AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 25, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National rc
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Assessment NOFORN-NOOONTRACT-
Center ORCON
Africa Review
25 August 1978
Secret
RP AR 78-004
25 August 1978
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AFRICA REVIEW
25 August 1978
CONTENTS
Angola-Zaire: Results of Neto's Visit. . . . . . . .
Although no agreements were signed and no
major substantive problems resolved, Angolan
President Neto's visit to Zaire served to
commit both sides to continuing their recon-
ciliation.
Nigeria: The Army and Civilian Politics. . . . . . . 3
As Nigeria enters the final and most diffi-
cult phase of its return to civilian rule in
1979, the military is strongly committed to
maintain national unity and may feel impelled
to halt or slow the transition should civilian
political activity degenerate into a regional
and tribal donnybrook.
Nigeria: The Press and Future Politics . . . . . . . 12
As Nigeria approaches the scheduled resumption
of open political activity in October, the mili-
tary government is stepping up efforts to con-
trol the news media, but the press is undaunted
in its efforts to expand its influence in antici-
pation of the inauguration of civilian rule.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Wash-
ington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional and
Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other of-
fices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The Africa
weekly focuses on major African issues and their implications. We
solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions on topics
that might be treated in future issues. Comments and queries can
be directed to the authors of .ndividual articles or to M
25X1A~, Chief, Africa Division 25X1A
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Angola-Zaire: Results of Neto's Visit
Angolan President Neto's state visit to Zaire last
weekend was successful. Although no agreements were
signed and no major substantive problems resolved, the
three-day visit served to commit both sides more firmly
to continuing the reconciliation process. Zairian Presi-
dent Mobutu has agreed to pay a return visit to Luanda
"as soon as possible."
Both leaders generally tried to avoid contentious
issues and focused on those areas in which progress could
be made most easily. They agreed to ask the Organization
of African Unity to establish a border security commission
as soon as Dossible.
25X1C
the two leaders agreed to establish 1
25X10 border checkpoints and to invite Nigeria, Sudan, Cam-
25X1 C
eroon, and Rwanda to sit on the commission. Tne uAu will
be asked to provide air and ground transport and communi-
cation facilities for the commission.
said the Angolans tried to ob-
tain a commitment from Mobutu to press Jonas Savimbi's
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to
cease its attacks on the Benguela Railroad. The Zairians
fended off the request by replying that they would rather
not become involved in an internal Angolan matter.
Over 50 Angolan officials accompanied Neto to Kin-
shasa to exchange views on cooperation accords on com-
merce, aviation, shipping, rail transport, and cultural
affairs. Bilateral working groups were established to
work out final details and prepare agreements to be
signed at subsequent meetings of the two presidents. In
the final communique, both leaders reaffirmed their deci-
sion to allow the voluntary return of refugees. Given
the complex problems involved, however, they were unable
to work out specific arrangements, despite pressure from
the Angolans to move ahead quickly on this issue.
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Neto and Mobutu were together during most of the
highly ceremonial visit and appear to have gotten along
quite well in public. On his departure, Neto described
the visit as a significant occasion and thanked Mobutu
for the "spectacular" welcome he received.
Although both leaders appear pleased with the re-
sults achieved so far, each probably continues to suspect
the other's motives. Some of the most important issues,
such as aid to the other's insurgents, have not yet been
seriously addressed, and both leaders probably expect
the pace of their reconciliation to slow considerably as
talks begin to focus on these issues. (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: The Army and Civilian Politics
Nigeria will enter the final and most difficult
phase of its scheduled return to civilian rule in 1979
with the resumption of open political activity this
October. In anticipation of this event, public specu-
lation about prospects for the future is reaching new
intensity. Among the most burning questions are: Will
civilian rule actually come about? If so, will it prove
lasting? Can tribalism and regionalism be controlled in
a civilian political environment?
The Army, which has ruled for 13 years through
three successive regimes, holds the answers to these
questions as the arbiter of Nigeria's future. The un-
certainties surrounding the transition to civilian rule
preclude firm prediction about Nigeria's future course.
Some light can perhaps be shed by reviewing in a politi-
cal context the current state of the Nigerian military,
with heavy focus on the oversized, ill-trained, and un-
deremployed army, an overriding political factor with
which any Nigerian Government must come to terms.
On balance, neither an Army coup to forestall
civilian rule nor postponement of democratic government
by the regime seems likely in the immediate future.
Neither event can be ruled out, however, should civilian
political activity degenerate into a regional and tribal
donnybrook. Relations between a future civilian govern-
ment and the Army are likely to be touchy from the out-
set, and many Nigerians assume that civilians will again
prove incapable of governing and will not last long in
power. It is clear that the present military government,
like its predecessor, is strongly committed to maintain-
ing national unity. Nigeria's future military leaders,
whether waiting in the wings for power or in charge of
the government, presumably will also share this goal.
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Discontent in the Ranks
A certain amount of discontent has long been evi-
dcnt in Nigeria's large and disparate 225,000-man army.
The real extent of unrest in the army, however, is not
clear. The possibility of plotting by ambitious or dis-
gruntled factions is a constant source of worry for Gen-
eral ?bas.anjo's government. For some time now, the Army
command has been cycling younger officers through a spe-
cial course designed to indoctrinate them in their civic
responsibilities and to warn them of the dire conse-
quences of rebellion.
The regime appears most anxious about middle grade
officers who are thought to be eager for power. They
are suspected of being less committed than senior offi-
cers to the idea of civilian rule. Members of this
group apparently believe they have not enjoyed the full
political and financial perquisites of military rule as
have their superiors. There were unconfirmed rumors
last March that a plot involving some majors was nipped
in the bud.
The majority of enlisted men seem more concerned
about inflation, reduced benefits, and the threat of
demobilization. These concerns reportedly were behind
an abortive plot by 30 to 50 army noncommissioned offi-
cers that was uncovered last March.
The government has recently taken additional steps
to defuse Army discontent, but many of the basic causes
of unrest remain. Just now, however, there is no hard
evidence of active plotting. Last month, the regime
acted to appease middle-ranking officers and to shake up
individual power bases in the military. It gave young
officers political roles as state administrators and re-
assigned other officers at all levels on a large scale.
The government has also been quietly promoting many
middle and junior officers to higher ranks. These meas-
ures were taken in response to security reports warning
that coup rumors were circulating widely and that pre-
cautions should be taken. For the time being, at least,
the possibility of a military coup seems much less likely.
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The decisions to reassign General Garba, the former
Foreign Minister, to head the defense academy and retain
three other generals in the cabinet were designed to
keep them from troop commands. The latter have long
been dissatisfied with their status in the regime and
will be forced to retire from the military with the
establishment of civilian rule next year. Although
Garba played a key role in overthrowing the previous
military regime, he is not known to harbor antiregime
sentiments and remains a member of the ruling military
council. He reportedly was surprised and upset over his
reassignment. Garba's apparent popularity in the Army
and his efforts to line up an important post under
civilian rule evidently fueled suspicion among his col-
leagues on the military council.
The Military's Role in the Transition
Inspector General of Police M. D. Yusufu, who was
also named Minister of Interior last month, and Nigeria's
new state military administrators apparently will be re-
lied on heavily by the regime to ensure law and order
once open political activity resumes. Yusufu, a north-
ern Muslim and a Fulani tribesman, is an experienced and
feared police officer who is considered to be close to
the regime's inner circle. The 19 state administrators,
drawn exclusively from the ranks of middle grade offi-
cers, are politically inexperienced. They may well have
difficulties in dealing with increased regional and
ethnic tensions that will inevitably follow the lifting
of the ban on politics this October. State administra-
tors, since they serve concurrently as garrison command-
ers, may as a group be in a good position to stage a
coup on behalf of middle grade officers if given the
pretext to do so by overly rambunctious civilian politi-
cal aspirants.
Political campaigning could easily lead to communal
disorders, and some informed Nigerians have doubts about
how effectively the armed forces will cope with such un-
rest. The police are by far the best trained and most
experienced in crowd control but would have to call on
help from the Army in the event of widespread disorder.
Earlier this year during an outbreak of student violence,
the police exercised restraint and generally avoided
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exacerbating the situation. In one instance that re-
quired Army support, the troops overreacted and several
students were killed.
Members of the armed forces, including those in the
government, are eligible to run for public office, pro-
vided they resign their position four months in advance
of elections. There reportedly is an agreement among
senior members of the regime that none of them will re-
sign before Nigeria's return to civilian rule to contest
elections. This would be in line with the apparent
strong commitment of the key members of the ruling mili-
tary council to restore Nigeria to civilian government.
These officers are determined to make their mark on
Nigerian history and regard a successful return to the
barracks as the hallmark of their domestic program.
They seem to regard military rule as an aberration that
threatens to exhaust the army's popular acceptance and
believe that civilians should be given another chance.
There is no sign that General Obasanjo, whose na-
tional stature has grown considerably since he was named
Head of State two years ago, is interested in playing a
De Gaulle - like role in the transition to civilian gov-
ernment. Instead, he plans to retire from the military
with the resumption of civilian rule. Obasanjo publicly
disavowed the idea of a military-civilian diarchy for
Nigeria after 1979, which was floated by an editorial
writer earlier this year in one of Nigeria's national
dailies. At this point only a small minority of Niger-
ian civilians, who fear a return to divisive ethnic pol-
itics, would favor drafting Obasanjo to stand as a can-
didate for civilian president.
Military council members are not immune, however,
to the pull of ethnic and regional loyalties despite
their good intentions. Sooner or later some of them may
be tempted to assist favored civilian candidates or polit-
ical groups clandestinely, although there is no evidence
of this happening. Partisanship would make it more dif-
ficult for General Obasanjo to maintain the council's
delicate political balance and could easily lead to
serious splits in the regime.
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Postponement or Cancellation of Civilian Rule
There are circumstances that could cause the mili-
tary to delay or prevent a return to civilian rule.
Should regional and tribal tensions reach such a pitch
during political campaigning that public order is seri-
ously threatened, the regime might suspend political
activity in hopes that passions would cool. Military
leaders could well cancel plans for civilian government
if they believe such action was Nigeria's best hope for
continued stability and unity. A factor in deciding
such moves would be concern that if the regime did not
act, it might be overthrown by middle grade officers.
A coup by middle grade officers would be motivated
by fears that the country is heading for chaos and that
civilians are incapable of running the government, and
by resentment that they have not had their share of
power and wealth. The plotters might be galvanized into
action by public disorders, which would.enable them to
cloak their coup as a rescue mission to save the country
in its hour of crisis. Presumably any military faction
that covets power would be aware that a coup would enjoy
little popular support if the political process was
moving forward without serious disorder. Simply denying
civilians their long-awaited chance for power would only
erode what little popular goodwill the military still
enjoys and make it much more difficult for a new mili-
tary regime to govern. It is true, however, that the
general unease that has set in among many Nigerians over
the return to civilian politics has made the idea of a
continuation of military rule less unthinkable to the
populace than it was a year ago. The civilian elite is
nonetheless determined to achieve power once again.
The Military Under Civilian Rule
Even if a civilian government is successfully in-
stalled in October 1979, its relationship with the mili-
tary establishment is likely to be touchy from the
outset. Civilian politicians presumably know that the
Army must be kept reasonably happy and that they must
avoid divisive ethnic politics lest the new government
be overthrown. The depth of civilian distrust of the
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Army is illustrated by the supposed ban on coups that
was written into Nigeria's new constitution by the
civilian constituent assembly.
The constitution provides for advisory positions
for senior military and police officials who will sit
on defense, security, and police councils chaired by the
civilian president. These bodies may provide institu-
tional mechanisms for a much needed civilian-military
dialogue. A new working relationship is likely to be
complicated, however, by the longstanding friction that
has existed between the civilian and military elites.
The military probably will be the object of thinly
veiled criticism during election campaigning by many po-
litical aspirants, and some influential civilians elected
to the government are sure to harbor attitudes that will
work against accommodation with the military. These
individuals have always regarded military men as unimag-
inative, heavyhanded, and wasteful; they resent the
Army's having usurped for so long the civilians' right
to govern the country.
The Army, with its consequent loss of power and
prestige and uncertain of its new position, may find it
difficult to respect political authority. Ordinary
soldiers will be fearful that civilians may try to re-
duce their amenities and privileges. Holdover officers,
who previously held political positions, will be uneasy
if the civilian government comes under pressure from the
National Assembly to probe allegations of military cor-
ruption and other abuses under Army rule. Many military
men assume that civilians will inevitably prove them-
selves incapable of governing because of ethnic rival-
ries and that after a relatively short period, the mili-
tary will again have to grasp the reins of power. Any
faction that covets power would probably hope to
achieve it by waiting for the political process to
break down before staging a coup.
Many informed Nigerians view the continuation
under civilian rule of General T. Y. Danjuma as Army
Chief of Staff as one of Nigeria's best hopes to keep
the Army out of politics. Danjurna reportedly would like
to resign with the return to civilian rule, but he ap-
parently would stay on if persuaded that this would
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contribute to stability. The 40-year-old Danjuma, a
middle belt minority tribesman, is a thoroughly profes-
sional soldier who is dedicated to upgrading the Army
and is seemingly in control of it. One of the Army's
most respected senior officers, Danjuma is serious-
minded, honest, and places national interests above
tribal ones.
The ethnic makeup of the new civilian government
relative to that of the armed forces will be another
important factor in future stability. Any drastic
civilian tampering with the existing ethnic balance in
the armed forces or pursuit of political goals detri-
mental to tribal interests in the Army could spark a
coup. The constituent assembly inserted a provision in
Nigeria's new constitution requiring that the composition
of the Army must reflect Nigeria's "federal character."
This is intended to remove fears of domination by one
section of the country through its strength in the Army.
To implement this provision, the new government presumably
would have to impose a quota system on the Army based on
the population of each of Nigeria's 19 states. If this
is the case, it increases the need for a population cen-
sus. Census taking has long been one of the most polit-
ically controversial and potentially explosive issues in
Nigeria, however, since competing ethnic groups have
always seen such counts as determining their political
weight in the government.
No reliable data is available, but it is generally
believed that the majority of the officer corps in con-
trol of troops is drawn from the former northern region.
This includes the Muslim Hausa-Fulani--the major north-
ern ethnic group that dominated the country's first
civilian regime--and a disproportionate number of minor-
ity tribesmen from Nigeria's "middle belt," an ethnic
buffer zone between the Muslim north and the predomi-
nantly Christian south. The Yoruba, the principal tribe
in the southwest, hold many staff positions in the Army
and are overrepresented relative to their share of total
population. The Army has few Ibo, the main tribe in the
southeast. This group is still stigmatized for having
attempted to secede in 1967 as the republic of Biafra,
and the Army has undertaken no program to encourage Ibo
recruitment.
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Nigeria's military leaders have striven to reduce
tribalism in the Army and to create a greater national
consciousness with the result that many in the officer
corps seem less driven by narrow ethnic concerns than
are civilians. More importantly, military units that
formerly were drawn from a single section have been in-
tegrated with personnel from all parts of the country.
This may make it more difficult for a particular ethnic
faction to mount a coup. There are also educational
programs to instill a sense of national identity in the
armed forces in place of tribal and regional loyalty.
Another problem looming is that a civilian regime
will have less money available to placate the military.
It will inherit an austerity budget adopted this year in
response to Nigeria's declining oil revenues and eroding
foreign exchange reserves. Financial belt tightening
has already caused the Air Force to postpone plans to
procure new fighter aircraft and other desired equipment.
Most important, at least part of the Army's long-needed
barracks construction program has been halted, and con-
struction under way is unlikely to be completed by 1979.
This means that many officers and men will continue to
be housed in rented civilian facilities. The continued
presence of poorly disciplined soldiers among civilians
could worsen already poor military-civilian relations in
the streets. Sporadic incidents of beatings and other
harassment of civilians by soldiers have long been a
sore point.
Because of the financial pinch, the new civilian
government could be tempted to accelerate the slow pace
of demobilizing the Army, which was built up massively
during the 1967-70 civil war. Demobilization is an ex-
tremely sensitive political issue, and no expeditious
way has-yet been found to reduce the Army. This is a
necessity if the Army is to become more manageable and
efficient. Well-publicized plans by the present regime
in its first days to reduce the Army to 150,000 men by
1979 contributed to a bloody coup attempt in February
1976. Since then, the regime has pursued a carefully
phased and far less ambitious reduction program. It
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claims to have discharged and found jobs for 25,000 sol-
diers in the past three years. Some of them, however,
have merely been transferred to the undermanned police
force. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: The Press and Future Politics
As Nigeria approaches the scheduled resumption of
open political activity in October, the military govern-
ment is casting a concerned eye at the rambunctious Ni-
gerian press and is stepping up efforts to control the
news media. The military leadership believes the press
may be one of the keys both to maintaining stability dur-
ing this critical period and to ensuring a peaceful turn-
over to civilian rule scheduled for October 1979.
The government has periodically warned the press
this year, with mixed success, to avoid giving publicity
to aspiring politicians whose behind-the-scenes efforts
to cement political alliances are becoming increasingly
frenetic. With open politicking allowed after October,
the press can be expected to try to carve out a greater
role for itself in a civilian environment. The press
will be tempted more than ever to step across the informal
limits the regime has established on criticism of the
government and publication of divisive commentaries on
the sensitive issues of tribalism, regionalism, and re-
ligion.
Many informed Nigerians doubt whether Nigeria can
withstand the stress of open politicking. They fear that
politicking will exacerbate regional and religious ten-
sions built up because of the controversy earlier this
year in the constituent assembly over a proposal for an
Islamic court of appeals. Their doubts may be well
founded.
Nigerian politicians proved divisive and demogogic
during the country's short postindependence experiment
in civilian government. The sensationalist press helped
to inflame ethnic rivalries, which led to the collapse
of civilian rule in 1966 and the civil war that followed.
In the event of a successful transition to civilian
rule, which we believe is still likely, a civilian gov-
ernment operating in a climate of partisan political
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activity will inevitably have to be more attuned than
NJ_geria's military regimes to public opinion and press
criticism. The new civilian regime will inherit insti-
tutional mechanisms for increased government control of
the information media, and the ruling party can be ex-
pected to try to impose its views on the press. The
military has had difficulty muzzling the media, however,
and civilians may find the task even more elusive.
Nigerian journalists, among the freest and most
vigorous in Africa, are likely to push hard for greater
press freedom once less restrictive civilian rule is re-
stored. If the press becomes more outspoken and critical
of government policies, strong residual anti-American
sentiment among many journalists may find a greater out-
let. A civilian government, especially one that lacks a
broad popular mandate, may well find it more difficult in
the face of press criticism to support actively US initia-
tives in southern Africa if prospects for their success
seem poor.
Positiun and Performance of the Media
Even under 12 years of military rule Nigerian jour-
alists have been allowed more freedom than their counter-
parts in many other African states. Government-controlled
media--all television and radio stations are state-run
and the government now holds a 60 percent equity in Ni-
geria's two major newspapers (see chart)--are used to
present government views, but both the government-con-
trolled and independent newspapers are frequently criti-
cal of the regime's policies. The government is atten-
tive to such criticism and to the public reactions such
criticism generates. There are few instances of outright
censorship of print or broadcasting media.
It is always difficult to determine the degree to
which the government-controlled media really reflect the
views of the regime. Prior clearance of news reporting
for publishing and broadcasting is not required., The
government media employ a number of editorial writers
who hold a wide variety of opinions. Thus a position
taken in an editorial commentary is often altered or
contradicted in a subsequent edition.
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Selected Daily Newspapers
Place Published
Lagos
Circulation
250.000
Kaduna
75,000
Lagos
50,000
Ibadan
50,000
Renaissance
Enugu
50,000
Daily Sketch
Daily Express
Lagos
NA
West African Pilot
Lagos
5,000
Daily Star
Enugu
NA
Morning Post
Lagos
31,000
Nigerian Chronicle
Calabar
NA
NA
NA
NA
Largest national daily; owned by federal
government.
Second largest national daily; owned by federal
government, but oriented toward predominantly
Muslim north.
Independently owned.
Independently owned; mouthpiece of veteran
Yoruba tribal politician andpresidential aspirant
Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
Owned by Anambra State. one of two states
dominated by the major Ibo tribe
Independently owned.
Independently owned; regularly carries Soviet-
supplied articles and is often quoted by Radio
Havana.
Apparently independent Ibo-oriented newspaper.
An official organ of the federal government.
Owned by Cross Rivers State; represents minority
tribes in the southeast.
Owned by Kwara State; represents northern mi-
nority tribes; frequently carries Soviet-supplied
items.
Owned by Bendel State; represents minority tribes
in the south central region.
Apparently owned by Plateau State; represents
northern minority tribes ("Middle belters"'.
UNCLASSIFIED
All newspapers in this list are published in English. In 1978, backed by an extensive tradition of indigenous
journalism, the Nigerian press published over 100 newspapers and periodicals with a circulation of over 2 million
copies and an estimated readership of over 6 million persons. This list will swell after October when political parties are
allowed to form and establish their own newspapers.
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The regime relies on indirect monitoring of the
media; offending journalists occasionally are jailed,
and publications sometimes are banned. The government's
press secretary meets weekly with editors of all the
country's newspapers to discuss in general what the re-
gime wants to see in print with the understanding that
reporting should take the government's desires into ac-
count. The boundaries of what is permissible have never
been clearly set, and the Nigerian press since the end
of the country's civil war in 1970 has been testing and
expanding these boundaries.
Journalists, while resisting conformity to the of-
ficial line, generally have avoided being too outspoken
for fear of government reprisals. Prior to Head of State
General Obasanjo's visit to the US last year the press
felt free to engage in open criticism of the government
for tilting too close to the US on southern African
issues, but it was then told to cease. During the re-
cent review of Nigeria's new constitution for civilian
rule, journalists campaigned unsuccessfully for the ex-
pansion-of guarantees of press freedoms contained in the
document.
The government is displeased with the way Nigerian
newspapers treated the country's domestic situation last
spring when tensions arising from a student strike, eco-
nomic austerity measures, and the Islamic court issue
created the country's worst political crisis in two years.
The press took issue with the government's decision to
increase school fees, which touched off student violence.
No newspaper attempted to explain fully the need for
economic retrenchment in the face of declining oil reve-
nues. Press coverage of the Islamic court controversy
reflected and emphasized Nigeria's regional and religious
divisions.
Government Moves To Harness the Media
The regime has apparently decided to tighten its
clamps on the information media. It looks to the Min-
ister of Information to ensure greater journalistic re-
sponsibility and accuracy, and last month it placed a
capable, trusted civilian in.control of the Ministry.
25 August 1978
15
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In the past three years the government has created
a federal agency to coordinate radio and television broad-
casting. It is particularly aware that television, now
available in 10 major urban centers, will for the first
time play an important part in election campaigning. The
government is pushing plans to have operational by Octo-
ber a press council for both newspaper and broadcasting
journalists and a national news agency, although this
target date is unlikely to be met. The press council
would certify practicing journalists, while the news
agency is intended to control the content of news used
domestically and for dissemination by Nigeria-based for-
eign wire service. Among the stated reasons for a gov-
ernment news agency is the need to correct "false" stories
and impressions about Nigeria in foreign reporting, which
reflects longstanding Nigerian sensitivity to real and
imagined slights and criticism.
Late last year, the military government caused a
political storm in the predominantly Muslim north when
it terminated all shortwave broadcasts by state govern-
ment-owned radio stations because they served to rein-
force regional particularism. Radio Kaduna's shortwave
service had traditionally served as the voice of the
northern political and religious establishment and was
generally listened to as an enunciator of northern views
by the illiterate masses. The curtailment of the sta-
tion's broadcast coverage will make it more difficult for
northern political aspirants to reach their constituents.
The government's decision has increased northern disdain
for what is already viewed as predominantly southern,
non-Muslim-oriented radio and, television coverage emanat-
ing from the Lagos-based Nigerian broadcasting corpora-
tion. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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FOR THE RECORD
CONGO: President Yhomby Opango has used an alleged
coup attempt on 15 August to move against a number of
southern, conservative opponents of his northern-
dominated, leftist regime. The three alleged ring-
leaders are rumored to have been executed, and a number
of other southern politicians have been accused of com-
plicity and are likely to be arrested. Few details on
the plot are available. The government has not followed
up on Yhomby's initial charges that some Western govern-
ments were involved. The President wishes to avoid jeop-
ardizing the gradual rapprochement with the West that has
developed over the past year. Yhomby, however, has de-
nied the French Ambassador access to a French national
accused of complicity in the plot. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
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17
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