AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: January 12, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National ,..~-~.-- ---- - Secret
vd ii nRelease 2002/01/30 :.Q4tMeTO&1AO0270001OO4Q FORN-NOCONTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 79-002
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040t*y
^'V7
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
REL...
FGI
This publication is available
on microfiche.
To get a microfiche copy of this
publication call=OCR/
DSB); for future issuances in
addition to or in
hard copies, call
(PPG/RD).
All material on this page
is unclassified.
This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to...
Foreign Government Information
Derivative classification by 006266
Review 30 years from date
Derived from multiple
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/3(EECkaRDP79T00912A002700010040-6
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
AFRICA REVIEW (U)
12 January 1979
CONTENTS
Rhodesia: Prime Minister Smith's Plans (U) . . . . .
Prime Minister Ian Smith told a close
adviser this week that he does not in-
tend to stand for reelection on 20 April,
but that he will stay on as Prime Minister
until a new government is formed and a 25X1C
25X1C black is appointed to his post
S NF
NC OC)
Namibia: UN Representative's Visit (U) . . . . . . . 3
Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary General's
special representative for Namibia, will
visit the territory next week to discuss
with the South African Administrator General
the problems blocking implementation of
the UN independence program. (C)
Nigeria: Economic and Social Tensions (U). . . . . . 5
Tensions in Nigeria have risen appreciably
over the past year in response to mounting
popular frustration over worsening economic
and social conditions. (C)
Cape Verde: Soviet Presence (S). . . . . . . . . . . 7
President Pereira seems determined to
preserve his country's nonaligned stance,
despite a rise since last spring in the
number of Soviet military and civilian
advisers on the islands. (S)
FOR THE RECORD (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
SECRET
 ~;~4 pg 9T00912A002700010040-6
Approved For Releaase OONO/ 1oW
25X1A
25XI C
25X1 C
25X1 C
lem. Although the Deputy Prime Minister has consist-
ently supported the Prime Minister's settlement plans,
Rhodesia: Prime Minister Smith's Plans (U)
Prime Minister Ian Smith told
that he does not intend to stand for re-
election on 20 April, but that he will stay on as Prime
Minister until a new government is formed and a black is
a ointed to his post,
25X1 C
-* Smith reportedly is reluctant to step down
before then because he fears the party might choose Co-
minister for Foreign Affairs Pieter Van Der Byl, to re-
place him. (S NF NC OC)
Van Der Byl has close ties among rightwing whites,
many of whom would like to scuttle the internal settle-
ment. Smith would prefer to have Deputy Prime Minister
David Smith succeed him if he stepped down before elec-
tions, but his replacement is elected by the party
caucus, which Smith fears would favor a hardliner such
as Van Der Byl. David Smith has long recognized the
need for a political settlement of the Rhodesian prob-
he believes
(S NF NC OC
Smith has often stated his willingness to retire
from public life if a settlement seemed assured. Al-
though his departure has long been a primary objective
of the black nationalists, it would not contribute much
to the resolution of the more basic problems of ending
the war, stemming white flight, or obtaining inter-
national recognition. (S)
*The Rhodesian constitution, published on 2 January, calls on the
president--who is elected by both houses of parliament--to appoint
as prime minister the person he "considers best able to command
the support of the majority of the members of the lower house."
Seventy-two of the 100 seats in the lower house are reserved for
blacks and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, black cochairman of the Executive
Council, is expected to win over half of the black votes and be
named as the new prime minister. (U)
12 January 1979
25X1 C
25X1 C
Approved For Release 2002/01/R(BQ 21A-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
 Approved For Release 2002/0'?69RJIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
Smith is not likely to publicly announce any deci-
sion to step down in the near future for fear of losing
white confidence in the transitional government. He
could change his mind anytime between now and the elec-
tions scheduled for April if the security situation
deteriorates further or he believes that remaining in
office is necessary to bolster the whites' commitment
to the new government. (S) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON)
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :2CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/8~ TCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
25X1A
Namibia: UN Representative's Visit (U)
Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary General's
special representative for Namibia, will visit the
territory next week to discuss with the South African
Administrator General the problems blocking implementa-
tion of the UN independence program. Ahtisaari's mis-
sion will test whether South Africa, in order to gain
international support for a Namibian Government, will
drop demands for modifications in the UN program that
probably would be unacceptable to the Security Council.
(C)
South African Prime Minister Botha has agreed in
principle to a UN-supervised election in Namibia that
would, in effect, nullify the election conducted by
the South Africans last month. Meanwhile, however, he
apparently intends to use the newly elected constituent
assembly to show Namibian sympathy for Pretoria's hard
bargaining with the UN. When Botha concluded his first
meeting with the Namibian Assembly in late December,
he said that the assembly would again be consulted be-
fore the South African Government makes a final decision
to accept a UN transitional assistance group in Namibia.
(C)
There is still a wide gap between stipulations in
the UN transitional program that the Security Council
adopted last September and various conditions that
South African leaders have subsequently stated. The UN
plan stipulates that South African and SWAPO forces
withdraw simultaneously within three months of a truce,
and that an election be held four months after both
sides fully comply with truce arrangements. In late
December, however, Prime Minister Botha informed Sec-
retary General Waldheim that no South African troops
would be withdrawn until it is clear that SWAPO has
ceased all guerrilla operations, but South Africa re-
quires an early agreement with the UN to hold an elec-
tion no later than 30 September 1979. (C)
12 January 1979
3
Approved For Release 2002/01fl~. IZEIYA-RDP79TOO912AO02700010040-6
 Approved For Release 2002/0~EEIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
Moreover, Botha has indicated to Waldheim that he
will insist on modifications in the UN plan for a peace-
keeping force in Namibia. The plan authorizes an overall
strength of 7,500 for the UN military force and stipulates
that national contingents will be selected so as to have
equitable geographic representation. Although Waldheim
has said that the actual strength may be well below 7,500,
depending on circumstances, Botha has implied publicly
that he will insist on prior agreement to a much smaller
force. He has also implied that South Africa will not
accept troops from any Communist country. (C)
Waldheim's decision to send Ahtisaari to Namibia
with instructions to challenge Botha to accept quickly
at least the first arrivals of a UN military force on
the premise that remaining problems will be resolved
jointly by Ahtisaari and Administrator General Steyn
as the operation proceeds. Waldheim has informed
Botha that placement of a UN force in Namibia must begin
by late February if Botha's goal of an election by
September is to be reconciled with the UN plan. (C)
If Botha agrees to the early arrival of a first
group of UN troops without nailing down his conditions,
he will still hold high cards. All the Namibian politi-
cal groups except SWAPO share his wariness of UN "par-
tiality" for SWAPO, and may back the South Africans in
continuing efforts to limit the actual deployments of
UN troops and the activities of the UN civilian staff.
The plan for phased replacements of South African troops
with a UN force will provide opportunities for foot-
dragging if the South Africans perceive threats to their
basic interests in Namibia. (C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
12 January 1979
4
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/098~TCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
25X1A
Nigeria: Economic and Social Tensions (U)
Tensions in Nigeria have risen appreciably over the
past year in response to mounting popular frustration
over worsening economic and social conditions. These
strains, when coupled with deep-seated tribal, regional,
and religious differences, add to a marked propensity
for impatience and violence that underlies relations
among individual Nigerians. The impact on internal pol-
itics of rising economic and social unrest will be of
growing importance in 1979, as Nigeria attempts an al-
ready difficult transition to civilian rule scheduled
for next October. Such unrest could disrupt progress
toward constitutional rule, which is already being
threatened by a resurgence of ethnic politics. Economic
and social demands will also pose a serious challenge
for the government, be it civilian or, more likely,
military, that governs Nigeria in coming years. (C)
Student and urban unrest, which flared last spring
before burning out by early June, revealed a serious
level of economic and social discontent in Nigeria that
could erupt into street violence with relatively little
provocation. Malaise is highest among students, low
income workers, urban dwellers, and middle class
professionals. (C)
Nigeria's oil boom of the early 1970s has increased
popular expectations that poor living conditions and un-
deremployment will be substantially alleviated. Unfor-
tunately, the short-lived boom has brought the inevita-
ble problems common to several other OPEC countries:
rapid population growth, accelerated urbanization, sharp
inflation, chaotic and uneven economic development,
shortages of consumer goods and housing, inadequate
public services, and wider disparities between the priv-
ileged few and the masses. Nigerians, whose per capita
income averages around $400 a year, find it difficult
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :'LIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/0q~'EIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
to accept that Nigeria's oil boom is now over* and that
the country must learn to get along on reduced means.
They are resentful of the personal sacrifices required
of them by the Obasanjo government's program of economic
austerity and retrenchment that is to see Nigeria to
civilian rule. (C)
Economic and social conditions are likely to be
major political issues through this year and probably
the next several years. Nigeria's civilian presidential
contenders have responded to popular concerns with a
heavy focus on economic and social issues in their party
platforms. They all espouse similar populist goals and
differ mainly on how swiftly the government should try
to achieve them. Aspiring politicians so far have
muffled direct criticism of the military's management
of the economy to avoid provoking punitive measures
against themselves and jeopardizing the process of re-
turning to civilian rule. Even if a civilian government
were installed, however, it is doubtful that it would
prove any more successful than Nigeria's military rulers
in coping with the rising tide of economic and social
demands or in demonstrating quick results. (C)
The more the organized work force--some 880,000 to
1 million unionists faced with continued wage controls--
is exposed to campaign rhetoric about increasing the
popular share of economic prosperity, the more likely
Nigeria's restive workers will be to express their re-
sentment via wildcat strikes and antimanagement riots.
While the military has forcibly kept labor unrest under
control, a future civilian government--being more vul-
nerable to popular pressures--might be less inclined
to intervene or to resist extreme labor demands. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)
-Oil output is expected to peak by 1980 and decline after the
mid-1980s, unless the government can soon provide investment
incentives for exploitation of untapped deep-water areas. (C)
12 January 1979
6
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/01 1 i TA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
25X1A
Cape Verde: Soviet Presence (S)
President Aristides Pereira, the moderate leader of
the strategically located Cape Verde Islands, seems de-
termined to preserve his country's nonaligned stance,
despite a rise since last spring in the number of Soviet
military and civilian advisers on the islands. The in-
creased Soviet presence, a result of Cape Verde's deci-
sion to develop its own military establishment, is un-
likely, at least for the short term, to undermine
Pereira's position or lead to Soviet military access to
Cape Verdean facilities. Pereira could eventually be
challenged, however, by his more radical and pro-Soviet
Defense Minister Silvino da Luz, who is reportedly being
cultivated by the Soviets and whose important position
in the growing military establishment could give him
leverage to influence future events. (S)
Soviet Involvement
The Soviets have pursued a long-term campaign aimed
at increasing their influence and presence in Cape Verde.
The Soviet Union was the principal benefactor to the
struggle of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau for independ-
ence from Portugal. Moscow continued to support Cape
Verde after independence in 1975. Soviet interest in
the islands--astride the north-south Atlantic air and
shipping lanes--is related to its search for alternative
and additional facilities to support its commercial and
military operations in Africa. (S)
Moscow is interested in obtaining military access
to naval and air facilities in Cape Verde because of its
need to support its involvement in the Horn of Africa
and because of Guinean President Toure's decision in
mid-1977 to terminate Soviet use of Conakry airport for
TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft flights. The So-
viets may also be anticipating that Toure will terminate
in coming months a Soviet-Guinean accord that has per-
mitted a small Soviet West African naval patrol to op-
erate off Conakry since the early 1970s. (S)
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : C? RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/01/,R FA 1-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
Western Sahara
Mauritania
4NOUAKCHOTT
Cape Verde
Gm
Vol"
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : C iA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/0'f 3OREQIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
The Soviets have requested authorization to use the
island's main airfield for military aircraft and recon-
naissance flights, but Pereira, who frequently says that
he will not permit foreign military use of Cape Verde,
has apparently turned them down. Pereira's protestations
have not, however, prevented him from allowing Cuba to
use the main airfield. While Pereira claims that Cuban
flights carry civilians, they also shuttle Cuban mili-
tary personnel back and forth to Angola and other Afri-
can countries. (S)
Soviet access to port facilities at Mendelo, on
Sao Vicente, would enhance their naval operations in the
Atlantic and along the West African littorals. Mendelo
has an excellent harbor and is ideal for resupplying
ships. It is also a center for international transporta-
tion--international shipping companies make regular stops
at Mendelo--in addition to having a submarine cable sta-
tion that links Cape Verde with Europe. (S)
In the past year, the Soviets made three military
deliveries to the islands, including several tons of
rifles, ammunition, grenades, portable rocket launchers,
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and communication equip-
ment. Pereira also agreed to accept a Soviet offer of
three MIG-17 fighters--which will be transferred from
Guinea-Bissau--after Moscow backed down on a demand that
Soviet pilots fly the aircraft and agreed to train Cape
Verdean pilots. (S)
The Soviets, who have extended only limited amounts
of economic aid to the islands, are presently providing
military training to about 200 Cape Verdeans. There are
also about 300 Cape Verdean students studying in the
Soviet Union, although the number will probably dwindle
with the beginning of generous scholarship programs
offered by France, Brazil, and Portugal. (S)
Pereira's Request
Pereira turned to Moscow last year for additional
military equipment and advisers to create Cape Verde's
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 9CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002 1g6T: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
own military establishment.* Moscow responded enthusi-
astically to Pereira's request and took the-opportunity
to increase its presence in Cape Verde from approximately
25 to 60 military and civilian personnel. The Soviets
are also active in other areas such as security, airport
management, and health. (S)
In an attempt to capitalize on its expanded pres-
ence, Moscow last month invited Defense Minister da Luz
to visit the Soviet Union. Da Luz is openly pro-Soviet
and pro-Cuban and claims to have arranged for Cuban
technical assistance to Cape Verde, in addition to ob-
taining the services of Soviet military and police ad-
visers. Although da Luz received government approval
to make the trip, the invitation stirred a heated de-
bate among more moderate government officials who ques-
tion Moscow's motives. (S)
Internal Situation
President Pereira--who has ruled Cape Verde since
independence in July 1975 and heads the island's sole
political party, the African Party for the Independence
of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC)--has no serious
political challengers at the moment and seems to be in
full control of his country. He is highly respected
and admired by the people for the role he played in the
liberation struggle against Portugal. (S)
As long as Pereira remains in power, Cape Verde
will probably continue to follow a nonaligned course and
resist Soviet overtures. Pereira is suspicious of Mos-
cow's intentions, especially its cultivation of da Luz,
and has attempted to play down the significance of the
Soviet presence in Cape Verde. The President also
recognizes that his country is heavily dependent on
Western assistance for economic development, and to
ensure continued Western support, Pereira probably
intends to set further limits on the Soviets. (S)
*Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau formed a single liberation army in
1961 in their independence struggle against Portugal. Both coun-
tries, which share the same political party, continued to rely on
this force, stationed in Guinea-Bissau, after independence in
anticipation of unifying the two states. With both countries
showing little interest in unification in recent years, Pereira
apparently felt that Cape Verde was in need of its own military
force. (S)
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/3m: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/(MEIEEIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
Pereira, however, who is troubled by poor health,
is being criticized by several disgruntled party and
government officials for his failure to come to grips
with the islands' perilous economic condition. While
Pereira is not in any immediate danger, the military's
increasing influence could dim Cape Verde's long-term
prospects for political stability. (S)
Da Luz, who is in control of Cape Verde's security
apparatus and whose political influence will continue
to grow along with the size of the military, will prob-
ably try to use the Soviet presence to enhance his own
political position. The Soviets will use their in-
creased presence to gain further influence with da Luz,
who probably wants to become president. If da Luz
gained power, he would probably nationalize private and
foreign businesses, opt for a policy of land collectiv-
ism, suppress the Catholic church, and initiate an anti-
Western foreign policy that could easily include grant-
ing military access rights to the Soviet Union. (S)
If da Luz attempted to press his advantage, he
would probably be challenged by Prime Minister Pires,
who could be a contender for the presidency himself
when Pereira leaves the scene. Pires, who supports
Pereira, would probably maintain and reinforce Cape
Verde's nonaligned position, expand its economic ties
with Western nations, introduce mixed economic programs,
and try to improve relations with Cape Verde's sizable
immigrant communities in the United States, Senegal,
and other countries. (S) (SECRET)
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30YCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2002/0'7]BOIFaIA-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
FOR THE RECORD (U)
DJIBOUTI-CHINA: China and Djibouti earlier this
week established iplomatic relations and agreed to ex-
change ambassadors as quickly as possible. For the
Djibouti Government, the decision clearly reflects an
effort to balance the diplomatic presence recently es-
tablished by the Soviets. Djibouti President Gouled,
who only reluctantly acceded to strong and persistent
pressure from Moscow for diplomatic ties, remains highly
suspicious that the Soviets will undermine his fragile
and ethnically troubled regime as well as that of neigh-
boring Somalia while attempting to pave the way for in-
creased Ethiopian influence in Djibouti. Peking has the
same concerns and will attempt to use Gouled's worries
to advance its own anti-S
25X1A
Africa. (CONFIDENTIAL)
GHANA: The announcement by the International Mone-
tary Fund this week of a $69 million loan to Ghana is
an important boost for the battered Ghanian economy.
Since its takeover in a bloodless coup last July, the
Akuffo regime has initiated a series of currency deval-
uations along with a sharp cutback in government spend-
ing in an attempt to curb the country's soaring infla-
tion rate and chronic balance-of-payments deficit. The
IMF loan should ease the way for additional foreign
loans and temporarily alleviate pressure on the regime
for more unpopular austerity measures. (U)
Even with this infusion of funds, Ghana is still
far from solving the basic problems contributing to its
economic plight--mismanagement, excessive public spend-
ing, corruption, and a stagnant agricultural sector.
Moreover, if the government's plans for a return to
civilian rule next July are carried out, a new--and
probably more insecure--civilian regime may prove less
able to adhere to the austerity program that is neces-
sary for longer term economic and political stability.
(C) (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
12 January 1979
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : 6?A-RDP79T00912A002700010040-6
SECRET
 Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010040-6