AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 11, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

pr 8U W4 or Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00912A0027000100OSret
Orelgn NOFORN-N000NTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-002
11 August 1978
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON
AFRICA REVIEW
11 August 1978
CONTENTS
Zaire-Angola: Prospects for Peace. . . . . . . . . .
Tensions have significantly lessened in re-
cent months, and both countries are on the
verge of establishing full diplomatic rela-
tions. Basic hostility and mutual distrust
persists, however, and the leaders of the
two countries may feel too insecure to make
the necessary concessions to cement the prog-
ress that has been made.
Nigeria: The Evolution of Foreign Policy and
Civilian a le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The odds favor a successful transition to
civilian rule in Nigeria, and, despite turbu-
lent periods, the process will have only a
peripheral effect on Nigerian foreign policy.
Once in power a civilian regime will continue
the main lines of current policy, although
there is sure to be substantial vocal mili-
tancy, particularly on southern Africa.
This publication was formerly entitled Africa Weekly Review.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the
Washington community by the Africa Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other
offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The
Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implica-
tions. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions
on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and
queries can be directed to the authors o articles
or to Chief, Africa Division
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The Nigerian Left and Future Politics . . . . . . . . 8
The government is keeping a close eye on
local leftists, particularly those in the
labor movement, and on Soviet and Cuban
activities in neighboring Benin as Nigeria
approaches the scheduled lifting of the ban
on politics in November.
Nigeria: Facing Foreign Exchange Stringency. . . . . 14
Nigerian foreign exchange reserves fell in
July to their lowest level in four years,
reflecting a decline in oil revenues. The
government has instituted a number of aus-
terity measures to counter the decline and
may be contemplating a devaluation.
Rhodesia: A Look at the Internal Settlement. . . . . 16
The key points from a memorandum.
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Gabon: Dentention Camp Uprising. . . . . . . . . . . 21
Mounting tension generated by previous Gabo-
nese attacks on Beninese nationals and grow-
ing frustration with detention camp life led
to violence in Gabon last week.
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The Organization of African Unity . . . . . . . . . . 24
The OAU was formed in 1963 to counter spread-
ing polarization between moderate and radical
states and since then has been involved in
the entire range of African crises. It seeks
to facilitate solutions rather than impose
them and represents African interests to the
outside world.
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Central African Empire
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Zaire-Angola: Prospects for Peace
A series of meetings that began last month in
Brazzaville between Zaire and Angola has resulted in a
significant lessening of tensions between the two coun-
tries. Both sides recently exchanged ambassadors and
are on the verge of establishing full diplomatic rela-
tions. Perhaps in response to Western--including US--
pressure, Zairian President Mobutu early last month
showed signs that he might be willing to take a more
conciliatory attitude toward Angola. In conversations
with US officials, Mobutu expressed relief that Angola
has taken some steps to disarm the Katangan insurgents.
He added, however, that he continues to be suspicious of
the Angolans because President Neto had t his
word in the past on controlling them.
contrasted
starkly with his hostile public ected to-
ward Luanda in the wake of the Shaba invasion by Angolan-
based Katangan rebels last May.
The Angolans apparently
were reluctant to meet, and
neither side expected much
from the negotiations. The
productive initial meetings by
the delegations in Brazzaville,
however, paved the way for two
additional meetings between
Mobutu and Neto at the OAU
summit in Khartoum. African
pressure probably was instru-
mental in getting them to-
gether. We do not know whether
the Soviets or Cubans exerted
pressure on Luanda to adopt a
more conciliatory attitude to-
ward Kinshasa. Mobutu and Neto
are longtime antagonists and
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ideological opponents. They prob-
ably realize, however, that their
serious internal difficulties--
both face severe economic, polit-
ical, and social problems--can be
better handled if they reduce the
tension that exists between them.
The initial agreement calls for
the repatriation of refugees who
wish to return to their respective
homelands; the establishment of
controls to ensure that the ref-
ugees are disarmed; the setting
up of a demilitarized zone on both
sides of the Zairian-Angolan bor-
der; the creation of a multilateral
African observer team, approved by the OAU, to monitor
the demilitarized zone; and the reopening of the Benguela
railroad.
The lessening of tensions has resulted in some ges-
tures of good will. Luanda reportedly has begun to with-
draw Zairian refugees at least 250 kilometers from the
border area and has released over -50 Zairian fishermen
and other prisoners who had been held in Angola.
There is still a long way to go, however, before
the agreement can be fully implemented. The two sides
apparently have agreed on the location of the checkpoints
to be used by the OAU verification committee. The com-
position of the committee, however, has not yet been
determined, and there appears to be lingering disagreement
over whether Nigeria and Rwanda will serve on it. Once
the committee is established, moreover, it faces numerous
logistic and supply problems before it can begin to
operate.
Refugee repatriation is a complex and sensitive
issue. Considerations involving mutual security will
have to be closely monitored, and allegations of sub-
version could arise from attempts to repatriate the
large numbers of each country's refugees. There are
approximately 250,000 refugees in northeastern Angola
and over 15,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire's Shaba Region.
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The continued ability and will--over the long term--
of both Mobutu and Neto to control the other's dissidents
could prove to be a major stumbling block. While the
dissidents are quiet for the moment, there is no guaran-
tee that their quiescence will last. Although Neto appar-
ently has disarmed large numbers of Katangans and trans-
ported them away from the Zairian frontier, roving bands
of dissidents and infiltrators remain in the area. Their
activities could cause Mobutu to allege that Neto is not
keeping his word on controlling the rebels.
On the other hand, Mobutu has the problem of his
continuing assistance to some of the Angolan insurgent
groups. Mobutu doubtless expects that the establishment
of an international border commission empowered to con-
duct onsite inspections would significantly restrict his
ability to funnel aid to the insurgents. Although
Angola's rebels probably anticipate major logistic prob-
lems if the border is neutralized, they do not believe
Zaire's rapprochement with Angola presages a major re-
duction of foreign military and financial support to the
movement.
The question of support to the insurgents has always
been a major point of contention between the two govern-
ments, and it is likely to come up again. Previous
negotiations between Zaire and Angola have foundered in
part because of this issue. Neither side may, in fact,
exercise the control over the other's dissidents that
each side attributes to the other.
Although generally regarded as a primary export
route for Zairian copper, the opening of the Benguela
railroad would also provide a boost to other sectors of
Zaire's economy. Although Zaire's copper and manganese
could be more easily exported by the rail line, the route
is more important as a conduit for the Shaba Region's
vital imports. In addition, Zaire would benefit from the
receipt of hard currency from Zambia in payment of tran-
sit fees and would recover railroad cars trapped in Angola
for the past three years. All of the benefits would take
several months to materialize and are dependent on con-
tinued political stability in Zaire and Angola and ef-
ficient operation of the port of Lobito.
The railroad probably will not be able to operate
at full capacity for some time. Major repairs must be
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made to the railroad bridge at Dilolo on the Angolan-
Zairian border, and UNITA continues to attack portions
of the line in central Angola. In a special communique
issued late last month, UNITA stated its firm intention
to continue sabotaging the rail line. UNITA believes
its international credibility rests in large part on its
ability to prevent the railroad from functioning, and it
is unlikely sufficient external pressure can be brought
to bear on the guerrillas to force a change in their
position.
Zambia has not had any role in the Zaire-Angola
negotiations. There is a lingering hostility on Mobutu's
part toward Zambian President Kaunda for his failure to
deter the Katangans from using Zambian territory to enter
Shaba. The opening of the Benguela railroad would, how-
ever, be an important development for Zambia.
In sum, many hurdles remain before the agreement can
be fully implemented, and a lasting reduction of tensions
between Kinshasa and Luanda will be difficult to achieve.
The basic hostility and mutual distrust between Mobutu
and Neto probably will continue. Each may feel too in-
secure to make costly concessions to the other, opening
the way for a resumption of allegations and a return to
the stormy past. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: The Evolution of Foreign Policy and Civilian
Rule*
We believe that the quality of Nigerian relations
with the United States during the next 18 months or so
will depend primarily on US policy, with a strong but
not completely exclusive focus on US policy toward south-
ern Africa. Other Nigerian concerns in relations with
the United States--oil prices, availability of develop-
ment capital and technology, North-South and nonaligned
issues, inter-African security problems, perceptions of
Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, US arms sales--will
be secondary.
Nigerian policy will remain relatively straight-
forward on the southern African problem. The Nigerians
will continue to support negotiations in the southern
African context, but only as long as these negotiations
hold serious promise,of achieving the objective the
Nigerians hold in common with other Africans--the dis-
mantling of white minority governments in favor of rule
by or in the name of the black populations. The Nige-
rians will simultaneously support the liberation groups--
though not by significant direct military intervention--
and the tactical flexibility that a Nigerian regime
shows in its day-to-day relationships should not be al-
lowed to create the illusion that it has moderated its
objective.
On the secondary issues, we expect to continue to
see a good deal of pragmatism from the Nigerians. The
amount of pragmatism, however, will be influenced by the
atmosphere created by perceived US action or inaction
in the main arena.
*These are the Principal Judgments from a recent Interagency Intel-
ligence Memorandum, Nigeria: The Evolution of Foreign Policy and
Civilian Rule, August 1978. If you desire a copy of the report,
please contact
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We do not now see a civilian regime doing much to
alter these basic approaches. Although there is sure to
be a substantial amount of vocal militancy--which will
be sincerely felt regarding southern Africa--the funda-
mental elements in Nigeria's economic, social, and demo-
graphic situation argue for continuity and compromise as
against sudden and radical change.
In our view, the odds still favor a successful
transition to civilian rule in Nigeria, meeting the
October 1979 deadline to which the military leaders re-
main committed. There will surely be turbulent periods
during this passage, and we make no forecast as to how
long civilian rule will last once it is installed. But
we believe that the process will have at most only a
peripheral effect on Nigerian foreign policy during the
coming 15 months.
Specifically, we believe that Nigerians:
-- Will work with the United States on the Rho-
desia problem, but will not accept any arrange-
ment that is not also acceptable to the
Patriotic Front and will do relatively little
more under present circumstances to persuade
the Patriotic Front leaders to moderate their
positions.
-- Will work similarly with regard to Namibia.
-- Will view with grave suspicion any signs that
the United States is expanding cooperation
with South Africa in any field--political,
economic, or nuclear.
-- Will gradually become more uneasy about the
role of Cubans and Soviets in Africa, but
will be reserved toward efforts to create
an international African security force.
-- Will not turn toward greater cooperation with
the USSR in international -arenas unless
Western efforts in southern Africa collapse
utterly.
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-- Will continue in their domestic affairs to
function so that--within the limits imposed
by nationalistic political requirements--they
will attract foreign investment and assistance.
-- Will, in the United Nations, the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting countries, and other
international forums, seek ways to make
visible their sense that their country, given
its size and resources, should continue to
play a leading role in African and Third
World affairs. (SECRET NOFORN)
11 August 1978
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The Nigerian Left and Future Politics
The Obasanjo regime is keeping an increasingly close
eye on local leftists, particularly those in the labor
movement, and on Soviet and Cuban activities in neighbor-
ing Benin as Nigeria approaches the scheduled lifting of
the ban on politics in October. The resumption of polit-
ical activity, which is intended to facilitate the organ-
ization of parties for elections next year, will bring
Nigeria to the last and most difficult phase of its pro-
gram to restore civilian rule in October 1979.
The period ahead is likely to be turbulent primarily
because of the rivalries politicking will engender among
Nigeria's competing regional and ethnic interests. Regime
leaders are concerned that indigenous leftists--possibly
with outside encouragement--could attempt to exploit the
situation to advance their fortunes and cause further
political disruption during the final stages of the tran-
sition from military to civilian rule.
Nigeria, unlike most black African states, has a
distinct Communist movement backed by the Soviet Union.
There is no reasonable prospect, however, that a Commu-
nist-dominated regime could come to power in Nigeria in
the foreseeable future. Nor do we believe that Nigerian
leftists will emerge as a major political force under
civilian rule. Leftist labor leaders, on the other hand,
could be in a position to wield greater influence. We
also believe that the Soviet Union will not significantly
increase its low-keyed support for the small Nigerian
Communist movement or engage in the kind of political
maneuvering that could undermine Moscow's hopes for main-
taining normal relations with a legitimately elected
Nigerian Government. It is in the Kremlin's interest to
emphasize establishing productive ties with whatever
civilian regime emerges, regardless of its ideological
makeup, because of Nigeria's position as Africa's most
populous and potentially most influential state. The
overwhelming weight of the Soviets' effort to expand
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their influence in Nigeria lies in dealing with the es-
tablished government. Moscow seeks further opportunities
to increase Nigeria's limited reliance on Soviet military
and economic assistance, areas that offer far greater pos-
sibilities to the USSR at this time than the uncertain
prospects of Nigeria's indigenous Communist movement.
Nigerian Communists and Socialists
Although the weak and factionalized Nigerian commu-
nist movement--which is confined largely to Lagos--is
likely to play only a minor role in the country's return
to civilian rule, it is nevertheless gearing up for the
legalization of politics. Hardcore Nigerian Communists--
those who are believed to be under direct Soviet influence
or control--account for only a fraction of the Nigerian
left, which itself composes only a small part of the
local political spectrum. Accurate figures are not avail-
able, but the underground movement probably numbers no
more than a few thousand out of Nigeria's population of
70 million or more.
During the early 1960s, the movement received an
annual covert subsidy from the Soviet Union of less
than $150,000, which was barely enough to keep it alive.
Two years ago, the Soviets provided the movement a paltry
$30,000 to contest local government elections. Before
Nigeria's ban on political parties in 1966, the movement
operated through the quasi-Communist Socialist Workers
and Farmers Party. Since then, it has pursued its activ-
ities through leftist trade unionists associated with the
former Nigerian Trade Union Congress, the Nigerian Com-
mittee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization,
and the Soviet-Nigerian Friendship and Cultural Society.
Regular contact between the Soviet Embassy and the move-
ment has resumed, and Secretary General Ipidapo Fatogun
visited Moscow last year to discuss plans and funding for
the remainder of the transition to civilian rule.
Nigerian Communists contribute to the pro-socialist
orientation of the Nigerian left, but there is no evidence
that they dominate it. They are generally drowned in a
babble of socialist rhetoric--some of it highly unortho-
dox--that comes from Nigeria's indigenous, homegrown left-
ists. Soviet propaganda probably provides some grist for
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socialist-oriented students, journalists, lawyers, and
university professors. Indigenous leftists led the anti-
Western outcry in Nigeria over western opposition to rec-
ognition of the pro-Soviet Neto government of Angola
in 1975 and over the assassination in 1976 of former Ni-
gerian Head of State General Muhammed, who backed the
Neto government against its South African - aided rivals.
Nigerian socialists were well represented on the
government-appointed committee that last year drew up
Nigeria's draft constitution for civil rule. They pressed
unsuccessfully for a constitution that would have pro-
claimed Nigeria a socialist state committed to work for
socialist economic goals. The draft constitution calls
for continuation of a mixed economy, more or less like the
present system, with the government to manage all major
sectors. Nigerian socialists have been among the most
persistent critics of the draft constitution. The issue
of whether or not Nigeria should be declared a socialist
state, however, did not become a subject of contention
in the constituent assembly, which approved without ap-
parent difficulty the section calling for a mixed econ-
omy.
Leftwing Political Parties
When the political ban is lifted, a socialist-ori-
ented party built around a motley group of indigenous
leftists will probably emerge in alliance with or paral-
lel to a resurrected quasi-Communist workers party.
Such groups are likely to exercise little clout in Nige-
rian politics, although leftwingers may win a few seats
in the federal and state legislatures. The issue of in-
flation and how to manage the economy at a time of declin-
ing oil revenues could give leftist politicians more am-
munition in political campaigning than they might other-
wise enjoy.
The major parties that emerge, however, will be based
primarily on regional and ethnic appeal and not political
and economic philosophy. The exigencies of Nigerian pol-
itics will cause many leftists to pragmatically ally them-
selves with major political groupings or presidential
contenders, such as veteran Yoruba tribal politician
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who espouses a vague form of Afri-
can socialism. one of Awolowo's former associates, Samuel
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Ikoku--a member of the major Ibo ethnic group--may be
among the contenders for leadership of a socialist party.
A Marxist intellectual and a former leftist trade union
leader, Ikoku's progressive brand of socialism is de-
signed to appeal to youth and labor.
Leftist Labor and Politics
The Nigerian Government embarked on a major restruc-
turing of the country's trade union movement three years
ago. Its aim was to create a relatively docile labor
organization and install a friendly set of labor leaders
to steer Nigeria's potentially restive workers safely
through the transition to civilian rule. The old union
leadership was ousted, the four competing labor federa
tions fused into one central organization, their affilia-
tion with international labor organizations prohibited,
and stronger wage and antistrike controls imposed. In
the process, the average Nigerian wage earner has suffered
a decline in real income and seen his aspirations for a
better life largely thwarted.
Today the regime is dragging its heels on giving
Nigeria's revamped labor movement the green light to
begin operating. It is discomfited by the strong left-
ist cast of the new national union leadership and by the
leadership's apparent intention to carve out a greater
role as the country prepares for civilian rule.
Although strikes are banned, the leaders of the Ni-
gerian Labor Congress (NLC) have threatened to call a
work stoppage by key unions unless the regime soon author-
izes funding for the organization, the registration of
member unions, and the collection of dues through a com-
pulsory checkoff. Their strategy--which is clearly in-
tended to test the government's resolve--is reportedly
the brainstorm of Wahab Goodluck, an old pro-Soviet
former labor leader who was proscribed by the government
last year from all labor activity after it was proven
that he had accepted Soviet financing in the 1960s. His
protege, Hassan Abedayo Sunmonu, is the current NLC pres-
ident.
The government's delaying tactics reflect its con-
cern over persistent reports that Sunmonu and other
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leftist NLC leaders are engaged in underground political
activities with Goodluck, who intends to run for the fed-
eral parliament as a candidate of a resurrected workers
party. The government is also investigating reports that
the leftist NLC leadership is receiving clandestine Soviet
financial assistance. According to one report, the USSR
has so far turned down requests by NLC leftists for fi-
nancial help on the grounds that they do not yet have
sufficient control of the organization to warrant it.
If the government finds that the Soviets are funding the
NLC, it will cut planned financial aid to the organiza-
tion by half, place the NLC leadership under surveillance,
and restrict its movements. This suggests that the mili-
tary regime intends to try to maintain a firm hand in
directing labor affairs and that it will not tolerate
disruptive labor tactics.
The election last spring of a leftist leadership
slate for the NLC reflects that group's superior organiz-
ing skill and indicates that a strong leftist element
exists within Nigeria's trade union movement. Leftist-
oriented unions account for 12 of the 43 unions that make
up the NLC and that were formerly associated with the
WFTU-affiliated Nigerian Trade Union Congress, one of the
four former labor federations in Nigeria. The NLC, with
a membership of 880,000 to 1 million workers, has con-
sider able political potential if its officers prove cap-
able of effective leadership. The new organization is
already showing, however, many of the divisive tendencies
that have characterized Nigerian labor since well before
the country's independence in 1960. Even the leftist
trade unionists are beset by severe ideological and per-
sonal rivalries.
The monthly journal of the Nigerian communist move-
ment has suggested that the NLC should unite with social-
ists to form a political party. The government's new
draft constitution for civilian rule and the constitution
of the NLC both appear to proscribe such a linkup. While
a socialist-oriented party could count on private sup-
port from leftwing trade unionists, the US Embassy doubts
that a leftist political party could effect a political
marriage with the entire NLC.
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Continued inflationary pressure on wage earners and
the advent of open political activity this fall are likely
to breathe more political life into Nigeria's union mem-
bership and could lead to greater agitation for relief
from the wage-price squeeze.
The Benin Factor
The Nigerian Government views Soviet and Cuban in-
volvement in neighboring Benin with growing concern and
is exploring a security arrangement with Benin aimed at
eliminating the Communist presence there. Nigerian
leaders are particularly concerned that Benin might be
used as a base for clandestinely aiding Nigerian leftists
and otherwise interfering in Nigeria's internal affairs
during the transition to civilian rule.
Nigerian Head of State General Obasanjo met two
weeks ago with Beninese President Kerekou to express
Nigeria's apprehension about the Soviet and Cuban role
in Benin. He also discussed Benin's defense needs, and
it was agreed that the Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, Gen-
eral Danjuma, would soon visit Cotonou. Obasanjo's aim,
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may be to lay the ground-
work for a security pact with Benin leading to the grad-
ual withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military advisers.
Since an attempted mercenary coup in January 1977,
Benin has welcomed Soviet military support, which to
date has included armored vehicles, antiaircraft weapons,
small arms, and an estimated 30 military advisers.
Benin's interest in Cuban assistance also increased after
the abortive coup, and some 55 Cuban military and secu-
rity advisers are now in the country. Kerekou maintains
that Benin needs these Communist arms and advisers to
safeguard his radical regime. The recent delivery of
additional Soviet military equipment and ammunition from
Libya will probably only heighten Nigeria's apprehension
about Soviet and Cuban intentions in Benin. (SECRET NO-
FORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Nigeria: Facing Foreign Exchange Stringency
Nigerian foreign exchange reserves fell to $2.2
billion in July, a drop of $2.0 billion since the be-
ginning of the year and the lowest level in four years.
Reserves are now equivalent to only about two months
worth of imported goods and services. The foreign
business community in Nigeria, which is experiencing
longer delays in receiving payments from the Federal
Military Government, believes that Lagos will devalue
the naira as the next step in relieving the foreign ex-
change crunch.
The rapid drawdown of reserves reflects the decline
of oil revenues--which account for more than 90 percent
of export earnings--coupled with the rise in imports of
capital goods and services essential to the economic
development effort. In March 1978, oil exports reached
their lowest level in more than six years, at 1.5 million
barrels per day. Demand for Nigerian crude has fallen
off as cheaper supplies from the North Sea and Alaska
have become available. Furthermore, rigid Nigerian oil
pricing policies have hampered efforts to keep up with
traditional competitors, particularly Libya and Algeria.
Already this year the government has taken a number
of initiatives in an attempt to boost export earnings
and ward off serious balance-of-payments problems. Among
these measures are:
-- Oil price cuts in the first and second quarters
and a recently announced additional discount
to third-party customers who sign long-term
contracts for specified crudes and to producing
companies that raise liftings beyond last
quarter's average.
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-- Implementation in April of an austerity budget
restricting consumer imports, suspending wage
increases and government subsidies, and limiting
federal spending to 1977 levels.
-- Renegotiation of foreign contracts for major in-
frastructure projects to stretch out the pay-
ment periods.
-- Arrangement of a $1 billion Eurodollar loan,
which has been completely drawn down, and
negotiation (near completion) of a second $1
billion Eurodollar loan.
-- Pursuit of barter arrangements with Japan,
Poland, Romania, and several US firms that
would enable Nigeria to receive capital goods
and food in exchange for oil.
Nigeria appears to be headed for a $3 billion cur-
rent account deficit in 1978, even if imports respond
quickly to the April restrictions. Although the oil
companies are beginning to respond to pricing incentives,
oil exports for the year will average 1.8 million barrels
per day at best, down from last year's 2.0 million
average. The austerity measures should hold down the
rapid increase in imported services, but necessary ex-
penditures for continuing projects will keep the deficit
on services more than $3 billion.
The devaluation reportedly under consideration would
do little to improve this year's current account deficit.
Indeed, its immediate effect would be to raise the im-
port costs of the development program. Although devalua-
tion would in the long run encourage local production
and import substitution, Lagos in the months ahead al-
most certainly will have to scale back its development
effort and/or seek additional international financing.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
Rhodesia: A Look at the Internal Settlement*
-- The biracial transitional government has
made only halting progress in implement-
ing an internal settlement in Rhodesia
and preparing for an election prior to
transferring power to a black majority
government by the end of the year.
-- The new government has been unable to
halt the fighting. The amnesty pro-
gram, on which it was counting heavily,
has made little headway, casting doubt
on whether a meaningful election that
might attract outside support can be
held.
-- The government is also plagued by bick-
ering between black leaders, who want
to implement changes more quickly, and
whites, who want to preserve their in-
fluence. Rivalry among the black
leaders presents an additional problem.
-- The internal leaders recognize the weak-
nesses of the internal settlement and
are using it as a bargaining tool with
the outside parties to the problem even
as they move ahead with their own plan.
*The Key Points above are from a memorandum entitled Rhodesia: A
Look at the Internal Settlement (RPM 78-10309), published on
7 August 1978. Copies of the memorandum may be obtained by contact-
ing the author.
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-- Ian Smith and to a lesser extent his
black colleagues recognize that Joshua
Nkomo's participation is essential to
a lasting solution, but they have been
unable to persuade him to participate
in the internal settlement.
-- Some sort of weak black-led government
will probably emerge at the end of the
year, but its prospects for ending the
war and gaining international approval
are poor.
-- The internal leaders may be hoping,
therefore, that the internal settle-
ment can demonstrate some staying
power before they consider new talks
within the framework of the UK-US
settlement plan. (SECRET NOFORN-NO-
CONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1 C
Gabon: Detention Camp Uprising
The detention camp used to house Beninese nationals
awaiting repatriation to Cotonou erupted in violence last
Saturday when frustrated youths stoned passing cars and
roughed-up several passengers. The specific reasons for
the uprising are not clear, but it is possible that mount-
ing tension--generated by previous Gabonese attacks on
the Beninese community and a growing weariness with de-
tention camp life--may have triggered the outburst.
Gabonese efforts to quell the uprising resulted in the
death of three Beninese and serious injuries to several
others,
An uneasy calm has returned to the camp, but Gabonese
President Bongo realizes that the longer the Beninese
have to cool their heels, the greater will be the likeli-
hood of a recurrence of violence. Bongo would like to
expedite the deportation of the Beninese, but Benin's
President Kerekou has obstructed the Gabonese President's
plans. Kerekou refuses to permit the returnees to enter
Benin by land and insists that they be returned directly
by air. Bongo has attempted to placate Kerekou by
arranging charter flights, and Air Afrique reportedly
has scheduled additional flights to facilitate the
Beninese return.
The Beninese Government bitterly attacked Bongo for
the lack of protection afforded the Beninese community
in Gabon and accused him of having personally ordered the
attacks against the community. The first Beninese re-
turnees have charged that Gabonese police engaged in
looting, pillage, and rape against Beninese awaiting de-
parture. Kerekou also charges that Bongo deliberately
repatriated businessmen in order to confiscate their
property, while allowing those with professional skills
to stay in Gabon.
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Lagos
~\ctonou`Porto Novo
N I G E R I A
Malabo,
Fernando Po
if
o 200 Miles
o eat Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessanly authoritative
SAO TOME
E PRINCIPE
' Sao Tome
Sao Tome
EQUATORIAL
/GUINEA
PNncrpe
Luanda
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Kerekou is apparently determined to make life as
difficult as possible for President Bongo. He can be
expected to use every opportunity to blame Bongo for the
hostile acts taken against Beninese nationals and also
for Gabon's involvement in the mercenary raid on Cotonou
in 1977. (CONFIDENTIAL)
11 August 1978
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25X1A
The organization of African Unity*
The formation of the Organization of African Unity
in 1963 was the outcome of mounting concern among African
leaders over a trend toward polarization of moderate and
radical African states in the early 1960s.
Historically, there had never been a political
structure encompassing all of Africa's diverse groups, but
as independence from European colonialism gained momentum,
multiple movements for African unity sprang up. The
first, comprising 12 moderate French-speaking countries,
was formed in Brazzaville in December 1960. This was
countered by the creation a month later of a Casablanca
Group linking six radical states in North and West Africa.
A number of moderate English-speaking states, concerned
about the Casablanca Group's ideological stance, in 1962
joined with the Brazzaville Group, which then became
known as the Monrovia Group. A preindependence lobby of
representatives of liberation movements and of states
from outside the area was active in East and Central
Africa. The moderates and radicals both proceeded to
create institutions and adopt charters presenting their
claims to speak for Africa.
By early 1963 the African voice was shrill and
divided, and on every side there was a growing desire for
a united organization. As a result, a meeting of all the
African foreign ministers was held in Addis Ababa in May
1963 for the purpose of drafting a new charter for a con-
tinentwide organization. Although it was based on a
separate Ethiopian draft, the proposed charter drew
extensively on the ideas formulated earlier by the
*These are the Key Points from a recent research paper prepared
within the Office of Regional and Political Analysis entitled The
Organization of African Unity (RP 78-10283, July 197iwww,
you de-
sire of this reference aid, please contact 25X1A
11 August 1978
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Monrovia Group. The follow-on summit meeting of all
African heads of state completed the charter and created
the OAU as the sole all-African political institution--
actions subsequently ratified by the member states.
Regional organizations continue to exist and are
accorded observer status in the OAU. They are expected
to conform to the OAU charter, however, and to have a
rational geographic base and some economic or technical
function.
Since its earliest years, the Africans have increas-
ingly insisted that the OAU should be the first forum to
which African disputes are referred, that there should be
no interference in the internal affairs of African states,
and that borders existing at the time of independence must
be acknowledged. Acting under these principles, the OAU
has been involved in the entire range of African crises
over the 15 years of its existence: Algerian-Moroccan
border clashes, Ghanaian harboring of subversive elements,
recurring interventions in Zaire, the Nigerian civil war,
the Israeli occupation of Egyptian territory, Rhodesia's
unilateral declaration of independence, Somali territorial
claims against Ethiopia and Kenya, the Angolan civil war,
and dozens of lesser disputes around the continent.
In dealing with these problems, the OAU frequently
works through international committees or plenary meetings
so that national concerns are played down and all view-
points are represented. It acts cautiously, with a heavy
emphasis on factfinding and on discussions conducted by
high-level mediators. With a few exceptions, it has
managed to keep African problems out of the UN and other
non-African forums. Actual solutions have been rare, with
the OAU generally satisfied to defuse open conflicts and
to keep disputants talking until they reach some accommo-
dation of their own accord. Unlike the Organization of
American States and the League of Arab States, which
generally seek UN or third-party intervention to settle
disputes in their areas, the OAU increasingly views
attempts to impose the advice of outsiders as patronizing
and an affront to African independence.
The OAU also performs a valuable, though often un-
heralded, service to its members by representing African
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interests to the outside world. It works within the UN
through the African Group, which it has transformed into
an effective bloc, and it uses every other international
organization in which Africans are members to enhance
Africa's role and increase its benefits. The one institu-
tion bringing all the states together, it is the agent
for lobbying efforts and the chief organizer of prestigious
events such as African trade fairs and cultural festivals.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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