SOVIET FULFILLMENT OF AGRICULTURAL GOALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00935A000200280001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1953
• Content Type: IM

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SECURITY INFOR'MN
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SOVIET FULFILLMENT OF AGRICULTURAL GOALS
1952
CIA/RR IM-381
12 October 1953
WARNING
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18, USCJ SECS.
793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF
WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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y m
The Soviet Central Statistical Administration recently has adopted
the annual practice of announcing the degree to which the various eco-
nomic segments of the country have fulfilled their predetermined goals
during the preceding year. The announcement, released in January 1953,
concerning fulfillment of the 1952 Economic Plan included a section on
agriculture and a few brief comments on forestry and on the sale of
food to consumers. Except for the comments on food sales, this section
was devoted almost exclusively to production goals or to goals related
to the improvement or increase of such production factors as the acre-
age of cultivated land. It omitted mention of many agricultural com-
modities, and some of those considered were given only general treatment
which is not susceptible of statistical evaluation.
The purpose of this memorandum is to evaluate these Soviet claims
of goal fulfillment for agricultural commodities and related products.
Its scope is limited, therefore, to an analysis of the items mentioned
in the announcement. Furthermore, it is confined generally to an
analysis of claimed production achievements and an appraisal of the
importance of the 1952 production of major commodities in respect to
larger Soviet goals. Where applicable, tables showing estimates for
the past 2 or 3 production years are given to provide a further basis
for evaluation of each Soviet claim.
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Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Weather Conditions, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Crop Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
a. Cultivated Acreage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
b. Grain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
c. Sugar (Sugar Beets) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
d. Industrial Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
e. Feed and Forage Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
f. Vegetable Oils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Textile Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Forestry Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Livestock Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
a. Types of Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(1) Cattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(2) Swine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
(3) Sheep and Goats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(4) Horses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
b. Livestock Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
(1) Meat and Dairy Products and Canned Food . . . . 28
(2) wool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Standard of Living . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix
Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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Page
1. Estimated Area,-Yield, and Production of Grains in the
USSR, 1951 and 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Estimated Area, Yield, and Production of Sugar Beets
and Production of Raw Sugar in the USSR, 1950-52 . . . 10
3. Estimated Area, Yield, and Production of Specified
Industrial Crops in the USSR, 1950-52 . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Estimated Area, Yield, and Production of Vegetable Oil
Crops in the USSR, 1950-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Estimated Timber Production in the USSR, 1950-52 . . . . 18
6. Estimated Rate of Increase in Cattle and Cow Numbers
on Collective Farms in the USSR, 1950-52 . . . . . . . 20
7. Estimated Swine Numbers in the USSR, 1952 and 1953 . . . 23
8. Estimated Sheep and Goat Numbers in the USSR,
1952 and 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Estimated Livestock Numbers in the USSR as of 1 January
1952 and 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10. Claimed 1952 Output of Soviet Food Products as a
Percentage of 1951 Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11. Total and Per Capita Production of Meat (including
Slaughter Fat) in the USSR and the US, 1938, 1951-55 31
12. Estimated Production of Selected Livestock Products in
the USSR, 1950-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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CIA/RR IM-381
(ORR Project 21.12.1)
SOVIET FULFILLMENT OF AGRICULTURAL GOALS*
1952
Summary
In the latter part of January 1953 the USSR announced the degree
of fulfillment of the 1952 Economic Plan. The announcement states
that the annual Plan for gross production was fulfilled. Several
ministries, however, fell short of their individuals goals, including
the Ministry of the Timber Industry, with only 90 percent fulfill-
ment; the Ministry of the Fish Industry, with 94 percent; and the
Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building, with 96 percent. Most
prominent among the Soviet claims for agriculture in 1952 are the
following: an increase of 2,765,000 hectares** in the total cultiva-
ted acreage; an increase in wheat acreage of 3,320,000 hectares; and
an increased grain production amounting to 131 million metric tons,
an amount 8 percent greater than the announced production for 1951.
The announced increase in the total cultivated acreage seems to
be reasonable in view of the long-standing efforts on the part of
the USSR to broaden its agricultural production base by extending
crop acreage on marginal lands in northerly areas and in semiarid
regions. Small increases in the cultivated acreage also have resulted
from the improvement of irrigation and drainage. The announced in-
crease in wheat acreage, although relatively large, is in keeping
with the growing emphasis of the USSR on wheat production at the ex-
pense of other grains. This increase must have been at the expense
of other grains, since the Soviet announcement also claimed in-
creases in acreage and in production both for industrial crops and
for fodder and grass crops. These claims seem reasonable, with the
exception of the 1951 base figure for sugar production, which is
considered to be too high. The 8-percent increase indicated for
total grain production represents a normal increase in the trend of
postwar production.
Livestock data comprise the most questionable part of the pub-
lished claims of agricultural Plan fulfillment. No mention was made
in the Soviet announcement either of total livestock numbers or of
* This memorandum contains information available as of 1 June 1953.
A hectare equals 2.471 acres.
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livestock in the private sector of the collective' farm economy.
Since there has been a drive to transfer :Livestock from the private
sector of ownership by collective farm members to the socialized
sector of the collective farm as a whole, it is believed that most,
if not all, of the increases in livestock claimed'by the government
refer to increases of socialized herds and may, therefore, be merely
the results of a statistical regrouping of animals already existing.
:Despatches received from the American Embassy in Moscow corro-
borate the Soviet claim that food consumption has improved in both
quantity and quality since 1951.
Despite the failure of the Ministry of Agricultural Macn.ine
Building to achieve its goal, the USSR states that mechanization in
agriculture has increased. This statement is probably true, but the
quality of this mechanization, as indicated by many sources of infor-
mation, is far from satisfactory.
Agricultural production in the USSR fell to dangerously low
levels during World War II. Since 1945 the USSR has been attempting
to return to or surpass prewar production. During the first years
of postwar recovery, gains were fairly easy to attain, but after
7 years the rate of gain has leveled off without the production of
most agricultural commodities having reached the prewar level, much
less the overambitious goals that the USSR has announced from time
to time. Some industrial crops such as cotton and oil-bearing seeds
exceeded prewar production in 1952. Grain production was lower than
in the best prewar year (1937), but it approached the average of the
4 years 1935, 1936, 1938, and 1939. In the livestock industry, only
sheep exceeded the numbers reported before the war.
It appears unlikely that in the near future the USSR can expand
significantly its cultivated acreage, increase materially the yields
of most of its crops, or enlarge substantially its herds and flocks.
Even if prewar production is reached, there will be a net loss in
the per capita supply of most agricultural products in view of the
increases in population that are taking place. Although some minor
sectors of agriculture and related industries may reach the planned
goals for 1955, the goals for the major commodities probably will
not be achieved.
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1. Introduction.
Each year, as soon after the close of the calendar year as prac-
ticable, the Central Statistical Administration attached to the
Soviet Council of Ministers publishes an announcement on the success
or failure of the various ministries to achieve predetermined goals.
In these announcements, successes are hailed, but failures often
are omitted or, if mentioned, deplored. Absolute figures rarely
appear, and achievements or failures are usually shown as percentages
of the previous year's accomplishment or of the goal established
for the year just ended, depending on what the Statistical Admin-
istration wishes to emphasize.
2. Weather Conditions, 1952.
Although weather is an important determinant of agricultural
production, no mention of weather conditions prevailing during
1952 appears in the Soviet announcement.
Available information on weather conditions affecting Soviet
crops in 1952 indicates that insufficient moisture retarded the
development of crops seeded in the autumn of 1951 for harvest in
1952. Rainfall during the spring and summer of 1952, however, was
favorable in amount and distribution in the principal crop-producing
areas, counteracting the earlier deficiency. In some areas, harvest-
ing losses may have increased because of somewhat excessive rainfall
during the harvest, but the net effect probably was the production
of a crop somewhat better than could have been expected under normal
weather conditions.
There are indications that rainfall was slightly below normal
in the important grazing regions of the Baltic republics and in
Kazakhstan. This deficiency, however, was not sufficient to war-
rant an assumption that decreases in livestock resulted.
3. Crop Goals.
a. Cultivated Acreage.
The cultivated acreage in the USSR in 1952 was reported by
the USSR to be 2,765,000 hectares greater than in 1951. At the same
time the wheat acreage was reportedly increased by 3,320,000-hec-
tares. Acreage devoted to industrial crops (cotton, sugar beets,
and sunflowers), forage crops, and grasses was reported to have in-
creased by unstated amounts.,
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Assuming that the total cultivated acreage of the USSR in
1951 was approximately 152 million hectares, 1/* the increase of
hectares would result in an area of 151l-,765, c hectares,
or 1.8 percent above 1951. These figures are to be compared with a
cultivated acreage of 150.1+ million hectares in 191+0, indicating an
increase of 2.9 percent from 191+0 to 1952. Increases of this small
magnitude appear to be reasonable in view of the long-standing Soviet
goal to enlarge the productive area. These increases may be attribu-
ted partly to the extension of production into the marginal or sub-
marginal arid lands of Central Asia or into northern areas where short
growing seasons limit production and where there may have been some
increase in lands reclaimed by irrigation or drainage.
Since the reported increase in wheat acreage of 3,320,000
hectares plus indefinite increases in the acreages of industrial
crops, forage crops, and grasses exceeds the increase in the total
cultivated acreage of the country, the implication is that there were
reductions in other crops such as feed grains (barley, oats, and corn)
and rye and in the fallow acreage.
Several observations may be made concerning the apparent
reduction in feed grain acreage: (1) the possible reduction in rye
and fallow acreage may have been proportionately greater than was
the decrease in feed grain acreage; (2) part of the land that was
formerly fallow may have been sown to feed crops; (3) regional shifts
in feed grain acreage could result in little or no decrease in feed
production: that is, a relatively small increase in a favorable
agricultural region could more than offset the production of a much
larger sown area in a submarginal producing region; or (1-) the in-
creased use of potatoes for feeding swine and the better use of
roughage and pastures for feeding other livestock could reduce the
requirements for feed grains, making possible a gradual decline in
their acreage. In any case, minor changes in a given year cannot be
interpreted to represent changing trends in the agricultural pattern.
They may reflect only weather conditions or other factors at sowing
time.
The USSR is rapidly approaching the limits of its potential
cultivated acreage -- the physical limits imposed by climatic and
agronomic factors. There remain no large areas of land that can be
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
the Appendix.
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put into economically profitable production. At best, the draining
of swamps and the much-publicized irrigation projects will increase
the acreage that can be profitably cultivated by only a few hundred
thousand hectares. Faced by these facts, the USSR in its attempt to
keep gross agricultural production in line with the increased demands
of an increasing population and of a large military force, and with
the need for maintaining reserve stocks, has recently been placing
greater stress on the increase of yields per unit of land already
under cultivation through use of improved strains of seed, greater
use of fertilizers, and improved techniques. Grain is the chief
food crop in the USSR, but neither the USSR nor the US has in the
past been able to increase grain yields greatly. As in the case of
cotton, the USSR can disregard poor economic returns from the use of
land with low yields and extend cultivation of any crop onto sub-
marginal land, but even a large expansion of mechanization and a re-
sort to dry farming on a greater scale than is now being practiced
would not solve this problem. If the population trend continues to
rise, the combination of the two factors -- limited arable land re-
sources and limits on yield increases -- can be expected to result
eventually in food shortages. These shortages may occur during the
next generation, forcing the USSR to enter on a long-time program
of importing essential foods.
b. Grain.
According to Soviet claims, grain production in 1952 was 8
billion poods (131 million metric tons) in terms of the biological
grain crop,* and the over-all production of wheat was 23 percent
higher than in 1951. The 1952 grain-production figure represents
an 8-percent increase over the official grain-production figure for
1951 of 7.4 billion poods (121.2 million metric tons) and is 5 per-
cent higher than t1fe announced figure of 7.6 million poods
(124.5 million metric tons) for 1950.
The indicated increase in grain production for 1952 seems
reasonable because of the moderate increase in grain acreage and
the weather conditions, which were slightly-more favorable for the
development of the crop than in 1951. Estimates of grain production
in terms of barn harvest** for 1951 and 1952 reflect an increase in
* The biological grain crop is an estimate of the amount of grain
growing in the field before harvest.
** The barn harvest is the amount of grain available for utilization
after harvesting has been completed.
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1952 over 1951 similar to that given in the Soviet announcements.
The estimated 1952 grain production (barn harvest) of 91,570,000
metric tons is about 6 percent higher than. the 1951. barn harvest
estimate of 86,540,000 metric tons. The discrepaflcy in the per-
centage of increase in 1952 grain production over that of 1951
between the Soviet data and the estimates can easily be reconciled
by differences in harvesting losses caused. by variations in weather
during the harvest period.
The claimed increase for 1952 in the over-all production of
wheat of 23 percent over 1951 seems somewhat high when compared with
estimates of wheat production for the 2 years. Estimates of the
wheat crop for 1951 and 1952 are 36,720,000 and 40,240,000 metric
tons, respectively. Based on these estimates, wheat production in
1952 exceeded that in 1951 by about 10 percent.
Although the USSR states,-in connection with its 1952 grain-
production achievement, that the grain problem has been solved finally
and irrevocably, its progress toward fulfillment of its Fifth. Five
Year Plan (1951-55) grain-production goal appears to be falling short.
Grain production during the Plan period is supposed to increase by
40 to 50 percent. Fulfillment of this goal by 1955 would entail an
average annual increase in the biological grain crop over the 1950
biological crop of 8 to 10 percent. During the first 2 years of
the Fifth Five Year Plan, however, no such large increase in grain
production has occurred. The following figures released by the Soviet
Central Statistical Administration (in millions of metric tons) --
1950, 124.5; 1951, 121.2; and 1952, 131 --- indicate that the biologi-
cal grain crop in 1952 was only about 5 percent greater than in 1950
(the base year of the Fifth Five Year Plan). Therefore, if the USSR
is to fulfill its 1955 grain-production goal in the remaining 3 years
of the Plan, it must increase grain production at the unrealistic
rate of 11 to 14.2 percent each year. At :present, the 1955 grain-
production goal appears to be impossible of attainment.
The 1952 grain crop was the largest in the postwar period,
and the per capita supply is higher than it was in 1951, although
lower than it was before the war.* The 1952 grain production of
almost 92 million metric tons exceeded that of 1951 by approximately
5 million tons. Several alternative uses of this statistical surplus
* The year 1938 has been selected as the prewar comparison base for
acreage and production.
-6-
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over 1951 production may be visualized: (1) domestic consumption
could be expanded to meet the increased requirements of a growing
population, (2) state grain reserves could be enlarged, (3) grain
shipments to the European Satellites could be used to alleviate the
effects of poor harvests in 1952, and/or (4) cheap grain could be
shipped to non-Soviet Bloc destinations. Table 1* gives the esti-
mated area, yield, and production of grains in the USSR for 1951
and 1952.
c. Sugar (Sugar Beets).
The USSR claims that sugar production in 1952 was 3 percent
above production in 1951. Considering the favorable weather condi-
tions, improved mechanization, and a slight increase in the acreage
of sugar beets, this 3-percent increase might appear conservative
and reasonable. The data upon which the USSR based this claim are,
however, open to question. The USSR claimed a production of 2.9 mil-
lion metric tons of raw sugar in 1951. A 3-percent increase would
indicate a production of 2,987,000 metric tons. Both of these figures
are based upon a planned acreage and a yield of 190 centners per hec-
tare. The average prewar (1935-39) yield in the USSR, however, was
only 154 centners per hectare, and in the postwar period (1947-51)
the average yield was only 136 centners per hectare. The base on
which the percentage increase was derived is obviously too high.
Based on realistic yields, the estimated raw sugar production for
1952 is about 2.3 million metric tons, which is 9 percent higher than
the estimate of about 2.1 million metric tons in 1951, which was an
unfavorable sugar-production year.
The 1952 production of more than 2.9 million metric tons
of raw sugar claimed by the USSR is obviously unrealistic. As a
result of large imports from the Satellites, however, the sugar
supply situation in the USSR in 1952-53 is better than during any
postwar year and even better than before the war, though sugar
consumption in the USSR is still low in comparison with sugar con-
sumption in the European Satellites. Production in excess of the
very low normal civilian requirements can be used to meet increased
military requirements, or it can be moved readily into reserve stocks
or into trade channels without materially lowering the standard of
living. Although it is not a strategically essential food, sugar
Table 1 follows on p. 8.
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can be an important morale factor to both civilian and military con-
sumers. The sugar supply situation can be expected to continue to
improve during the next few years because of the emphasis Qn new
agricultural techniques and on the increase of sugar-processing ca-
pacity.
Table 2*.gives the estimated area, yield, and production of
sugar beets and production of raw sugar in the USSR for 1950-52.
d. Industrial Crops.
The Soviet report states: "In 1952 the area under culti-
vation for cotton, sugar beets, sunflower seed, and other industrial
plants was increased /-Over 19517."
The acreage seeded to cotton in 1952 is estimated to have
been increased by approximately 200,000 hectares over 1951, and
slight increases have been estimated for flax and hemp.
The area sown to cotton in 1952 approaches the planned
acreage for 1955. Recent increases, however, have largely been on
unirrigated lands and have resulted in lower average yields than
formerly. Gross production, on the other hand, is approximately
113 percent greater than the 1935-39 average. This increase places
the USSR in a self-sufficient position at present levels of utili-
zation by.an inadequate textile industry. This self-sufficiency
results in a surplus of lint cotton, the greater part of which is
exported to the Soviet Bloc countries. Part of this lint cotton
imported by the Satellites is later re-exported to the USSR as fin-
ished fabrics under existing processing agreements. The USSR is
thus integrating, to a certain extent, the textile industries of the
Satellites with those of the USSR. Assuming that the USSR does not
engage in war, exports to the Satellite countries can be expected to
continue. The quantity of these exports, however, will depend on
production and changes in the domestic utilization pattern. A war
could adversely affect the cotton supply in the Bloc countries,
which are now dependent on imports from the USSR, because that supply
would probably be curtailed to meet stronger or new demands within
the USSR itself. If the Russians discontinued shipments to the
Satellites, their present production of cotton might meet the most
urgent domestic needs except perhaps in a prolonged war.
Table 2 follows on p. 10.
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Flax and hemp, like cotton, are produced in greater amounts
than the established industry can process, although the quality of
hemp products is inferior to similar end items produced from hard
fibers. Soviet plans give evidence that the linen- and hemp- proc-
essing industries are being enlarged, and it is safe to assume that
at least some replacement of worn-out equipment and even some expan-
sion have taken place. Under peacetime conditions the industry
operates on the basis of meeting immediate current requirements,
which may not require maximum output. In the event of a falling
market, hard fibers may be imported for stockpiling purposes or for
military and industrial uses which require better grades of fiber.
In time of war, however, the industry would. be pushed to capacity,
civilian consumption could be reduced, and, if necessary, cotton
could be substituted for hemp fiber or flax tow in many industries.
Table 3* gives the estimated area, yield, and production of
specified industrial crops in the USSR for 1950-52.
e. Feed and Forage Crops.
The USSR claims that in 1952 the area under cultivation of
fodder was "significantly increased" and that the area under grass
was also "enlarged."
Despite unfavorable weather in some grazing areas, no sig-
nificant decrease in the production of grass and hay is indicated.
It appears that the total production of roughages for summer grazing
and for carrying livestock over the winter remained approximately
the same as in 1951. This production of roughage supports the esti-
mate that in 1952 cattle numbers remained constant and sheep and
goat numbers increased by only 2.8 percent, inasmuch as cattle,
sheep, and goats are the main consumers of roughages.
It is estimated that the total production of feed grains
decreased but that the total production of potatoes increased
sufficiently to allow the use of potatoes as feed to support the
estimated 1.5-percent increase in swine.
Any increased availability of roughage or other livestock
feed, however, may be used to obtain a greater productivity of milk
and meat per animal rather than to increase significantly total
livestock numbers.
Table 3 follows on p. 12.
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f. Vegetable Oils.*
The production of vegetable oils in 1952 is claimed by the
Russians to be 9 percent higher than in 1951.
A 9-percent increase in the production of vegetable oils does
not appear to be keeping pace with the estimated increase in oil-
bearing crops available for processing. There is, however, a time
lag between harvesting the crops and their processing. The produc-
tion of vegetable oils in 1952 is assumed to be the output from
both raw materials grown domestically in 1951 and raw materials
imported in 1951 and 1952. Domestic raw material production in 1952
exceeded that in 1950 by 10 percent. If imports, which are equal
to about 15 percent of domestic production, are added, the total
increase in production in 1952 should have been more than 9 percent.
The Soviet announcement may indicate, therefore, that processing
has reached maximum capacity. Because raw materials may be stock-
piled, a continued high level of production of vegetable oils in
1953 can be expected.
The 1952 production of vegetable oils from domestic materials
is estimated at 885,000 metric tons as against 858,000 metric tons
in the prewar period. On a per capita basis, this production is
estimated at 1.2 kilograms per year as compared with the prewar aver-
age of 4.5 kilograms per year, but postwar imports from Communist
China have more than compensated for the loss in the per capita
supply. The current supply of 120,000 metric tons of oil for tech-
nical use is double the average prewar supply, while the supply of
vegetable oils has just about returned to its former level.
The 1953 level of production will probably show no appreci-
able rise, because of the decrease in cotton seed production for
the past year. Imports from Communist China constitute about 15
percent of the vegetable oils used for domestic consumption and
about 25 percent of the total used in industry. The USSR is reported
to be negotiating with Argentina for the purchase of linseed.
The average of sunflower seed, which provides approximately
40 percent of Soviet vegetable oils, is estimated to have been in-
creased by 150,000 to 200,000 hectares in 1952 over 1951.
* Output basis.
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In addition to postwar increases in the acreage of vegetable
oil crops, imports of vegetable oil and oil seeds have been increased
to meet domestic requirements. It is expected that, if peace con-
tinues, imports will be maintained at present levels or may even be
increased. Under wartime conditions the acreage of oil-bearing crops
could be increased, but probably not sufficiently to remove the need
for some imports. The USSR, therefore, would be vulnerable to a
cessation of trade in vegetable oils and oil seeds. Table 4* gives the
estimated area, yield, and production of vegetable oil crops in the
USSR for 1950-52.
4. Textile Goals.
The USSR claims that the sown area of cotton and other industrial
crops was larger in 1952 than in 1951. It also claims that the tex-
tile-processing industry showed the following gains in production in
1952 over 1951: ginned cotton, 7 percent; cotton cloth, 6 percent;
woolen cloth, 8 percent; and silk cloth, 29 percent. Increases of
39 and 18 percent, respectively, were claimed in the number of looms
and spinning frames.
The sown area of cotton in 1952 has been estimated to be approx-
imately 200,000 hectares larger than in 1951. Because of adverse
weather during the spring sowing period, however, the 1952 cotton
harvest is estimated to be lower than in 1951 despite the increase
in acreage. If a greater than normal percentage of the larger pro-
duction of raw cotton was carried over unginned at the end of the
calendar year 1951 to be ginned in 1952 together with a large part
of the 1952 production, a 7-percent increase during 1952 in textile
production might be statistically possible.
In absolute figures a 6-percent increase in cotton cloth would
represent the difference between 4,705 :million meters in 1951 and
4,987 million meters in 1952, or 282 million meters. Considering
the available ginned cotton, this increase would appear low, unless
it is assumed that spinning and weaving equipment has been unable
to keep pace with supply.
The textile figures for 1952 must be considered in the light of
the time lag between production and processing. Ginnings in 1952
include part of the 1951 crop in addition to part of the 1952 crop.
Tab follows on p. 15.
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Ginnings in 1951 were reported to be 33 percent above 1950 (the
highest production year, prewar or postwar) and would largely repre-
sent the supply available for the production of cotton cloth in
1952. A comparison between the 33-percent increase in raw material
and the 6-percent increase in the succeeding year's output of cloth
points to a bottleneck in the processing industry. The report of
increases in the number of looms and spinning frames in 1952 is the
first indication from Soviet sources that this problem is receiving
serious consideration.
The goal for the production of cotton cloth during the Fifth
Five Year Plan (1951-55) is a 61-percent increase over 1950. On
the basis of present production of raw cotton and projections of
production by 1955, it appears doubtful whether this goal will be
attained. The goal will be even less attainable if other Soviet
Bloc countries continue to get an increasing share of the raw cotton
supplies of the USSR.
The estimated production of woolen cloth in 1952 reached 185 mil-
lion meters, which is 21 percent more than in 1950. There was a
steady increase in the production of woolen cloth during the Fourth
Five Year Plan (1946-50). The announced increases for that period
seemed to be reasonable because of large anp.ual imports. In 1951-52,
however, only relatively small imports of wool were reported, indi-
cating a greater dependence on wool domestically produced and wool
imported from the Soviet Bloc. Considering that the number of sheep
and goats increased by only 2.8 percent in 1952, the announced in-
crease of 8 percent in the production of woolen cloth either is high
or is a result of increased collections and greater use of coarse
domestic wool and blends, which would tend to lower the quality of
the woolen cloth output.
The per capita supply of cotton textiles for 1940 is estimated
at 21 meters. If 1955 goals are attained, the per capita supply
will be raised to 29 meters, and woolen textiles will be increased
from 0.65 meter per capita in 1940 to 1.1 meters. Accomplishments
in the Fifth Five Year Plan through 1952 indicate that the textile
goal for 1955 cannot be attained.
There is some evidence that the production of both cotton and
woolen textiles is increasing at a slightly more rapid rate than is the
population. If this trend continues, the per capita supply of these
textiles will be higher in 1955 than it was in 1940, but not so high
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as would be possible if the 1955 goal could be reached. To attain
the 1955 goal, it would be necessary for the USSR to increase its
plant capacity, reduce exports to the Satellite countries, and
increase imports of raw materials from non-Soviet Bloc countries.
At the present time, indigenous raw material supplies cannot be
expected to reach a level of output sufficient to attain planned
goals.
5. Forestry Goals.
The Ministry of the Timber Industry reports 90-percent fulfil-
lment of the 1952 annual Plan of gross production.
It should not be assumed from this statement that total timber
production was 10 percent under the Plan, since the output of the
Ministry of the Timber Industry is only 35 to 4+5 percent of all
planned timber production in the USSR.
Timber in the USSR is usually broken into two broad categories,
based on the end use: industrial (commercial) timber and fuel wood.
The Ministry of the Timber Industry was reprimanded for failing to
fulfill the Plan for commercial timber haulage. It can further be
assumed that the gross production Plan was padded with large amounts
of above-quota fuel wood.
The reported 90-percent fulfillment is a drop from the 9)+-per-
cent fulfillment for 1951. This shortage can be attributed to
adverse weather, poor use of equipment, use of seasonal labor, poor
transportation, and a goal that was, probably set too high. If the
reported fulfillment applies to all timber producers, then the
total industrial wood production may be almost 200 million cubic
meters (roundwood measure). Table 5* gives the estimated timber
production in the USSR for 1950-52.
The Ministry of the Paper and Wood-Processing Industry, which
processes into finished goods the raw wood furnished by the Min-
istry of the Timber Industry,** reported overfulfillment of the 1952
gross production Plan by 102 percent, a drop from the 103-percent
Table 5 follows on p. 18.
The Ministries of the Timber Industry and the Paper and Wood-
Processing Industry have, since March 1953, been recombined into
one ministry, the Ministry of Timber and Paper Industry.
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Estimated Timber Production in the USSR
1950-52
Year
Industrial Wood
Fuel Wood
Total Roundwood
1950
190.00
180.00
370.00 J
1951
193.00
182.00
375.00
1952
205.00
175.00
380.00
a. Total "planned" roundwood production in 1950 was
to have been 280 million cubic meters, of which 190
million cubic meters were to have been industrial
wood and 90 million cubic meters fuel wood. "Planned"
production does not include local production by col-
lective and state farms, communities, or individuals.
The bulk of this local production is fuel wood. The
estimated local production has been added to planned
production in this table.
overfulfillment reported in 1951. The gross production percentage
gives no solid ground for estimates of production of specific
commodities or of the quality of the good produced. The bulk of
production was probably composed of goods of inferior quality.
Permanent installations; an enlarged permanent work force; and
large quantities of sawmill, woodworking, pulp, and paper-mill
machinery (chiefly Finnish reparations) are among the factors that
have enabled the gross Plan to be fulfilled.
The Soviet timber industry (all producers, not just the Ministry
of the Timber Industry) has probably surpassed prewar production
levels, even though nonfulfillment of plans has been reported. Mech-
anization has apparently increased tremendously over prewar levels,
and appears in certain fields to exceed US levels: namely, in the
development and use of wood-burning gas generator engines and in
the electrification of logging equipment.
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Rumors have been cropping up that the USSR plans to increase
greatly the exploitation of its timber resources in order to flood
the world market with timber. This may indicate only that, with
the bulk of reconstruction out of the way, the USSR is ready to
resume its prewar role as one of the largest timber exporters.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-50) called for an increase in
timber production in areas that were at that time relatively un-
exploited -- the North, Northwest, and Siberia -- with a decline in
activities in those areas where limited timber reserves had been
more or less depleted -- the Ukraine and Central regions. Perhaps
these timber-dumping rumors are an indication that such a transfer,
at least partially, has taken place and that the industry is ready
to produce larger quantities than ever before.
The USSR has announced the following percentage increases in
livestock during 1952 (numbers on hand 1 January 1953): (a) on
the socialized sector of collective farms: cows, 6 percent; swine,
4 percent; sheep, 7 percent; horses, 4 percent; and (b) on state
farms of the Ministry of State Farms: cows, 5percent; swine,
4 percent; sheep, 8 percent; and horses, 9 percent.
No reference was made to total livestock numbers or-to live-
stock in the private sector: that is, to livestock owned by col-
lective farm members, independent farmers, workers, and employees.
Neither cattle nor goats were specifically mentioned.
a. Types of Livestock.
(1) Cattle.
By omitting any reference to cattle numbers the Russians
appear to be admitting tacitly that no gains were made. Even for
the preferred socialized sector no increases in cattle were claimed
as was done for swine, sheep, and horses.
A comparison between the claimed increase in the num-
ber of cattle and the claimed increase in the number of cows on col-
lective farms for the years 1950 to 1952 indicates that cow numbers
increased at a faster rate than cattle numbers, as shown in Table 6.*
* Table 6 follows on p. 20.
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Table 6
Estimated Rate of Increase in Cattle and Cow Numbers
on Collective Farms in the USSR
1950-52
Year (l January)
Percentage Increase
over Previous Year
Cattle
Cows
1950
21
27
1951
10
20
1952
12
15
Since, during these years, cow numbers in the socialized
sector of collective farms increased at a more rapid rate than total
cattle in this sector, a 6-percent increase in cow numbers would seem
to indicate, at best, less than a 6-percent increase for total cattle
numbers in the socialized sector of collective farms. On 1 January
1952, cattle on collective farms totaled 31.7 million head, of which
approximately 8 million, or about 25 percent, were cows. An increase
of 6 percent in cow numbers during 1952 might indicate an increase
of as little as 1.5 percent in total cattle numbers on collective
farms.
There has been a tendency in recent years for cattle
numbers, as well as numbers of all categories of livestock, to in-
crease in the socialized flocks and herds of collective farms at the
expense of those in the private sector,* including collective farm
members. Shortcomings in the stockbreeding program of the social-
ized sector have been made up by acquisitions from the more success-
ful private sector. The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) calls for an
increase in the socialized livestock of collective farms, which in
reality means a change in ownership rather than a natural increase
through breeding. Consequently, if cattle numbers on the collective
* Property held by the private sector includes that which is owned
by individual members of collective farms, independent farmers,
workers, and employees.
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farms have held their own since 1 January 1952, cattle numbers in
the private sector have probably decreased.
Increases in cow numbers, but not in cattle numbers, also
were given for state farms, although only for those under the Min-
istry of State Farms. The proportion of cow numbers to total cat-
tle numbers on state farms is greater than the proportion of cow
numbers to total cattle numbers in the socialized herds on collec-
tive farms, but the omission of any reference to cattle numbers
seems to reflect only slight gains, if any, in total cattle num-
bers on state farms. A 5-percent increase in cow numbers on state
farms is claimed. In the past, moreover, the performance of the
Ministry of State Farms in increasing livestock numbers has been
better than the over-all performance of all Soviet state farms.
On the basis of all of the above evidence, it is assumed
that cattle numbers for 1 January 1953 are not appreciably higher
than the figures carried for 1 January 1952 and may be even lower.
The preliminary estimate for cattle numbers as of 1 January 1953 is,
therefore, approximately the same as the 1 January 1952 total of
58.8 million cattle.
It appears that cattle numbers may be leveling off or
at least that the future rate of increase may be somewhat less than
the rapid rate at which recovery was being made up through 1951.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) calls for about 67.5 million
cattle on 1 January 1956 as compared with the above estimate of
58.8 million cattle on 1 January 1953. This would require an aver-
age increase of 5 percent for each of the next 3 years. Although
the USSR has planned to increase substantially the area in summer
pastures and the quantity of roughages to be stored as feed to car-
ry cattle through the winter, it is improbably that even under
reasonably favorable weather conditions the USSR will be able to
increase cattle numbers at an average rate of 5 percent per year.
Cattle numbers attainable by 1 January 1956 are estimated at about
61.8 million. On the basis of this estimate, the Soviet goal for
1 January 1956 is unrealistic.
(2) Swine.
There were reported to be 16.1 million swine as of
1 January 1952 in the socialized sector on collective farms in the
USSR. When the reported 4-percent increase during 1952 is added to
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this figure, the estimated number of swine in socialized herds on
collective farms as of 1 January 1953 becomes 16.7 million. The
increase in swine on state farms of the Ministry of State Farms
is also reported at 4 percent. If this claimed increase, which
seems modest enough, is assumed to cover all state farms, swine
numbers on state farms increased from 4.1 million as of 1 Jan-
uary 1952 to 4.3 million as of 1 January 1953.
Swine numbers in the socialized sector have been in-
creasing, as have cattle numbers, at the expense of the private
sector. The absence of any mention of total swine numbers for all
categories of owners seems to indicate that swine numbers in the
private sector have not increased and may even have decreased. The
transfer of swine from the usually more successful private sector
to the socialized sector of collective and state farms makes the
reported increase possible. On the basis of reported figures, the
total number of swine in the USSR on 1 January 1952 has been placed
at 26.7 million, which, as indicated in Table 7* below, included
16.1 million swine in the socialized herds on collective farms and
6.5 million swine in the herds of collective farm members and other
private owners.
As indicated above, there has been a reported increase
equivalent to 0.8 million swine in the socialized herds of collec-
tive and state farms. On the premise that there was no change in
total swine numbers in the USSR, it may be further assumed that
the private sector lost 0.8 million swine to the socialized sector.
The resulting figure may be accepted as the lower limit of the
1 January 1953 range of swine numbers. For the upper limit of the
range of swine numbers, the claimed increase in the socialized
sector has been added to swine numbers as of 1 January 1952, and
swine numbers in the private sector as of 1 January 1952 have been
carried over to 1 January 1953, as indicated in Table 7.
The median between the upper and lower limits for swine
numbers is about 27.1 million and is accepted as the preliminary
estimate for swine numbers for 1 January 1953, a 1.5-percent gain
over the number estimated for 1 January 1952.
* Table 7 follows on p. 23.
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Estimated Swine Numbers in the USSR
1952 and 1953
1 Januarry,1952
1 January 1953
(Lower Limit)
1 January 1953
(Upper Limit)
State Farms
4.1
4.3
4.3
Socialized Sector
of Collective Farms
16.1
16.7
16.7
Private Owners
6.5
5.7
6.5
Total
26.7
26.7
27.5
The Fifth Five Year Plan for swine, less realistic than
that for cattle, has a goal of 35 million, a 29-percent increase
over estimated 1 January 1953 numbers of 27.1 million. This over-all
increase represents an annual increase of about 9 percent for the
years 1953 through 1955. Although increases of these proportions
in swine numbers are biologically feasible, there is doubt as to
whether the availability of feed, particularly grain and potatoes,
will support such increases. In the USSR, cattle receive relatively
little grain, oilcake, or other concentrates. Swine are fed chiefly
grain and potatoes. It is extremely doubtful that over one-third
more grain and potatoes could be made available to make possible
an increase in swine numbers of 29 percent in 3 years, particularly
in view of the demand for grain and potatoes by the increasing
human population in the USSR. It is anticipated that swine numbers
will level off to about 28.2 million on 1 January 1956.
(3) Sheep and Goats.
It has previously been noted that goat numbers were not
mentioned in the report on livestock increases. There is the pos-
sibility that the USSR may have used the Russian word for sheep
(ovtsa) to refer to both sheep and goats. However, Soviet practice
in the past has generally been to distinguish between these cat-
gories of livestock. Furthermore, since there are fow goats in the
socialized sector, it would not be too meaningful for the USSR to
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speak of both sheep and goats in the socialized herds on collective
or state farms. In recent years the combined total of sheep and
goat numbers (primarily, sheep in the socialized sector and goats
in the private sector) has shown greater absolute gains than have
all other categories of livestock combined, and the Fifth Five
Year Plan reflects optimism as to further increases.
Some of the increase in sheep numbers in the socialized
sector is at the expense of the private sector. The continuing
increases in goat numbers in the private sector, however, may tend
to offset its losses of sheep to the socialized sector. Two assump-
tions have been made in determining sheep and goat numbers. First,
it has been assumed that the reported 7-percent increase in the
socialized flocks on collective farms and the 8-percent increase
on state farms apply to the few scattered goats in the socialized
sector as well as to the overwhelming majority of sheep. It is
further assumed that the increase announced for the Ministry of
State Farms applies to all state farms, although this may not
actually be the case.
On the basis of reported figures, the total number of
sheep and goats in the USSR on 1 January 1952 has been placed at
107.5 million. This total includes '73.5 million in the socialized
flocks on collective farms and 24.1 million held by collective
farm members and other private owners.
The reported increase in the socialized sector is equiv-
alent to 5.9 million sheep and goats. On the premise that there
was no change in total sheep and goat numbers in the USSR, it may
be further assumed that the private sector lost 5.9 million to the
socialized sector. This figure may The accepted as the lower limit
of the 1 January 1953 range of sheep and goat numbers. For the
upper limit of the range, the claimed increase in the socialized
sector was added to sheep and goat numbers for 1 January 1952,
and numbers in the private sector for that date were carried over
to 1 January 1953, thus assuming smaller requisitions from the
private sector and increases in goat numbers in this sector to
counterbalance the losses of sheep, as indicated in Table 8.*
The median between the upper and lower limits for
sheep and goat numbers is about 110.5 million and is accepted as
Table 5 follows on p. 25.
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Estimated Sheep and Goat Numbers in the USSR
1952 and 1953
1 January 1952
1 January 1953
(Lower Limit)
1 January 1953
(Upper Limit)
State Farms
9.9
10.7
10.7
Collective Farms
73.5
78.6
78.6
Private Owners
21+.1
18.2
24.1
Total
107.5
107.5
113.4
the preliminary estimate for sheep and goat numbers for 1 Jan-
urary 1953, a 2.8-percent gain over the number estimated for 1 Jan-
uary 1952.
The-USSR has set 158.4 million sheep and goats as its
goal for 1 January 1956, as contrasted with the estimate of 110.5
million in 1953. The Five Year Plan goal of 158.4 million sheep
and goats calls for an increase of about 48 million sheep and goats
in 3 years, or an increase of 43 percent from 1 January 1953 to
1 January 1956, which amounts to about a 14-percent increase per
year. Despite the fact that sheep and goats in the USSR have shown
greater absolute gains than have all other categories of livestock
combined, postwar Soviet experience has shown that the average annual
increase in sheep and goat numbers for 1949 to 1953 was only about
5.1 percent. Expansion of pastures through construction of irriga-
tion and reclamation projects will enable the USSR to increase sheep
and goat numbers to some extent, but far below the planned goals.
It is estimated that sheep and goat numbers for 1 January 1956 will
be 117.2 million. Thus the Fifth Five Year Plan goal of 158.4 mil-
lion would seem to be highly unrealistic.
(4) Horses.
The announced 4-percent increase in horse numbers in the
socialized herds of the collective farms during 1952 indicates about
12.1 million horses as of 1 January 1953, or a gain of over 400,000
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over the 1 January 1952 figure of 11.7 million horses in the social-
ized sector of collective farms. Since the Fifth Five Year Plan calls
for 12.3 million horses in socialized herds on collective farms by
1 January 1956, it is apparent that the current Five Year Plan figures
for horses have almost been met 3 years ahead of plan.
As a result of wartime losses and increased collectiviza-
tion, horse numbers in the private sector have represented only a small
fraction of total horse numbers since the war. Although not many de-
tails are available, horse numbers in the private sector are estimated
to have been under one-half million on 1. January 1952, with collective
farm holdings representing 1L.7 million, or 80 percent of the Soviet
total of 14.7 million. State farm horse numbers have been assumed to
be over 2.5 million.
It may still be possible for the socialized sector to in-
crease horse numbers at the expense of the private sector, as is the
case with other categories of livestock. With the virtual disappear-
ance of horses in the private sector, however, any transfer of live-
stock would have to be on a small scale and at a diminishing rate.
The 1952 horse numbers on state farms are increased by
100,000 to 2.6 million to account for the claimed 9-percent increase
in horses on state farms of the Ministry of State Farms.
The planned total horse numbers for 1 January 1956 are
15.1 million. Since the planned collective farm total of 12.3 mil-
lion horses has not yet been reached, it is safe to assume that 1956
planned total numbers have not yet been attained. Fifteen million,
therefore, is taken as the upper limit of total horse numbers for
1 January 1953. The 1 January 1952 total of 14.7 million is taken
as the lower limit. The median between the upper and lower limits
for horse numbers is 14.85 (or 14.9) million, which is accepted as
the preliminary estimate for horse numbers for 1 January 1953, or a
1.4-percent increase over 1952.
The Fifth Five Year Plan goal for horses is 15.1 million
on 1 January 1956. As indicated above, this total has virtually been
reached and should be maintained through the Plan period.
Table 9* shows estimates of livestock numbers in the USSR
for 1952 and 1953 as of 1 January. The percentage of change has also
been computed.
* Table 9 follows on p. 27.
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Table 9
Estimated Livestock Numbers in the USSR
as of 1 January 1952 and 1953
Livestock
1 January 1952
(End of 1951)
1 January 1953
(End of 1952)
Percentage of Change
State Farms
4.3
4.3
0
Collective Farms
31.7
31.7
0
Privately Owned
22.8
22.8
0
Total
58.8
58..8
State Farms
4.1
4.3
+4
Collective Farms
16.1
16.7
+4
Privately Owned
6.5
6.1
-6
Total
26.7
27.1
+1-5
Sheep and Goats
State Farms
9.9
10.7
+8
Collective Farms
73.5
78.6
+7
Privately Owned
24.1
21.2
-12
Total
107.5
110.5
State Farms
2.5
2.6
0
Collective Farms
11.7
12.1
+4
Privately Owned
0.5
0.2
-60
Total
14.7
14.9
+1.4
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(1) Meat and Dairy Products and Canned Food.
Plan fulfillment claimed for the food ministries in 1952
was as follows: Fish Industry, 94 percent; Meat and Dairy Industry,
100.5 percent; and Food Industry, 103 percent. The 1952 output of
various food products in terms of the 1951 output, according to
Soviet claims, is given in Table 10.
Claimed 1952 Output of Soviet Food Products
as a Percentage of 1951 Output
Category
Percentage of 1951
Meat
115
Butter
104
Milk Products
105
Canned Milk
128
Cheese
115
Canned Goods
111
Failure of the Ministry of the Fish Industry to fulfill
the 1952 Plan may indicate an overambitious goal in view of the
reported use of obsolete equipment and the reluctance of certain
officials of the Ministry to promote the modernization of the.in-
dustry. Since World War II the USSR has been rebuilding and
re-equipping its fishing fleet. Although the fish catch immediately
after the war was lower than before, it is estimated that by 1949
the catch had exceeded that of most prewar years. Since 1949 the
rising trend has continued. With the planned replacement of old
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equipment and the adoption of new techniques, such as the use of
underwater illumination for night fishing and the use of airplanes
for locating schools, it is believed that the catch can be increased
still further.
The Russians indicate that the Ministries of the Meat
and Dairy Industry and the Food Industry barely met their goals.
These ministries may have exceeded their goals in certain segments
although failing in others. The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy
Industry probably met its goal for 1952 because of the increased
availability of meat and dairy products to government distribution
channels. The drive to increase the number of livestock in the
socialized sector has increased the state's control over production
and distribution of dairy products, but this control cannot be
expected to improve per capita consumption. Dairy products may, how-
ever, move to the various consumer groups in different amounts than
formerly. The nonfarm laboring class and other favored groups will
have access to more dairy products and, as a result of recent price
reductions, at lower cost than in the past.
The base on which the Russians computed the outputs of
various commodities was shifted from a comparison with goals to a
comparison with the'preceding year (1951). This shift presents more
favorable achievements than would be possible if goals had been used
as a base, as is illustrated by the canned food output, which,
although showing an 11-percent increase over 1951, fell 9 percent
below the announced goal of a 20-percent increase for the year. The
canned food output of the USSR was about 1 billion cans (400-gram
standard cans) in 1940. During the war, production fell to low
levels. It had attained and exceeded the 1940 output by 1949 and
has increased progressively in succeeding years. Production in 1952
is estimated at 1.8 billion cans, and further increases can be expec-
ted to occur. Plants are not being used at their maximum capacity,
largely because of inefficient management and a lack of skilled labor.
It is believed that these inefficiencies contributed to the failure
of the industry to attain the announced goals for 1952. Shortages of
tinplate could be a drawback if the industry shifted to an all-out
military production basis. If, however, production of canned foods
adapted to civilian requirements is emphasized, glass containers can
be made and used to greater advantage than at the present time.
The increase in meat products was facilitated by the con-
tinued expansion of livestock numbers in the socialized sector,
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primarily at the expense of the private sector. It is believed that
as a concomitant of the leveling off of cattle, swine, and sheep
numbers during 1952, meat production in. the USSR increased, by almost
one-half million tons (3,460,000 metric tons in 1951 as compared with
3,950,000 metric tons in 1952). Assuming reasonably favorable weather
and crop conditions for 1953, some increase may be anticipated in
livestock numbers. If there is an increase in livestock numbers, a
leveling off, it not an actual drop, in meat production may be expec-
ted for 1953. A tentative estimate of future Soviet meat production
places 1953 production at 3,870,000 metric tons and 1954 production
at 3,960,000 metric tons. The estimated meat production for 1952
and 1954 is roughly equal to the 1938 meat production. When the
increasing population in the USSR is taken into account, however, it
becomes apparent that the 1952 and 1954 per capita meat production
is over 10 percent below the 1938 level, as is shown in Table ll.*
By way of comparison, per capita meat production figures of the US
are included.
A 3-year series of production estimates for specified
livestock products is given in Table 1;'..**
(2) Wool.
The production of raw wool was not reported in the
announcement of Plan fulfillment. Woolen textile production for
1952, however, is claimed to be 108 percent of 1951 production.
Increases in sheep numbers justify carrying the amount
of the wool clip proportionately higher than in 1951. The 8-percent
increase reported, however, is higher than is justified by the esti-
mated increase of 2.8 percent in sheep and goat numbers. The Fifth
Five Year Plan goals visualize large gains both in the average yield
per sheep and in sheep numbers. If they are achieved, wool produc-
tion will more than double in the USSR between 1951 and 1955. It is
expected that Soviet sheep numbers will fall far short of the es-
tablished goal. Sheep numbers for 1952 were near the record high,
and pastures and roughage resources cannot support the planned in-
creases of sheep and other categories of livestock at the same time.
Planned wool yields for 1955 are also unrealistic. The 1952 average
* Table 11 follows on p. 31.
Table 12 follows on p. 32.
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Total and Per Capita Production of Meat
(including Slaughter Fat) in the USSR and the US
1938, 1951-55
USSR I/ US b/
Total Total
(Thousand Per Capita (Thousand Per Capita
Year Metric Tons) (Kilograms) Metric Tons) (Kilograms)
1938 c/ 3,980 21.4 8,259 63.2
1951 3,460 17.0 11,237 72.4
1952 3,950 19.1 11,758 73.8
1953 d/ 3,870 18.4 N.A. N.A.
1954 a/ 3,960 18.5 N.A. N.A.
1955 a/ 4,100 18.8 N.A. N.A.
a. Based on total domestic production of meat and animal fats
and on 1 January population estimates.
b. Based on domestic production of carcass meat and lard and on
1 July population estimates.
c. Based on present boundaries.
d. Forecasts are based on the assumption of reasonably favorable
weather and crop conditions.
wool clip per sheep of 1.7 kilograms is still below the prewar level
of 2.04 kilograms despite efforts to increase production by the use
of better feeding and management practices. Time is too short to
bring about the significant increases in the average wool clip
visualized for 1955.
7. Standard of Living.
The Soviet announcement of 1952 achievement stated that state
and cooperative retailers sold to the population 10 percent more
goods than in 1951. The percentage of increase in the amount of
food products sold through these outlets includes the following:
meat, 10 percent; fish products, 13 percent; butter, vegetable oils,
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Estimated Production of Selected Livestock Products
in the USSR
1950-52
Commodity Unit
Meat (Commercial) Million Metric Tons
Butter (Creamery) Thousand Metric Tons
Canned Milk Million 400-Gram Cans
Canned Goods Million 400-Gram Cans
(including Meat)
1950
1951
1953
1.10
1.23
1.41
343
364
379
72
104
133
1,363
1,637
1,817
and fats, 17 percent; eggs, 9 percent; milk and. dairy products, 17 per-
cent; and sugar, 26 percent. It was also reported that the fifth
lowering of the prices of "mass consumption commodities" since the end
of rationing (1947) took place on 1 April 1952.
The announcement does not give a clear picture of changes in the
availability of food products to consumers, inasmuch as the propor-
tion of the total retail trade handled by the state and cooperative
stores is not known. The food distributed through state retail
outlets represents less than 50 percent of the food consumption of
the nation as a whole. This retail distribution is closely related
to. the controls which the state enforces to procure these products
from the producers, the extent to which. the state controls the
processing of farm products, and the requirements levied on supplies
for the military forces and for stockpiling.
Sugar, which is one of the most completely controlled commodities
because it is processed in state-controlled refineries, can easily
be put in or withdrawn from retail channels by the state. Only about
one-third of all meat is processed under the supervision of the state.
The state, therefore, is more limited in the proportion of total pro-
duction that it can sell at retail than it is in the case of sugar.
Such products as eggs and fresh vegetables, which require no proc-
essing, are controlled to a lesser extent than meat, and, as a result,
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a relatively large proportion of these. commodities is consumed in
the households of those who produce them, and to a large extent their
sale is confined to private retailing on peasant markets.
Another consideration that precludes unqualified acceptance of
the announced increases in state sales as a net gain to the consumer
is that no allowance has been made by the USSR for the absolute in-
crease in population between 1951 and 1952, which is estimated at
3.5 million, or 1.72 percent.
Although reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate
that there has been some improvement in the quantity and quality of
the food available for consumption by nonfarmers, it is improbable
that a 10-percent increase in retail sales indicates a commensurate
improvement in the standard of living of the nation as a whole.
Price reductions announced by the USSR in 1952 are confirmed by
the American Embassy. The gains from these reductions accrued
chiefly to nonfarming consumers because few commodities purchased
by peapants were reduced in price. Price reductions applied largely
to agricultural products, with many of these commodities being sold
at low, fixed prices in state and cooperative stores. The prices
received for them by producers were lower than formerly. The peas-
ants, therefore, were adversely affected in two ways by the price
reduction. They were at a relative disadvantage in the prices they
paid for the commodities they bought, and they were subjected to
absolute decreases in their incomes from the sale of their products.
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APPENDIX
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
Only two sources are cited in this report. All other information
has been drawn from previously prepared CIA estimates.
The intelligence report published by the Office of Intelligence
Research, US Department of State, is considered to be a reliable
estimate of the total cultivated acreage of the USSR available for
the year indicated.
The Soviet statement, paraphrased from a report of the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, is suspect as a consequence of the
official Soviet state policy restricting the dissemination of infor-
mation about all phases of Soviet activity. The statement paraphrased,
however, is probably true.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
A - Completely reliable
1 -
Confirmed by other
sources
B - Usually reliable
2 -
Probably true
C - Fairly reliable
3 -
Possibly true
D - Not usually reliable
4 -
Doubtful
E - Not reliable
5 -
Probably false
F - Cannot be judged
6 - Cannot be judged
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on
the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this
report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation of the cited document.
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1. 41to OIR Intelligence Report No. 5805, 20 May 1952, p. 11.
2 A RR B-2.
2.
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