AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 20, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
National
App d For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO027
Assessment
Center
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-012
20 October 1978
Copy 0 3 Q
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For
AFRICA REVIEW
20 October 1978
CONTENTS
Somalia: Tribalism and Its Threat to Siad. . . . . . 1
Somali President Siad is faced with serious
threats to his authority not only because of
his failure to attract Western military and
political support but by attempts of tribal
opponents to exploit his weakened position
in the aftermath of the Ogaden war.
25X1
25X1
Nigeria: Possibility of Major Party Realignments . . 10
Although the formation of three major
political parties was announced soon
after the legalization late last month
of political activity, the party scene
clearly is far from having crystallized,
and the choice of presidential candidates
by the parties could precipitate important
defections and realignments among the groups.
Approved For Release 2005/1 2/ 4SpL -RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 25X1
Approved For ReI4
25X1A
Somalia: Tribalism and Its Threat to Siad
Somali President Siad, who celebrates the ninth
anniversary Saturday of the coup that brought him to
power, is faced with serious threats to his authority.
Not only has he failed to attract Western military and
political support, he is also confronted by the danger
that Ethiopia, frustrated by continuing Somali-supported
guerrilla activity in the Ogaden, may launch a major
punitive cross-border attack against Somalia's still
disorganized Army. The most immediate threat to Siad
and his regime, however, is that posed by tribal oppo-
nents within and outside Somalia who have attempted to
exploit the Somali leader's weakened position in the
aftermath of the Ogaden war.
Tribal Opposition
Political continuity and stability in Somalia have
always hinged precariously on the ability of the country's
political leaders to balance the competing demands of
the many mutually antagonistic tribes that make up the
Somali body politic. Civilian governments generally man-
aged this balance successfully, but the system at times
has broken down under military rule as a result of the
repressive measures Siad has employed to counter tribal
dissatisfaction and his abolition of the myriad of par-
ties that previously ensured tribal elements a voice in
the political process.
The most important opposition to Siad comes from
the Majertain clan, one of Somalia's largest tribal
groups and the one that was preeminent before Siad's
accession to power. The Majertain have long resented
Siad's blatant favoritism--political, military, and eco-
nomic--toward his fellow Marehan clansmen. This has re-
sulted in Marehan domination of virtually all aspects
of Somali national life.
Majertain opposition came to a head last April when
Majertain Army officers--attempting to capitalize on
1
Approved For Release 2005/1 21 g A-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/f?PI CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
popular discontent with Siad's withdrawal of Somali
regulars from the Ogaden--spearheaded an abortive coup
in Mogadiscio. Several hundred alleged participants
and sympathizers were subsequently arrested; 17 have thus
far been sentenced to death--although none has yet been
executed--in a series of public show trials that have
significantly exacerbated tribal tensions.
25X1
2
Approved For Release 200?A@ W: CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/:TCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
Siad will continue to have considerable difficulty
defusing tribal tensions that were sharply exacerbated
by Somalia's military debacle in the Ogaden war and
that threaten seriously to undermine his regime's
stability. A number of other tribes, for example, despise
Siad and his fellow Marehans as much as they do the
Majertain, and their price for cooperating with Moga-
discio--greater tribal autonomy--is almost certainly
more than Siad would be willing to pay. Such a move
would further undercut the authority of the central
government and undermine its emphasis on the unity of
ethnic Somalia. Siad is a shrewd operator, however, and
evidently believes that he can buy their loyalty with
political appointments, military promotions, fancy hard-
ware, and appeals to Somali nationalism.
As for his primary opponents, the Majertain, Siad
could take a major step toward reconciliation by grant-
ing pardons--or at least commuting the death penalty--
for those sentenced for their part in the April cou
wring the revolution day ceremonies.
If he comes down hard on the coup plotters, the
Majertain will almost certainly react by executing the
pro-Siad tribesmen taken hostage since the start of the
trials in Mogadiscio some two months ago and by other-
wise stirring up trouble in areas of the Somali country-
side they dominate. Such a decision by Siad will also
give impetus to the efforts of Ethiopian-based Somali
announce nis ecision
4
Approved For Release 2005AF1W CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/12/g4C~I1 -RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
dissidents to unseat the Somali leader
No matter what course Siad follows, and he is likely
to proceed cautiously, he will continue to face tribally
based problems. Characteristically, he will probably
try to insulate himself further from criticism over the
regime's failure in the Ogaden and Somalia's thus far
unrewarding policy shift toward the West. To this end,
Siad has already threatened to dissolve the Somali
Socialist Revolutionary Party and reconstitute the Su-
preme Revolutionary Council--a collegial body that nomi-
nally ruled Somalia until the formation of the party in
July 1976. Siad probably reasons that such a move would
force Somali policymakers to share full responsibility
with him for the controversial decisions with which they
have been directly associated in the past. There are,
in fact, strong indications that Siad will announce major
government and party changes--possibly including the
naming of a prime minister--during the anniversary fes-
tivities.
These moves could give Siad a small boost, but they
will not remove the factors that have aggravated tribal
animosities in Somalia. Indeed, it is doubtful that
Siad will be willing or able to modify his approach to
tribal issues sufficiently to do more than superficially
patch over w at long-term promises to be a lem for
his regime.
25X1
25X1
5
Approved For Release 2005/120 F~RiA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/92tKTCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
25X1A
Nigeria: Possibility of Major Party Realignments
Although the formation of three major political
parties was announced soon after the legalization late
last month of political activity, the party scene clearly
is far from having crystallized. It is also still too
early to spot a presidential contender who can be pre-
dicted a winner in elections next year that will precede
the turnover to civilian rule in October 1979. Political
alliances in both the Muslim-oriented north and the pre-
dominantly Christian south remain in a state of flux.
Because of intraparty strife, it is possible that at
least two of the three emergent major parties could be
completely recast into new political combinations in the
next two months. The watershed development in this re-
gard may be determined by who is named the presidential
candidate next month of a fragile north-south amalgam
calling itself the Nigerian People's Party. The choice
could precipitate important defections from the group
and realignments among major parties.
If the political struggle continues to evolve along
current lines with three main parties splitting the na-
tional vote, it is probable that no presidential contender
will meet constitutional requirements to win a popular
election next year. A successful candidate must obtain
a plurality nationwide and one-quarter of the votes in
13 of 19 states, a difficult task given the pervasive-
ness of Nigeria's ethnic and regional loyalties. Other-
wise, the selection of a president from among the two
top contenders is thrown to federal and state legislators
who act as an electoral college and make their choice by
simple majority vote. In this situation, the outcome
would become extremely unpredictable and be characterized
by considerable horse trading and shifting political al-
liances. A president chosen in such an indirect, runoff
election would find it difficult to claim a national man-
date. This could adversely affect his ability to govern
the country, although a civilian president will have
strong constitutional powers.
10
Approved For Release 2005/tTCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/'3ZW-:TCIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
Serious political campaigning probably will not get
under way until after the major parties become stabilized
and their presidential candidates emerge. Incidents of
political thuggery--an endemic problem in Nigeria's first
civilian government--can be expected to become more common
as the pace of politicking intensifies. No party has yet
been officially registered, a necessary step to gain a
place on the ballot. To do so, each party must prove to
a federal electoral commission that it has national status--
support and organization in all 19 states. This require-
ment will bar the host of minor parties that have appeared.
Nigeria's competing ethnic and regional groups have
so far not responded to two potentially controversial de-
velopments: the public unveiling last month of electoral
district constituencies for legislative elections next
year; or the preliminary national voters roll whose valid-
ity is subject to some doubt. The number of registered
voters may have been inflated by as much as 20 percent,
and the final list could swell to some 50 million claimed
voters.
Major Party Developments
Barring kaleidoscopic changes ahead in party forma-
tion, the major electoral contest appears to be shaping
up between groups belonging to the northern Muslim-oriented
National Party of Nigeria and the People's Party of Ni-
geria, which is based primarily in the south. The third
major party--led by veteran southern Yoruba tribal politi-
cian, 69-year-old Chief Obafemi Awolowo--would seem to
have little chance of winning the presidency. Awolowo,
who has boundless ambition, considerable organizing skills,
and an ample supply of money, appears nonetheless re-
duced to playing the role of a spoiler.
Awolowo's Unity Party of Nigeria at this time is the
best organized and most stable of the major parties, but
it probably has the least support across tribal and re-
gional lines--a necessary ingredient for victory. The
Unity Party was the first to hold a nominating convention,
which designated Awolowo as its presidential candidate
to no one's surprise. Awolowo's choice as a vice presi-
dential running mate of an obscure politician from the
major Ibo tribe of southeastern Nigeria underscores his
lack of significant appeal outside the Yoruba heartland.
11
Approved For Release 2005/1214T CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Approved For Release 200S1t2RF4: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
EMERGENT NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES*
Part Name
MAJOR GROUPS
Unity Party of Nigeria
Nigerian People's Party
National Party of Nigeria
MINOR GROUPS
National Union of
Nigerian Citizens
Nigerian National Con-
gress Party
Nigerian Workers and
Peasants Vanguard
Movement
Socialist Party of
Workers, Farmers, and
Youth
Republican Party of
Nigeria
United Nigerian People's
Party
Leader
Not yet chosen
Not yet chosen
Aminu Kano
M. 0. Idrisu
Not yet chosen
Not yet chosen
A. T. Rerri
Orientation
Major Yoruba-based party with
a slightly left-of-center
populist stance.
Amalgam of southern tribal
factions of the major Yoruba
and Ibo groups plus various
minority peoples and a north-
ern Muslim faction.
Northern Muslim-oriented and
dominated by major Haus-a-
Fulani tribe.
Splinter group from National
Party representing more pro-
gressive and radically-
inclined northerners.
Socialist-oriented
Socialist-oriented
Based in Bendel and Imo States
This is a listing of political parties that have appeared since political
activity was legalized on 21 September, and others will follow. None has yet
been officially registered to compete in elections tentatively scheduled to be-
gin next April. To gain a place on the ballot, each party must prove that
it has national appeal, which will preclude most from electoral participation.
12
Approved For Release 200 t&g4 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 200 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
Nigerian Democratic Con-
H. Dappa-Biriye
gress
People's Progressive
A. A. 0. Ezenwa
Based in several southeastern
Party
states
Nigerian People's
G. B. A. Akinyede
Platform not yet announced
Welfare Party
National Advance Party
T. Braithwaite
Billed as a "youths' party"
Movement of the People
Fela Anikulapo-
A so-called "present gen-
Kuti (leading Afro-
eration" party
beat Musician)
Nigerian Labor Party
M. A. Abdul
A workers' party; based
in Benue State
Moreover, the narrow Yoruba cast of his party will make
it vulnerable to charges of being a tribalist party bent
on domination of other groups, particularly the north.
Awolowo apparently has written off the north, which
has long been irredeemably hostile toward him. At the
same time, he cannot realistically expect much Ibo sup-
port. Awolowo earned a reputation as a federal hardliner
toward Ibo secessionists during Nigeria's civil war
(1967-70) with his comments about using starvation as a
legitimate weapon of war. Many Ibo also maintain that
Awolowo misled the east into believing that he would pull
the Yoruba west out of the Federation if the east seceded.
The People's Party is the most ethnically diverse
and unstable of the major parties. It illustrates the
difficulties of political cooperation in Nigeria's plural-
istic society. Plagued with continuing divisions among
the various groups that opportunistically fused to form
the party, it may not hold together.
Heavily southern in makeup, the People's Party in-
cludes anti-Awolowo Yorubas, some Ibo tribal factions,
and various southern minority tribesmen. Many of its
members are drawn from the so-called "Club of 19," a
grouping of young southerners and minority tribesmen of
Nigeria's middle belt region who were responsible for
13
Approved For Release 200'1E(': CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/12MOU(DIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
the defeat in the constituent assembly last spring of a
controversial northern proposal for a federal Islamic
court of appeals.
The People's Party plans to hold a convention on
16 November to sort out its severe leadership problem.
Southerners in the group apparently have not found a
well-known southern politician with significant voter
appeal. At the same time, many of them are opposed to
giving the party's presidential nod to Waziri Ibrahim,
who aspires to the presidency with or without the People's
Party. He is a dissident northern politician and wealthy
businessman of the Muslim Kanuri tribe and appears to be
the party's best hope for projecting a much needed national
image.
Should Ibrahim win the People's Party presidential
nod and much of its southern membership decide to stay
with the group, the overall political party situation
may stabilize along current lines. If either event does
not happen, major political shifts could occur. It is
possible, for example, that Ibrahim could join forces
with the northern Muslim political establishment to head
the as yet leaderless National Party based in the north
or form another northern party.
The northern Muslim-oriented National Party is clearly
having organizational problems and may be more fragile
than it earlier appeared. The party represents an appar-
ently uneasy political marriage of the northern Muslim
establishment and the region's younger and more anti-
traditional elements between whom there reportedly have
been bitter disputes. The group is built around remnants
of the Hausa-Fulani-led party that dominated postinde-
pendence electoral politics. It is aimed at papering
over northern political disunity and reasserting northern
control of a future civilian government.
The Muslim north has the largest bloc of votes, with
38 percent of the electorate. If the north can agree on
a leadership slate with southern appeal and not seriously
split its own vote, its presidential nominee will prob-
ably be able to build up a sufficiently broad alliance
with other groups to win. A great deal depends on whether
or not the Muslim north can rebuild its former political
alliance with a majority of the southern Ibo tribe.
14
Approved For Release 2005/1 g cIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/12114RHMA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
Serious infighting within the National Party, however,
has hindered the selection of a leader. One party spokes-
man recently told the US Consul in Kaduna he believes
that calling a party nominating convention any time soon
would only further divide and weaken the party. He be-
lieves the party's eventual presidential candidate will
be a northern Muslim with a southern running mate. There
has been renewed speculation, however, that the presiden-
tial nod might be given to Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo and
Nigeria's well-known, 74-year-old ex-President under the
postindependence parliamentary government.
It does not appear that the National Party will be
seriously affected by Aminu Kano who recently defected
to form a northern splinter party. Kano is a 58-year-
old politician of radical-socialist bent.who led a small
northern "progressive" party in the early 1960s. Kano
has been joined by a few of the National Party's younger
and more radically inclined elements including some "pro-
gressive" Ibo politicians. Kano's departure may mean
the National Party is becoming more conservative politi-
cally.
The North's "Libyan Connection"
One of the northern personalities portrayed by re-
cent reports as pro-Libyan, Mohammed Abubaker Rimi, has
teamed up with Amino Kano's splinter group. Two other
Nigerian figures alleged to be conduits in reported
Libyan efforts to influence northern politics have re-
mained in the National Party. It is unclear if Kano's
Party will be more favored by the Libyans. Altogether,
we believe that religious extremists and pro-Libyan poli-
ticians in the National Party compose a very small faction
of younger and more militantly inclined individuals, and
there is no indication that they hold real power.
25X1
15
Approved For Release 2005/12RIA-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005t=14T CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
The Minor Parties
Most of the minor parties on the scene will probably
broker their support to the major parties or wither away.
These groups are based on various regions, special inter-
ests, or personalities. None can be expected to have
broad impact in the larger Nigerian society. The emer-
gence of at least three socialist-oriented parties sug-
gests that there are deep divisions within the Nigerian
left. They probably will expend much of their energy
in sectarian feuding. If nothing else, the appearance
of small parties in such large numbers is reminiscent
of the divisiveness and chaos that marked Nigeria's first
civilian party-based government. Nigeria's new constitu-
tion is intended to encourage greater national coopera-
tion and unity with requirements such as the one that
limits electoral competition to broad-based, multiethnic
political coalitions.
25X1
16
Approved For Release 2005 1?, : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
 Approved For Release 2005/1281'A-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
FOR THE RECORD
UGANDA-TANZANIA: Ugandan agitation over the alleged
invasion by Tanzanian forces appears to be subsiding.
President Amin made a visit to the "front" and subsequently
declared Ugandan forces would not retaliate. Tanzania,
which has consistently denied that any invasion occurred,
reportedly instituted a precautionary military alert. It
appears that whatever happened on the border centered on
government efforts to subdue dissident Army troops.
Amin's elaborate fiction of an invasion may have
been intended to preserve the new image Amin has been
trying to create as a respecter of human rights--both
of Ugandan nationals and of US citizens resident in his
country. Amin's blast at the US last week in the wake
of President Carter's signing of the trade embargo may
have alleviated some of his anger--at least for the mo-
ment.
Amin has since remained quiet on ,
suggesting that the appro imately 170 US citizens in
Uaanda are not currently the object of his attention.
25X1A
25X1
17
Approved For Release 2005/12/'ACgik-RDP79T00912A002700010020-8
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010020-8