions that would be equally acceptable to
both countries.. The USSR on 7 June offered to settle a longstanding
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : 0%
conflict over uE.e of the waters controlled by a Soviet-built dam across
the Aras River. 17/ Later, on 7 August the USSR formed a mixed com-
mission with Turkey to provide water from the Soviet-built dam despite
Turkey's rejection of a Soviet note on 20 July, protesting the coming
visits of US and. UK warships to the Straits. 18~
In June the Israeli Foreign Minister extended feelers through
the Satellites on the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations
with the USSR. According to a Turkish source,j Moscow made recognition
contingent on two conditions: a pledge by Israel not to join any anti-
Soviet alliance, and punishment of those :Lesp nsible for bombing the
Soviet Legation on 9 February 1953. 19/ On 2 July, Moscow resumed
relations with :Israel after a 5-month break. A.N. Abramov, former
Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, was appointed on'5 August as Minister
to Israel. 20/
The USSR informed Yugoslavia on 8 Jun that it wished to send
an Ambassador to that country. In a speech o 14 June Tito announced
that Yugoslavia would acceed to the Soviet re ,uest. 21/ On 21 July
the USSR sent an Ambassador to Yugoslavia as the first step in
normalizing relations with that country since the Cominform break in
2196 The new envoy is Vasilly Valkov. 22/
The Soviet Mission in Tokyo announced on 18 July a gift of
$10,000 for flood relief. In an interview wit h Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov, four days later, Ikuo Oyama, foremost Japanese participant
in the World Peace Movement and Stalin Peace Prize Winner, reportedly
was told that concrete steps would be taken bI the USSR to reestablish
normal diplomatic relations with Japan, that lultural and economic
relations could be established without waitine for formal diplomatic
relations, and that the return of Japanese "wr criminals" laelel by
the USSR could be arranged. 24/
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 - Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
The post of Soviet Ambassador to Greece, vacant since 1947,
was filled on 22 July with the appointment of M.G. Sergeev. On
30 August, Moscow announced the appointment of M.A. Menshikov as
Ambassador to India, to replace I.A. Benedictov, whose recall was
made public on 28 August. Menshikov had served as Minister of
Foreign Trade from 1949-51 and as deputy director of UNRRA during
the period 1944-46. 25/
C. October-December 1953?
On 18 November, one day after his replacement by Thomioja,
ex-Finnish Premier Kekkonen reported that in late October the Soviet
government had offered aid to alleviate Finland's economic problems.
He reported that Soviet Minister Lebedev in Helsinki had told him that
the USSR was prepared to negotiate with Finland regarding (1) payment
in Western currencies for 10 to 15 percent of Soviet imports from
Finland; (2) increased Soviet-Finnish trade; (3) a substantial loan;
and (4) possible arrangements for Finland to use the Saimaa. Canal. 26/
Yugoslavia, the only non-Soviet Bloc member, attended the
ninth session of the Danube Commission, which met in Galati, Rumania,
on 9 December. The Yugoslav delegate was elected secretary, a post
theretofore held by a Soviet representative. Belgrade also succeeded
in gaining acceptance of certain proposals, including the shifting
of the permanent site of the commission from Galati to Budapest. The
election of a Yugoslav to the secretaryship, however, was only a
gesture because at the same meeting that post appeared to have been
shorn of virtually all of its authority. 27/
A clandestine Near and Middle East Communist conference took
place in Lebanon on. 18 and 19 December. Resolutions published after
the conference, apart from familiar denunciations of imperialism,
asked for trade pacts with "all countries," implying that Soviet Bloc
trade efforts'may increase in Arab countries. 28/
On 1 December the USSR sent its first envoy to Israel since
relations were resumed with that country in July. At that time the
USSR also agreed to deal officially with Israel in Jerusalem, a step
most other powers had refused to take because of the international
status of the Holy City. 29/
-9-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RPP79T00935A000300050004-3
D. January-April 1954.
In an agreement signed on 6 February 954 the USSR granted
Finland a stand-.by loan of 40 million rubles ('$10 million). Finland
may draw on the loan account at its discretion for the purpose of
improving its exchange position. Withdrawalsimay take place over a
3-yeax period in any currency, including gold'and US dollars. The
amounts borrowed must be repaid in the same m dia within 10 years,
with interest sl.t at 2.5 percent. 30/ 1
At Soviet request, the Egyptian Legat
Soviet Legation in Cairo were raised to embas
Shortly afterwards, on 27 March, Egypt was ma
Soviet technical assistance. There were also
offer being made to Iran. 31/
On 27 N.arch the Soviet Ambassador to.
to a relief fur..d for flood victims. 32/ Anot
10,000 dinars ($25,000) was made by the USSR
for Iraq flood victims. 33/
on in Moscow and the
y status on 13 March.
a specific offer of
reports of a similar
fghanistan contributed
er conttribution of
on 6 April to a fund
The Soviet delegation which was in the process of negotiating
frontier and f:_nancial problems with Iran switched to a "reasonable"
attitude folloiing a brief trip to Moscow by'Ambassador Lavrentiev. 34/
The US 3R announced in April that it
Australian wool purchases as of the end of t
against the Petrov affair. 35/
ould discontinue
e month in retaliation
Thus the USSR has attempted to ease is relations with
surrounding Free World countries, especiallyjin the period since the
death of Stalin. It has shown particular in Brest in improving its
economic and political position in the near d middle East and in
Japan.
IV. Radio Propaganda.
Soviet radio propaganda since 1952 'aas raphically illustrated the
changing pattern of Soviet trade tactics an has identified some of
the principal political and economic target .
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CI4-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 ;.,; Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
A. January-March 1953?
Until shortly after Stalin's death Soviet radio propaganda
on trade relations between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World, as
shown in the accompanying chart,* remained at a low level. This
neglect continued a trend which extended back into mid-1952 and
which might be explained by the position which Stalin had taken in
his Bolshevik article, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." 36/
In this article Stalin had asserted that the West's economic blockade
resulted only in the strengthening of the Bloc at a time when Western
economies were beginning to disintegrate. He also warned of the
danger inherent in economic relations with countries whose economies
were unplanned and anarchistic.
During the period immediately following Stalin's death there
was an increase in the frequency of radio commentaries on intra-
Soviet Bloc trade. By July, however, propaganda on intra.-Bloc trade
had fallen off to an average of about one commentary a week.
B. April-September 1953.
It is significant that in May, 6 weeks after Stalin's death,
the frequency of radio commentary by Soviet propagandists on the
subject of East-West trade increased suddenly. Reaching an average
frequency of 30 per week in the. period 22 June-19 July, broadcasts
continued to average more than 24 per week through September. The
comparative average from January through April had been only 2 per
week.
In a talk which was broadcast by the USSR, Near Eastern
Service, on 30 July 1953, Boris Leontyev, a prominent Soviet
economist whose views on economics and socialist theory are
frequently beamed abroad, quoted Leninist theory as supporting
econom.ic relations between the socialist and capitalist states.
Leontyev said:
Lenin stressed that the Soviet Socialist State
was ready to trade with capitalist states, and
that the capitalist states would benefit there-
from. In the course of 3 decades, sufficient
experience has been collected for trade and
mutually profitable relations between the Soviet
Union and the capitalist states. 38/
Following p. 12.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3 !
The timing of increased East-West trade propaganda and the
fact that Leninist theory was brought in to support it suggest that
Stalin's opposition was the prime factor in restricting such propa-
ganda during the 9 months preceding his death.
At the same time that the East-West trade theme was being
given more frec;uent airing by the Soviet propagandists, commentaries
on Western economic rivalry and intra-Soviet Bloc trade declined and
leveled off at the low average of only 1 or y per week.
C. October-December 1953.
The trends which were noted during April-September generally
persisted thror.ghout October-December. `The frequency of Soviet radio
commentaries or. the subject of East-West tr e, although decreasing
somewhat, remained at the rather high level cf about 18 per week from
October througi. the end of the year. Cowmen cries on Western economic
rivalry averaged about 2 per week and those on intra-Soviet Bloc trade
only about 1 per week.
D. January-May 1954. I
At the turn of the year an abrupt increase in Soviet propa-
"ganda on East-pest trade was noted in radiobrroadcasts. The average
number of commentaries per week on this subject jumped from 16 at
the beginning of January 1954 to 32 by the erd of the month, then
reached and maintained an average of 58 throtghout February.
A large part of the increased volume ;during late January and
early February was related to Molotov's statements at the Berlin
Conference of Foreign Ministers and merely p aphrased his remarks.
The central theme of these broadcasts was that economic realities
were breaking town the artificial barriers constructed by the US
against increased trade between the two camp q. Several commentators
stated that Wek;tern business circles had learned that rearmament
and the arms race could not solve economic p oblems and that the only
real solution :.ay in an extension of East-We t trade. 39/
In ear:_y February a large delegation
visited Moscow? A statement made to them by
Trade I.G. Kabonov to the effect that "given
the USSR'?ould import from the UK over the n
amounting to a total value of 400 million po
of British businessmen
Minister of Foreign
appropriate conditions"
xt 3 years goods
.nds sterling" 40/ was
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
SECRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
given wide publicity on the Soviet airways. This attention was
apparently an attempt to offer firm evidence of the. USSR's sincere
intention of implementing increased East-West trade.
A primary target of Soviet radio propaganda during early
1954 appears to have been the Western export control program. Kabanov's
offer to the British and contracts resulting therefrom (many of which
cannot be implemented under present COCOM restrictions) were used to
focus the attention of Western businessmen on what East-West trade
could amount to "under normal conditions." In its broadcasts to the
West, the Soviet radio also blamed the US for restrictions that
prevented an expansion of trade which it was claimed could boost the
economic well-being of Western nations. In a speech beamed in
English to the UK on 28 March 1954 for example, "Our Observer" said,
"There are still serious obstacles for trade between the
West European countries on the one hand and the Soviet
Union and the People's Democracies on the other. The way
is still blocked by US restrictions and bans." 41/
On 14 April 1954, an interview with the Soviet economist
Vinogradov (probably the same Vinogradov who is an important official
with the Administration for Trade with Western Nations) was beamed in
English to the UK. In reply to the question "Would you say that this
US policy is harmful to the Western countries?" Vinogradov replied,
"I certainly would. I think the benefits to the Western
countries of trade with the USSR, China and the People's
Democracies could increase. .... trade with the USSR and
other Communist countries is a commercial necessity for
Britain, and more than that, trade cooperation can bring
about political cooperation. Trade achievements can lead
to friendlier relations."
Vinogradov then went on to point out that many difficulties
experienced by British, French, Belgian, and other manufacturers
would be much less if they were free to select their customers. 42/
Other major aims of Soviet propagandists during the period
January-May 1954 appeared to be the economic alienation of the Middle
and Far Eastern countries from Western nations and the strengthening
of their economic ties with the USSR. A February meeting of the UN
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was widely
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
exploited from this angle. Asian listeners, inlparticular, were
told that trade with the USSR, Communist China, and the European
:People's Democracies offered the one sure road to emancipatidn of the
Asian nations frcm the predatory trade policies of the Western powers,
especially the US. 43/ In their bid to draw th Asian countries
closer to the USSR, the Russians voiced their w llingness to aid the
economic development of these countries through technical assistance
and by the development of trade -- "on a basis of equality and
mutual benefit, on a basis of stable prices and of payments is the
currency of the country concerned." 44/ I
A loan ani offer of technical assistant given to Afghanistan
for the construction of a bakery and grain elevators, an invitation
to about a dozen Asian countries to send repres ntatives to the USSR
at Soviet expense to witness developments in Soviet industry and
agriculture, as well as the trade agreements with India and Ceylon,
were all utilized as radio broadcast material. 5/ Apparently they
were cited by the Russians to foster the impression that the under-
developed countries "now have in the Soviet Uni n, the Chinese People's
Republic, and the European People's Democracies trade partners ready,
not only by word,but by deed to give sincere an effective assistance
to the underdeveloped countries in the development of their industry
and agriculture, and in raising the standard of living of the masses." 46/
These combined themes made up the bulk df Soviet broadcasts
on East-West trade, which averaged more tha:z 35 per week from the first
of the year through the end of April. Although the average frequency
of these commentaries dropped to about 12 per welek during May, no
-change in content was noticed. Over the pe^iodIJanuary-May, the
frequency of commentary upon Western economic riralry and intra-Bloc
trade remained low, the latter disappearing almost completely.
Soviet attempts to negotiate trade pacts wita Free World countries
increased sharply after the death of Stalin,, 1
A. January-Myth 1953?
Although the USSR concluded several trail pacts with Free World
countries during the first quarter of 1953, as shown in Table 1*, most
such trade negotiations were bogged down. Trade and barter agreements
* Table 1 follows on p. 15.
- 14 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 1 47
Finland-Poland ) 24 February 1953
Finland-Czechoslovakia)
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
January-March 1953
Annual protocol under
long-term agreement
of June 1950
Trilateral trade protocol
under long-term trade
agreement of June 1950
USSR exports: $112.5 million
USSR imports: $150.0 million
Compensating deliveries to Finland
by Poland and Czechoslovakia
Poland exports to Finland: $14.5 million
Czechoslovakia exports to Finland:
$8.0 million
Exchange of cotton valued at 3 million
pounds sterling for industrial
machinery.
Exchange of Egyptian cotton for wheat
USSR: 90,000 tons a/ wheat against
9,900 tons cotton
Bulgaria: 15,000 tons wheat against
1,600 tons cotton
Poland: 10,00.0 tons wheat against
1,170 tons cotton
Total Value: $12,600,000
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
were signed with Finland and Egypt respectively, but Soviet negotia-
tions with Sweden, France, and Norway moved slowly. Sweden refused
to accept Soviet wheat or maize and the USSR was unwilling to
liquidate sizable holdings-of Swedish currency. 48/ France was
waiting for a Soviet response to its January proposal for a limited
barter agreement. 49/ Soviet talks with Nor ray had encountered
their annual difficulties over quotas of non errous metals. The
USSR wanted mcre aluminum, and objected to tie volume of Norway's
request for manganese ore on the grounds tha it exceeded Norway's
domestic requirements. 50/
Certain developments notwithstanding the relative inactivity
in Soviet-Free World trade pact relations during this period stood
in sharp contrast to the increased activity videticed after Stalin's
death on 5 March. Such inactivity tends to upport the contention
that the emergence of the new trade tactics oward the West which
were adopted by the Malenkov regime was a di!ect result of the new
regime and therefore divorced from and unenv.sioned by Stalin.
B. April-September 1953?
Highlighted by the April ECE East-West trade consultations,
the 6-month period following Stalin's death ritnessed the most
outstanding developments in. that phase of Soviet trade tactics which
has since become known as Moscow's new appr ach to the West. It was
in the field of trade pacts that the Kremli decided to launch this
new approach. Trade pacts completed between the USSR and non-
Communist cour.tries during the period were precedented both in
number and in type.
Durin?; the ECE trade consultations iii Geneva, the Soviet
representative pointed out that during the 6xt 12 months the USSR
could increase exports to the West by more an 15 percent. Imports
sought by the Russians were mentioned as ships, metals, and industrial
equipment, but the delegate also indicated that the USSR would be
willing to import consumer goods such as herring, fats, cork, textiles,
and citrus fruits. 51/
At subsequent trade negotiations with non-Communist countries
4 aspects of soviet trade tactics emerged. (1) The USSR indicated a
willingness to expand trade by signing trail pacts with some nations
for the first time, or for the first time i a number of years.
(2) In many instances the planned value of trade between the USSR and
- 16 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
particular countries exceeded the planned or actual value of such
trade in 1952. (3) The USSR negotiated for increased imports of con-
sumer goods (especially food and textiles). (4) The USSR appeared
willing to export larger quantities of petroleum, coal, manganese,
and chrome. 52/
Trade pacts concluded by the USSR either for the first time
in the postwar period or for the first time in several years included,
as shown in Table 2*, agreements with France, Greece, Iceland, and
Argentina. The agreement with France followed increasingly evident
attempts of the USSR to concentrate on that country in an effort to
split the Western coalition.. Molotov's unusual visit to the French
embassy for the July 14 celebration preceded by one day the signing
of the first trade agreement between the two countries since 1949.
The same month witnessed the arrival in Paris of the new Soviet
Ambassador, S.A. Vinogradov. 53/
The first postwar agreement between Greece and the USSR,
signed on 28 July, was preceded the week before by the appo'Lntment
of M.G. Sergeev as the first Soviet Ambassador to Greece since
1947. 54/ Trade relations with Greece pointed up Moscow's increasing
concern in the Balkans. The agreement concluded with Iceland on
3 August not only paved the way for the resumption of trade relations,
virtually nonexistent between the nations for.the previous five years,
but also enabled the USSR to plant the seeds of future discontent
between Iceland and her allies. By exporting to Iceland almost all
of that country's requirements for petroleum, economic difficulties
of previous Western suppliers would, of course, be increased.
The trade agreement concluded with Argentina on 5 August was
unique in several aspects. It provided for the extension of a large
credit by the USSR to Argentina and included provisions for the
export of Soviet capital equipment and the import of consumer goods.
Political and economic entrance into Latin America was undoubtedly a
major consideration influencing the Soviet decision to make this new
approach to Argentina.
Planned increases over previous periods in the volume of
trade were indicated during April-September in newly concluded trade
pacts between the USSR and Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Norway,
Iran, and Argentina. A notable exception was evidenced in the Soviet-
Swedish trade agreement of 9 April in which planned trade ,turnover for
1953 was pet at less than half of the 1952 actual turnover. This
Table 2 follows on p. 18.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 19 - DP79T00935A000300050004-3
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
April-September 1953
June 1953 Signed prior to conclu-
sion of trade agreement
and included in trade
agreement quota.
June 1953 Signed prior to conclu-
sion of trade agreement
and included in trade
agreement quota.
Table 2 55
10,000 standards of timber from USSR to Denmark at
12 million kroner, no direct connection with trade
agreement. Payment to be made through Danish-Soviet
Clearing Agreement.
6,000 tons butter to USSR at 7.35 kroner per kilogram
totaling approximately 44 million kroner.
Herring contract 5,000 tons Faroe Island herring totaling 6 million kroner
to USSR.
Trade agreement Soviet exports: wheat (50,000 tons), oilcakes (70 000
tons), soybeans (30,000 tons), cotton (2,000 tons.
Soviet imports: butter (10 000 tons), pork (6 000 tons),
salted herring (5,000 tonsj, lard (4,000 tonsj.
Trade: 145 million kroner each way.
Supplement to Soviet imports: Additional 1,000 tons butter, 5,000 tons
trade agreement frozen beef with partial payment in pounds sterling.
Butter included in trade agreement quota, but there is no
F
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 2 55
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
April'-September 1953
(Continued)
Free World Country
Date of Signature
Period
France
15 July 1953
1 July 1953-30 June 1954
Greece
28 July 1953
28 July 1953-28 July 1954
Iceland
3 August 1953
August 1953-August 1954
Netherlands
April 1953
No time period specified
Contracts
and barters
.4 July 1953
No time period specified
Contracts
and barters
Type of Agreement Remarks
Trade and payments First trade agreement since 1949.
Soviet exports: corn, asbestos, chrome, crude oil.
Soviet imports: freighters, steamboilers, cranes, lead,
textiles.
Clearing Soviet exports: fuel oil, anthracite, timber.
Soviet imports: tobacco, cotton, rice, laurel leaves.
$20.0 million total.
First postwar trade agreement.
Trade and payments Resumes trade relations virtually non-existent last
5 years.
Soviet exports: petroleum products, wheat=cement.
Soviet imports: salted and frozen herring, frozen fish.
Soviet exports: $ 6.0 million.
Soviet imports: $10.0 million.
19
Represents one-half Iceland's total annual herring pro-
duction and one-third frozen fish production. Import
of petroleum almost al Iceland's annual requirements.
Contract signed for the delivery of 20,000 barrels salt
herring to USSR; conclusion of further contract for
15,000 to 20,000 barrels herring reported signed.
10,000 tons Netherlands butter for 95,000 tons wheat.
Approved For Release 19 79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 19991b9121 -C1A-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 2 55
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
April-September 1953
(Continued)
Free World Country
Date of Signature
Netherlands
ICnnti nnPA
PO Tbl v 1494
No time neriod specified
Contracts
and barters
July 1953
No time period specified
Contracts
USSR placed orders for 500,000 meters Netherlands rayon
and barters
goods and 500,000 meters of woolen goods.
28 August 1953
No time period specified
Contracts
2,500 tons butter and 1,750 tons Dutch cheese for
and barters
approximately 45,000 tons of Russian wheat.
First week
of April 1953
(Agreement con-
firmed by ex-
change of notes
22 May)
Year 1953
Soviet exports: manganese quota increased, cereals.
Soviet imports: aluminum quota increased, herring, fats.
Trade: $9.0 million each way.
Additional Norwegian-USSR trade, outside barter agreement
was carried on. USSR exports consisted of grains, chrome
ore, autos, and petroleum products. Norwegian exports
consisted of herring, whale oil, and staple fiber.
Two significant aspects are: Soviet failure to demand
bearings and Soviet consent to ship petroleum products
to Sweden.
Trade: 75 million kroner each way.
Sovie expo r tr s:~ uaTmon and cra 0 cases 1,070 tons
totaling 1 million pounds sterling.
Soviet imports: Herring (180,000 barrels), tin plate
(1,000 tons) totaling 1,090,000 pounds sterling.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 - Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 2 22/
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
April-September 1953
(Continued)
Free World Country Date of Signature Period Type of Agreement
UK (Continued) 1 July 1953 No time period specified Textile contract Soviet exports: matches.
Soviet imports; textiles.
Trade: $1.4 million each way.
Initialed
25 July 1953
Approved 11 Aug
1953
Iran 10 June 1953 1 April 1953-31 March
1954
Argentina 5 August 1953 15 August 1953- Trade and payments Soviet exports: petroleum, coal, industrial equipment,
15 August 1954 raw materials.
Soviet imports: linseed oil, wool, cheese, pork, mutton,
lard.
Soviet government undertakes to finance $30 million of
capital equipment to Argentina on credit. First postwar
trade agreement.
Iranian exports of lead are increased. Volume practically
doubled over previous barter.
Total Trade: $112.0 million.
- 21 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/2,1 ,; GIA-BDPL&W35A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935AO00300050004-3+
decrease, however, resulted primarily from the terminatton of deliveries
under the 1946-51 credit agreement and from a f ilure to renew quotas
for the exchange of Soviet grains and Swed:Lsh bearings- 56/
FollowinE: up its line at the April ECE meeting, the USSR
negotiated with Western countries for procurement of consumer goods,
especially food e,nd textiles. Trade pacts signed during April-
September made provision for Soviet imports of banish meat, butter,
and fish; French textiles; Greek tobacco and rice; Icelandic fish;
Dutch butter, fish, and cheese; Norwegian fish British fish and
textiles; and Argentine wool, cheese, and meat. Although Moscow and
Western observers played up the consumer goods aspect of these agree-
ments, Soviet in-:erest in Western strategic gods continued to be
indicated. With the possible exception of Argentina and Iceland, the
countries from which the consumer goods were t be imported also
served. as the areas of supply for such important items as nonferrous
metals, various -ypes of vessels, and heavy industrial equipment.
C. October-December 1953.
Trade pats signed during the last qu
total number of such Soviet West agreements co
to more than do-dole the number signed in-1952.
Soviet tactic of negotiating for imports cf Co
industrial-raw materials, as witnessed during
quarters, was evidenced in trade agreements co
India, and in coatracts signed with the Nether
Israel as shown in Table 3.* Other Soviet, pro
during the period, however, continued to refle
the acquisition of non-consumer goods from the
ter of 1953 brought the
eluded during the year
A continuation of the
dstuffs and consumer
,he second and third
eluded with Italy and
ands, Denmark, and
urement activities
t Soviet interest in
Free World.
Important developments were evidenced .n the USSR's trade
agreements with Finland and India. Under the terms of the 1954 agree-
ment signed on 25 November 1953, Soviet trade with Finland was
scheduled for a decrease from 1953. Lower pries and a Soviet refusal
to accept as large a quantity of Finnish metal products as in 1953 were
the main reasonE for the decline. In trade between the two nations,
a $40 million trade surplus in favor of Finlan~ was anticipated under
the agreement. Of this amount $25 million was; to be liquidated by
Finnish trade with Satellite countries under t e various trilateral
trade agreement,. 57/ Much speculation was pr valent during that
period concerning the possibility that in orde to liquidate the
* Table -3f ollows on p. 23.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935AO00300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 3 58
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
October-December 1953
Free World Country Date of Signature Period Ty of Agreement
Denmark December 1953
Contract USSR agreed to make payment in sterling for shipments of
Finland
25 November 1953
Year 1954
Annual protocol
under long-term
agreement of
June 1950?
Italy
27 October 1953
27 October 1953-
26 October 1954
Trade and payments
Netherlands
24-28 October
Contract
1953
December 1953
Contract
5,000 tons butter, 500 tons pork,and 1,150 tons frozen beef.
Total payments for these commodities amount to approximately
6.5 million pounds sterling. The 5,000 tons of butter
includes 2,800 tons which constitutes the remainder of the
10,000 tons provided for in the trade agreement and the 500
tons pork is also included in the trade agreement. There is
no quota in the trade agreement for beef. In addition to the
above contract for beef, it has been agreed Denmark will
sell 3,500 tons beef frith payment to be made by the National
Bank.
Decrease in level of trade is partially due to lower prices
and to Soviet decision to reduce purchases of metal products
below levels previously included in the agreements.
Renews 1952 protocol. List of capital goods for eorts to
USSR under the 148 trade
9 agreement agreed upon at the'same
time.
2,000 tons butter for delivery to USSR. USSR endeavored to
place additional orders but refused by Netherlands because
current stocks and the demands of other outlets did not
warrant further exports.
10,000 carcasses B-quality cattle to USSR.
Price: 1.55 Free Dutch border florins per kilogram.
- 23 -
Approved For Release 19 79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21xP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 3 58
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
October-December 1953
(Continued)
of Agreement
Free World Country Date of Signature Period Type
Israel 3 December 1953 No time period specified Contract
Soviet exports: fuel oil (100,000 tons) with option to
purchase additional 100,000 tons.
70V le L 11q.all moo. i:i ~. -L .r.,.__... ( $2 .7 hana.na.s
($200,000)
Trade: $2.9 million each way.
Annual protocol Commodities essentially same as those exchanged previously.
under agreement Nittual deliveries of goods will increase.
of 17 July 1950
5-year trade agreement Trade and payments
m ?n' ('~ D -m m
Soviet exports: wheat, barley, petroleum products, iron
and steel, industrial products.
Soviet imports: jute products, tea, coffee, wool, hides
and skins, vegetable oils.
Furnishing of Soviet technical assistance connected with
supplying of Soviet equipment to India.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 ,,,w Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
remaining imbalance of $15 million, Finland would enter into some
type of trilateral trading arrangements which would include other
Free World countries. To date (July 1954), however, nothing concrete
has materialized along these lines. Also witnessed during the last
quarter of 1953, and undoubtedly related to Finland's trade surplus
with the USSR, was the possibility of a Soviet tactical reverse in
that the USSR was allegedly permitting the Finns to re-export 100,000
tons of Soviet wheat 59/ and unspecified amounts of Soviet petroleum
to Brazil. 60/
The 5-year trade and payments agreement signed on 2 December
1953 between the USSR and India was significant for two reasons. It
was the first such agreement between the countries, previous trade
having been governed by a barter system, and it provided for technical
assistance in the form of installation and operation of Soviet equip-
ment in India by Soviet technicians.
D. January-April 1954.
Through the fourth month of 1954 the USSR signed more trade
pacts with the Free World than in the comparable 1953 period. As
shown in Table 4*, trade agreements with Egypt and Lebanon were
signed for the first time, protocols to previous agreements were con-
cluded with Belgium and the Netherlands, and annual renewals were com-
pleted with Norway and Sweden. Under a loan agreement, the USSR
also extended a $3.5-million credit to Afghanistan for the. purchase of
equipment for the construction of grain elevators, a flour mill, and
a baking factory. The agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands, and
the Scandinavian countries all envision a larger trade turnover in
1954 than in 1953. Thus the negotiations with these countries continue
to reflect the "increased trade" emphasis in current Soviet trade
tactics. Furthermore, all of these 1954 agreements involve the procure-
ment of foodstuffs or textiles by the USSR, thus apparently continuing
another feature of post-Stalin trade tactics. Nevertheless, as in the
previous periods, these recent agreements. with European countries are
not divorced from Western supply of capital goods, as is pointed up by
the inclusion of ships, dock installations, cranes, and dredgers.
Soviet trade negotiations have thus been adapted to several
purposes. Trade pacts were used to provide an entry into areas with
which the USSR had limited previous contact. By emphasizing the
Table follows on p. 26.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
January-April 1954
Free World Country Date of Signature Period
Belgium 30 January 1954 1 January 1954-
1 January 1955
Norway 25 January 1954 Year 1954
Sweden 2 February 1954 Year 1954
2nd protocol to the 18 February Protocol under the 1948 agreement was signed in
1948 trade agreement November 1950 for the period 1 May 1950-1 May
1951.
50V iC~ -Pul'~b: ulu, bC.t3z, =,'_o
iron, anthracite, grains.
Soviet imports: textiles, refrigerator ships,
fish, metal products, dock installations.
Trade: $70.0 million each way.
Trade agreement Commodities are essentially those exchanged in
previous agreements and outside the agreements.
Volume is approximately 50 percent higher than
1953?
Trade: $14.5 million each way.
Trade and payments Shift from Soviet imports of iron and steel
products to consumer goods and consumer goods
machinery. Petroleum imports from Soviet
increased. Sweden's exports of butter raised
and quotas for staple fiber, herring, sawmill
and paper mill machinery, and food stuffs
machinery added for first time.
Egyptian cotton valued at 4 million Egyptian
pounds for 350,000 tons petroleum products.
Of the 35(),W0 t-ons, USSE to deliver
250,000 tons and Rumania 100,000 tons.
Petroleum products include kerosene,
gasoline, gas oil, and fuel oil.
- 26 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table 4 61
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
January-April 1954
(Continued)
Free World Country
Date of Signature
Period
Type of Agreement
Egypt
27 March 1954
March 1954-March 1955
Trade agreement
Netherlands
March 1954
No time period specified
Herring contract
28 April 1954
Year 1954
Protocol for 1954
based on 1948
agreement
Afghanistan
27 January 1954
Loan agreement
Remarks
Soviet exports: industrial equipment, agricultural
machinery, autos, oil products, grain.
Soviet imports: cotton, rice, rayon yarn, and hides
and skins.
New herring contract for delivery 30,000 barrels of
salted herring to USSR.
Soviet exports: grain, lumber, anthracite, asbestos,
autos, pitch.
Soviet imports: cargo vessels, dredgers, cranes, butter,
meat, herring, leather and hides, staple fiber.
USSR granted credit to Afghanistan in the amount of
$3,500,000 at 3 percent interest in connection with
construction of 2 grain elevators, a flour mil_~ and a
baking factory. Credits will be used. to pay for equip-
ment and materials supplied by USSR and Soviet technicians
will be sent to Afghanistan. Afghanistan to begin
repaying in 1957 with supplies of cotton, wool, and oil
seeds.
Approved For Release 19 I'll _ T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release - - DP79TOO935A000300050004-3
Table 4 J
Soviet Trade Pacts with Free World Countries
January-April 1954
(Continued)
Free World Country Date of Signature
Finland 6 February 1954
Period
Type of Agreement Remarks
Loan agreement USSR will grant to Finland a loan of 40 million rubles at a
rate of interest of 2.5 percent and a period of amortization of
10 years. The acceptance of the loan is subject to the con-
sideration of the Finnish government within the course of 3 years
in gold, American dollars, or in other agreed currency.
30 April 1954 One year agreement Trade agreement Balanced exchange. Soviet wheat, lumber, and hides for agri-
cultural products. Sixty percent of Lebanese exports will be
bananas, apples, and vegetables.
28 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
possibility of expanding trade, an attempt was made to encourage
Western disunity by appealing to the economic interests of individual
nations. In addition, trade agreements were used by the USSR as a
basis for advancing Soviet propaganda.
VI. Level of Soviet-Free World Trade.
The relatively low level of Soviet Free World trade, planned and
carried out under Stalin during early 1953, contrasted sharply with
the present regime's new trade approach to the Free World. Because
of the time lag, the increased trade negotiations carried out during
the period after Stalin's death were not reflected in actual trade
until the last quarter of 1953-
A. January-March 1953.
1. Imports.
In terms of current value, as shown in Table 5*, Soviet
imports from the Free World during the first quarter of 1953 declined
to $76 million from $141 million during the comparable 1952 period.
With several exceptions -- namely, the Netherlands, Iran, Greece,
and Finland -- this decline encompassed Soviet trade with all Free
World countries and was especially evidenced in Soviet imports from
the UK which decreased to less than $15 million from $54 million
in the comparable period.
2. Exports.
The value of Soviet exports to the Free World. in the
first quarter of 1953, $67 million compared with $133 million for the
similar 1952 period, represents a decline of about 50 percent. This
decline is shown in Table 6.** Though exports to Finland. and West
Germany showed increases, Soviet exports- to almost all other Western
countries were below the level of 1952. Exports to the UK declined
from $66 million to $19 million during the respective 1952-53 periods.
Table 5 follows on p. 30.
Table 6 follows on p. 32.
-29-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 199.01V ~A
T00935A000300050004-3
Free World Exports to TJ J * 62
1952-53
Austria
200
75
49
324
4
312
Belgium-Luxembourg
,
8
117
1
297
14 8 3
15500
D
k
0
,
,
-
2,077
3,825
1b
enmar
9
0
6
3,945
162o
214
537
France
W
t
1,351
3,464
1,,6 38
*
,
1,633
3,731
10,683
es
Germany
1
105
45
151
u7
1
6
5
1
6
Greece
I
l
d
0
1
20
21
1167
865
,
2
470
.
72
i8o2
ce
an
0
0
0
0
0
508
2
Italy
3,560
9
988
6
9
38
r2
0
,
2,977
Netherlands
588
,
,
3
3,090
8,56o
11,430
23 a80
No
6
6,
9
1,301
12,671
704
8
3
rway
P
t
l
9
1
4o6
,
2,885
10,252
543
8,765
,
5
8o4
1
112
or
uga
1,400
2
524
1,991
5 915
1,107
2
204
,
1
28
5
Sweden
9,755
20,878
13,813
4t 7,6
503
4
,
10
170
,
5
Switzerland
900
1,209
330
,
,
7,135
21.--
9
Turkey
100
2,268
0
2368
35
0
1,706
1,157
28
98
UK
54
441
628
37
12
844
~ 9
1,78
86
387
,
,
,
10
13
14,711
13,847
5,7
3+,3+
30,077
7n.5A2
Algeria
E
t
68
0
68
152
768
550
1 4
0
gyp
G
ld C
t
Z
28,791
1
28791
756
11,141
0
7
117
o
oas
53_
_
Iran
I
7,600
12,748
8,037
2,694
2
1+85
13216
raq
I
l
0
0
,
115
115 /
srae
167
0
954
561
532
1L023
- 30 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Free World Exports to !3M / 62
1952-53
(Continued)
Free World Country
Ceylon
India
Japan
Malaya
Pakistan
Australia
Argentina
Cuba
Mexico
Uruguay
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1952
0
501
0
50?
2,871
1,111
239
4,221
0
12
141
153
5,349
4,031
0
9 30
2,367
1,500
11,562
15
0
0
25
25
0
6
0
6
0
32
0
32
103
0
0
10
0
0
0
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1953
0
0
0
0
442
173
137
I
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,353
0
7,353
2
3,653
29,416
33,071
0
0
N.A.
N.A. 1
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
267
2tl
75,671
1741
163,804
416,416
Total 1903 40,230,492 109,461 480_86
a. Unadjusted as reported by Free World Countries.
b. Less than $500.00.
c. January-November.
- 31 -
Approved For Release 199 79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 19 9T00935A000300050004-3
Free World Imports from USSR , 63
1952-53
Free World Country January-March April-September October-December Total for 1952
Us 4,795 9,109 2,914 16,818
Canada 87 1,634 648 2,369
Austria 102 3 0 105
Belgium-Luxembourg 1,697 4,965 4,911 11 573
Denmark 7,200 2,105 1,801 06
France 6,327 8,965 2,797 18;0
West Germany 24 670 3,263 31957
Greece 0 0 0 0
Iceland 0 4 0 7
Ireland 3 5 161 169
Italy 6,908 19,256 7,897 34 UU1
Netherlands 8,006 11,058 6,546 25`610
183 6 909 3,304 11,3
,
,
Norway 1
Portugal b 1 9 l0
Sweden 1,002 15,862 3,128 19,992
Switzerland 900 1,372 520 2 792
UK 65,738 67,921 29,115 162,77_
Finland 14,761 39,876 26,944 81,581
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1953
3,182
5,479
2,130
10,791
117
337
401
J
15
49
64
1,821
9,117
5,782
16 720
2,983
1,419
4,033
835
3,757
6,849
6,277
lb tk33
3,885
5,946
5,788
1
0
41
133
0
0
1,587
15 587
'
1
332
554
887
2,293
3,421
3,547
9 T
'
883
16,581
13,798
3
1Y2
6
1,014
7,101
8,837
,952
11
0
1
0
1
739
5,166
4,151
10 056
x
$88
1,775
1,396
,059
18,699
55,131
37,642
111,722
19,508
50,512
19,627
89,647
0
_ 0 _
0
n
0
1
158
159
Alg- in
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
21
72
32
125
24
142
224
390
Belgian-Congo
0
74
1
75
0
5
1
0
Cyprus
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
6
4
1
3
967
362
25
1
802
31,13!
278
13,719
13
,
1
33
Egypt
,
,
,
- 32 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Free World imports from USSR / 63
1952-53
(Continued)
French Morocco
Gold Coast
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Lebanon
Malta
Southern Rhodesia
Syria
October-December
Total for 1952
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
2
8,206
10,557
5,179
23,942
0
3
o
3
26
9
4
3~9
21
9
8
3S
0
1
0
0
19
o
19
0
86
0
96
7
11
0
18
0
254
9
23
0
65
190
255
1,485
161
122
1,7769
0
0
0
0
0
3
456
459
4
5
0
9
52
169
147
369
77
933
90
1 100
~
73
57
38
ibS
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1953
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
6,652
3,639
2,534
12,825
0
3
2
5 J
11
13
11
35
1
18
9
35
0
J
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
14
0
2
1
3
226
530
16
46
36
1,218
848
2,102
8
2
10
9
17
9
35
56
1,494
197
1,747
23
70
38
131
Burma
Ceylon
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Malaya
Pakistan
Australia
New Zealand
- 33 -
Approved For Release 19a9jnaQ1- ? rl&-RnP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Free World Imports from USSR a
1952-53
(Continued)
Free World Country
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1952
January-March
April-September
October-December
Total for 1953
Colombia
0
0
2
2
e`uba
U
v
V
U
U J/
Mexico
Q
12
29
41
5
15
30
50
Peru
2
2
2
7
0
0
0
0
Venezuela
10
9
0
19
4
8
6
1S
Total
13
225
102,069
462,344
667
114
120 ,431
120,127
3677
a. Unadjusted, as reported by Free World countries.
b. Less than $500.
c. January-November
-34+
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
B. April-September 1953-
1. Imports.
During the period April-September 1953, the value of
Soviet imports from the Free World was $177 million compared with
$230 million in 1952. Although Soviet imports during the period
represented only 76 percent of the comparable 1952 period,, an
increase in trade activity during the third quarter tended to reduce
the large differential noted during the first quarter when the 1953
level reached only 53 percent of the previous year. By the end of
the period, imports from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway;, and
Pakistan had increased substantially over 1952, but those from the
UK and. Finland were down.
2. Exports.
Soviet exports to the Free World during the period stood
at $190 million as against $228 million in 1952 or about 83 percent
of 1952 exports. As in the case of imports, increased activity was
noted in third-quarter Soviet exports to certain countries. Ship-
ments to Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, and Japan registered
increases over 1952, but exports to UK, Sweden, Egypt, and Iran
continued below the level of 1952.
C. October-December 1953.
1. Imports.
Soviet imports from the Free World during the last quarter
of 1953 were valued at $164 million compared to $109 million in 1952.
With several exceptions, notably the UK, Sweden, Pakistan., and Iran,
Soviet imports from the Free World, particularly West European
countries and Australia, surpassed the comparable previous year's
trade by large margins.
2. Exports.
The value of Soviet exports to the Free World in the last
quarter of 1953 stood at $120 million compared to $102 million in 1952.
As in the case of imports, though not of the same magnitude, an
increase over the comparable period of 1952 was noted in Soviet; exports
to Western European nations during the last quarter of 1953? In this
- 35 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
period, Soviet exports to the UK also finally
over a comparable 1952 period.
As ;shown in Tables 5 and 6, during the last quarter of
1953, Soviet trade with the Free World spurted to surpass the com-
parable 1952 period, but not sufficiently to ring the year's level
up to that of 1952. Increased trade during the last three months
of 1953 can be viewed as the result of the ne~ Soviet trade tactics
gaining momentLzi. During this period the relatively large number of
trade pacts concluded after Stalin's death commenced to be ;.mplemented.
Trade was espec'.ally active between the USSR nd those West European
countries which previously had negotiated to xport foodstuffs to the
USSR. Thus, Danish exports to the USSR Burin the last quarter con-
sisted almost entirely of meat, dairy, and of er food products.
Dutch exports bulked large in butter; and the major Norwegian ship-
ments undoubted-.y consisted of herring, hardeied fats, and staple
fibers.
D. January.-March 1954. 64/
Preliminary trade data for 1954 indic to that the expansion
of trade between the USSR and the Free World in the last quarter of
1953 continued ',hrough the first quarter of 154. The value of
Soviet trade turnover with the Free World during the first 3 months
of 1954 was $260 million,a sharp increase ove the 1953 level of
$143 million ancL almost comparable to the 195 level of $273 million.
Such a development certainly presages even lager trade increases
during the rema-.nder of the year.
Dur:.ng the first 3 . months of 1954 Soviet imports from the
Free World amounted to $150 million compared -with $76 and $141 million
for the respect:_ve periods of 1953 and 1952. Very large increases were
registered. over the comparable 1953 perioi in Soviet trade with Denmark,
the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand, Soviet
imports from the UK, Sweden, Iran, and Pakistan were down compared with
1953?
- 36 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
2. Exports.
Soviet exports to the Free World during the first quarter
of 1954 stood at $110 million compared with $67 million and $132
million for 1953 and 1952 respectively. A large increase over the
1953 period was evidenced during 1954 in the USSR's trade with France,
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. USSR exports to the UK and
Finland also increased over 1953.
VII. Other Aspects of Special Interest.
In the period from January 1953 to April 1954, certain aspects of
Soviet trade tactics developed which appear worthy of separate
mention. These developments are discussed below by subject.
A. Ministerial Reorganization.
1. January-March 1953?
Trade was one of the fields in which the new Soviet
leadership introduced broad organizational changes. On 6.-March 1953,.
the day after Stalin's death, it was announced that the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Trade had been merged. The new
Ministry of Foreign and Domestic Trade was headed by Anastas Mikoyan,
a member of the Party Presidium and a former Minister of Foreign
Trade (1938-49). I.G. Kabanov, former Chairman of the State Com-
mittee for the Material Technical Supply of the Economy (GOSSNAB),
was named First Deputy Minister. P.N. Kumykin and V.G. Z;havoronkov,
displaced Ministers of Foreign and Domestic trade respectively,
remained on as Deputy Ministers.
2. April-September 1953?
The merger of the trade ministries lasted about six
months. On September 15 and 16 1953, additional ministerial changes
were announced by the Soviet government. The Ministry of Foreign
and Domestic Trade was once again divided into its 2 component parts.
Mikoyan was appointed Minister of Domestic Trade, and Kabanov was
elevated to the post of Minister of Foreign Trade. The appointment
of a person of Mikoyan's experience tended to emphasize the role of
domestic trade and therefore the role of domestic production in the
announced increase in the availability of consumer goods.
- 37 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-1RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
B. Malenkov's Speech.
In a long speech to the Supreme Sovi t of the USSR on 8 August
1953, Malenkov sounded the keynote to the new Soviet trade policy. In
a section dealing with the international. situation he stressed the
importance of strengthening relations between the USSR and neighboring
states. He also pointed out that the number of states with which the
USSR entertained trade relations was growing and indicated that
business circles in.Free World countries wer dtriving to remove
discriminatory measures restricting internat onal trade. 65/ The
speech, therefore, was consistent with the Soviet trade tactics which
were then prevalent. It gave the Kremlin an,opportunity to advertise
its tactics and at the same time to help promote their successful
implementation.
C. Petroleum Exports.
One of the outstanding features of S iet foreign trade tactics
during the lat-;er half of 1953 was the abrupt increase in the shipment
of petroleum and petroleum products to the West as .well as increased
offers 'to ship these products.
During July and August 1953 the USISR negotiated trade pacts
which included unusually high quotas for Soviet export of petroleum
and; petroleum products. Agreements with Argeitina, France, Greece,
and Iceland, aE- indicated in. Table 7*, included quotas for 500,000;.
1+00,000; 300,000; and 200,000 tons, respectively. These quotas totaled
1.4 million tots, or more than 3 times the esttimated total petroleum
exports to the Free World from the USSR in 193.
It is estimated that actual volume of Soviet exports of 1
petroleum products to the Free World was about 80 percent greater in
1953 than in 1552, amounting to 419,000 tons and to 250,000 tons,
respectively. At the same time Soviet Bloc exports of petroleum to
the Free World increased about 1+5 percent, fr 1,905,000 tons in
1952 to 2,780,000 tons in 1953. It is estimated that approximately
75 percent of all 1953 Soviet exports of petroleum products to Free
World countries occurred in the last 6 months of the year, and that
about 50 percent took place in the last quart r alone,. 661 Favor-
able market conditions notwithstanding,puch an abrupt increase in
* Table 7 f oll )ws on p . 39-
- 38 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Possible Soviet Exports and Actual Bloc Exports of Petroleum
and Petroleum Products to Selected Free World Countries L7/
1953-54
(Thousand Tons)
Volume of
Possible Shipments a/* Actual Shipments
1953-54
1953
Free World Countries
Volume
Delivery Period
Bloc.J
USSR
Argentina
500
August 1953 August 1954
/
c
l
i
B
100
1954
$
C'
g
um
e
Denmark
200
1954
9
C/
Egypt
350
1954
1
E
land
Fi
774
1954
8
n
France
400.1/
July 1953-July 1954
20
C/
Greece
300
July 1953-July 1954
17
c/
d
Icela
200
August 1953-August 1954
51
51
n
India
40
1954
/
J
Israel
200 e/
1954
0
0
It
l
500
October 1953-October 1954
330
121
y
a
Japan
223
1954
0
0
Sweden
.boo
1954
289
135
Turkey
77
1954
c
Wes?. r e,?,,,:,.,
200 f/
1954
130
2
UK
100-
1954
0
Total for indicated selected countries
Estimated total to all Free World Countries
4,7641
1,541, 3992
2,780 449
* -Footnotes for Table 7 follow on po 40.
- 39 -
Approved For Release 1999/ P79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2'r:-CfiA=RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Table- 7
Possible Soviet Exports and Actual Bloc Exports of Petroleum
and Petroleum Products to Selected Free World Countries 67/
1953-54+
(Continued)
a I dude trade .,, .7 1~
w.,rtcr .,....tir_L._.i._
t- --"'~-`---?- '~ - ~.-+`- -+~+ vu V CL V~7, o,LLLL Vi1Gl p?
b. Includes USSR-.
C. Not available.
d. Deleted from trade agreement in February 1954 but some shipments had already been made and others
might be made.
e. Includes a 100,000-ton option.,
f. Volume estimated from a given value figure of $5 million-
- 40 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
petroleum exports could be interpreted as the result of a change in
Soviet trade tactics because the availability of many types of
petroleum for export is not subject to seasonal variations?
Concurrent with the increase in actual exports, the USSR made
overtures to continue petroleum exports at a high level in 1954.
Table 7 presents data on possible and actual exports of petroleum
and petroleum products to the Free World. In examining Table 7,
however, it must be borne in mind that offers and trade agreement
quotas are not contracts. The USSR is not, therefore, firmly com-
mitted to export petroleum products in the amounts specified and,
in fact, probably will not. It should be further pointed out that
although most of the agreements with and offers to the Free World
have been made by the USSR, it is estimated that less than 20 percent
of the shipments actually originate in the USSR. Nevertheless, it
is readily apparent that since mid-1953 the USSR has shown a far
greater eagerness to export these products.
D. Soviet Gold Shipments.
if October-December 1953-
A sharp rise in the volume of Soviet gold exports was another
feature of the new trade tactics. During the-last quarter of 1953,
unusually large shipments of gold moved from the USSR to the Free
World. These shipments brought the 1953 Soviet gold exports to the
Free World to an estimated total of between $100 million and $150
million. In value terms this amount would have represented a large
increase over estimated average annual sales of from $50 to $100
million.
In part, these large exports of Soviet gold were apparently
made in order to offset an accruing trade deficit unfavorable to the
USSR., Because of the large volume of goods exported by the USSR to
Western countries in the last quarter of the year, however, the
estimated 1953 Soviet trade deficit with that area approximated only
$38 million (Tables 5 and 6). Roughly $69 million to $110 million*
worth of Soviet gold was therefore exchanged directly for Western
currencies or credits which could be used by the USSR for a variety
of purposes including payment for clandestine trade transactions,
* Plus or minus net additions or subtractions for other balance-of-
payments -items.
- 41 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA'RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
financing Communist organizations and activity s, and the establish-
ment of a foreign exchange reserve.
2. January April 1954.
The Level of Soviet gold shipments j to .the Free World in
the first 4 months of 1954 indicated continued, heavy sales. For
this period, Soviet sales are estimated to havt been between $60
million and $100 million.
Offers and subsequent sales of lame amounts of Soviet
gold to the Free World should not be unexpected.. The USSR has con-
tinued to indicate a willingness to increase c odity imports even
though it appears to be having difficulties in finding export com-
modities accepta'sle to the Free World. Therefore., the activity in
Soviet gold sales to the Free World, noted. during the latter paxt of
1953, continued at least through the first four months of 19:54.
E. Soviet Platinum Sales.
1. 1953.
The :-ising gold sales were paralleled by a marked increase
in the amount, of Soviet platinum appearing in
During 1953 the USSR exported 94,900 troy ounc
at $8,797,600,to the UK. 68/ These facts are
reasons. Platinum, in certain forms, is a, str
was the first year since 1947 that the USSR ex
UK. Moreover, t'ie indicated amount sold to th,
estimate of the total annual platinum producti
to 125,000 troy junces). 69/
2. January-March 1954.
ree World markets.
s of platinum, valued
ignificant fo: several
tegic commodity, and 1953
orted platinum to the
UK approaches a rough
n in the USSR (100,000
In March 1954, the bulk market price for platinum dropped
from $90 to $84 per troy ounce. The reappearance of Soviet platinum
on the world mar'cet in substantial quantities as listed as a factor
contributing to the fall in price. 70/ Thus to large shipments of
Soviet platinum --lo the UK witnessed in 1953 and the appearance of
that commodity in several trade pacts concluded by the USSR with Free
World countries :Ln 1954 point up the Russians'attempt to substitute
certain commodities for traditional exports iniorder to balance trade.
- 42 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
F. Trade Minister's Report.
The value of recent Soviet offerings of petroleum,, gold, and
platinum has represented a definite break with the previous export
pattern of the USSR, and suggests an increased interest in securing
goods in Free World markets. The widely publicized consumer goods
program and the continuing Soviet commitments to heavy industry and
defense production are at least partially responsible for this
interest.
In Soviet decrees and speeches during the last quarter of
1953,the role of foreign trade in the domestic consumer goods pro-
gram of the USSR received only secondary attention, with the
possible exception of Mikoyan's report at the All-Union Conference
of Trade Workers on 17 October 1953? Mikoyan stated: 71/
A few words must be said about the import of consumer
goods. During recent years we have been making use of this
additional source of supply for the population. Having be-
come better off we can now allow ourselves to import such
foodstuff as rice, citrus fruits, bananas, pineapples,
herring, and such manufactured goods as high standard
woolens and silk fabrics, furniture and certain other goods
supplementing our range. These goods are in good demand by
the population. Although we are buying 4 billion rubles
worth of consumer goods from abroad this year, two-thirds
of this sum will be spent on goods from the People's Democ-
racies. In turn we are exporting certain consumer goods
of which we have a sufficiency, and are helping the People's
Democracies.
Here then is a direct statement regarding foreign trade.
There is a complication, however, which affects a complete under-
standing of what was meant, namely, that the type of rubles was not
specified. If official rubles (4 rubles: 1 US dollar) were meant
then consumer goods imported during 1953 were valued at $1 billion,
two-thirds of which were to come from Soviet Bloc countries and the
remainder -- $333 million -- from the Free World. If this indicated
1953 Soviet import figure for consumer goods from the Free World
($333 million) is related to the subsequent actual 1953 total import
figure ($416 million) from that area, almost 80 percent of total
Soviet imports from the Free World would have consisted of consumer
-43-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA
goods. Though complete- commodity trade stat
are not yet available, such a high percentag
imports* appears out of the question.
RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
sties for the year 1953
of consumer goods
It hae been estimated that for 1950, 1951, and 1952 the
percentage of total Soviet imports from the Free World accounted for
by consumer goods was 8, 13, and 16 percent respectively. :L2/ In
view of these estimates, and because there as been no evidence of a
radical shift in the commodity composition of Soviet imports from
the Free World, Mikoyan's statement now appears to have been purpose-
fully misleading, extremely optimistic, or erhaps based on an
exchange rate other than 4 to 1.
G. Soviet Ship Procurements.
One indication of continuing Soviet interest.in items other
than consumer goods was the effort to incre se the number of ships
which would be imported by the USSR fran We tern European nations.
Under trade agreements signed during the pe iod from July 1953 to
April 1954., the USSR planned to import approximately 193 ships
(excluding an unknown ship quota from the N therlands) . The USSR
signed contracts with the UK and West Germany for the purchase of
30 additional ships. 73/ The quota for ships in the 1954 Soviet-
Finnish trade agreement was essentially the same as in the 1953
agreement 74/ but the order for 25 ships fr m Sweden was the first
Soviet order :or vessels from that country since the expiration of
the 1946 cred:Lt agreement on 8 December 195"- 75~ Although no con-
tracts for French vessels were negotiated between the nations in
1952, the Soviet-Franco trade agreement of my 1953 provided for
the USSR to import ships. 76/ The renewal n 1953 of the Soviet-
Italian agreement provided for a list cf go s which included the
delivery of snips to the USSR- 77/ The agr ement signed with
Belgium in January 1954 provided for the delivery of refrigerator
and cargo sht s to the USSR. 78/ In Octobe 1953, under the 1953
Danish-USSR trade agreement, 5 refrigerator ships were contracted
for delivery to the USSR, 79/ and in April 954 the Soviets were
reportedly ready to contract for the construction of 5 additional
such ships. 82J
* Based on the definition of."consumer go
11 as used in source 72/.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
H. USSR-UK Trade Negotiations.
Recent Soviet overtures have revealed a particularly strong
interest in encouraging trade with certain key Western European
countries. The important part played by the UK in current Soviet
trade tactics is indicated by the large number of negotiations which
the USSR has carried on with British businessmen in 1954. It is
claimed that about 100 representatives of 54 British firms have
visited Moscow since the beginning of the year. These firms are
mainly engaged in the production of power station, forge, and press
equipment; machine tools; and equipment for the textile and food
industries and for shipbuilding. 81/
Moscow's overtures of increased trade to the UK (British
businessmen) reached their climax on 4 February 1954. On that
date Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Kabanov handed a group of
British businessmen a list of items specified for import from the
UK in the years 1955-57. The total value of these goods was
estimated to be 4.5 billion rubles ($1,125 million), which would
average 1.5 billion rubles ($375 million) per year.
An extract from Minister Kabanov's statement follows: 82/
Given proper conditions in respect of normalization
of Anglo-Soviet trade, Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations
might place orders for ships and equipment to be ful-
filled in 1955, 1956, 1957 for about 3 billion rubles
including: ships, 1,500 million rubles; power equipment,
600 million rubles; forging and press equipment and
machine tools, 400 million rubles; textile and food
industrial machinery, 375 million rubles; and miscellaneous
equipment, 125 million rubles; as well as purchase within
the same period of raw materials, food and industrial
goods for an approximate amount of 1.5 billion rubles,
thus making a total of 4.5 billion rubles, or over b 400
million sterling.
It is evident in the above quotation that the usual. Soviet
hedges were present -- "Given the proper conditions ... Trade
Organizations might place orders. Indefiniteness was
also indicated in the very general description of the last-mentioned
Emphasis inserted by analyst.
- 45 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 s a
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-;RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
category. Raw materials), food, and industrial consumer goods, although
accounting for 1.5 billion rubles or one-third of the total value of
indicated trade, are not broken down in terms of value of of relative
importance. Furthermore, in subsequent cim me its pertaining to the
implementation of this particular trade offer,, the Russians have con-
tinually repeated the qualifying phraEe - - "given the establishment
of the necessary conditions ". These necessary conditions are
never fully spelled out but most certainly imply the removal, of
Western trade controls.
If this trade offer were carried out, its significance
could be grasped- by realizing that Soviet imports from the CK during
each of the years 1955-57 would average $375 million or about 32
times the 1952 postwar peak of $105 million. Moreover, the normally
exported goods which the USSR stated it would ship to the UE: during
1955-57 to pay for imports would have to increase more- than 100
percent by value: over 1952?, when Soviet exports to the UK totaled
$163 million.
Unless gold and other precious metal xports from USSR can
be increased, i'; is presently doubtful whethe the USSR can directly
balance expanded imports from the UK. Soviet grain shipments to the
UK in. 1952 accounted for about 60 percent of total Soviet exports
to that nation. Partially because of a Sovie supply problem which
incorporates thc: domestic consumer goods grog am, and also because
trade! in Britain has been returned to private hands, the ab'Llity of
the USSR to satLsfy any large potential demand by the British for
Soviet grain in the near future presently appEars doubtful. Faced
with such a situation, Moscow would undoubtedy attempt to substitute
other products, such as petroleum, in place of' grain. Soviet success
in such a ventu:^e would be conditioned more b Western demand than
by Soviet domestic availability.
On 29 April, Sir Greville S. Maginnes , President of the
Associated British Machine Tool Makers Ltd., and president of the
Russa-British Chamber of Commerce, stated- that firm orders to the
value of between $84 and $112 million had been placed in Britain by
the USSR since the beginning of 1954. 83/ He neglected to mention,
however, that cf this total value probably on y half would be free
from strategic trade controls. Because of Si Sreville's position
his statement cn Soviet-British trade would u doubtedly reflect
optimism. Nevertheless, impending relaxation of Western trade con-
trols, coupled with the high pitch'of British businessmen's
enthusiasm for increasing trade with the USSR, does set the stage for
a possible expe.nsion of trade between the nations.
- 46 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Soviet imports from the UK during the first quarter of 1954
were valued at $13 million, compared. with $15 million during the
comparable 1953 period; and Soviet exports to the UK reached $23
million in the similar 1954 period, against $19 million in 1953?
Thus,total trade turnover between the countries through the first
3 months of the. current year represented only a minor increase over
1953. Because recent trade negotiations have included many goods
which require relatively long production periods, however, ultimate
deliveries would not yet be reflected in trade statistics.
I. USSR West German Trade Relations.
A very important aspect of Soviet trade tactics with the
Free World has emerged in the form of increasing activity in the
USSR's trade relations with West Germany. Highly industrialized,
West Germany is a potential supplier of industrial and technical
equipment to the USSR. Moreover, increasing competition between
Western nations for world markets enhances the susceptibility of
Western businessmen to Soviet trade stimuli. The increased trade
turnover between the USSR and West Germany, indicated in Tables 5
and 6,therefore will probably continue and could reach major
proportions.
Such a situation could be advantageous to the USSR,. The
USSR might procure desired equipment, and the likelihood, of
business animosities developing between West Germany and other
Western nations would be enhanced. In addition, there would be
a strong possibility that any sharp improvement in the economic or
political status of West Germany might arouse the suspicions of
other Western European nations to the detriment of programs for
Western international cooperation.
Events in the last quarter of 1953 and early 1954 indicated
an expansion of trade between the USSR and West Germany. In December
1953 a Foreign Office official stated that West Germany had. decided
to proceed with final contracts for 10 of the 30 fishing vessels
which the USSR had requested to be built. 84/ At the end of
January 1954 it was revealed that the items the USSR agreed. to
exchange for the West German vessels consisted of nickel, $700,000;
manganese and bhrome ore, $4,800,000 to $6,000,000; mixed petroleum
products, $5,000,000; silver, $1,000,000; platinum, $150,000; and
timber, $4,000,ooo. 85/
- 47 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA
RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
The firs-; ship is scheduled to be delivered in February 1955
and the last in December 1955. An order for five more vessels and
a floating fishery processing factory equipped with cannery machinery
may also be cohe_uded.
A Hamburg; businessman returned from Mo~cow in early March 1954
after having concluded a contract with the USSF. He purchased 8,000
tons of naphthal?sne valued at $540,000 in exchange for delivery to the
USSR of aniline dyes,,$254,490; citric acid, $51,500; and calcium
chloride, $160,000. The arrangement was a barer transaction because
neither party wa>; willing to pay in free dollars, pounds, or Swiss
francs. Notes made by this businessman indicated that Soviet require-
ments for import,; were merchant ships, fishing ii vessels, dredges, and
1,000 to 3,000 tons of lead. In exchange, the Soviets were ready to
offer gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and i idium. The business-
man felt that the USSR was also able to deliver chrome and manganese
ores, timber, vegetable oil cakes, drugs, and castor oil. 86/
In the latter part of March 1954 a direct barter agreement
was. concluded be.:;ween a Frankfurt grain tradin firm and Soviet
export agencies. The agreement provided that 10,000 tons of Russian
bread grain was ;o be supplied in exchange for German shoe leather.
The price of the .Russian grain was reported to be below the world market
level. This Frankfurt grain trading firm has qo far received about
32,000 tons of Russian grain under other similar barter agreements. 87/
Although West Germany does not have a rade and payments
agreement with the USSR, there is a strong demand for some such type
of agreement. German-Soviet talks were held recently in Geneva to
explore the poss:,'_bilities of putting trade on firm legal basis.
Following the preliminary trade talks in Geneve, a group of German
industrialists and bankers, representing tine "Eastern Trade Committee
of German Industry," prepared to go to Moscow o continue trade talks
and to investiga-;e the ramifications for estab ishing some type of
trading arrangement. 88/ Recent information 1 dicates, however, that
the planned visi'; has been cancelled by the intervention of Adenauer. 89/
J. Soviet Technical and Financial , Assistance and Loans.
Soviet offers of technical assistance ere originally made
last July at a U11 Economic and Social Council COSOC) session in
Geneva with a qualified offer of 4 million rubles, and later in
February 1954 at the tenth meeting of the t7N Edonomic Commission for
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~IRDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 ,. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in Ceylon. Subsequent events imply
that the type of technical assistance planned by the USSR involves
the sending of Soviet technicians abroad rather than outright
grants of money. The December 1,953 Soviet trade agreement with
India and the January 1954 agreement with Afghanistan both include
aspects of technical assistance. The possibility of some type of
Soviet technical assistance to Egypt also was indicated during early
1954. 9o/
It appears that the technical assistance program of the USSR
aside from attempting to woo underdeveloped countries toward the
Communist camp is basically designed to serve as a propaganda plat-
form for international meetings, and to enhance the prestige of the
USSR both at home and abroad.
In August 1953 the USSR extended a credit in the amount. of
$30-million to Argentina. This credit was followed in January 1954
by a $3.5-million credit 911 and a later 600,000 credit to
Afghanistan. 92/ On 6 February 1954 the USSR granted Finland a,
$10-million loan which, unlike the previous "loans," was not for
specific Soviet goods but rather an account on which Finland could
draw gold dollars or any other foreign currency agreed upon. This
grant was apparently the first gold or convertible currency loan
made by the USSR to a Western country.
The Argentine credit may be viewed as a corollary to the
signing of the Soviet Argentine trade agreement. Because the
agreement itself would assist the USSR in any planned economic
penetration of Latin America, the extension of the loan contains
implications other than economic expediency. Futthermore, the
Soviet grant puts the USSR in competition with Germany, the UK, and
the US in supplying capital goods to Argentina on credit.
The Finnish loan agreement appears to be the culmination of
a long series of negotiations designed to convert Finland's clearing
ruble accounts into a more readily spendable form. Consequently,
the Soviet loan to Finland is better viewed as a compromise between
Finland's desire to convert her ruble balances and the USSR's
reluctance to make them convertible.
- 49 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
K. Trade Consultations.
In 1954, Soviet trade tactics have ontinued to reflect
political as well as economic overtones. A- the ECE-sponsored
East-West trade consultations held in Geneve,from April to May 1954,
the Russians left the Free World delegates uncertain as to Soviet
intentions. 93/ Following the concerted bu'ld-up given to East-
West trade pcssibi.lities by Soviet press an radio services, many
representatives from the-Free World approacied the meetings full
of optimism. By the close of the consultations, however, optimism
over the immediate prospects of increasing East-West trade was
dampened considerably.
Beginning with multilateral discussions of the broader
obstacles to trade, consultations followed Ithe pattern established
at last year's meeting. During this year's multilateral talks,
the Soviet delegate disappointed West Europan proponents of East-
West trade development when he appeared completely unprepared to
offer any constructive suggestions despite the fact that at earlier
plenary sessions the USSR had recammended t e discussion of specific
structural problems impeding an increase in trade. The major
structural problems were considered to be t Lie differences between
Soviet Bloc end Free World trading organizations and techniques, and
the new trade patterns which had developed jsince World War II.
One of the few positive actions on I he part of the Soviet
delegate was his support for discussion of A possible East-West
clearing arrangement. During the subsequent discussion, however,
although he c.id appear attentive, he offered nothing constructive.
Concerning the possibility of a multil.ater l clearing, it was antic-
ipated that tL working group would be f arme to consider the problem
when and if the ECE Committee on Trade Development meets in October
1954.
The Russians also aroused great consternation among the Free
World experts when they failed to transactlany substantial business
during this ;rear's bilateral talks. In f
for trade were developed at these talks th
Discussions of problems arising under exis
tracts were :'_nconclusive. Soviet Bloc rep
were not prepared to discuss suggestions t
trade could be raised if their countries w
price and quality of which could compete w
t, fewer possibilities
n at last year's meetings.
ing agreements and con-
esentatives apparently
at the level of East-West
uld export more goods the
th Free World products.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 ti Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Neither were the Bloc delegates willing to discuss the settlement
of adverse balances by transfers of gold or acceptable currencies.
The USSR thus has attempted to use the prospect of increased
trade to political advantage, but has been slow to remove some of
the principal obstructions to this trade.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 1. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Information used for this memorandum revealed two major gaps
in intelligence: the lack of firm values for Soviet exports of
precious metals and the unavailability of current commodity trade
statistics.
Estimates of Soviet exports of precious metals are available,
but the range is large. This is primarily the result of limited
source reporting. In order to increase the volume of reporting on
this subject, requirements have been submitted to numerous potential
sources from whom a more complete coverage is expected in the
future.
The unavailability of current commodity trade statistics for.
Soviet trade with the Free World is and will undoubtedly continue
to be a major gap in intelligence. This is because of the nature of
the subject. The USSR publishes no complete trade statistics for
commodity turnover, and such information must be obtained from all
the Free World trade partners of the USSR. Computation by each
individual country of its trade turnover with other nations is a
time-consuming process. Submission of trade. statistics by the
individual Free World country to the US Department of Commerce and
the final tabulation of all these statistics increases the time lag
so that many months elapse before such statistics are available for
CIA use.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
APPENDIX B
SOURCES AND, EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
The information, contained in this report was drawn from a
variety of sources. Data concerning international meetings and
bilateral tactics were taken largely from information contained in
numerous Department of State periodicals, especially Soviet Affairs.
Figures for the chart on the frequency of Soviet radio propaganda
were supplied exclusively by FBIS and were based on published
reports or unpublished data. The trade pact information contained
in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, was derived from numerous documents
maintained in the trade agreements file of ORR. The statistical
data on the level of Soviet trade with the free world in Tables 5
and 6 were constructed primarily from value series information
prepared by the International Economic Analysis Division, Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce. In Table 7, figures con-
cerning actual petroleum exports were constructed from information
contained in a CIA document, and figures on possible petroleum
exports were derived from various documents contained in the trade
agreements file of ORR. Estimates on Soviet gold sales in 1953 were
extracted from a published CIA report, and the figures for sales in
195+ are taken from a recent estimate by ORR which has not yet been
published. For the purposes of this report, which is intended to
show changes and trends in recent Soviet trade tactics, the statisti-
cal data presented are believed to be reliable. Because information
was taken from a variety of sources, errors in specific details may
have occurred, but not to such a degree as to impair the over-all
accuracy of the report.
2. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
S
ource of Information
Doc. - Documentary 1
A
- Completely reliable 2
B
- Usually reliable 3
C
- Fairly reliable 4
D
- Not usually reliable 5
]E
- Not reliable 6
F
- Cannot be judged
- Confirmed1 by other sources
- Probably true
- Possibly true
- Doubtful 1
- Probably alse
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents
and organizations; copies or translations of su
staff officer; or information extracted from su
staff officer, all of which may carry the field;
Evaluations not otherwise designated are th
cited document; taose designated "RR" are by th
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agr
on the cited document.
)f foreign governments
h documents by a
h documents by a
evaluation "Documentary."
se appearing on the
author of this report.
1.
State,
0Th Report No. 4800 Soviet Af
fairs, Feb 1913.
S.
2.
State,
0Th Report No. 4800.51, Soviet Af
fairs, Mar 1953.
S.
3.
State,
OI12 Report No. 4800.53, Soviet A:
fairs, May 1953.
S.
4.
State,
Ollt Report No. 4800.55, Soviet Af
fairs, Jul 1953.
S-
5-
State,
0Th Report No. 4800.59, Soviet Af
fairs, Dec 1953.
S.
6.
Ibid.
7.
State,
OIIh Report No. 4800 .62, Soviet Af
fairs, Mar 1954.
S.
8.
State,
Ollt Report No. 4800.63, Soviet Af
fairs, Apr 19;14.
S.
9.
Ibid.
10.
State,
OIEh Report No. 4800.49, Soviet A
fairs,
Jan 1953.
S.
11.
State,
OD, Report No. 4800.50, Soviet A
fairs,
Feb 1953.
S-
12.
Ibid.
13.
State,
0 Report No. 4800.51, Soviet Af
fairs , Mar 1953.
14.
Ibid.
15.
State,
0Th Report No. 4800.52, Soviet A
fairs,
Apr 1953.
S-
16.
State,
0Th Report No. 4800.55, Soviet A
fairs,
Jul 1953.
S.
17.
State,
OTt Report No. 4800.54, Soviet A
fairs,
Jun 1953.
S.
- 56 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
25X1A8a
18. State, OIR Report No. 4800.56, Soviet Affairs, Sep 1953? S-
19. State, OIR Report No. 4800.5, Soviet Affairs, Jul 1953. S-
20. State, OIR Report No. 4800 .56, Soviet Affairs, Sep 1953. S-
21. State, OIR Report No. 4800.54, Soviet Affairs, Jun 1953. S-
22. State, OIR Report No. 4800.56, Soviet Affairs, Sep 1953? S-
23- State, OIR Report No. 4800 .55, Soviet Affairs, Jul 1953. S-
24. State, OIR Report No. 4800.56, Soviet Affairs, Sep 1953? S-
25- Ibid.
26. State, OIR Report No. 4800 .59, Soviet Affairs, Dec 1953? S-
27. State, OIR Report No. 4800.60, Soviet Affairs, Jan 1954. S.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. State, OIR Report No. 4800.62, Soviet Affairs, Mar 1954. S-
31- State, OIR Report No. 4800.63, Soviet Affairs, Apr 1954. S.
32. Ibid.
33? State, OIR Report No. 4800.64, Soviet Affairs, May 1954- S-
34. State, OIR Report No. 4800 .63, Soviet Affairs, Apr 1954. S.
35. State, 0IR Report No. 4800.64, Soviet Affairs, May 1954. S.
47. USSR with:
Finland -- Annual Protocol: State, Helsinki Despatch
No. 547, 4 Mar 1953. C. Eval. RR 1.
Finland-Poland ) Trilateral Annual Protocols: Ibid.
Finland-Czechoslovakia )
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Egypt -- Barter Agreement: State, Ii.coming Telegran,
London, No. 3651, 5 Jan 1953. Evalt RR 3.
Egypt-Noland-Bulgaria -- Barter Agrement: State, Cairo
Despatch No. 1870, 13 Mar 1953? U.1 Eval. RR 1.
48. State, OCR Report No. 4800.50, Soviet ffairs, Feb 1953-
S.
49. Ibid.
50. State, OCR Report No. 4800.51, Soviet Affairs, Mar 1953- S-
51,, State, OCR Intelligence Reports No. 6275, 27 Aug 1953- S-
52. State, OCR Report No. 00.57, Soviet Affairs, Oct 1953- S-
53,, Ibid.
54. State, OCR Report No. 4800.56, Soviet Affairs, Sep 1953- S-
55., USSR wita:
Denmarc -- Timber Contract: State, openhagen Despatch
No. 1390, 25 Jun 1953? S. Eval. 1.
Buttec Contract: 'Ibid.
Herring Contract: State, Copenhagei Despatch No. 248,
31 A-ag 1953. S. Eval. RR 1.
Trade Agreement: State, Copenhagen,Despatch No. :L22,
29 Jzl. 1953. C. Eval. Doc.
Suppl,sment: State, Copenhagen Desp.tch No. 241, 28 Aug 1953-
C. :'val. RR 1.
France -- Trade and Payments: State Paris Despatch No. 286,
28 Jil 1953- U. Eval. Doe.
Greece -- Clearing: State, Athens D spatch No. 127,
5 Aug 1953? C. Eval. Doc.
Iceland. -- Trade and Payments: Stag, Reykjavik Despatch
No. 52, 18 Aug 1953? C. Eval. Doe.
Nether Lands -- State, The Hague Despatch No. 1150,
14 Aor 1953. R. Eval. RR 2.
State, The Hague Despatch No. 1.50-B S, 10 Aug 1953? C.
Eval. RR 2.
State, The Hague Despatch No. 232, 7 Aug 1953? C.
Eval. RR 1.
Norway -- Barter Agreement: State, Oslo Despatch No. 30,
15 Jal 1953. S. Eval. RR 1.
State, Oslo Despatch No. 324, 31, Nov 1953. S. Evil. RR 2.
Sweden -- Trade Agreement: State, Stockholm Desptch No.
1-034, 29 Apr 1953. U. Eval. Doc.j
- 58 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
UK -- Herring Contract: Air, AA London, Joint WEEKA,
No. 27, 3 Jul 1953? C. Eval. RR 2.
Textile Contract: State, London Despatch No. 528,
29 Jul 1953. U. Eval. RR 2.
Egypt -- Payments: State, Cairo Despatch No. 398,
12 Aug 1953. C. Eval. Doc.
Iran -- Barter Agreement: State, Tehran Despatch No. 1082,
12 Jun 1953? C. Eval. RR 2.
Supplement: CIA FBIS, Daily Report, Western Europe
and Near East, 15 Oct 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
Argentina -- Trade and Payments: State, Buenos Aires
Despatch No. 114, 6 Aug 1953? U. Eval. Doc.
56. State, OIR Report No. 4800.57, Soviet Affairs, Oct 1953. S-
57- State, OIR Report No. 4800.60, Soviet Affairs, Jan 1954. S.
58. USSR with:
Denmark -- State, Copenhagen Despatch No. 682, 30. Dec 1953-
C. Eval. RR 1.
Finland -- Annual Protocol: State, Helsinki Despatch
No. 385, 14 Dec 1953? C. Eval. RR 1.
Italy -- Trade and Payments: Navy, NA Rome, No. 368-53,
4 Dec 1953? U. Eval. RR 1.
Netherlands -- State, The Hague Despatch No. 445,
26 Oct 1953? C. Eval. RR 2.
Army, MA, The Hague, Black No. 659, Joint WEEKA, No. 51,
18 Dec 1953? C. Eval. RR 2.
Israel -- New York Times, 4 Jan 1954. U. Eval. RR 1.
Afghanistan -- Annual Protocol: CIA FBIS, Daily Repport_,
Western Europe and Near East, No. 251, 28 Dec 1953. C.
Eval.RR2.
25X1A2g India -- Trade Agreement: State, Incoming Telegram,
Moscow, No. 646, 3 Dec 1953? C. Eval. RR 1.
59. State OIR Report No. 4800.60, Soviet Affairs, Jan 1914. S.
6o. 21 Apr 1954.. C. Eval. RR 2.
61. USSR with:
Belgium -- Trade Agreement State, Brussels Despatch
No. 802, 8 Feb 1954. U. Eval. Doc.
Norway -- Trade Agreement: State, Oslo Despatch No., 486,
15 Jan 1954. S. Eval. RR 1.
Sweden -- Trade Agreement: State, Stockholm Despatch
No. 831, 11 Feb 1954. C. Eval. Doc.
Egypt-Rumania -- Barter Agreement: Commerce, Weekly
Economic Developments Abroad, 5 Mar 1954. S.. EvaL. RR 1.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA~RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
Egypt -- Trade Agreement: State, Incoming Telegram,
Moscow No. 1169, 30 Mar 1954- C. Eval. RR 1.
Netherlands -- Herring Contract:: Army, MA, The Hague,
Black No. 696, Joint WEEKA, No. 10, 5 Mar 1954. C.
Eval.RR2.
Protocol: State, Incoming Telegram, Moscow No. 1345,
29 Apr 1954. OFFICIAL USE ONLY. val. RR 1.
Afghanistan -- Loan: CIA FBIS, Daily Report, USSR and
Eastern Europe, No. 20, 29 Jan 19 . OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
Eva RR 1.
Finland -- Loan: Army, MA, Helsinki, ACC 12-54, Joint
WEEKA, No. 6, 11 Feb 1954. C. E al . RR 1.
Lebanon -- Trade Agreement: CIA FBI , Daily Report,
USSR and Eastern Europe, No. 65, 1 May 195
OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Eval. RR 1.
62. Constructed primarily from "Value Ser'les" information
prepared by the International Economic Analysis Divisions
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Departure t of Commerce. C.
63. Ibid. 25X1 A8ad
64. Ibid.
66. CIA/RR, IP-361, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses
of Act:.on through Mid 1956, 30 Apr 1 5 S.
67. USSR wii;h:
Belgium -- State, Brussels Despatch No. 802, 8 Feb 1954.
U. Eval. Doc.
Denmark -- State, Copenhagen Despatch No. 216, 3 Oct 1953-
S. Eval. RR 3.
Egypt -- State, Cairo Despatch No. 035, 25 Feb 1954. S.
Eva_ . RR 3.
India -- CIA FBIS, Ticker Tape, London, 18 Jan 1954. U.
Japan -- State, Incoming Telegram, Faris, Polto No. 1435,
11 Mar 1954. S. Eval. RR 3.
Turkey -- Air, AA, Ankara, Joint WEEKA, No. 51, Part 2 from
Sane. AFC 392, 18 Dec 1953? C.
Stat,;, Ankara Despatch No. 262, 181Nov 1953? S. Eval. RR 3.
West Germany -- State, Incoming Telegram, Hamburg No. 133,
29 Tan 1954. C. Eval. RR 3.
UK -- Financial Times, London, 29 Jon 1954. U. Eval. RR 3.
All other countries -- Based on. CIA; estimates.
- 60 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-IRDP79T00935A000300050004-3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3
25X1A6a
68. State, London Despatch No. 2646, 3 Feb 1954. U. Eval. RR 2.
69. Interior Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1950, Washington,
1953, p? 1031. U. Eval. RR 3.
2(1AaBchester Guardian, 17 Mar 1954. U. Eval. RR 3.
72. State, OIR Report No. 4800.63, Soviet Affairs, Apr 1954. S.
73. ORR Contribution to NIE 10-54, 9 Mar 1954. S.
74. State, Helsinki Despatch No. 385, 14 Dec 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
75. State, Stockholm Despatch No. 831, 11 Feb 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
76. State, Paris Despatch No. 1575, 15 Dec 1953? C. Eval. RR 3.
77. Navy, NA Rome, No. 368-53, 4 Dec 1953. U. Eval. RR 1.
78. State, Brussels Despatch No.. 802, 8 Feb 1954. U. Eval. RR 1.
79. Commerce, Weekly Economic Developments Abroad, Nov 1953. U.
Eval. RR 1.
80. State, Copenhagen Despatch No. 1133, 14 Apr 1954. U.
Eval. RR 2.
81. Soviet Weekly, London, 29 Apr 1954. U. Eval. RR 3.
82. Board of Trade Journal, London, 6 Mar 1954. U. Eval. RR 3-
83- Financial Times, London, 30 Apr 1954. U. Eval. RR 2.
84. State, Incoming Telegram, Bonn, No. 2001, 18 Dec 1953? C.
Eval. RR 2.
85. State, Incoming Telegram, Hamburg No. 133, 29 Jan 1954. C-
92. State, Incoming Telegram, Kabul No. 382, 29 Apr 1954. C.
Eval. RR 2.
93. State, Current Economic Developments, No. 442, 25 May 1954,
PP. 11-13. S. Eval. RR 1.
te, Hamburg Despatch No. 330, 3 Mar 1954. C. Eval. RR
State, OIR Report No. 3800.62, Soviet Affairs, Mar 1954. S.
State, Moscow Despatch No. 934, 2 Jan 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
State, Kabul Despatch No. 251, Joint WEEKA, No.
29 Jan 1954. C. Eval, RR 2.
- 61 -
T / T
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000300050004-3