AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign NOFORN-NO00NTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
Africa Review
22 September 1978
Secret
RP AR 78-008
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AFRICA REVIEW
22 September 1978
CONTENTS
South Africa: Vorster Resigns, Announces Shift in
Namibia Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Prime Minister has stepped down for
reasons of health, opening the way for a
fierce intra-party battle for the office.
Whoever comes to office will have to patch
up relations with the outside world as a
result of Vorster's parting decision to
proceed unilaterally with a program for
Namibian independence.
South Africa: Exile of Blacks from the Cape. . . . 5
The South African Government is determined
to force the families of black workers out
of the western part of Cape Province as part
of its effort to create a secure white home-
land in the area.
Rhodesia: Smith Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Smith can probably weather the current wide-
spread domestic criticism and is trying to
do the minimum possible to appease white
opinion while hoping that a calmer atmosphere
will develop to allow him further opportu-
nities to seek a negotiated settlement.
UK-Rhodesia: Charges of Sanction-Busting. . . . . . 13
The political fallout from the release of a
report on British oil company violations of
UN sanctions against trade with Rhodesia is
expected to be minimal because both the Labor
and Conservative parties were in office when
the infractions occurred and African leaders
already suspected that violations were being
ignored.
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Senegal: Succession Struggle. . . . . . . . . . . . 15
President Senghor, who may soon retire, moved
earlier this week against dissidents in his
party who hope to block his designated con-
stitutional successor, Prime Minister Diouf,
from taking office.
Mauritius: Deepening Labor Party Rift . . . . . . . 17
Prime Minister Ramgoolam is confronted
by an increasingly serious challenge
from reform-minded dissidents in his
Labor Party and an uneasy narrowly
based coalition, and he could fall
from power if he does not make com-
promises.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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25X1A
South Africa: Vorster Resigns, Announces Shift
in Namibia Policy
Prime Minister Vorster announced his resignation
for health reasons on Wednesday and indicated that he
would be willing to step up to the presidency. Vorster's
successor as Prime Minister will be chosen next Thursday
by the ruling National Party parliamentary caucus. The
caucus--175 members of parliament and the senate--will
elect the new President the following day.
The announcement of Vorster's resignation has
sparked a fierce battle for the premiership within the
party leadership. The Prime Minister, during his 12
years of rule, never singled out a successor, and there
is no way of knowing how much political weight he will
be willing to wield in behalf of any of the major con-
tenders during the next week. Vorster, in true Afrikaner
tradition, has ruled by compromise and consensus, and he
may expect the party caucus to pick a leader who can
control the country in the same manner.
The way in which Vorster views his role as President
will affect his behind-the-scenes maneuvering in helping
choose a successor. If a proposed new constitution al-
lowing limited power sharing with Coloreds and Asians--
but not blacks--is put into effect within the next two
years as the government hopes, the presidency could
evolve into a strong executive institution. In such a
case, Vorster may well want a Prime Minister whose views
are compatible with his own.
There are four front-runners for the National Party
leadership. Although they differ in style and some have
stronger views on foreign policy than others, none would
change the existing party policy of separate political
development for blacks and whites. The electorate is
basically conservative, and even Vorster, with the mas-
sive political mandate he won in last year's election,
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believed he could not institute change without risking
a split in the party. The next South African Prime
Minister will, at least for the foreseeable future, find
it necessary to continue to run the country by consensus.
Minister of Defense P. W. Botha is an astute poli-
tician with a reputation for unpredictability. An older
conservative, he favors a strong defense force, tough
internal security laws, and national self-sufficiency
in the face of external pressures. Botha has taken a
firm stand on Rhodesia and has advocated retaliatory
raids on neighboring states harboring anti - South
African guerrillas. He has also led the battle in the
cabinet against acceptance of the UN plan for a settle-
ment in Namibia. As leader of the Cape Province branch
of the National Party, Botha has a strong political
base.
Minister of Plural Relations and Development Connie
Mulder heads the largest of the four provincial parties
that make up the National Party. Mulder had been con-
sidered heir apparent to Vorster until a recent finan-
cial scandal in his ministry damaged his political
standing. Mulder, whose ministry controls almost every
aspect of black life in South Africa, is a conservative
who has nevertheless been able to put a slightly more
acceptable face on South African racial policy without
effecting any real changes. As Prime Minister, Mulder
could deal with some of the older, more conservative
blacks in South Africa, although he does not appear to
have any rapport with the younger members of the black
community. Mulder is a pragmatist on international
issues and could initiate dialogue with Western and
moderate African governments.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof ("Pik") Botha is
an experienced diplomat who served as Ambassador to the
US. He has had no domestic political experience and has
no party base, but appears to have a more flexible ap-
proach to racial matters than most other Afrikaner poli-
ticians. As Prime Minister, Botha might risk introduc-
ing some reforms, although not in the area of genuine
political rights for blacks. Botha has been a longtime
advocate of a peaceful settlement in Namibia, but he may
have lost political ground during the latest cabinet
wrangle over the UN proposals for Namibia. Botha has
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been considered a Vorster protege, and he is personally
popular with whites who see him as a tough, articulate
defender of South Africa able to deal with the outside
world.
Namibian Policy Shift
On Wednesday Vorster also gave the press a detailed
position paper on Namibia that strongly implies that the
cabinet has given up hope of reaching agreement with UN
Secretary General Waldheim and therefore has decided to
proceed unilaterally on a program leading to independ-
ence. Vorster argues that South Africa holds to its
acceptance of the Western settlement proposal, but will
not accept certain "deviations" appearing in Waldheim's
recommendations for implementing the Western plan. He
singled out Waldheim's recommendations for a UN peace-
keeping force of 7,500 men, for a UN police component
of 360 men to monitor the South African police, and for
holding a Namibian election seven months after the UN
Security Council decides to go ahead with a settlement
program.
In fact, the Western plan proposed that the Secre-
tary General set the size of the UN military force, that
the UN civil staff monitor the South African police, and
that a seven-month preparatory period precede an elec-
tion. The Western proposal also set a target date for
independence of 31 December 1978. This would have been
consistent with the seven-month interval if the Security
Council had adopted the Western proposal when it was
accepted by South Africa last April. The SWAPO leaders,
however, did not accept the proposal until July, and
Vorster has argued that Waldheim's opting for the seven-
month preparatory period shows his partiality for SWAPO.
Vorster told the press on Wednesday that the cabi-
net had not set a date for a Namibian election, but had
authorized the Administrator General for Namibia to do
so. Subsequently, the Administrator General announced
that an election will be held on 20-24 November. Such
an early election date is unacceptable to the UN Secu-
rity Council because it does not allow time for other
Namibian political groups to compete on an even footing
with the group favored by South Africa. Pretoria's
move--very likely at Vorster's behest--may be intended
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to secure a position for hard bargaining at the UN and
to reassure South African hardliners that no concessions
will be made until Vorster's successor takes command.
The hardliners might countenance a later election date,
set by Vorster's successor, in return for other revi-
sions in Waldheim's recommendations.
The non-Western members of the Security Council are
unlikely to go along with a postponement of a session on
Namibia until after Vorster's successor is chosen.
South Africa's unilateral setting of an election date
may provoke the non-Western Security Council members to
back SWAPO's demands for changes in the settlement plan
that would be unacceptable even to South African
moderates. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
South Africa: Exile of Blacks From the Cape
The impending demolition of Crossroads, the black
squatter town of 20,000 people on the outskirts of Cape
Town, illustrates the determination of the South African
Government to force the families of black workers out of
the western part of Cape Province. At its annual con-
gress late last month, the Cape branch of the ruling
National Party reaffirmed both its hardline policy to-
ward blacks and its determination to preserve the Cape
as a permanent home solely for whites and Coloreds, the
2.5 million South Africans of mixed blood who are con-
centrated there.
In 1955, the government drew a north-south boundary,
the Eiselen Line, through Cape Province and set off the
western third of the country as an area in which
Coloreds have employment and housing privileges not given
to blacks--although far fewer than those accorded to
whites. The government decided at that time that it
would gradually remove all black laborers from western
Cape Province and relocate them in nearby black home-
lands. Ten years later the government proclaimed a
5-percent annual reduction in the number of blacks al-
lowed to work in the area and put a moratorium on the
construction of new housing for black families.
The government did not, however, foresee the indus-
trial boom and economic expansion of the late 1960s,
which made black labor more essential than ever. Since
the Eiselen Line was drawn, the number of blacks legally
in the area has doubled to about 360,000, and there may
be an equal number there illegally. Despite this in-
crease, the ban on legal family housing remained in force.
Squatter towns mushroomed, and the government is now
systematically eliminating them and ousting dependents--
in part to forestall disorders such as those spearheaded
in the past two years by young blacks living in the
townships.
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South Africa: Western Cape Labor Preference Area
Cape
-- Piovmce boundary
- - mdependenl homeland
boundary
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Despite some muttering from Afrikaner intellectuals
about the need for a better deal for blacks, the provin-
cial party congress last month voted unanimously to
tighten controls on the influx of blacks and make black
labor more expensive for the employer. The congress
ruled out any prospect that urban blacks west of the
Eiselen Line might be allowed to hold property leases,
an innovation introduced elsewhere in the country in an
effort to stabilize some of the urban population.
The hardline tone of the congress was set by Minis-
ter of Defense P. W. Botha, the Cape Province party
leader and one of the contenders for the premiership now
that Prime Minister Vorster has announced his resigna-
tion from office. Minister of Plural Relations and
Development Connie Mulder, one of Botha's political
rivals, jumped on the bandwagon and took a strong stand
against a black labor force with permanent residence
rights in the province. Mulder, whose department con-
trols nearly every aspect of black life in South Africa,
promised to remove Crossroads, the last of the Cape's
major black squatter communities, despite protests from
many Cape Town whites.
The congress also completely ruled out the possibil-
ity of political rights for blacks. The government, how-
ever, is still considering proposals to give a limited
political franchise to Coloreds. Afrikaners in the Cape
obviously believe they can coexist with the Colored
community, which observes white mores while remaining
subservient to white domination.
The Eiselen Line is one of the boundaries that is
often cited in speculation about the possibility of a
federated system--or even of partition in the long-term
South African future. The Cape National Party has shown,
by its determination to remove as many blacks as possi-
ble, that it intends to continue to mold the area west
of the line into a white homeland that could remain in-
tact whatever the future holds for South Africa. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
Rhodesia: Smith Under Fire
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith is facing the most
widespread domestic attacks on his policies since Rho-
desia's whites unilaterally declared independence from
the UK in 1965. Following the shootdown of a Rhodesian
airliner by Zimbabwe African People's Union guerrillas
earlier this month, rightwing spokesmen have become in-
creasingly vocal in attacking Smith for lack of leader-
ship and calling for more vigorous military efforts.
Most of Smith's senior military advisers, however, are
still pressing for a negotiated settlement, although the
internal settlement is faltering badly and prospects are
dim for holding new talks with ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo
or convening an all-parties conference in the near future.
Smith can probably weather the criticism and is trying to
do the minimum possible to appease white opinion while
hoping that a calmer atmosphere will develop that will
allow him to look for further opportunities to pursue a
negotiated settlement.
Whites have reacted emotionally to the airliner
disaster, and rightwing politicians have attracted in-
creased support by calling for strong measures, includ-
ing retaliation against ZAPU forces in Zambia. Smith
responded by announcing that limited martial law measures
would be implemented, and the government reimposed bans
on the internal political wings of ZAPU and the Zimbabwe
African National Union and arrested most of ZAPU's in-
ternal officials. Smith is apparently resisting pres-
sure for a large-scale strike into Zambia.
Many whites were disappointed by Smith's announce-
ment, but are thus far not calling for his resignation.
Rightwingers continue to exploit the situation by criti-
cizing Smith's "weak" response, however, and some moder-
ate politicians are complaining that he did not advance
any new ideas on a settlement.
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Most Rhodesian military commanders opposed the impo-
sition of martial law,
25X1C _ At a meeting between Smith and the commanders be-
fore Smith's announcement, the military leaders asserted
that there were no military advantages to martial law and
that disillusionment among whites would only increase
because they would expect results that the security forces
could not deliver. As they have in the past, the command-
ers urged Smith to seek a negotiated settlement because
they believe the war cannot be won. General Walls, Rho-
desia's senior military leader, stated that a partial
mobilization would be required under martial law since
he would need more troops, but Smith ruled out any call-
up because it would wreck the economy.
In the end, the military leaders accepted Smith's
contention that the limited declaration was necessary to
alleviate white pressure. The commanders agreed to select
only tribal areas where they could implement martial law
measures without further straining their already thin
resources, thereby leaving prosecution of the war essen-
tially unchanged.
Settlement Efforts Stalled
Recent events have increasingly cast doubt on the
viability of the internal settlement, as well as on
whether Smith and his black partners will even try to
carry it out in its present form. Smith stated publicly
that the regime probably will not be able to hold elec-
tions in December as scheduled and that the settlement
might have to be delayed. Even then guerrilla activity
in many rural areas will make it impossible to hold an
election in some parts of the countryside.
Moreover, the positions of the major internal black
leaders, Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, continue
to erode. The two men publicly disclosed Smith's recent
secret meeting with ZAPU leader Nkomo in order to fore-
stall being cut out of a settlement by a Smith-Nkomo
deal. Neither is playing a significant role in important
policy decisions, and they do not appear to have had much,
if any, say in Smith's decision regarding martial law.
One or both might decide to leave the transitional gov-
ernment, but they lack armed strength of their own and,
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appear to have little option other than remaining with
the internal settlement as their best chance for coming
to power in a black government.
Smith now seems to have little confidence in Muzorewa
and Sithole, in part because they have failed to persuade
large numbers of guerrillas to defect under the govern-
ment's amnesty program. Smith no doubt is also aware
that Muzorewa, who has been considered the most popular
Rhodesian black leader, is losing black support.
Smith had intensified his efforts to reach an agree-
ment with Nkomo largely because of the internal settle-
ment's declining fortunes. Now, however, the public dis-
closure of the secret meeting between Smith and Nkomo
and the white reaction to the airliner incident have
closed off the possibility of further direct contacts
between the two men in the near future. Although Smith
and Nkomo are taking a negative position toward further
talks, they still could reconsider.
Prospects for early progress on the UK-US settle-
ment initiative are also bleak. Although a spokesman
for Robert Mugabe's ZANU has publicly differed with Nkomo
by asserting that ZANU is still prepared to attend the
proposed all-parties meeting, neither Patriotic Front
leader seems in a hurry for such a meeting. They prob-
ably see Smith's martial law announcement as further evi-
dence that his position is weakening and that time is
on their side. Nkomo and Mugabe remain interested in
settlement talks, however, because they believe that a
military victory for their forces is not close.
Preserving white confidence in the future of Rho-
desia continues to be Smith's major objective in pursuing
a negotiated settlement. His announcement of limited
martial law was designed to buy time and reduce criticism
of the government, but he risks serious damage to white
confidence and possible increasing white emigration if
he does not take some further action soon.
Smith's Options
some rightwing politicians would like Smith to make
a "second unilateral declaration of independence" and
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return Rhodesia to white rule, while at the same time
staging heavier cross-border attacks on guerrilla forces
in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana. Smith almost cer-
tainly will not adopt such a course. He knows his mili-
tary leaders are opposed to a tougher policy, and both
he and the military leadership realize that an all-out
military effort would not end the fighting.
Smith apparently will carry on with the internal
settlement unless he sees an acceptable alternative. He
realizes that he needs an accord with more than the in-
ternal leaders alone to achieve a viable settlement, but
he probably will try to keep them in the government be-
cause he wants to include at least one of them in any
settlement to balance against the more militant externally
based nationalists.
If criticism from whites continues and Smith's sup-
port appears to be eroding, he might resign or at least
threaten to do so. He has publicly expressed his desire
to get out of politics. Despite his problems, however,
no other white politician can come close to matching
Smith's stature or experience. Many of his critics re-
alize this and probably would not want him to go at this
critical time.
Due to hardening white attitudes, Smith will be un-
able over the short term to push for new settlement talks,
but he probably hopes that the current emotionally charged
atmosphere in the white community will dissipate within
a few weeks. Although Nkomo's public boasting over the
Rhodesian airliner incident has, at least temporarily,
made him as anathema to whites as Mugabe has been, Smith
probably still believes Nkomo's strong support within the
Ndebele tribe makes it vital that he be part of a settle-
ment. Smith's resistence to pressure for a large-scale
attack on ZAPU camps in Zambia suggests that he still
hopes to deal with Nkomo and his principal backer, Zambian
President Kaunda.
Because of the unlikelihood of further secret con-
tacts with Nkomo, Smith may see the UK-US settlement
initiative as the best hope for renewed talks. One of
Smith's key advisers told UK and US officials last week
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that they should "let the dust settle" for a few weeks
before trying again to set up an all-parties meeting.
Smith probably has concluded that Muzorewa and Sithole
will have no choice but to attend despite their misgiv-
ings, and that he can gain white acquiescence for his
attendance by arguing that the continuing insurgency
makes it necessary to try once more to talk with the
Patriotic Front through the UK and US. (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
25X6
UK-Rhodesia: Charges of Sanction-Busting
The political fallout from the release on 19 Sep-
tember of the Bingham report--an inquiry into British
oil company violations of UN sanctions against trade
with Rhodesia--is expected to be minimal because both
the Labor and Conservative Parties were in office when
the infractions occurred. But the rhetoric--especially
from Labor's left wing--is expected to be considerable
and will continue at least through the debate scheduled
for November on continuing adherence to the sanctions.
Although African leaders probably will condemn the vio-
lations, the report should have little effect on Brit-
ish relations with Africa since most leaders already
suspected that London was ignoring the violations.
According to press accounts of the commission's
findings, oil has been reaching Rhodesia via both Mozam-
bique and South Africa ever since sanctions were imposed
in 1966. Elaborate systems of bonding were employed to
obscure sources and destinations. During part of the
time a swap arrangement with the French company Total
was in effect to further hide the involvement of Brit-
ish companies. British Petroleum and Shell consist-
ently asserted that they could not be held responsible
for the activities of their southern African subsidiar-
ies. Company assertions that sanctions were not being
violated went unchallenged by the British Government
until Foreign Secretary Owen commissioned Thomas Bingham
18 months ago to investigate compliance.
Hypocrisy in High Places
Pres
findings put into
The gov-
ernment has consistently defended sanctions, and indeed
it has encouraged the prosecution of minor offenders.
Moreover, substantial sums of money were spent to main-
tain a blockade of the Mozambican port of Beira to pre-
vent oil from getting to the Rhodesian pipeline.
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Only a full investigation will show where the big-
gest gap was: whether embarrassing facts were kept from
the directors of British Petroleum, especially from the
two government-appointed directors; whether the govern-
ment directors concealed facts from government ministers;
or whether the ministers knew what was going on but chose
not to act.
Impact on Domestic and Foreign Policy
There may be a bipartisan move to minimize the dam-
age done by the release of the Bingham report. Moderate
members of both parties believe that little can be gained
from the revelations, except to reassure voters that noth-
ing is being covered up. The left wing of the Labor Party
will probably press the hardest for a full investigation.
What effect the scandal will have on the voting to
renew sanctions is hard to predict. The Tories remain
divided on the issue. The Tory right, strong supporters
of the Smith-backed internal settlement, will try to
break any momentum generated by the report for renewing
the sanctions. While not condoning breaking the law,
they may argue that lifting sanctions is the more real-
istic course to follow. The party leadership, however,
supports the view of shadow Foreign Secretary Davies that
the time is not yet ripe for the party to press the issue.
In any case, the party must be unified and must win the
support of the undecided smaller opposition parties to
gain parliamentary approval for lifting sanctions.
It does not appear that this affair will have much
impact on British relations with Rhodesia or the African
Frontline states. The Patriotic Front and the Frontline
Presidents will regard the report as a confirmation of
their long-held suspicions that violations were occur-
ring. Owen's credibility with the Africans could be en-
hanced if the report generates widespread publicity and
his role as the official who commissioned it becomes
well-known. So far Rhodesia's transitional government
has not reacted publicly to the revelations, largely be-
cause other matters weigh more heavily. Sanctions or no,
Rhodesia has been able to obtain oil, as various countries
abetted by South Africa have demonstrated their willing-
ness to do business with the white-dominated regime.
(CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
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25X1A
Senegal: Succession Struggle
President Senghor, who may soon retire despite his
recent public denial of ill health, moved earlier this
week against dissidents in the ruling Socialist Party
who hope to block his designated constitutional succes-
sor--Prime Minister Diouf--from taking office. Babacar
Ba, Diouf's chief rival, was replaced as Foreign Minister
and is now the object of other government-inspired meas-
ures intended to embarrass him politically. This will not
eliminate the opposition Diouf faces and could stimulate
greater restiveness as the political scene heats up.
Senghor, against doctor's orders, returned home last
week from medical treatment in Europe--where he ostensibly
was on vacation--to try to arrange for an orderly succes-
sion,
Senghor underwent treatment or cancer and that colleagues
in his party believe the 72-year-old President wants to
ste down as soon as possible. Other
25X1C while differing with regard to diagnosis, is consis-
tent in stating that Senghor's illness is serious and
that he wants to resign.
The succession fight has begun in earnest, with the
military in the position of being the final arbiter in
case of a protracted succession squabble. Senghor clearly
will resist pressure to revise the constitution to pro-
vide for a new presidential election in the event he steps
down. Diouf's automatic succession is contested not only
by elements in Senghor's party, but by minor opposition
parties and top Army leaders.
Senghor's bid to bolster his dauphin probably will
reinforce the view that Diouf is a self-effacing creature
of the President who lacks a strong political base of his
own and cannot claim a mandate to lead Senegal. Senghor
will either have to rally greater support for Diouf or
dump him for a figure who commands broad backing.
22 September 1978
25X1 C
25X1 C
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Ba, who apparently remains a party member, still is
a powerful political figure and a potential challenger to
Senghor's succession plan. We do not know how the Army
views Ba's dismissal. Ba's civilian supporters are un-
happy, but no demonstrations have materialized in Dakar.
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
22 September 1978
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25X1A
Mauritius: Deepening Labor Party Rift
Prime Minister Ramgoolam, already hampered by an
aggressive opposition party and the need to maintain an
uneasy coalition with a small parliamentary majority,
is now confronted by an increasingly serious challenge
from dissidents in his own Labor Party that could bring
down his government. Ramgoolam's once tight grasp on
Mauritian politics has weakened considerably in recent
years, and the Prime Minister is attempting to reimpose
party unity by threatening to resign and labeling the
dissidents as Communist-inspired. Nonetheless, the dis-
sidents have won considerable popular support and appear
to be gaining momentum.
The dissident group, led by deputy party leader
Harish Boodhoo, charges that corruption and cronyism are
rampant in the Labor Party and is demanding economic and
other reforms from the out-of-touch Ramgoolam. The
mavericks proclaim their loyalty to the party and Ram-
goolam and insist their sole object is to reform the
party from within by purging deputies who no longer
abide by traditional party principles. Nonetheless,
the dissidents have implied that if their demands are
not satisfied, they will bolt the party, resulting in
the loss of the coalition's small majority and necessi-
tating new elections that the Labor Party is likely to
lose.
The Boodhoo group realizes that the tenacious
Ramgoolam is unlikely to agree to all of its demands.
As a result, the dissidents have decided to make their
appeal public and have struck a responsive chord among
many Mauritians.
They have enlisted the help of Agriculture Minister
Sir Satcam Boolell, a high caste Hindu who is an impor-
tant contender for Ramgoolam's position. The dissidents
apparently see Boolell as a successor to Ramgoolam.
Boolell would probably attract considerable support from
the Hindu community--the country's largest ethnic group,
22 September 1978
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 SECRET
M a U r 1#iI $ed For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010015-4
COMORO
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18 SECRET
JJ`I ..
AMIRAATE
ISLES
Mal?a /eland
Seychelles
B.L.O.T. Caer,.x rand
(U.K.)
Mare
A'APoert
22 September 1978
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which constitutes slightly more than half of the popula-
tion--the private sector, civil servants, and the Mauri-
tian Social Democratic Party--Labor's coalition partner.
Boolell has been in contact with the Labor Party's oppo-
sition, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), and
Ramgoolam believes that Boolell would be willing to make
concessions to it. The MMM may be encouraged to deal
with Boolell because, despite its impressive showing in
elections in 1976 and 1977, it has recently suffered
its own internal division, leaving it unable to exploit
the Labor Party rift.
Ramgoolam's Retirement
There is little doubt that Ramgoolam is alarmed
over the division of the Labor Party into an "old guard"
faction supporting the Prime Minister and the Boodhoo
group, which is gaining support from wavering deputies.
Ramgoolam is using the threat of his early retirement and
the resultant specter of a Labor Party fall from power
to generate unity among the feuding party members. The
77-year-old Ramgoolam, who is in poor health, would
probably like to retire from politics, but he will post-
pone his retirement until he is certain he can transfer
power to his heir apparent, Finance Minister Sir Veerasamy
Ringadoo--a capable administrator who would probably
continue Ramgoolam's moderate policies and preserve
Mauritius' multiparty democracy. Ringadoo leans
slightly to the left, but is friendly to the US and is
unlikely to form a coalition with the MMM. Ramgoolam
will have a hard time, however, selling Ringadoo to the
dissidents, who apparently regard Ringadoo as Ramgoolam's
surrogate and not an acceptable successor.
Outlook
It is clear that Ramgoolam will have to suppress
the dissidents or make some compromises to bring them
back into the fold if he is to prevent a complete rupture
of the Labor Party and avoid elections. Ramgoolam, who
has survived numerous challenges during his 30 years in
politics, may yet be able to come out on top with much
of his authority intact. He is still widely respected
and even revered and has considerable power in the party.
He is increasingly on the defensive, however, and his
opponents are likely to catch up with him eventually.
22 September 1978
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In the meantime, the Boodhoo group may be frustrated
enough by Ramgoolam's tenacity and his determination to
place Ringadoo in control to consider an unconstitutional
move. The dissidents, however, appear to lack the neces-
sary support in the security apparatus for such a step,
especially in light of Ramgoolam's efforts to tighten
up security following the coup in the Seychelles last
year. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
22 September 1978
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FOR THE RECORD
GHANA: The 1979 budget announced by General Akuffo's
government last week is a key feature of its economic
stabilization program. The budget's austerity measures
pose considerable political risks for the regime, and
implementation will be a major test of its will. The
budget is a prerequisite for obtaining large loans from
the International Monetary Fund and Western donor coun-
tries that are needed to help resolve the massive eco-
nomic problems inherited from the ousted Acheampong re-
gime.
The budget is intended to reduce severe inflation
by substantially narrowing deficit spending and holding
expenditures close to this year's levels. It represents
a major step toward an eventual balanced budget and a
reversal of the previous trend toward ever larger defi-
cits. At the same time, the budget doubles the price
paid to producers of cocoa--the major foreign exchange
earner. The government hopes this will discourage farmers
from smuggling nearly a fourth of the crop to neighbor-
ing countries for better prices.
A 10-percent cost-of-living wage increase is planned
for government workers. The government has also recom-
mended that wage increases in the private sector be
limited to 10 percent. Organized labor, confronted with
a 150 percent jump in consumer prices in the past year
and showing signs of growing restiveness, will doubtless
react negatively to the wage guidelines. Widespread in-
dustrial unrest and new inflationary wage pacts clearly
could threaten the government's plans to stabilize the
economy. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
22 September 1978
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