AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 4, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

NNatio_nai or Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912A0027000
Assessment
Center
Africa Review
4 August 1978
ret
d
4-NOCONTRACT
Secret
RP AR 78-001
4 August 1978
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AFRICA REVIEW
4 August 1978
CONTENTS
Angola: Pushing the Western Option . . . . . . . . .
The Angolan Government has embarked on a ma-
jor effort to improve its relations with the
West and at the same time has taken steps to
reduce threats to its security along its north-
ern and southern borders.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Slow Economic Growth . . . . . . 5
Most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa have
been unable to generate rapid economic growth
in the 1970s as a result of internal political
strife, sluggish world demand, persistent
drought and mismanagement.
This publication was formerly entitled Africa Weekly Review.
NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the
Washington community by the Africa Division, office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other
offices within the National Foreign Assessment Center. The
Africa weekly focuses on major African issues and their implica-
tions. We solicit comments on the articles as well as suggestions
on topics that might be treated in future issues. Comments and
queries can be directed to the authors of the individual articles
or to Chief, Africa Division
25X1A
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Benin-Gabon: Dispute Over Beninese
Expatriates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Charges by Benin's President of Gabonese in-
volvement in raids on his country have pro-
voked attacks on Beninese resident in Gabon
and Gabonese efforts to deport them.
Mali: Traore in Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
President Traore is moving Mali gradually to-
ward civilian government and seems assured of
election to head the new regime, especially
after having strengthened his position by ef-
fectively suppressing a coup attempt last
spring.
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Angola: Pushing the Western Option
The Angolan Government has embarked on a major ef-
fort to improve its relations with the West. At the
same time, it has taken steps on the diplomatic front
to reduce threats to its security along its northern and
southern borders. The parallel efforts seem aimed at
permitting a reduction in Cuban and Soviet military and
economic support,.
Since President Neto met with Portuguese President
Eanes in Guinea-Bissau in late June, Angolan officials
have approached a number of West European states and Ja-
pan in an effort to establish diplomatic ties and to se-
cure economic and technical assistance. The US decision
to respond to Angola's invitation to send a high-level
delegation to Luanda for bilateral talks and South Af-
rica's attack on the South-West Africa People's Organi-
zation base at Cassinga last May probably served as
major catalysts for this drive.
Angolan officials say they are turning to the West
in part because they are disappointed by the quality and
relatively high cost of technical assistance provided by
the Communist states. The Angolans argue that Portuguese
technicians could do the same job much more cheaply, and
they believe other Western countries could provide a
higher degree of expertise at the same or lower prices.
The Angolans also suspect that the socialist states--
particularly the USSR--are exploiting Angola's resources.
For example, Prime Minister Nascimento told Swedish de-
velopment officials last month that the recent fisheries
pacts concluded with the USSR and Poland posed major prob-
lems for his government, particularly when compared with
a much more favorable pact Angola subsequently signed
with Spain.
The Angolans hope greater Western involvement in
their country will not only bring them economic benefits
but also enhance the political legitimacy of the govern-
ment and increase its flexibility in dealing with the
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USSR. The Angolans appear to be pleased with the results
of Ambassador McHenry's visit to Luanda in late June, and
the visit probably encouraged them to push harder on their
opening to the West.
Despite the substantial Soviet and Cuban commitment
to Angola, the economy has not improved, and the military
situation has actually deteriorated. So long as Angola
must divert most of its resources to the military strug-
gle, there is little hope for economic progress. Given
the apparent failure of several recent offensives against
anti-Neto insurgents, the military establishment may have
concluded that the guerrillas cannot be defeated on the
battlefield--even with the substantial number of Cuban
troops in Angola. The South African incursion last May
further underscored the fragility of Angola's security
situation despite the Cuban military presence.
The Angolans--already concerned by the tensions
generated by the substantial foreign presence in their
country--may have decided that the answer to their prob-
lem was not to ask for more troops but to push for a po-,
litical solution. The Cubans may also have balked at
the idea of sending more soldiers to Angola. In recent
months, the Cubans have come under increasing attack in
the nonaligned movement for their African activities,
and they may be considering withdrawing some soldiers
in order to refurbish their credentials before the non-
aligned summit meets in Havana next year.
By forcing SWAPO to accept the Western proposals
on Namibia, Angola opted for an internationally accept-
able solution that should eliminate South Africa as a
military threat along its southern border. In the north,
the Angolans have begun an effort to neutralize the
Katangans as a guerrilla threat in exchange for Zairian
promises to pacify the border and to stop aiding anti-
Neto insurgent groups.
The Angolans doubtless believe that once both bor-
ders are relatively secure, insurgent groups operating in-
side Angola--particularly Jonas Savimbi's National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola--will be cut off
from foreign support and will eventually wither away.
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Over the long term, the Angolans may also be counting on
growing western involvement with the Neto regime to un-
dermine political and military support to UNITA.
The Angolans probably also hope that the establish-
ment of peace on their borders will allow some Cuban
troops to be withdrawn. A Cuban troop withdrawal would
not only ease internal tensions, but would greatly fa-
cilitate efforts to improve relations with the West.
If Neto's current peace initiatives allow a substantial
Cuban troop reduction and UNITA's position is suffi-
ciently undercut, Neto will be in a much stronger posi-
tion to push for a political reconciliation on terms more
favorable to his regime.
Recent Contacts with the West
Angola's desire to promote a more "nonaligned" image
was a major theme during EC Commissioner for Development
Claude Cheysson's visit to Luanda in early July. Neto
had requested that Cheysson visit Angola before the OAU
summit in Khartoum. On his arrival, he told Cheysson
that although some senior Angolan officials were ideo-
logically opposed to an opening to the West, the coun-
try's serious economic problems have compelled it to
solicit Western economic aid.
Neto expressed interest in joining the Lome Conven-
tion--which links 53 developing African, Caribbean, and
Pacific states to the EC--when the agreement is renego-
tiated in 1980. Cheysson indicated that in the interim
the EC would be willing to provide some food aid and
other limited assistance.
In mid-July, Neto instructed the Angolan Ambassador
to Belgium to convey to West Germany his desire to normal-
ize relations. West Germany is the only EC member that
does not have diplomatic relations with Angola, and Bonn
is willing to begin negotiations immediately. Several
issues, including the presence of a commercial West
German rocket launching facility in Zaire, have held up
talks in the past, however, and it is unlikely relations
will be established in the near future.
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During a recent visit to Japan, the governor of the
National Bank of Angola asked if the Japanese would es-
tablish a diplomatic mission in Luanda. He also invited
two major trading companies to participate in oil explo-
ration activities off Angola's northern coast. The Jap-
anese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade and Industry are reluctant to establish diplomatic
relations and grant export insurance to Japanese firms
dealing with Angola and consequently have agreed only to
study the proposals. The Japan External Trade Organiza-
tion which sponsored the governor's visit, has decided,
however, to station a permanent representative in Luanda
to facilitate commercial transactions.
Over the past two months, the Angolans have also:
-- Signed a technical assistance agreement with
Italy involving the ceramic, lock, and ele-
vator industries.
-- Approached the Dutch for assistance in the
fishing, health, and shipping areas.
-- Received a Spanish parliamentary delegation.
-- Sent the Minister of Justice and the governor
of the National Bank to Italy to discuss eco-
nomic assistance.
Meanwhile, Angolan and Portuguese officials have
been implementing agreements signed at the Guinea-Bissau
summit. About 2,000 Angolan refugees in Portugal are now
registered to return to Angola; of these, 600 are pre-
pared to leave as soon as transportation and financing
are arranged. Officials of the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee on European Migration estimate that between 4,000
and 5,000 refugees eventually will be authorized to re-
settle in Angola and that about half this number can de-
part by the end of the year if sufficient funding is
found. They estimate that about 15 percent of the ref-
ugees are of European origin, 60 percent are African,
and 25 percent mulatto. Many are skilled workers. (SE-
CRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
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25X1A
Sub-Saharan Africa: Slow Economic Growth*
Most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa have been
unable to generate rapid economic growth in the 1970s.
Economic progress has fallen victim to civil wars and
coups, which in turn partly reflect the low level of eco-
nomic development. Africa has fallen steadily behind
in the competition for export markets. Along with in-
ternal political strife, sluggish world demand has hampered
sales of nonoil minerals; persistent drought in some areas
and widespread mismanagement have cut shipments of cash
crops. Achievement of higher growth rates will require
substantial increases in foreign aid, greater foreign
investment (especially in transport facilities), and a
backing off from "indigenization" policies. For most
countries, little improvement in these areas is in
prospect for the next several years at least.
Faltering Economic Growth
Since 1970, the aggregate GNP of the sub-Saharan
countries has risen only 4 percent a year on average,
down from 4.5 percent in the 1960s, and only about 1
percent in per capita terms. Performance would have
been much worse--2.8 percent a year--without the strong
oil-fueled growth of the Nigerian economy, which now ac-
counts for 30 percent of sub-Saharan output. Africa's
growth pattern looks particularly weak in contrast to the
6.9-percent annual average of all LDCs in the 1970s.
This article summarizes a forthcoming OER Intelligence Report,
Economic Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. In it, the terms "Africa"
and "sub-Saharan" are defined to include all continental African
countries except South Africa, Namibia, and Arab North Africa--
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Also included are the
islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, Reunion,
Sao Tome and Principe, and the Cape Verde Islands.
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Growth has lagged across all economic sectors. Al-
though food production (outside the Sahel) has risen in
most years since 1970, declines in the output of coffee,
cocoa, and peanuts have kept agricultural growth at 1.4
percent a year, compared with 3.8 percent in all LDCs.
Starting from a very low base, real growth in manufac-
turing has come closer to the LDC average--6.7 percent
a year versus 7.1 percent. Only a few nonoil minerals
have done well, notably bauxite, which has been boosted
by a large expansion in Guinea.
Both political and economic factors have tended to
undercut African economic development in the 1970s:
-- The sub-Sahara has suffered from 10 local wars
and insurrections during the decade; coups
have taken place in 17 countries. The civil
war in Angola and the transition to independ-
ence in Mozambique have proved particularly
damaging economically, leading to sharp drops
in output of coffee, cashew nuts, and diamonds.
More recently, the Shaba invasion disrupted
Zaire's copper and cobalt production and ex-
ports.
-- The 1973-1974 oil price hikes and global re-
cession have sharply reduced sales of major
African commodities such as copper and sisal.
-- Inflation of import costs, particularly for
oil, has forced a number of African countries
to introduce austerity measures to cut foreign
payments deficits.
Overall data mask substantial variations in growth
among individual sub-Saharan countries. Nine have boosted
national output 5 percent or more annually since 1970.
Of these, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, and Ivory Coast
also have made noticeable strides in spreading income
gains among average citizens. In other leading growth
states, such as Nigeria and Gabon, prosperity has come
as the result of the development of one or two major
commodities for export, and the benefits have been con-
fined largely to urban areas.
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
Real GNP Growth Trends
(Average annual rates)
US? 20
Mallawi-
I t iopla f1 der'
{.ia is NI`pei a?.?-
umea RFodesia
" ` Eeso[ o am is "
Iberia ,' .
aqua' uganca
Zaire
ur ROV."" riAat..
C'am rbi Th` hod2
Kenya?Y,,
Liberia upper
`-Congo,' PR.
1{enya
Mozambique
Sierra LLdne
Tanzania '
Bi tswana:"
Gabon
IvoryCoast
Mauritania
Swa"ziland
Togo
"Guinea
Ivory Coast
Mauritius
""[Vigavia J
Rwanda
Countries experiencing average growth of less than
3 percent a year generally have suffered from political
turmoil, a dearth of natural resources, or, in the case
of the Sahel, repeated drought.
Falling Behind in World Markets
Many of the same economic and political factors
that have suppressed growth have cost Africa world
market shares in the 1970s. Growth in export volume
averaged only 2 percent in 1971-1977. It may be even
lower this year; copper exports in particular are suffer-
ing, reflecting not only production problems at home but
also stiff competition of low-cost producers. Variable
production costs for copper, for example, average more
than 60 cents a pound in Zambia compared with 50 cents
in Chile.
Among agricultural exports, peanuts registered the
steepest drop in market share--from 72 percent in 1969-
1971 to 49 percent in 1975-1977. The falloff mainly
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reflects the impact of drought and disease on major pro-
ducers, particularly Nigeria. Formerly the world's lead-
ing exporter of peanuts, Nigeria has been forced to im-
port peanut oil for the past two years.
The only dynamic element in the region's trade has
been the sharp rise in petroleum exports--of benefit
principally to Nigeria--which at $11 billion in 1976 ac-
rounted for nearly one-half of total African exports.
Terms of Trade, Trade Balances, and Foreign Debt:
A Mixed Bag
The number of African countries that have gained
from shifts in the terms of trade in the 1970s about
matches the number that have lost. At the extremes are
those benefiting from oil price increases (Nigeria,
Gabon, and Angola) versus those hit by declining copper
prices (Zambia and Zaire). Copper-producing Zambia and
Zaire have been in arrears on import payments for sev-
eral years, severely damaging their international credit
ratings. Sudan's growing deficit is requiring bailout
aid from the International Monetary Fund.
Despite the plight of the big terms-of-trade losers,
sub-Saharan Africa's foreign debt amounts to only $15
billion, less than 10 percent of the non-OPEC LDC total.
Zaire, Zambia, Sudan, and Gabon account for nearly one-
half. Except for these countries, the debt service
ratios of the African countries remain well below the
15-percent average for all LDCs.
Foreign Economic Role Still Strong
Low debt service ratios partially reflect the high
proportion of grants and concessional aid in inter-
national assistance--more than four-fifths of the $5
billion received by Africa in 1976. Africa now receives
twice as much foreign economic aid per capita as the
average for all less developed regions--$14 versus $7.
Although most is used to develop and maintain infrastruc-
ture and social services, in recent years a growing pro-
portion has been required to cover foreign exchange def-
icits. Development Assistance Committee members remain
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the largest aid donors; resource flows from OPEC coun-
tries have recently been growing. The francophone coun-
tries absorb the biggest share of the aid, accounting
for 40 percent of the total.
The stock of foreign private investment has in-
creased in the 1970s, while the role of foreign manpower
has decreased:
-- The biggest investment jumped has occurred in
Nigeria, where the stock of foreign capital
has more than doubled since the mid.-1960s due
to the oil boom; in sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole, the value of investment has risen by
60 percent.
-- Foreign manpower has decreased steadily in
almost all major countries except Nigeria,
Gabon, and Ivory Coast; in Angola and Mo-
zambique, where fear of political turmoil
drove out the great majority of the Portu-
guese, the foreign presence has been drasti-
cally reduced.
Outlook
The chronic problems of political turmoil, inex-
perience in economic management, inadequate real capi-
tal, and rapid population growth will continue to hamper
African development. Where political factors remain
stable, the small markets and generally unskilled and
poorly educated populations will continue to stand in
the way of the large-scale investment needed to stimulate
development on a broad front. Meanwhile, the continued
sluggishness of the developed economies will limit de-
mand for African products and could dim prospects for an
expansion of economic aid. Given the slow growth in
available industrial jobs and the continued population
explosion, the proportion of subsistence farmers is not
likely to fall much below 80 to 90 percent in the next
decade.
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In particular, the stable political conditions
needed to foster steady economic progress are likely to
be lacking. The outlook for southern Africa is espe-
cially dim because of the black-white confrontation.
Tensions in the Horn are unlikely to abate much in the
near future, and hostilities between Chad and Libya and
among Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria could escalate.
Given the sub-Sahara's record to date, coups can be ex-
pected in any number of countries. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
Benin-Gabon: Dispute Over Beninese Expatriates
Members of the Beninese community residing in Gabon
were harassed and beaten by Gabonese last month. Gabo-
nese anger was aroused when the media played up charges
made at the recent OAU summit by Mathieu Kerekou, Benin's
radical leftwing President, that Moroccan and Gabonese
mercenaries had conducted raids into Benin in January
1977. The Gabonese attacks probably had the tacit ap-
proval of Gabon's President Omar Bongo, although he con-
tinues to disclaim any responsibility for the incidents.
Bongo has ordered the repatriation of the Beninese re-
siding in Gabon because he claims he can no longer guar-
antee their personal safety or security.
The Gendarmerie attempted to protect the expatriate
community, but Beninese homes were systematically ran-
sacked and gutted, and many Beninese were injured. Ex-
tensive damage also occurred when an outraged crowd, ac-
cording to press reports, looted and destroyed roughly
80 percent of Libreville's central market, where many
Beninese work.
Repatriation
The repatriation of the Beninese nationals has de-
veloped into a king-sized headache for Bongo. More than
4,000 Beninese awaiting deportation are reported to have
sought police protection. These individuals have been
temporarily settled in a secondary school near the air-
port. Transportation difficulties have hindered the op-
eration. According to the Gabonese Foreign Minister,
Gabon is unable to use its own aircraft to transport
the returnees. Gabon has made several requests for
transport assistance, but the Ivory Coast and Togo--as
well as other West African countries--refuse to become
involved in the dispute. US assistance was also
solicited but denied.
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Luanda
N I G E R I A
EQUATORIAL
/ GUINEA
( Prrnoips
% SAo TOME
PRINC
E IPE
* $Bo Tomb
SAo Tom!
Boundary representation to
not necesaanty, authontatixe
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France has agreed to help and on 31 July sealifted
about 450 Beninese to Cotonou. France will provide ad-
ditional sealifts if there is no opposition from Kerekou,
who may doubt the loyalty of the expatriates and may not
permit all of them to return to Benin. Another 300 are
reported to have made their own arrangements to return
to Benin.
Bongo's worries are not over. A total repatriation
of the Beninese community could create problems for
Gabon's economy. Gabon is dependent on many services
provided by the Beninese. Libreville's principal bakery,
for example, is primarily staffed by Beninese and was
unable to supply bread to the city during the recent
disturbances. Because of Gabon's reliance on the ex-
patriates, Bongo has relaxed his decision to repatriate
all Beninese and agreed to allow political refugees,
doctors, teachers, engineers, and Beninese who have
Gabonese citizenship to remain in the country. Bongo
may also face the problem of granting citizenship to
the Beninese rejected by Kerekou.
Outlook
The actions against the Beninese have hurt Bongo's
position in the international arena. In addition to the
criticism Gabon has received for its complicity in the
mercenary raid against Benin, Gabon will now be cited as
a violator of human rights by Africa states. Bongo's
attitude probably will be considered by other Africans as
evidence of his support for the raid. Bongo's ire
against Kerekou plus his move to repatriate the Beninese
community sharply contrast with his past performance on
similar matters--he intervened on behalf of Ugandan dis-
sidents and Western journalists in the Central African
Empire last year--and will probably raise serious doubts
about the validity of his statesmanlike image.
The repercussions of Kerekou's accusations far ex-
ceeded his intentions--he probably only wanted the 1977
mercenary raid addressed officially in an international
forum--and he did not expect the hostile reaction by the
Gabonese or Bongo's orders to repatriate the Beninese
community. French participation in Gabon's efforts to
transport Beninese nationals to Cotonou may arouse more
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African concern about external intervention in a purely
African controversy. This will be a particularly sensi-
tive issue for Kerekou; he also accused Paris of involve-
ment in the 1977 coup attempt. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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25X1A
Mali: Traore in Control
President Moussa Traore, head of the 10-year-old
military government of Mali, has long favored a return
to civilian rule. A 1974 constitutional revision pro-
vides for the transition to be made in five years with
the ruling Military Committee to retain control until
that time.
Preparations for the new government has thus far
proceeded smoothly. There is to be a single ruling
party--the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM)--
for which local units have already been established.
Traore has substantial popular support and is likely to
be elected to head the new civilian government.
Traore has tried to defuse potential problems by
emphasizing open dialogue with all segments of the popu-
lace. His efforts to create a national youth movement
have paid off. In late June, the first congress of the
National Union of Malian Youth was held. Debates were
lively and candid, and in his concluding remarks, Traore
praised the spirit of the attendees. He hopes that by
achieving some degree of collaboration with the usually
restive youth, chances for disruption during the coming
months will at least be minimized, and perhaps a con-
structive coalition will evolve.
Traore is apparently serious about seeking popular
support. In June, he sent the Interior Secretary to
each of the regional capitals to hold town meetings,
and he has solicited complaints and suggestions for im-
proving the lot of the citizens.
Meanwhile, Traore appears to have further strength-
ened his position as a result of his strong and effective
action in the wake of an abortive coup attempt last spring.
He has carried out a widespread purge of those implicated,
and his main adversary, the corrupt former Defense Min-
ister who led the coup attempt, is in jail along with
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the other two coup principals, the Ministers of Security
and Transportation. The coup failed mainly because of
the plotters' lack of security and coordination.
Some of the lesser figures implicated in the coup
plot were given reprieves but moved to different jobs.
The purge offered Traore the opportunity to revamp the
civil service and install some younger, well-educated
technocrats. Some of those transferred were given better
positions.
Immediately following the initial arrests, Traore
assumed the portfolios of the three deposed ministers.
He has since relinquished the security and transportation
portfolios, but retains responsibility for defense. A
new ministry has been created to help Traore with some
of his expanded responsibilities. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4 August 1978
Approved For Release 2002/01/16: CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010006-4
SECRET
 Secret Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02700010006-4