AFRICA REVIEW

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010008-2
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 18, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
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Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-003
18 August 1978
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AFRICA REVIEW
18 August 1978
CONTENTS
Nigeria: Libyan Involvement in Northern Politics. . 1
Libya is attempting to develop political
ties and influence with aspiring Muslim
politicians in northern Nigeria. The
Nigerian Government is uneasy over these
activities and has stepped up efforts to
monitor them.
South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups. . . . . 10
The leaders of the African National Congress
and Pan Africanist Congress are concentrating
on fomenting internal unrest rather than pre-
paring for Rhodesian-style cross-border raids,
but realize they will have to cultivate greater
support among South Africa's blacks for this
to succeed.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
This publication was formerly entitled Africa Weekly Review.
NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
This publication -is prepared for regional specialists in the
Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other
offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The
Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implica-
tions. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions
on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and
queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles
or to , Chief, Africa Division
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Nigeria: Libyan Involvement in Northern Politics
Scattered reports in recent months strongly suggest
that Libya is attempting to develop political ties and
influence with aspiring Muslim politicians in Northern
Nigeria. The country will soon enter the final and most
challenging phase in its planned return to civilian rule
in 1979--the formal resumption in October of.political
activities allowing the organization of political parties
for elections next year. Even without Libyan involve-
ment, the transition is likely to be turbulent because.
of the rivalries that political activity will engender
among Nigeria's competing regional and ethnic interests
and because of the country's traditional style of con-
frontational politics.
The extent of Libyan involvement and intrigue is
not clear at this time. It seems safe to assume, how-
ever, that Libyan President Qadhafi has ambitions to
advance the political fortunes of Muslims in Nigeria--
by far the largest Muslim community in Africa--and to
develop a following among them. The Nigerian Government
is uneasy over the incipient Libyan connections with
northern politicians and has stepped up efforts to moni-
tor Libyan activities in the country.
Nigeria's military leaders are already concerned
about the ever-present tensions between the northern and
southern parts of the country. These tensions were ex-
acerbated during the recent review of Nigeria's new con-
stitution for civilian rule when the constituent assembly
rejected a controversial proposal for a federal Islamic
court of appeals. If covert Libyan activism in Nigeria
increases significantly and key Muslim leaders are recep-
tive, this could cause northerners to take an even more
confrontational approach and make religion more of a po-
litical issue. Such a development, by forcing to the
surface dangerous ethnic and religious antipathies in
Nigerian society, could jeopardize prospects for a peace-
ful transition to civilian rule.
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In the event of serious communal disorders, the
military probably would intervene, either halting the
process temporarily to let passions cool or canceling
the return to civilian rule to preserve stability. A
successful transition to civilian rule, on the other
hand, could well result in the installation of a Muslim-
dominated government, though we do not believe such a
regime would be beholden to Libya or involve Nigeria
deeply in Arab affairs.
Islam and the Dynamics of Nigerian Politics
Muslims constitute the largest religious group in
Nigeria, composing at least 47 percent of Nigeria's popu-
lation of 70 million or more, and have always wielded
strong political influence. Islam, arriving from the
northeast in the 13th century, has long been the domi-
nant creed in the north and is slowly moving southward,
particularly among the Yoruba ethnic group. Christians
account for about 35 percent of the population, while
some 18 percent are followers of traditional African
religions.
Islam's hold is strongest in the far north from
Sokoto to Borno, an area regarded by Nigerian Muslims
as the "holy north," Between 95 and 98 percent of all
Nigerian Muslims are considered to be orthodox (Sunni)
Muslims, and the north has been the most conservative
section of Nigeria because of its long exposure to con-
servative Islamic values. The political power of north-
ern traditional leaders has eroded in recent years, but
not their enormous religious and social influence over
the Muslim masses. The most important of these conserv-
ative leaders are the Sultan of Sokoto--titular leader
of all Nigerian Muslims--the Emir of Kano, and the Shehu
of Borno. The Sultan of Sokoto heads a supreme council
for Islamic affairs with avowedly religious and cultural
goals. It serves as a coordinating body for Nigerian
Muslims and has been a force for moderation in the north.
Politics in Nigeria are based less on religious
relationships than on regional and tribal identities.
Sixty percent of Nigeria's people belong to three main
ethnic groups: the Muslim Hausa-Fulani in the north,
the Christian and Muslim Yoruba in the southwest, and
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the Christian Ibo in the southeast. Small pagan, Islamic,
and Christian tribes in the "middle belt" of Nigeria who
fear domination by the big tribes, serve as a political
and ethnic buffer between the Muslim north and non-Muslim
south. Each major group, including the middle belt, has
vied for supremacy in the government.
The vastly larger and more populous northern region,
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, controlled postindepen-
dence politics in a regionally based parliamentary system
that fueled ethnic rivalry. The 1966 military coup trans-
ferred power briefly to the Ibo, who imposed a unitary
government. A northern countercoup brought a stronger
federal system with middle belters acting as brokers be-
tween the larger tribes. This regime was overthrown in
1975, and the process of returning to civilian rule was
begun. The prominence of the Hausa-Fulani and Yorubas
in this government contributed to an attempted coup by
middle belters in 1976, in which Hausa Head of State
General Muhammed was assassinated and replaced by General
Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba.
The recent battle over the north's proposal for a
federal Islamic court of appeals was a regional power
contest as much as a reflection of differences over the
relationship of religion to government. To Muslims, the
court proposal was a natural outgrowth of a belief that
a strict separation of church and state need not apply
in all instances. More importantly, the Muslims regarded
the court issue as a symbolic test of the power that nor-
therners hope to wield under civilian rule.
The defeat of the proposal at the hands of south-
erners and middle belters demonstrated to the Muslim
north that it can no longer expect to control the politi-
cal scene automatically as it did between 1960 and 1966.
Clearly the creation of 10 states in the former northern
region has broken the hold the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy
once had over smaller Muslim ethnic groups and middle
belt tribesmen. This has led to the passing of the old
"solid" north and allowed the ethnic and political diver-
sity that has always existed in the north to manifest
itself. The battle over the court seems to indicate that
a new and more fluid balance of political forces may be
developing in which traditional northern political in-
fluence, though still prominent, is no longer predominant.
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The Muslims, facing the prospect of decreased power
under a civilian government and less northern unity than
heretofore, recognize that they may be headed for a real
contest with non-Muslims in the coming political elec-
tions. Under these circumstances, some Muslim leaders
could be more psychologically receptive to Libyan blan-
dishments than they might otherwise be.
Although the ban on politics remains in effect,
behind-the-scenes politicking is in full swing. In the
north there are indications that the emergent political
contender for national power will be a group dominated
by moderate-to-conservative older generation "establish-
ment" northerners, with many younger and more progres-
sive-minded elements co-opted. Northern strategy is aimed
at reestablishing old links with middle belters and the
southern Christian Ibo peoples with whom the Hausa-Fulani
had been allied during Nigeria's first civilian regime.
This could well prove to be a winning coalition and re-
sult in the installation of a Muslim president.
Right now, northerners--including many old-guard
middle belt politicians--seem to be consolidating behind
Shehu Shagari, the strongest contender to become the
major northern presidential candidate. Shagari is a 53-
year old Hausa from Sokoto state who held various minis-
terial posts in the first civilian government. He has a
reputation for honesty and moderation.
The "Libyan Connection" With Northern Politics
Much of our information about Libyan involvement
in northern politics comes from
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it status if it survives at all. 25X1C
25X1C , some younger elements in the Shagari camp have
had contacts s with Libya since before the Islamic court
dispute. Supposedly there are northerners who regularly
visit Tripoli, while other contacts are handled through
the Libyan Embassy in London.
25X1C claims Tripoli provides advice and fi-
nancial support. He has also heard, but cannot con-
firm, that some Libyan arms have been smuggled into Ni-
geria where they could be used in the event of communal
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disorders between Muslims and Christians who work in the
north. He reports that Qadhafi has given northern visi-
tors to Tripoli assurances that he will spend "millions,
billions, whatever it takes to make Nigeria a Muslim
nation."
Qadhafi has long given high priority to extending
Tripoli's influence in Africa and believes it a religious
duty to promote Muslim political influence in African
states that have some Muslim population. Some Nigerian
Muslim politicians undoubtedly are opportunistic enough
to accept Libyan money to build up their political cam-
paign chests. The Nigerian Government, for its part,
intends to fund equally all registered political parties
to try to reduce inequities between them and decrease
the temptation to seek financing abroad.
The Nigerian Government is aware of the Libyan
activities. Nigerian security officials believe--perhaps
overconfidently--they have Libyan activities under effec-
tive surveillance and control. Nigeria's security or-
ganization apparently has uncovered some evidence that
Qadhafi has attempted to "purchase" or otherwise gain
influence with several well-known Nigerian Muslims, in-
cluding the Sultan of Sokoto and Brigadier Yar' Adua,
the regime's second-ranking officer. We have no evi-
dence, however, that any leading Nigerian Muslim relig-
ious or governmental figure is actually connected with
the Libyans.
25X1C Qadhafi has
sought to acquire in uence by ottering large sums to
Islamic religious organizations for such things as build-
ing mosques. The treasurer of one Islamic group recently
told the US Consul in Kaduna that a Libyan religious del-
egation had visited there several months ago and offered
financial assistance to the Muslim community. He claims
his organization is considering accepting Libyan help
for purely religious purposes, including establishment
of a newspaper that would carry the "truth" for Muslims.
He left little doubt that the Libyans were willing to
provide funds for other activities if asked. He also
said that Libya aids a Pakistani Muslim sect that is
active in southern Nigeria, although it has been banned
in Pakistan. He did not say that Libya was aiding sev-
eral small hard-line Muslim sects found in the north.
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Libya is also developing contacts between Al-Fateh
University in Tripoli and at least two Nigerian univer-
sities, including Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria which
has a number of northern radicals and socialists on its
staff. There are few Nigerian students or other resi-
dents in Libya.
The Libyan community in Nigeria is somewhat larger
and of longstanding. Libyans have lived in Kano, an
ancient gateway to north Africa, for 200 years. The
Libyan Ambassador to Nigeria was born in Kano, and his
family is one of five or six large Libyan landholders in
northern Nigeria.
Alleged Conduits for the "Libyan Connection"
We know little about the two Nigerian politicians--
Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed and Mohammed Abubakar Rimi--
25X1C portrayed as the principal
conduits for the "Libyan connection" among the Shagari
grouping of northerners. Ahmed admits privately to being
pro-Libyan, and
25X10 ~, he is one of the Nigerians that Libya has tried to
"buy." Tripoli allegedly favors Ahmed as a possible
northern presidential candidate. He is said to visit
Libya frequently, although the US Embassy in Tripoli
cannot confirm these visits.
Ahmed, a medical doctor in his
40s, was born in Kano State and
educated in Nigeria. He apparently
is well-known locally and is politi-
cally active. He has been described
as a Muslim hard-liner with an abra-
sive personality who is passionately
opposed to colonialism. He report-
edly favors a militant solution to
the problems of southern Africa.
Ahmed is reported to be well
connected with various influential
older northern politicians. The
northern-oriented New Nigerian
newspaper recently portrayed him
as one of the new and untested
politicians on the northern scene
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who could pose a potential challenge to the old guard
leadership if it does not close ranks in a broad politi-
cal front. Ahmed was a member of the committee that
drafted Nigeria's new constitution for civilian rule,
though his candidacy for the constituent assembly became
bogged down in litigation for reasons that remain. unclear.
The other alleged Libyan connec-
tion, Mohammed Abubakar Rimi, is de-
25X1C scribed as one
of the leading young northerners
con-
25X1 from Kano State in the recent con-
stituent assembly.
claims Rimi is personally close to
Qadhafi. The New Nigerian has por-
trayed him as a radical with social-
ist proclivities. Educated in Brit-
ish universities, he is a former
journalist and the present adminis-
trative secretary of the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, a
research group that offers foreign
policy advice to the government.
Ahmed and Rimi must be considered
radically inclined, disaffected sons
of the northern establishment. This
younger, better educated group of
Alhali Mohammed
Abubakar Rimi
Muslims tends to be more progressive and reformist in
outlook and less responsive to the wishes of the'tradi-
tional elite than most ordinary northerners. They also
are intensely nationalistic, and their "radicalism"
takes on a chauvinistic, xenophobic cast.
It is probably among the northern university
student community and recent graduates that Ahmed and
Rimi find the bulk of their supporters. There report-
edly is growing sentiment among this group for "Muslim
unity and power." We have not yet seen evidence, how-
ever, that the kind of militant political ideology es-
poused by Qadhafi is taking hold in Nigeria.
We cannot yet ascertain now much political influence
Muslim militants like Ahmed and Rimi have in the larger
northern political establishment. In today's political
climate, the northern political "king-makers" are a gen-
erally conservative and cautious lot. They probably
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view Qadhafi with disdain and are wary of his activism
in Africa. These leaders are not likely to involve
themselves with the Libyans in ways that risk upsetting
the local establishment or jeopardizing their political
ambitions by antagonizing Nigeria's watchful military
government.
Libyan-Nigerian Relations at the Official Level
Official relations between Libya and Nigeria can
best be described as outwardly cordial and correct. Qad-
hafi regards Nigeria as a major power in Africa and also
as a rival to his own African leadership pretensions. Ni-
geria acknowledges Libya as an important "African state,"
but regards it as an unwelcome competitor for influence
south of the Sahara and takes a jaundiced view of Qad-
hafi's subversive activities in the region. Lagos has
made clear that Nigeria will not tolerate the patroniz-
ing attitude Libya displays toward most other African
states.
Qadhafi is keenly disappointed with the present Ni-
gerian military regime which was initially headed by a
Muslim but no longer is. Libya, the first country to ex-
tend recognition after the July 1975 coup, quickly sent a
delegation to Lagos in a none-too-subtle effort to influ-
ence the new regime to adopt a strong pro-Arab stance and
to promote revolutionary programs. Instead, the Nige-
rians quickly adopted an activist, African-centered for-
eign policy concerned primarily with eliminating white
minority rule in southern Africa and asserting a Nigerian
leadership role in Africa.
We know of no cultural, economic, or military agree-
ments between Libya and Nigeria. For strictly economic
reasons, Nigeria and Libya, together with Algeria, are
now closely coordinating their oil policies in a sort of
mini-OPEC because their oils are similar in quality and
are competing with one another at a time of depressed de-
mand and diminished revenues.
Islam, Libya, and Nigeria's Future Orientation
In the event that a Muslim-dominated civilian gov-
ernment comes to power next year--even with Libyan en-
couragement--we do not believe it would align Nigeria
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closely with Libya or adopt a significantly more pro-Arab
stance. Because of domestic political realities, a Mus-
lim political leader in Nigeria cannot afford to champion
Muslim causes in foreign policy lest this heighten fears
of Muslim domination at home and seriously strain the in-
ternal political fabric. Similarly, Nigeria, which has
long aspired to a leadership role in black Africa, can-
not side overtly with the Arab states of North Africa or
the Middle East. Neither Nigeria's first civilian presi-
dent nor General Obasanjo's predecessor, both Muslims,
advanced Muslim interests in the country's foreign policy.
Despite the supposed bond of Islam, the bulk of Ni-
geria's Muslims do not seem to display a strong sense of
political identity with or a feeling of special kinship
for the Arabs of North Africa or the Middle East. Nor
do they seem to have a high degree of interest in such
Arab-related problems as the Arab-Israel conflict, the
Western Sahara, and the Chad-Libya dispute. The present
government takes an officially neutral stance toward the
Western Sahara and Chad-Libya problems. Nigeria gener-
ally has avoided attending international Islamic gather-
ings and refrains from allowing Arab organizations like
the PLO to open offices in Lagos.
The prevailing pro-Arab sentiment in the north does
not translate into a significantly stronger position on
the Arab-Israel issue than that of the current government.
Nigeria's general support for the Arab side in the Middle
East is no more forthright than the stance taken by many
other black African states, and Nigeria was among the last
of the OAU members to sever relations with Israel in 1973.
Nigeria officially supports the Arabs on many issues that
are not of direct relevance to it or of particular concern
to Nigeria's Muslims because of its OPEC membership and in
the name of Third World solidarity. Though Lagos favors
closer Afro-Arab cooperation in principle, many Nigerian
Muslims no doubt share the regime's resentment that Arab
states have not given as much support for majority rule
in southern Africa as Africans have given the Arab side
in the Middle East dispute. (SECRET NOFORN)
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South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups
The leadership of the African National Congress,
the larger of South Africa's two exiled liberation or-
ganizations, is convinced that externally based guerrilla
warfare like that being waged in Rhodesia will not work
against South Africa. The ANC, therefore, is planning
to concentrate on fomenting industrial unrest and urban
guerrilla warfare inside South Africa to force the gov-
ernment to change its policies toward blacks. It claims
it has stored large caches of arms inside the country
for that purpose. Although the majority of South Afri-
can blacks are opposed to violence and realize that they
will be hurt most by urban terrorism, an increasing num-
ber see violence as their only recourse.
The ANC, the oldest existing South African political
organization, was founded in 1912. It functioned inside
South Africa until 1960 when it and the rival Pan Afri-
canist Congress were banned after the government became
al-armed over political protests following a massacre of
blacks by police at Sharpeville. The ANC, infiltrated
during the 1950s by members of the small, previously
banned South African Communist Party, receives modest
support from Moscow. White, Asian, and colored Commu-
nists are an important minority in the organization's
leadership.
The Pan Africanist Congress, the smaller and less
effective of the two exile groups, agrees in principal
with ANC strategy to concentrate on internal disruption
rather than cross-border raids. There is, however,
little coordination between the two groups. The PAC was
formed in 1959 by members of the ANC who rejected both
the multiracial approach and Communist influence in the
older body. The role of whites in a black-ruled South
Africa is still a main area of disagreement between the
two groups, both of which rule out a merger between them,
despite renewed attempts by the Organization of African
Unity to arrange a reconciliation. The PAC receives
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some financial and military assistance from Peking. Both
receive funding through the OAU and are seeking expanded
support from African countries. The United Nations has
recognized the ANC as the "true representative" of the
South African people.
After languishing for more than a decade, both groups
were revitalized in 1976 by a large influx of students
who fled South Africa after the Soweto riots. Their
present strength is difficult to gauge. The South Afri-
can Government estimates that the ANC has some 3,000
members and the PAC some 1,000. These estimates probably
include many of the students now in refugee camps.
there are about 800 trained cadre i
mi 1 ary camps primarily located in Tanzania, Zambia,
and Angola, while about 100-200 with military training
are inside South Africa. The number of PAC members under-
going training or operating inside South Africa is con-
siderably less.
The South African military leadership agrees with
the ANC and the PAC that the Rhodesian model of armed
incursion from operational bases in neighboring coun-
tries is unlikely to happen in South Africa in the near
future. It bases this judgment on the belief that most
of the adjacent countries would be reluctant to support
large-scale operations because of the heavy military and
economic retaliation South Africa could inflict.
The military is aware of the steadily increasing
infiltration of trained terrorists into South Africa and
expects that acts of sabotage and terrorism will increase
in urban areas and eventually extend into rural areas as
well. Since July 1977, more than a dozen incidents, in-
cluding bombings and attacks against blacks and whites,
have occurred in Johannesburg and its black environs.
The ANC needs much more internal support than it
now has before the urban guerrilla bases it envisages
can be set up. Such bases would be difficult to hide
from South Africa's security forces, even among a sympa-
thetic populace. Moreover, the ANC is aware that the
black community, which is largely moderate and opposed
to violence, would be damaged most by urban terrorism
and unrest and that blacks are dissatisfied with the lim-
ited accomplishments of the liberation organization.
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indicates that the majority would rather negoti-
ate with whites than fight them. Nevertheless, 28 per-
25X1C cent of the blacks believe that their lot will
never improve unless they resort to violence, and a-sig-
nificantly larger proportion of younger and better edu-
cated blacks support the need for violence than do their
elders. Only 10 percent were in favor of strikes as a
method of inducing change. That figure points up the
economically fragile plight of urban blacks and highlights
the growing belief among them that they have few alterna-
tives to violence as long as the government refuses to
grant genuine political concessions.
25X1 C
taken between the Soweto riots of
1976 and the massive police crackdown on black political
leaders and organizations last October, the ANC garnered
22 percent of popular support among black leaders, and
the PAC polled 7 percent. ANC President Nelson Mandela,
imprisoned in South Africa since 1974, received most of
the backing; the exiled leaders of both organizations
obtained minimal support.
The extent of support for the ANC and PAC is sur-
prisingly high considering that the organizations have
been outlawed for nearly 18 years and have thus been pre-
cluded from any open propagandizing or or anizing. In
reality, the support may be higher than indicates
because many blacks would be unwilling to express support
publicly for the two groups for fear of police reprisals.
(SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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FOR THE RECORD
NIGERIA: The Nigerian Government has recently con-
cluded an accord with Benin aimed at reducing Benin's
need for Soviet and Cuban aid. The Agreement calls for
the training of some Beninese military personnel in
Nigeria and for increased air service and trade.
Nigeria has promised to consider additional Beninese
requests for military assistance. The agreement follows
a late July summit meeting in which Nigerian Head of
State Obasanjo told Beninese President Kerekou that he
was uneasy about the Soviet- and Cuban-aided expansion
of Benin's military forces. The Beninese have given
assurances that they will halt the military buildup and
reduce the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers. The
Nigerians, however, question Kerekou's willingness to
follow through on these commitments.
Obasanjo's press secretary told a US Embassy officer
that Nigeria will next bring pressure on Equatorial Guinea
to reduce Soviet and Cuban involvement there. Equatorial
Guinea's President Masie is unlikely to respond positively
and could retaliate against Nigerian contract laborers.
Mistreatment of such workers two years ago led to a verbal
confrontation and the evacuation by Nigeria of some
40,000 of its citizens. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
25X1A
18 August 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/3%Ec -RDP79T00912A002700010008-2
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010008-2
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010008-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO0270001 008-2
SECRET
NOFORN
NOTE TO HOLDERS OF Africa Review, RP AR 78-003,
18 August 1978:
The attached map #623936 should be inserted with
"Nigeria: Libyan Involvement in Northern Politics,"
in your copy of the publication.
RP AR 78-003
18 August 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010008-2
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010008-2
V
Nigeria:. Federal States, Tribal Groups, and Islam
Nicer
Ana. a ich
Niger
1' v t
i Capital
Federal {
Te ry plateau ,~_?`~. Gongola
- =-
Equatorial
Guinea
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010008-2
The "Holy North" -75-100% Muslim
Former northern region boundary
State boundary
Hausa and Fulani
(intermingled)