AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 2, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

A ~ $ d For Release 2002/
Assessment
Center
Africa Review
Secret
0027000*0Q&37CON
Secret
RP AR 79-008
2 March 1979
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AFRICA REVIEW (U)
2 March 1979
CONTENTS
Senegal: Growing Concern Over Mauritania (U). . . . 1
Senegal is concerned about signs of insta-
bility, maneuvering, and ethnic tensions
in neighboring Mauritania and fears it
could become involved if the situation
boils over. (C)
Congo: The New Government Settles In (U). . . . . . 4
Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who replaced
Joachim Yhomby Opango as interim President
last month in an interparty shuffle, appears
to be consolidating his position. (S)
Malawi: Succession Prospects (U). . . . . . . . . . 6
Whether Malawi's carefully nurtured stability
departs with President Banda will depend in
large part on the ability of his colleagues
to carry out a complex constitutional system
for the selection of a successor. (S)
FOR THE RECORD (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS
South Africa: The National Party--Built for
Survival (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Senegal: Growing Concern Over Mauritania (U)
Senegal is concerned about signs of instability,
maneuvering, and ethnic tensions in neighboring Mauri-
tania and fears it could become involved if the situa-
tion boils over. If serious problems do ensue between
the two countries, Senegal probably would turn for help
to Morocco, France, and the United States, which Dakar
looks upon as the principal defenders of black Africa's
moderate, pro-Western states. For now, Senegal's posi-
tion is one of noninterference, cooperation, and watch-
ful waiting. Senegal is also establishing a modest se-
curity force along its previously undefended frontier
with Mauritania, although there is little prospect of
any military intervention by the Dakar government.
Events ultimately could cause Senegal to raise its as
yet unpressed claims to ethnically similar southern Mau-
ritania, a development that would add serious new ten-
sions to the Western Sahara region. (C)
The Senegalese worry above all about the emergence
in Mauritania of a more radical and potentially hostile
Moor-dominated regime.* Senegal fears that a negotiated
settlement of the Sahara conflict might give presently
unrepresented Polisario elements an influential position
in the Mauritanian Government. The result, the Senega-
lese believe, could be a less tolerant attitude toward
Mauritania's black minority population that is concen-
trated in a narrow zone in the far south along the Sene-
gal River valley. The existing military regime in Mauri-
tania already is viewed by Senegal as markedly more Arab-
oriented, less attuned to black Africa, and less com-
mitted to building a genuine biracial society than was
the previous government led by Ould Daddah. (C)
*The Moors are descended from Arab and Berber peoples, are Arabic-
speakers, and make up some two-thirds of the country's 1.5 million
people. They traditionally have controlled the Mauritanian Govern-
ment, economy, and the top ranks of the armed forces. (U)
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The Dakar government is concerned about Senegal's
military weakness along its long and porous border with
Mauritania. It is especially worried that a Polisario
force could be deployed along the border to mount puni-
tive raids in retaliation for previous French use of
Dakar as a staging base for anti-Polisario air strikes
over Mauritania. (C)
Senegal is also troubled by growing racial tension
and strife in Mauritania between the Moor majority and
restive blacks who are seeking greater political and
economic equality. President Senghor feels obliged
quietly to look out for the welfare of Mauritania's
500,000 blacks, whom he regards as ethnic Senegalese
torn away from their homeland by arbitrary French demar-
cation of colonial frontiers in 1905. He is concerned
that if racial problems continue to mount, they may force
Senegal to take measures to defend the rights of Mauri-
tanian blacks. (C)
Economically, Senegal looks to Mauritania as a key
partner in the development of the water resources of the
Senegal River valley to help alleviate the recurrent
problem of Sahelian drought. Mauritania also is an im-
portant export market for Senegal, which itself benefits
from the services of some 200,000 Mauritanian Moors who
work as small shopkeepers, artisans, and traders. (C)
The only important Senegalese military presence
near the border with Mauritania is a small garrison at
the old Atlantic port city of Saint Louis. Two new
company-sized military camps have recently been con-
structed in the interior along the Senegal River at
Podor and-Bakel. The latter is to be manned by some of
the troops currently serving with the Senegalese bat-
talion in Shaba Province in Zaire. (C)
Algeria is seen by Senegal as the key to what
happens next in Mauritania, and President Senghor is
promoting a dialogue with the new Algerian leadership
in hopes of contributing to a peaceful resolution of
the Western Sahara dispute. A settlement that would en-
hance Polisario and Algerian influence in Mauritania
would be unacceptable to Senghor, who wants to keep Al-
gerian "hegemony" as far as possible from Senegal's
borders. He traditionally has seen the Western Sahara
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conflict as a manifestation of Algerian and therefore
Soviet expansionism, aimed in part at subverting Mauri-
tania and Senegal. If a pro-Algerian radical, racist
regime were to come to power in Mauritania, President
Senghor has already said he would mount a diplomatic
campaign on behalf of the right of Mauritania's black
minority to "self-determination" or reunification with
Senegal. We believe, however, that Senghor would not
risk exacerbating relations with Mauritania without care-
fully weighing the security implications for Senegal,
which argues for a continued policy of caution and flex-
ibility on his part. At present, there are no signs of
militancy on Senegal's part to recoup the land it says
was arbitrarily assigned to Mauritania by France. (C)
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Congo: The New Government Settles In (U)
Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who replaced Joachim
Yhomby Opango as interim President last month in an in-
terparty shuffle, appears to be consolidating his posi-
tion. Although Sassou is thought to be more pro-Soviet
and radical than Yhomby, we have no evidence that the
Soviets played a role in the power changeover. Sassou's
accession to the presidency appears to have been largely
the result of his ability to outmaneuver Yhomby and Labor
Party unhappiness with Yhomby's failure to check govern-
mental corruption and waste, improve the country's de-
clining economy, and obtain foreign aid. (S)
I
President Yhomby Opango (R) and Denis Sassou-Nguesso during former's
swearing in ceremony. (C)
During the past few weeks tension in Brazzaville
has subsided as the Congolese, who greeted Yhomby's down-
fall with enthusiasm, have involved themselves in polit-
ical rallies and meetings. This activity is a prelude
to the special party congress scheduled for 26 March,
when Sassou will probably be confirmed as head of state.
(C NF OC)
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The ruling Labor Party, anticipating international
concern over the replacement of the more moderate
Yhomby, has attempted to reassure current and prospective
Western aid donors that Congo will maintain its interest
in broad international cooperation, which was given im-
petus by Yhomby. The party has also emphasized that it
will not discourage private or foreign enterprises from
operating in the country. (C)
Although the Soviets are reportedly putting hard
pressure on Sassou for military access to the port of
Pointe Noire, the President insists that he will main-
tain a policy of nonalignment and that he does not in-
tend to grant Moscow military access to Congolese facili-
ties. Sassou's political intentions and ideological
proximity to the Soviets are unclear, but we will prob-
ably have a better reading of his plans after he is
confirmed as President by the party congress. In any
event, while Sassou may make some tactical shifts in
Congolese policy, he will probably not make an abrupt
shift towards the leftist camps--given Congo's serious
economic and financial situation, and the country's
strong dependency on the West for economic and technical
assistance. (S) (SECRET NOFORN-ORCON)
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Malawi: Succession Prospects (U) K_iim
Under the authoritarian
leadership of President H.
Kamuzu Banda, Malawi has become
one of Africa's most stable and
conservative countries. Banda
shows no interest in retiring
despite his advancing age (he
claims to be 73, but probably is
closer to 80), and he is likely
to die in office. Although
Banda has carefully avoided des-
ignating a successor, he has de-
vised a complex constitutional
system for the selection of the
next president. The ability of
his colleagues to carry out
these provisions will have much
to do with whether Malawi's care- President Banda. (U)'
fully nurtured stability departs
with Banda. There is no Vice
President in Malawi and, at a minimum, there is likely
to be a period of intense political infighting as vari-
ous competitors struggle to grasp Banda's mantle. None
of the potential successors seems likely to continue all
of Banda's extremely conservative policies, which have
made Malawi something of a pariah in black Africa, al-
though all contenders will probably maintain close rela-
tions with the West. (S)
Key questions in Malawi's future are whether the
constitution will be respected; if so, who will be the
successors; and if not, what forces or individuals are
likely to benefit by opposing the constitutional measures.
(S)
1This_Is Malawi, July 1975.
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Factors in a Smooth Transition
As one of Africa's least developed nations, Malawi
has boasted a strong economic growth rate since its in-
dependence from the United Kingdom in 1964. But a de-
cline in worldwide tobacco prices, overcrowded farming
conditions, and difficulties in obtaining commodities
through Mozambican rail lines are eroding Malawi's eco-
nomic development. (S)
If Banda continues to cope effectively with Malawi's
economic problems, chances are good that the transition
of power after his death will take place according to
the constitution. A three-man commission would be formed
to handle the day-to-day responsibilities of the presi-
dency until a new leader was chosen. The commission
would be composed of the Secretary General of the Malawi
Congress Party (MCP) and two Cabinet members. An elec-
toral college, dominated by district officers of the
party and its affiliate organizations,* tribal chiefs,
and heads of district councils, would nominate a presi-
dent from within the party, who would then be approved
or rejected by the electorate. The electoral college
would meet as many times as necessary to choose a presi-
dent acceptable to the people. (S)
Factors that would favor the success of the consti-
tutional process are the strong position of the MCP,
which dominates the political system, and the loyalty of
the ethnic groups to Banda. Even after his departure,
the chiefs, who closely identify with Banda, are apt to
adhere closely to those provisions sanctioned by their
ngwazi (peerless chief). (S)
Candidates for Succession
If the constitution is followed, there are currently
three major front-runners for the presidency: Reserve
Bank Governor John Tembo, Minister without Portfolio and
MCP Secretary General Elson Muluzi, and Youth and Culture
Minister Gwanda Chakuamba. Tembo, because of his close
ties to the President, probably has the best chance of
succeeding Banda, although Muluzi is moving rapidly to
consolidate his political power. (S)
*The Malawi Youth Pioneers and the Malawi League of Women. (U)
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Of the three, Tembo has been involved in government
affairs the longest. He has a strong political base in
his home area in the central region and holds a seat on
the influential 15-man MCP National Executive Committee.
Tembo is also popular among Malawi's educated elite and
high-level civil servants. (S)
Tembo has spoken privately about the need for
Malawi to align itself with the frontline states and, if
he were selected he would probably gradually strengthen
ties with Malawi's neighbors. He has also been critical
of apartheid and might cut back on relations with South
Africa. Because Tembo has always held a great deal of
admiration for the United States and realizes Malawi's
dependence on the developed nations, he would probably
maintain close relations with Washington. (S)
Elson Muluzi is the youngest of the three contenders
and has moved more quickly than the others in establish-
ing a strong political base. As Secretary General of
the MCP, he holds the most powerful party position (other
than President Banda) and would automatically be included
in the three-man commission that would govern after
Banda's departure. Muluzi has moved up through the ranks
of the MYP and until recently was regarded as being de-
pendent on Gwanda Chakuamba for his political status.
Since his appointment to the Cabinet, Muluzi has proved
his independence, however, and is reputed to be handling
his responsibilities well. Muluzi would be likely to
continue close ties with the United States. (S)
Gwanda Chakuamba's political prestige stems from his
position as leader of Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), which
he assumed in 1973. The MYP has expanded rapidly in re-
cent years as has Chakuamba's influence in the party.
He also commands widespread respect throughout the
southern region, which has traditionally been politically
apathetic and backward. Chakuamba accompanied Banda on
his trips to the United Kingdom and the United States in
1977 and may have been the President's choice for a suc-
cessor at that time. Since then, Chakuamba's personal
financial problems may have eroded his political stand-
ing. (S)
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Unlike Tembo, Chakuamba would be unreceptive to any
political moves that might endanger his country's rela-
tions with South Africa. He would probably continue
Banda's strong pro-US line. (S)
Possible Opposition to the Constitutional Provisions
Because there is no single candidate for the presi-
dency who commands a clear majority of popular support,
the selection process will probably be characterized by
backstage maneuvering in the best of circumstances. If
this occurs, the military, led by General Graciano
Matewere, is the only organization capable of taking
power by force. Matewere, a loyal supporter of Banda,
would probably authorize a military takeover only if he
believed that the constitutional provisions could not be
implemented. He would adhere more closely than the other
candidates to Banda's foreign policy line. (S)
There is an outside chance that Matewere might plan
a coup if Chakuamba were nominated as president. The
Army and the MYP have become rivals in recent years as
the MYP has grown in strength. Matewere, who contends
daily with unrest and dissatisfaction throughout the Army,
has shown signs of jealousy over the MYP's effective
leadership and high morale. He also questions the MYP's
paramilitary and intelligence gathering functions. (S)
Chakuamba is ambitious and would probably exploit
the MYP's comprehensive intelligence network before the
electoral college convenes. The MYP could be used as a
vehicle to gauge nationwide support for the candidates,
and Chakuamba might attempt to rig the voting in the
college if he realized that he would not be nominated.
(S
Outlook
In any event, a military takeover would probably be
temporary; the MYP and other party members would resist
a military government. In the,long term, a compromise
choice, most likely a party official, or a power-sharing
arrangement between Chakuamba and Matewere would pre-
vail. (S)
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However the transfer of power is achieved, it will
probably be followed by a short period of political in-
stability. The new leader(s) will have limited executive
experience because of Banda's autocratic style. Further-
more, no candidate for succession is likely to receive
the nationwide support that Banda enjoys, and tribal
rivalries, which have long been troublesome, may erupt
on a larger scale. Continuing economic difficulties,
such as the land crunch, will add to the new leader's
responsibilities. (S)
In the long term, the unrest caused by these factors
is unlikely to damage Malawi's reputation as a calm de-
veloping nation. Political infighting will probably not
touch most of the rural, unsophisticated Malawiians. (S)
(SECRET)
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FOR THE RECORD (U)
NIGERIA: The Nigerian Army reportedly has decided
to purchase an unspecified number of T-54 tanks from
the Soviet Union after a long search for a new tank suit-
able for its needs. The tank order probably will not
be very large and will supplement the Army's 135 French
and British armored cars and 55 British Scorpion light
tanks. All four Nigerian Army infantry divisions now
have armored brigades, which the Army leadership has
wanted to outfit more fully before the scheduled turn-
over to civilian rule next October. Nigeria apparently
will depend on Poland to maintain its Soviet-supplied
tanks, which reflects the military's general dissatis-
faction with the Soviet's record in providing training
and spare parts for previously purchased military equip-
ment. Nigerian Army Chief of Staff General Danjuma and
Armor Director Brigadier Mohammed visited Poland last
September where they met with top Polish military offi-
cials and toured armored units and a tank training
school. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN) ORPA,
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South Africa: The National Party--Built for Survival (U)*
There was considerable political turmoil in the
Afrikaner community last year, leading to widespread
public speculation that the basic cohesion of the Na-
tional Party was beginning to dissolve. This paper ex-
amines the events of the past year in the context of the
National Party "system" and assesses their impact on the
party's dominant role in South African politics. (U)
In its 30 years in power, the National Party has
shown remarkable internal flexibility, accommodating a
diversity of opinion without risking self-destructive
divisions. Nothing in the tumultuous events of the past
year suggests this pattern is changing. (S)
The party does have significant regional and personal
rivalries, and the key competition between its Cape and
Transvaal branches is unlikely to disappear. This com-
petition is not likely to become unmanageable or radically
alter the historic movement of the party as a whole to
the political right. (S)
The debate over minor aspects of racial discrimina-
tion will continue, but will remain within the narrow
framework of universal agreement on the need to maintain
separate development. (S)
If past practice holds, and we believe it will,
Prime Minister Botha can count on the traditional ability
of Nationalist politicians to sink their differences in
order to avoid jeopardizing the fundamental interests of
Afrikanerdom. (S) (SECRET)
*These key judgments are taken from The National Party of South
Africa--Built for Survival, RP 79-10087, February 1979. A copy of
the entire text may be obtained from the author. (S)
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