1953 SOVIET AGRICULTURAL RESULTS FUTURE PLANS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 13, 1954
• Content Type: IM

IwApproved For Release 1999/09
-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
1953 SOVIET AGRICULTURAL RESULTS
FUTURE PLANS AND PROSPECTS
CIA/RR IM-391
13 August 1954
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18, Usc, SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
4W
FOREWORD
The analyses and conclusions presented in this memorandum are
based on Soviet press material published during the period from
August 1953 through March 1954. The commodity and livestock number
estimates are based on an analysis of published statistical material,
crop condition reports, and weather data. Previous evaluations of
the new agricultural program by Embassy Moscow and the Department
of State were also used.
Although additional information on the general subject of this
memorandum has become available since the completion of writing,
as of 23 July 1954 none of that information materially alters the
conclusions reached.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
wr
------------
CONTENTS
Summary. . . . . . . . . ? ? . . . -o . . ? . . . . . . ? . .
Page
Is Intro duct io n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Crop Production and Livestock Numbers, 1953 . . . . . . . . 4
A. Food and Fibers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . .
B. Livestock Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? .
III. Measures for Increasing Agricultural Production, 1953 . . . 6
A. Changes in Investment 8 7
B. Incentive Measures
C. Increased Inputs 10
D. Initial Implementation, October 1953 - March 1954. . ? 12
E. Grain Problems and Acreage Changes . . . . . . . . . . 14
F. Change in Acreage Patterns . . ? 21
Tables
1. Estimated Production of Major Food Crops and Fibers in 5
the USSR, 1951-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Livestock Numbers in the USSR, 1952-54 . . . . . . . . . ? 5
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 ,,Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
cmA/RR IM 391
(ORR Project 21.148) -----~'---"_--
1953 SOVIET AGRICULTURAL RESULTS, FUTURE PLANS, AND PROSPECTS
Summary
By the end of 1953 the production of most crops and most species
of livestock in the USSR had failed to reach prewar levels. The
acreage sown to crops in 1953 was less than 1 percent larger than
that in 1940, and the yields of most crops had failed to increase.
1953 production of major food crops, such as grain and potatoes,
fell below that of the previous year, and livestock numbers in-
creased only slightly. In the face of these negative factors was
the fact that the population had been increasing for a number of
years at the rate of about 1.5 percent annually. Recognition of
the fact that agricultural development has not kept pace with popu-
lation growth and of the need for improving the quality of the diet
of an industrially expanding society appears to be the basis of the
new programs to increase agricultural production.
Within the first year after the death of Stalin the USSR had
adopted a series of measures designed to effect a rapid improvement
in Soviet agriculture. These included a series of incentive meas-
ures -- a downward revision in the level of agricultural taxes,
a reduction in delivery quotas levied on collective farmers, and
increases in the prices paid by the state to collective farms and
farmers for obligatory deliveries and for government purchases;
increases in capital investment, largely in farm machinery and
fertilizer; the establishment of permanent cadres of technically
trained personnel at machine tractor stations; and continuance of
the pressure to improve farm practices.
In addition to the positive measures adopted by the government
during 1953, such projects as the shelter-belt programs and the
Williams crop rotation syst an have been curtailed, and most, if not
all, of the irrigation projects auxiliary to the "great construc-
tion projects" have been cancelled.
Through the 1953-54 fall and winter, there was a concerted
effort by the party and the government to expedite various parts
of the new program, and in February a definite grain-acreage
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
expansion program was publicly announced. The expansion of acreage
into the virgin and unused lands is the most spectacular phase of
the new program, but other phases are more significant. Apparently
there will be large-scale changes in the structure of sown acreages
for all important agricultural regions. The modification of the
rotation system, causing a reduction in sown grasses, and the partial
abandonment of the principle of regional self-sufficiency will be
the two most significant factors and will bring about sharp changes
in inter-regional acreage patterns. In general, the emphasis will
be on an increase in grain production.
It is still too early in the implementation stage of the "new
course" to predict an upward trend in the productivity of land and
labor in the agricultural economy of the USSR. Expansion of
acreage will give a short-term increase to over-all production,
assuming no adverse weather conditions, but short-term measures can
only delay the time when a. general rise in crop yields and livestock
productivity will be needed to sustain a growing population at
present consumption rates. An even greater rise will be required to
improve the diet. In order to bring about adequate long-term pro-
duction, increased inputs of machinery, fertilizer, and skilled
manpower will be essential. Ultimate determination of the success of
the "new course," however}. lies with the peasant -- the actual.
producer -- and his reaction to the new incentive measures.
I. Introduction.
Soviet propaganda has attempted to create the impression that
the USSR is a land of vast and rich agricultural resources. That
the land mass is vast cannot be denied. That the agricultural
resources are rich is a claim that is open to question. Only a
little more than 10 percent of the USSR proper!: is classified as
tillable, and only a small proportion of the tillable land has a
good balance of the factors favoring high production. To generalize,
the areas of adequate precipitation are also the areas of poor soil
* Excludes acquired territory.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
and short growing seasons. The areas of uncertain or deficient
precipitation are areas having the best soil. A vast portion of
Central Asia and Siberia has poor soil and is subject to various
climatic extremes generally unfavorable to crop production.
Circumscribed as it is by these natural limiting factors, the arable
area of the USSR cannot be extended greatly beyond the currently
estimated 157 million hectares without encountering marginal or
submarginal growing conditions.
Soviet crop yields have always ranked among the lowest in the
world, but the large acreage devoted to crops, especially the cereals,
has always made the USSR a world leader in the production of wheat,
rye, barley, and oats.
In the pre-collectivization period, Russia's requirements for
most agricultural products were met from its own production. Small
quantities of rice, tea, and some minor food products were imported.
During the same period, Russia was the world's leading exporter of
wheat, rye, barley, and oats.
The interwar period was a time of declining exports for the
USSR. Collectivization had disrupted production in the early
1930's; war stocks were increased in the late 1930's; and to the
present time the growth of the population, especially the urban
population, has put heavy demands on crop production. During the
past 40 years the population has grown at a greater rate than that
at which the cultivated acreage has been enlarged. It has been
estimated that the area seeded to crops in 1913 amounted to .84
hectares per capita. It had declined to .80 in 1938 and to about
.73 in 1953.
Production of agricultural crops may be increased by extending
the cultivated area and by increasing the yield per unit of land.
While the Soviet government has used both methods, the extension of
the area under cultivation has been the traditional and easiest way
to keep a semblance of balance between the production of crops and
the needs of the population. The expansion of acreage is becoming
increasingly more difficult and costly as the limits of cultivation
are approached. Since the early 1930's, emphasis has been put on
increasing total production by raising yields through the use of
improved strains of seed, greater use of fertilizer, and Lmproved
techniques. The use of improved materials and the adoption of new
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9A
agricultural techniques in a country as large and diverse as the
USSR is a slow process. Even in the U.S there has been but little
increase in the yields of small-grain* crops in the past 50 years.
Although the USSR satisfies more than two-thirds of its caloric
requirements with cereal crops, livestock and industrial crops are
also important, and both have received considerable attention from
the Soviet planners.
Under the. Soviet regime, industrial development has been favored
over agriculture. Capital investments, grants, subsidies, and man-
power priorities have all been in favor of industry. This allocation
of capital and labor has resulted in a disproportionately slow rate
of growth in the output of agriculture. The disparity between the
two sectors became partic-.ilarly apparent as agriculture failed to
provide the foodstuffs considered necessary for direct consumption
and the raw materials for the operation of light industry.
II. Crop Production and Livestock Numbers, 1953.
A. Food and Fibers.
Table l:f:* gives the estimated production of major food
crops and fibers in the USSR, 1951-53.
As a result of relatively adverse weather conditions, 1953
production of the two most important food crops, grain and potatoes,
fell below that of 1952. Grain production suffered not only from
an estimated 12-percent drop in yields but also from a slight drop
in acreage. Cotton, the most important fiber, was favored by
better growing conditions, and the estimated raw (unginned) produc-
tion was at a postwar high.
B. Livestock Numbers.
Two of the three livestock categories showed some increase
in 1953 over 1952, but cattle numbers had not recovered from the
setback in the winter of 1952-53. Table 2** gives livestock num-
bers in the USSR, 1952-S4.
ea , rye, barley, and oats.
Table 1 follows on p. 5.
3 * Table 2 follows on p. 5.
-4-
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
Estimated Production of Major Food Crops and Fibers
in the USSR
1951-53
Million Metric Tons
1951 1952 1953
Grain
82.4
91
8
Potatoes
.
80.7
S
59.5
69.7
66.4
ugar Beets
C
tt
21.5
22.0
22.3
o
on (Raw)
Wool (G
3.5
3.2
3.6
rease Basis)
.160
.165
.175
Livestock Numbers in the USSR
1952-54 a/
Million Head as of 1 Jan
1952
1953
1954
Cattle
58.8
56.6
56.8
Swine
Sh
26.7
28.5
30.0
eep and goats
107.5
109.9
113.0
a. and i.ves c num ers are o icza sus figures from Soviet sources, but the USSR has
changed the published livestock census date from
1 January to 1 October, making it rather difficult to
compare 1952 with 1953. Summer and fall numbers are
always considerably higher than winter numbers because
of heavy slaughtering in the October-December period.
The 1 Jan 54 data are extrapolated estimates from
1 Oct 53 official data.
-5-
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
III. measures for Increasing Agricultural Production, 1953.
within the first year after the death of Stalin the Soviet
government adopted a series of measures designed to effect a rapid
improvement in Soviet agriculture. Without changing the institu-
tional framework of socialized agriculture as incorporated in the
collective farm, state farm, and machine tractor station, the Soviet
government has abandoned certain policies and modified others, but
for the most part the government has re-intensified the -drive to
have the peasants produce more food, feed, and fiber within the
broad institutional framework of the past 25 years by better use of
many of the previously approved techniques and methods.
The general tenor of the "new course" was first indicated in
Minister of Finance Zverev's report to the Supreme Soviet on
5 August 1953. Three days later, before the same body, Malenkov
gave additional details. Without a specific indictment of the
inadequacy of agricultural. production, malenkov implied that current
output is insufficient anc. that "our immediate task is...in the
an
next two or three years tc secure the creation in our cou.try of
abundance of foodstuffs for the population and of raw materials for
light industry."
"ialenkov then outlined the corrective measures to be applied in
bringing about an "upsurge" of production. These included a series
of incentive measures, such as a downward revision in the level of
agricultural taxes, a reduction in delivery quotas levied on col-
lective farmers, and increases in prices paid by the state to col-
lective farms and farmers for obligatory deliveries and for government
purchases; increases in capital investment in agriculture -- largely
in farm machinery and fertilizer; the establishment of permanent
cadres of technically trained personnel at machine tractor stations;
and, of course, a continuance of the pressure to improve farm
practices.
The newly elected First Secretary of the Communist Party,
inctet, a month ater fild in ricultural economyeangeneral d gave framework with
indictment of the e ag
the new incentive and capital investment programs.
In comparing the slow growth of postwar agricultural production
to the relatively rapid progress made in industry, Khrushchev claimed
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
an over-all production increase of 10 percent in 1952 over 1940.
While this modest increase in itself indicates the lagging of the
agricultural economy, even this claim is believed to be inflated.*
After the publication in early September 1953 of a decree
issued by the Central Committee of the Party and Khrushchev's
report on which the decree was based, three supplementary decrees
were issued elaborating on particular segments of the original
decree. These three supplementary decrees covered the livestock,
potatoes and vegetables, and machine tractor stations sectors with
no further elaboration on the important grain and technical crop
section of Khrushchev's report. It was not until February and March
of 1954 that further details of plans for the expansion of production
of grains and technical crops were given.
A. Changes in Investment.
There can be little doubt that there has been a sweeping
reappraisal in the past year by Soviet leaders of agricultural
performance, plans, and prospects. Certain technical procedures
that were considered dogma up to the time of Stalin's death have
been abandoned or modified. The most spectacular negative changes
have come about from the cancellation or modification of those two
well-advertised programs, the plan for the "transformation of nature"
and the irrigation schemes of the "great construction projects."
That drastic reductions have been made in these two programs is
implied by the conspicuous absence of reference in the press and
is confirmed by all the measures adopted since last August.
The shelter-belt program, first announced in 1948 and
publicized as a keystone to increments in crop yields in the drier
regions, has apparently now been curtailed after a large investment
in the planting of some 2.6 million hectares of trees. As a corollary
to the "transformation" program, the use of the famous Williams
* Assuming;- tit current procurement prices were used in weighing
the individual commodity productions in calculating the aggregate,
the high-value technical crops, such as cotton and sugar beets,
which have shown relatively large increases since 1940 would
distort the over-all index because of the low procurement prices
for such an important commodity as grain.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-90W
crop rotation system that had been part of official dogma from
Ploscow has recently been severely criticized and probably will be
modified.
At least part of the irrigation schemes of the "great con-
struction projects" were dropped during 1953. The largest of the
irrigation projects, the Great Turkmen Canal, has definitely been
eliminated, and there is evidence that work will be suspended on
the irrigation networks of the other four projects.
All of these highly propagandized projects were parts of
the over-all program for mitigating the effects of drought. After
a realistic appraisal of such costly and questionable inputs, the
current regime was willing, apparently, to switch the allocated
resources to more practiea]. schemes that may raise agricultural
output in the iimnediate future. :lost of these new inputs are designed
to arouse the interest of the peasant and to provide him with more
of such items as tractors, machinery, and fertilizer.
B. Incentive Measures?
One of the basic reasons for the low labor productivity
and the consequent low output of agricultural workers is the lack
of Zainteresovannost' (interestedness) on the part of the peasant.
To increase the initiative of the peasant, the government has
adopted a series of incentive measures.
Prices for obligatory deliveries for livestock, livestock
products, and potatoes and vegetables have been increased, 25 -.,per-
cent for certain vegetables and. up to 450 percent for livestock on
the hoof. Prices for livestock products sold to the government
beyond obligatory deliveries are to be increased by 30 to 50 per-
cent. Although these percentage increases will be applied to an
extremely low base resulting in the new procurement prices re-
maining low, the current prices may be high enough to encourage at
least the individual collective farmer to sell to the state a
greater proportion of the output from his private plot.
Apparently the price schedules for grain, the most important
crop, have not been changed, and thus the major source of income to
agriculture remains at its previous low level. The rates of obliga-
tory deliveries for livestock products from the privately owned sector
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 ,,Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
have also been lowered to give to individuals further encouragement
to retain at least a cow.
As far as obligatory deliveries from the collective farms
are concerned, the government will now ttdemand11 that established
norms for deliveries be strictly observed. In the past this princi-
ple has been violated by state procurement organizations when, to
compensate for the underfulfillment of delivery goals by the lower
producing collectives, higher rates were imposed upon the higher
producing collectives despite fixed norms for given regions. Al-
though Khrushchev previously implied that this practice had been
carried on without the knowledge of Soviet officials, violation of
the hectare-norm principle was accepted practice throughout the
postwar years, especially in grain. Every year up to 1952 the
central press carried letters and telegrams, from various provinces
and addressed to Stalin, announcing the fulfillment of grain de-
liveries and usually declaring that "voluntary" deliveries over and
above the plan had been made. Thus the government was able to ful-
fill the over-all delivery quotas by penalizing higher yielding
provinces to counterbalance a bad crop year in other provinces.
It remains to be seen if in the future Soviet officials do not ask
for "voluntary" deliveries from the better producing farms, rayons,
and oblasts.
To the peasant the first concrete indication, in terms of
rubles and kopeks, that the government was again changing its
"attitude" came at the time of the Supreme Soviet Session in early
August. A new tax law that reduced the over-all tax yield from 20
to 25 million collective farm households by 43 percent in 1,053, with
further reductions in 1954, was adopted at that time.
Besides the reduction in tax rates on private holdings,
there has been a simplifying of assessment methods. Under the old
law, collective farm households were assessed on the basis of the
types of produce grown, with a separate assessment for livestock.
The new system incorporates a fixed rate of assessment per one-
hundredth of a hectare of land in the private plots, regardless of
the type of crop, and -- most important of all -- eliminates the
separate tax on livestock. This new method of assessment will
encourage farmers to grow more valuable crops and to own livestock.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
An added incentive for those peasants who do not own cows
(about 45 percent of the households) comes with a reduction of tax
rates of 50 percent in 195;3 and 30 percent in 1954. This supposedly
will give enough added income to the individual household to permit
the purchase of a calf or young heifer.
The peasant workim7 on the collective farm may decide that the
new and less stringent policy concerning his private holding will
result in a greater return for his work time than will work for the
collective farm. In order to discourage such a decision, the
government has included a -.penalty that increases by 50 percent
taxes and obligatory deliveries of livestock products on a collective
farm household if one of its members fails, without good reason, to
work the minimum number of work days set by collective farm statutes.
C. Increased Inputs.
It has been pointed out that as part of the reappraisal. of
the general agricultural situation, the government has curtailed
or abandoned certain costly projects such as the shelter-belt scheme
and large-scale irrigation projects. Apparently the savings from
such delayed or abandoned investments will now be directed to in-
creasing the availability of other inputs such as mechanized draft-
power, machinery, fertilizer, and trained manpower.
Rates of delivery of tractors from 1954 to 1957 will average
annually about 40 percent greater than 1953 deliveries. In the last
quarter of 1953, the annual rate of deliveries of both tractors
and grain combines had increased by 7 percent over the 1953 rate as
a whole. Besides more mechanized draftpower, the government wants
to increase labor productivity in such unmechanized sectors as
potato and vegetable growing and animal husbandry by providing
large amounts of specialized machinery used in those sectors.
Not only will there be the advantage of increased labor productivity
from the use of a larger tractor and farm machinery park, but,
probably most important of all, there will be improved timeliness
of operations. The previous practice of completing certain field
operations long after the initiating date has undoubtedly aggravated
the harvest losses.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
One of the most realistic proposals of the "new course" is
the provision for a large increase in output of mineral fertilizer.
Production goals were set for 1959 and 1964 at 17 and 29 million tons
respectively. While this plan indicates a rational appraisal of the
type of input needed, it would mean an increase in 1953 plant capacity
of 3 times by 1959 and 5 times by 1964. It is believed that such
goals cannot be attained unless the USSR is willing to give dispro-
portionate emphasis to construction of mineral fertilizer facili-
ties -- to the detriment of other areas of the economy. Production
has already fallen behind the rate necessary to fulfill the modest
goal of 6.6 iillion tons set for 1955,-= the last year of the Fifth
Five Year Plan. To meet the Plan, there will have to be a 24-percent
increase in production in both 1954 and 1955, compared to increases
of 7 percent, 8 percent, and 9 percent for the last three years. It
is not considered likely that the Plan goal will be attained.
In the manpower area, the new program points toward increas-
ing the number of skilled personnel of the managing class of the
machine tractor stations and collective and state farms, of agronomic
and animal husbandry specialists at the farm level, and of skilled
and semi-skilled labor for machinery operation. All. of the various
manpower programs are cla.culated to reverse the tendency of the most
skilled and best educated collective farm members to leave the farms
and take more lucrative jobs in industry, and also to move agricul-
tural specialists away from desk jobs "closer to production tasks."
Although criticism of the personnel program was severe throughout
the 1953-54 fall and winter months, recent claims indicate that
plans are being fulfilled, at least in gross numbers.
The government's attention is now centered on improving the
quality of the collective farm chairmen, who -- Khrushchev now
readily ad_ i.ts -- are selected or dismissed br Party and ;government
organs. The confirmation of this procedure, heretofore implied, in
naming collective farm chairmen does away with the pretense in-
corporated in the collective farm statutes of "election" of the
chairmen by vote of the collective farm members.
In the organizational sphere, the machine tractor station
as an agency for technical assistance, political control, and
Excludes ground phosphorite and Thomas slag which, undoubtedly,
have been included in the 1959 and 1964 goals.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003- %
mechanization of Soviet agriculture has been considerably strengthened
by the new program. Many cf the new policies affecting machine
tractor stations reflect the years of government neglect of the
agricultural econoir. Such changes as the creation of a permanent
staff of tractor drivers and other machine operators, the payment
of these workers directly by the machine tractor stations instead
of by the collective farm,- and the permanent attachment to the
machine tractor stations of agronomist and other specialists will
center more than ever in the machine tractor stations the "responsi-
bility" for the carrying out of production tasks on the collective
farm. Besides having a greater economic responsibility, the machine
tractor station is to be the center of political control. The
reorganization of the rayon Party apparatus now going on will ?:lace
in each station one of the rayon Party secretaries, who will head
a group of e-,perienced pa3-ty workers (instructors) carrying out
political work in the col:!_=ctive farms served by the station. 'These
moves in the organizational field are intended to delineate better
the chain of responsible command and to eliminate the problem of
pinpointing the blame for production failures.
D. Initial Implementation, October 1953 - "March 1954
From 1 October 1953, the date of the last supplemental.
agricultural decree, to early ;;arch of 1954, there has been a
constant barrage of press commentary and conferences and a mass
effort by the Party and government to "explain the decisions...
to the working people of towns and villages." Using the medium of
editorials, conferences, and meetings, the government has carried
on a campaign of badgering; officials throughout the organizational
pyramid, from Moscow to the remote rayons, to carry out this or
that part of the new program. Although criticism was rather severe,
certain plans, particulary in the personnel area, were declared
to have been completed after earlier press comment indicated that
such programs as the transfer of specialists were not being carried
out.
At a meeting of editors in late November 1953, 1arushchev
took the opportunity to criticize officials in the lower echelons
of the Party for shortcomings in carrying out the agricultural
program. At this meeting T rushchev probably set the tone for the
* Although the latter still contributes to the wage fund.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9 I
 .,,Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
type and intensity of criticism to be used by the central authorities
in pushing the new program. The "new look" in criticism is more
mundane and free swinging than in the past, getting to specific
points more directly with less verbiage and generalization. This
is typical of the more realistic attitude of the Soviet leaders.
With unusual candidness, Khrushchev accused some officials
of having an "aristocratic attitude" toward agriculture and of
underestimating its importance. He also criticized the party organs
for not selecting the best available men to be the chairmen of
collective farms.
In January and February 1954, separate conferences of
machine tractor stations and state farm workers and "foremost"
agricultural workers of the RSFSR were held in the Kremlin. These
meetings were used as sounding boards to "disclose existing short-
comings" and to "propagate leading experience in the struggle for
carrying out the decisions."
In December 1953, the now deposed First Secretary of the
Kazakhstan Party, Z. H. Shayakhmetov, gave first indications that an
expansion of acreage in the dry steppelands was being considered. In
an article in the Republic press, he said there was a possibility
of the expansion of 6 million hectares of sown acreage in the
northern areas of Kazakhstan. An article in an agricultural weekly
in early January 195j also discussed the problems involved in
expanding acreage on virgin and unused lands.
In early March, a decree adopted by a plenum of the Central
Committee was published under the title, "For the Further Increase
in Output of Grain in the USSR and the Bringing of Virgin and Unused
Land Under Cultivation." Two weeks later Khrushchev's report, on
which the decree was based, was published. The "decision" and the
report were used as vehicles not only for a fuller explanation of
the grain acreage expansion program but also to fill in the details
on raising yields of -rain crops and yields and production of
technical crops and on the changes in planning as well as to bring
up to date a report on the progress, or lack of progress, made in
the agricultural program.
In the personnel field, Khrushchev claimed successes in
the transfer of engineers, technicians, and machine operators and
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9"
in the posting of responsible Party workers at the farm and machine
tractor station level; a reduction in the death rate of livestock
by one-third during the winter Season; acquisition by individual
owners of more livestock; and a greater 1953 rate of procurement by
the government of meat, mi:Lk, wool, and vegetables.
F. Grain Problems and Acreage Changes.
Last August, a few minutes after telling the Supreme Soviet
that "our country is fully supplied with grain," Malenkov gave an
indirect interpretation of what he meant by "fully supplied." He
said, "He are obli;;ed to secure a further and more rapid increase
in production of grain, bearing in mind that this is necessary for
our country not only in order to satisfy the growing requirements
of the population for bread, but also for a rapid development of
animal husbandry and the supply of grain to areas which produce
industrial. crops." A monta later Khrushchev gave a further clue
as to this interpretation when he said, "In general, we meet the
country's grain requirements in the sense that our country is pro-
vided with bread, that we.aave the necessary state reserves and that
we are able to engage, within certain limits, in export transactions."
?'hrushchev then went on to describe current supplies of feed grains
as inadequate.
Idalenkov and Illlrushchev were both obviously talking in a
static sense* when referring to the solution of the grain problem,
and then they switched to a frame of reference that included the
dynamics of population growth and the need for improving the quality
of the diet by consumption of more animal products. As Soviet
officials are now more pragmatic about agricultural affairs, they
undoubtedly realize that the completely unrealistic plans for
greatly increasing production of grain via the yield route could
not be attained in a few years.
Ihrushchev's report, and the Plenum decree in early Sep-
tember 1953, spoke mostly in generalizations about the need for
greater production of grain and technical crops and included only
plans for changes in acreage patterns affecting a minor part of the
* Static .-T- n e sense that grain availabilities were sufficient
to sustain the population during the 1953-54 consumption year with
the present dietary pattern.
- la -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
total sown acreage. The fact that a supplemental decree pertaining
to grain and technical crops was not published last fall gave
further indication that plans concerning acreage patterns in general
and grain acreage specifically had not at that time been formulated.
At a Kremlin conference of agricultural workers in February
1954, first indications were given that. acreage patterns were to
be changed, although earlier press references in December and
January had referred to possible acreage expansion in the dry
steppelands. Further data were given in the March reports.
Over-all grain acreage has remained about constant the last
three years and by 1953 was still about 3 percent below prewar.*
The government now plans to expand grain acreage, at least temporarily,
some 15 to 20 percent until there occurs a rise in grain yields,
which -- according to Khrushchev -- "has been and remains the main
method of increasing the production of grain."
In indicating the need for more grain, Khrushchev also gave
a well-stated definition of what he means when he says, "grain is the
basis of the agricultural economy." In listing the needs, he gives
priority to the following:
1. Bread, Bread Products, Flour, and Groats.
An important phase in the "new course" will be the con-
tinuation of the trend toward increased consumption of "white"
bread produced from wheat in place of the coarse, black rye bread,
the traditional bulk product in the Russian diet. This improvement
of the quality of caloric intake from grain products also includes
more wheat flour, which was placed on unrestricted sale for the
first time last year, and more groats, consumed as porridges and
cereals,
The planners must also reckon with the dynamics of
population growth which will require another 5 million or 6 million
tons of food grains by 1960.* During the consumption year from
* Postwar boundaries. Total acreage in 19110 was 110.4 million
hectares and in 1953 106.6 million hectares.
*Y* Based on an estimated population in 1960 of 234.7 million and
a grain consumption rate of 230 kilograms per capita.
- 15 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
1 August 1953 to 31 July 1954, as was true the two or three pre-
ceding consumption years, there was enough grain available to sus-
tain the current estimated consumption rate of 215 to 230 kilograms.
The Soviet officials want to decrease this high rate of consumption
(usual tell-tale sign of a poor diet) by making available more
animal and vegetable products. At the same time they hope to improve
the quality of that part of the diet coming from bread products by
substituting ever increasing amounts of wheat bread, wheat flour,
and groats for the coarse rye grain products. A greater availability
of bread grains will also allow the lowering of flour extraction
rates, which will increase the quality of the bread produced.
2. Supplementing of State Grain Reserves.
The Fifth Five Year Plan calls for the doubling of
state reserves. It is assumed that grain reserves will also be
increased proportionately as part of the over-all reserve program.
Because most yield-stabilizing projects such as shelter-belt and
irrigation projects have been deflated or abandoned,. the possibility
of severe crop failures resulting from drought remains a serious
threat. The Soviet planners must then keep in reserve greater
quantities of agricultural products in case of crop failure -- at
least until new measures have been taken to give greater stability
to grain production. Such measures would include increased acreages
and yields of grain crops in the podzolic soil districts where
amounts of precipitation are adequate.
3. Grain for L:_vestock.
There is obviously a great need for more grain both to
sustain increasing numbers of livestock and to increase the now
low productivity rates of milk, meat, wool, eggs, and other products.
While there has been a 20-percent increase in wheat acreage compared
to 1940, feed-grain acreage (barley, oats, and corn) has decreased
20 percent; livestock numbers have remained about the same. Feed-
grain acreage will expand in the next two or three years, and al-
though most of this expansion will be the replacing of perennial
grasses in the dry areas, there may be some substitution of feed
grains for other grains -- for example, barley in place of rye in
the Upper Volga Valley. This will be particularly true if the
scheme for expansion of spring wheat acreage on the virgin and
unused lands is successful.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
- - - - - - - - - - - -
In rationalizing the substitution of feed grains for
perennial grasses, Khrushchev said that in 1952 state farms'
grain yields amounted to 10.2 centners per hectare (c/ha), or
1,420 fodder units per hectare, as compared to a yield of only
11 c/ha, or 550 fodder units per hectare, for perennial grasses
sown on state farms. In order to arrive at an adequate balance of
hay to feed grains, the planners will probably emphasize the
relegation of sown grasses to the poorer yielding lands and also
the more careful harvest of wild hay.
4. Greater Grain Requirements for Regions Growing Technical
and Other Crops.
With the expansion of non-grain-crop acreage in those
regions best suited for these crops, there will undoubtedly be
some reduction in grain acreage. The planned expansion of acreages
of such crops as cotton, flax, sugar beets, and vegetables will
result in some grain-acreage substitution by these crops. These
measures naturally will require a greater importing of food and
feed grains into the deficit grain-producing regions. In effect,
this implies a modification of the regional "self-sufficiency"
principle.
5. Expanding the Export of Grain.
The USSR will export an estimated 2 million tons of
grain during the 1953-54 trade year as compared with 2.4 million
tons the previous year. This order of magnitude has been the
general pattern for the last five years. In order to finance the
large projected increases of consumer goods and other imports and
to back up claims of intentions to increase trade with the West,
there will be a need for greater quantities of grain, both wheat
and feed grains, for export.
The most spectacular and widely publicized facet of the
.change in acreage patterns has been the program for expanding
food-grain acreage in the areas of "inadequate rainfall." The 1954
plan calls for the expansion of spring-wheat and millet acreage on
2.3 million hectares of virgin and unused land in 1954 and on
13 million hectares in 1955. This expansion, by itself, will in-
crease over-all grain acreage 12 percent by 1954. One-third of this
expansion will take place on state farms. Most of this acreage will
- 17 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9 ak,
be sown along the southern and eastern periphery of the traditional
spring-wheat belt, where both soil and climatic conditions are
adverse for stable yields. In these dry steppelands of chestnut
soil and 10 to 15 inches of rainfall, the USSR can expect 2 almost
complete crop failures every 5 years. In the first crop year, a
probable soil moisture reserve in this area will provide better
than the usual 60-percent chance of getting a "normal" crop.
Apparently Khrushchev considers a yield of 10 to 11 centners per
hectare to be the standard. The Plenum adopted the maximum variant
of 14 to 15 c/ha, resulting in an estimated production of 18 million
to 20 million tons in 1955. Probably a more realistic average yield
would be on the order of 5 c/ha, giving a total production incre-
ment of 6.5 million tons, an increase from this part of the over-
all grain program of 6 to 7 percent of the total grain output.
At best, the USSR can expect to sustain this part of
the grain expansion program for only a few years. This general
area of dry steppelands was the scene of the so-called "grain
factory" undertaking during the First Five Year Plan. First pro-
jected in the spring of ,1928, the state farm "grain factory"
project was finally launched by the government in 1930. After
first-year success, the result of very good weather conditions,
the project failed the two following years when very low yields were
produced after "enormous investments by the state" (Stalin, Seven-
teenth Party Congress). In 1933 the sown acreage on these large
grain farms in the drier regions was greatly restricted. In 1939
there again was planned an expansion of grains in the dry regions.
Instead of in spring wheat, however, this venture was in winter
grains -- expansion of winter wheat in the Middle and Lower Volga
in the fall of 1938 and a plan for the increase of the more drought-
resistant winter rye in Siberia and Kazakhstan in 1939. In April
1940, the government again announced a 3-year plan for the expansion
of general grain acreage by 4.3 million hectares in the eastern
regions, mostly in the semi-arid zone. Evidence is lacking as to
the outcome of these expansion projects in the immediate prewar
period, although wartime exigencies required an expansion of winter
rye acreage in this area.
In cultivating these new lands, the inputs involved
will have some effect on the rest of the agricultural economy,
most significantly in the machinery sector and perhaps in the
skilled manpower sector. In his report to the Plenum at the end of
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 %wApproved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
February, Khrushchev said, "This year most tractors, combines, and
other machines delivered to agricultural areas will be sent to the
areas of new lands." The tractors allocated to the new project will
be the general-purpose caterpillar types, the KD-35 and S-80.
Although the rest of the agricultural economy is relatively well
supplied with this type -- compared with the great need for the
universal, or row-type, tractors, the traditional grain-growing
regions such as the Ukraine could well use more of the caterpillar
tractors to improve the timeliness of seasonal operations.
The total of 1.8 million tractor horsepower to be
allocated to the "new areas" will constitute about 10 percent of
the horsepower in the present tractor park but somewhat less than
10 percent of the total tractor numbers.
There are two alternatives to the direct allocation
of tractors from new production scheduled for agriculture or from
the existing machine tractor stations and state farm tractor parks.
A part of the 1.8 million horsepower could be obtained from the
scheduled 1954 new-tractor allocation of 1.4 million horsepower to
tphe non-agriculture sectors or by transferring tractors from con-
struction projects.
Probably of greater importance in terms of machinery
inputs will be the problem of utilization and maintenance of tractors
in the new areas. Apparently the task of obtaining spare parts
remains a weak link in the operation of tractor and farm machinery
parks. Throughout the agricultural economy there is a shortage of
maintenance facilities, primarily of repair shops equipped with
machine tools.
The other important input is the labor force. Although
it is estimated that the total labor force required for the entire
project will not exceed 400,000 (less than 1 percent of the total
agricultural labor force), there will be a serious drain on the
skilled or semi-skilled labor force that will manage the farms and
operate and repair the machinery. Although the badly depleted
technician force of the existing network of machine tractor stations
and the collective and state farms has been "reinforced" since the
last crop season, the rest of the agricultural economy is hardly
in a position to supply experienced machine operators, agronomists,
or engineers without weakening their own operations. Khrushchev,
- 19 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
however, not only calls on industry and urban centers to supply
manpower, but he also expects the present system of farms and tractor
stations to supply qualified specialists even to the point of
"appointing to the new state farms the best directors, chief engineers,
and chief agronomists from the old state farms... ."
A less spectacular but probably more productive program
in the long run will be the "carrying out of the large-scale reclama-
tion of large areas of meadows, marshy land, poorly productive
meadows, and pasture lands in the central and northwestern areas
of the country." In these areas of adequate precipitation, real
achievements can be made if, after reclaiming the land, sufficient
inputs of lime (to correct the acidity of the soil) and of mineral
and organic fertilizers are used.
The rationalization behind the expansion of grain
acreage on the virgin and unused lands* in the dry area is open to
speculation. Probably one or more of the following factors were
of paramount importance:
a. A desire to obtain greater quantities of wheat to
replace the loss of food grains -- a loss resulting from the re-
placement by other crops of food-grain acreage in traditional
regions.
b. The need to provide a production substitute required
by the abandonment of those irrigation projects that were scheduled
to result in an increase in wheat acreage.
c. The realization that planned increases in grain
yields were not going to be even partially realized with the present
inputs and that, consequently, there must be a temporary expansions
of wheat acreage -- an expansion which would continue until the
change to more rational inputs (lime and fertilizer) could become
effective in raising yields of grains grown in areas of adequate
precipitation.
* "Unused" or fallow lands are defined as those lands that have not
been plowed for a period of 2 to 25 years and are now covered with
wild grass; "virgin" lands are those lands abandoned for over 25
years. It is also claimed that lands will not be utilized that have
an annual precipitation of less than 250 millimeters (10 inches).
*,H* No official indication has been given that this is to be a
temporary program.
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
n n rr Ti T n-L_~T_T_T
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
d. A possible need for a rapid increase in reserves
of food grains, an increase dictated by an undefined national
"contingency" such as preparation for hostilities.
F. Change in Acreage Patterns.
The need for drastic changes in acreage patterns midway
in the Fifth Five Year Plan results mostly from a combination of
(1) the failure to achieve even partially the planned increases in
the yields of such important crops as grains, oilseeds, flax and
perennial grasses, and (2) the necessity for more than lip service
to increasing consumption rates and to improving the quality of
the national diet.
In the planning so far announced, there have been apparent
two trends which indicate modification or abandonment of dogmas
previously accepted. Those dogmas included the so-called grass-
field rotation in all important non-irrigated agricultural regions
of the country and regional self-sufficiency in supplying food for
the local population.
The doctrine of incorporating sown grasses in the crop-
rotation system was adopted in the late 1930's, but did not become
widely enforced until after the war. In its simplest form, this
doctrine was a matter of setting up a 7- to 10-year rotation
which included two or three years of grasses, preferably perennial
grasses.
The widespread use of grasses was first emphasized because
of the need for hay. Since the late 1930's the emphasis has been
on the allegedly beneficial effect of rotation grass on soil
structure and fertility and, thus, the raising of yields. Apparently
ignoring the negative results of the use of such a system in
climatically analagous areas of the US and Canada, the Soviet leaders
endorsed the indiscriminate use of grass in rotations in dry areas
as well as humid areas. As a result, valuable feed-grain and food-
grain acreage was replaced with grasses that supposedly would raise
yields of grain and at the same time provide large quantities of
high-quality hay for livestock. Neither of these two "benefits"
resulted. Not only have grain crops in rotation with grasses in the
dry steppes of the Ukraine and North Caucasus not shown an upward
trend in yields over the last ten years, but also there has been a
decrease in feedstuffs available for livestock.
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
Khrushchev indicated very low yields of hay and declared
that perennial grasses yield "much less fodder than the feed-grain
crops in the Southern Ukraine, North Caucasus, Volga Valley,
Siberia, the Southern Urals and Northeastern oblasts of Kazakhstan."
According to the new program, there will be a sharp reduc-
tion of perennial grass acreage in these areas, which will allow
the expansion of other crops on 4 million hectares, most of which
will probably be sown to feed grains such as corn, oats, and barley.
Throughout the new program for a change in sown acreages,
there are indications that the principle of regional self-sufficiency
has been pushed to the background in favor of intensifying the pro-
duction of those crops bast fitted to certain soil and climate areas.
The modification of the 'principle of self-sufficiency may cause a
rather sharp change in inter-regional acreage patterns.
Generally speaking, there appears to be planned a large
increase in feed grain acreage; an increase in wheat acreage, but
not a large increase in wheat production; increases in acreage of
potatoes and vegetables and of most technical crops; and a decrease
in low-yielding perennial grass acreage. This scheme of acreages
is hopefully geared to provide the country with a better quality
diet in the next two or three years without waiting for crop yields
to rise.
In the final analysis -- regardless of the technical
accuracy of the planning; -- the success of the new agricultural
program will mostly depend upon the peasant -- the actual producer --
and his reaction to the incentives offered by the government.
-22-
-- - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9 I
 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9
Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200380003-9