INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 30, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
Secret
RP IIR 79-003
30 March 1979
f,- 84
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
30 March 1979
CONTENTS
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
NEW FOCUS ON LDC COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE
Changing LDC perceptions of the value of economic
and technical cooperation among developing coun-
tries may have a major impact on the North-South
dialogue, although it probably will not reduce the
level of LDC demands on industrial countries.
DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY ISSUES: DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES
AMONG SOUTH ASIAN LITTORAL STATES . . 11
This article examines shifts in the views of South
Asian littoral states on key regional security is-
sues. These and other developments could affect
the approaching UN Conference on an Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace and reduce pressures for prompt with-
drawal of superpower military forces from the area.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
TERRORIST ADAPTATION TO COUNTERMEASURES 20
Recent threatening letters to US and Chinese diplo-
mats in Europe demonstrate terrorist awareness of--
and adaptation to--governmental countermeasures.
Strategic and tactical implications of these devel-
opments are briefly explored.
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TERRORISM [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
This article summarizes an Intelligence Assessment
that surveys the political impediments to concerted
international legal responses against terrorism.
While general international antiterrorism measures
have been resisted, there has been some success in
dealing with specific types of terrorist acts.
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New Focus on LDC Collective Self-Reliance
Over the last year, multilateral economic negoti-
ations between industrialized and developing countries
have been relatively cordial despite a generalized
less developed country (LDC) perception that, at best,
only limited progress has been made through the North-
South dialogue toward achieving the goals of a New In-
ternational Economic Order (NIEO). In part, this cor-
diality results from growing LDC recognition that, at
least for this stage in the evolution of North-South
relations, they may take some satisfaction from the
fact that the industrialized countries are now negoti-
ating with them seriously on a wide range of issues.
Another reason for the persistence of this noncon-
frontational atmosphere is the prospect, which is the
focus of this article, that a shift in perceptions is
taking place among LDCs as to how they can achieve
more rapid economic development.
At least some LDCs believe they have now reached
a level of economic development where to achieve addi-
tional significant growth they are not totally depend-
ent on benefits extracted by coercion or negotiation
from the industrialized countries. A corollary belief
is that new levels of economic and technical coopera-
tion are possible among LDCs and can raise their col-
lective well-being. These new concepts--which the
Group of 77, led by the more advanced LDCs such as
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, the Philippines, and
India have been developing--emphasize a form of coop-
erative self-reliance. Support from industrialized
countries is still viewed as useful and sometimes es-
sential, but there is a growing feeling that it should
be free of industrialized country control. The more
vital flows of economic and technical cooperation are
thus visualized as occurring between two or more de-
veloping countries, with support and assistance (but
not direction) from developed countries.
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Cooperative self-reliance is not a new concept
among developing countries. A large number of coop-
erative activities have been carried out over the
years and many are now in progress. Up to now, how-
ever, these activities have been undertaken piecemeal,
primarily in a bilateral or, at the most, regional
context. In contrast, the current interest in LDC
cooperation focuses on global political and economic
measures. This new perspective is reflected in the
recent institutionalization within the UN of the con-
cepts of Economic Cooperation Among Developing Coun-
tries (ECDC) and Technical Cooperation Among Develop-
ing Countries (TCDC), which are designed to advance
LDC efforts to find avenues for cooperation. The term
ECDC refers loosely to all forms of economic contact
involving two or more developing countries, but trade
expansion has been the most significant component.
Closely related to ECDC and reinforcing it is TCDC,
which seeks to improve the capacity of LDCs to absorb
and adopt developed country technology through pref-
erential arrangements among themselves for exchange
of experience and expertise, through pooling and shar-
ing of technical resources, and through development of
complementary infrastructural capacities in such vital
areas as banking, shipping, and communications.
These concepts are still largely at the talking
stage. If they develop momentum, the LDCs will likely
come forth with greater attention to self-help and a
more practical definition of requests for assistance
and changes in international institutions that the in-
dustrial countries have asked for. But, at the same
time, the latter are likely to face more persistent
demands from the LDCs for shifts in resources and au-
thority.
Technical and Economic Cooperation Among Developing
Countries
The importance of cooperation among developing coun-
tries in general and of technical cooperation in particu-
lar, has been recognized in a series of declarations,
resolutions, and decisions of the UN General Assembly, as
well as in meetings of the nonaligned movement and some
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LDC regional organizations in recent years. As originally
advanced in these forums, TCDC meant simply that UN agen-
cies should spend more of existing UN development funds
on the experts, consultants, equipment, and training facil-
ities that the more advanced developing countries had to
offer. This concept proved unpopular with less-advanced
LDCs who wanted developed country expertise from the UN
instead of from Third World experts. As it is currently
defined by its sponsors, however, LDC technical coopera-
tion has a broader appeal and is generally accepted by
LDCs as a possible buffer against the fluctuations of
world economic forces to which they are particularly
vulnerable. In addition it might help them jointly to
find ways to obtain investment capital, meet debt ser-
vice payments, and cope with pressures from multina-
tional corporations.
This form of cooperation touches upon some important
development issues. For example, there is a marked con-
cern with developing and applying "appropriate," simpler
technology, or indigenous, innovative, and labor-intensive
methods in accelerating development. The concept of ap-
propriate technology, to which LDCs were originally cool
because of its derogatory implication that poorer coun-
tries cannot make efficient use of the advanced nations'
technologies, has come to symbolize the LDCs' rejection
of dependence on the industrialized countries. In addi-
tion, TCDC addresses the problem of the increasing tend-
ency of the industrialized world to tie development aid
to buying developed country industrial products and ex-
pertise. UN studies have shown that contracts to supply
technology are routinely tied to purchases of raw mate-
rials, machinery, and plant equipment from the supplying
country, thus increasing the dependence of LDCs on the
industrialized countries. TCDC also promotes LDC economic
cooperation efforts by facilitating institutional arrange-
ments, such as jointly run shipping lines, credit and in-
surance unions, and expanded regional communications and
banking systems, which are the practical vehicles through
which such economic cooperation would occur.
The most concerted effort by the LDCs to present
their program for technical and economic cooperation took
place at the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation Among
Developing Countries, held in Buenos Aires in September
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1978. Debate on the concept of TCDC at Buenos Aires re-
affirmed the importance to the LDCs of traditional tech-
nical assistance from the developed countries, but gener-
ally insisted that more attention be paid to the suita-
bility of the aid given and to the use where feasible of
existing LDC resources and institutions. The Plan of
Action drawn up by the conference requests additional
financial support beyond existing programs from developed
countries for TCDC projects and activities through in-
creased support to intercountry projects and programs at
the bilateral, subregional, regional, and interregional
levels and increased contributions to the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP).* The Plan recommends that
developed countries employ their bilateral financial and
technical assistance so that it enhances the technological
capabilities of developing countries directly by support-
ing the growth of relevant institutions in those countries
and indirectly in ways that stimulate greater reliance by
LDCs on resources available locally or in other develop-
ing countries.
Economic development among developing countries was
the subject of an October 1978 UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and it was prominent on the agenda
at Arusha, Tanzania, in February of this year when the
Group of 77 foreign ministers met to draft a statement
for the fifth session of the UNCTAD, scheduled for May.
In addition, the UNCTAD Secretariat is sponsoring more
than 40 studies of LDC economic cooperation in prepara-
tion for UNCTAD V. The concept of ECDC is still too
loosely defined to be perceived of as a distinct pro-
gram, but it generally encompasses a desire to expand
such economic activities among developing countries as
%The Plan of Action places great emphasis on the role of the UNDP
in TCDC and suggests the institutionalization of the concept
within the Program. The UNDP's preliminary bureaucratic plans for
following up the TCDC Conference are reflected in the change in
the status of the unit responsible for such work from one of a re-
search and reports office to one having more direct operational
responsibilities focusing on the development of cooperative proj-
ects, such as common infrastructure and services, joint informa-
tion systems and data banks, regional communications and banking
systems.
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preferential trade arrangements, complementary and coordi-
nated production arrangements, regional resource develop-
ment, financial payment and clearing arrangements, joint
investment programs, joint import procurement, producers'
associations, and locating commodity exchanges in LDCs.
Exclusive Use of UN Resources
In conjunction with a new stress on UN programs to
boost developing country technical and economic coopera-
tion, the LDCs are working to redirect UN administrative
and internal financial resources to redress what they
perceive as a fundamental and damaging disparity between
North and South in technical preparations for economic
negotiations. In the past year these efforts have encom-
passed a concerted drive by the UNCTAD Secretariat, sup-
ported by the Latin American contingent of the Group of
77, to hold UN-supported meetings attended exclusively
by LDCs and/or devoted exclusively to LDC concerns. There
has also been an increasing tendency to preempt the staff
and resources of the UN Secretariats (especially UNCTAD)
for the exclusive use of LDCs.
This aspect of cooperative self-reliance has met
with determined developed country opposition, based on
the belief that funding exclusive meetings from general
UN funds violates a fundamental UN principle. At the
September UN Conference on TCDC, for example, the Group
of 77 asked for authority for UNCTAD to support up to
two weeks of meetings in 1979 on LDC economic cooperation
which would be restricted to LDC government experts and
the secretariats of regional economic groupings of devel-
oping countries. The request was not approved because the
developed countries refused to permit UNCTAD to regularize
the principle of exclusive UNCTAD meetings for LDCs. The
issue is likely to become even more heated in the future.
For example, now pending in UNCTAD is a request by the
Group of 77 that the UNCTAD Secretariat support a series
of LDC meetings on ECDC and prepare documentation for
them. In addition, in November the UNCTAD Secretariat
did succeed in convening a meeting, to prepare the Group
of 77 position for UNCTAD V, which was attended only
by experts from the LDCs but was funded by the UN Develop-
ment Program.
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Advanced LDC Leadership
Support among the members of the Group of 77 for
these new directions is by no means universal. The poorer
LDCs, concerned that increased intra-LDC economic cooper-
ation might come to mean domination by other LDCs rather
than industrialized countries, continue to emphasize
transfers of resources and unilateral trade concessions
from the developed world. Nevertheless, the wealthier,
more advanced LDCs, primarily from Latin America and
Southeast Asia, appear to be prevailing in bringing
these concepts to the front rank of issues to be dis-
cussed in multilateral forums with the industrialized
countries. These LDCs have reached a stage of develop-
ment at which technological exchange is vital. In addi-
tion, they believe that their efforts to take advantage
of the rapidly expanding LDC market will be enhanced
through greater economic cooperation and trade among LDCs.
They are attracted by the fact that intra-LDC trade al-
ready comprises 25 percent of global LDC nonfuel trade
and has the potential to expand rapidly because of rising
population and income in developing countries.
The advanced LDCs that place a high priority on
technological exchange--such as India, the Philippines,
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina--exercised particularly
effective leadership at the Buenos Aires TCDC Conference.
The moderates were able to outmaneuver both the radical
delegations--who see TCDC as an opportunity to launch
sweeping condemnations of the existing international
system--and the poorer developing countries, such as
Bolivia, Bangladesh, and most African states, which are
not developed enough to benefit substantially from tech-
nological exchange and thus normally have little interest
in discussion of these issues. This was accomplished at
Buenos Aires through the creation of an LDC policy with
broad appeal that emphasized the potential utility of
technical cooperation for countries at all levels of
development in the widely acceptable LDC campaign to
reduce their chronic dependence on industrial countries.
In addition, the argument, heard frequently in LDC
polemics, that developed countries do not support TCDC
was substantially turned aside by a statement from
President Carter displaying US interest in and under-
standing of the concept. The moderates' success was also
facilitated by the efficient planning and management of
the Conference by the Argentine Government, which played
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a low-key arbitrating role as the host country and endeav-
ored to keep the conference on technical rather than po-
litical issues.
Developed Country Attitudes
The response of the industrialized countries to the
issue of intra-LDC cooperation as it has arisen in inter-
national forums has been tentative and inconsistent,
largely because of the linkage between ECDC-TCDC and ex-
clusive use of UN resources.
Developed countries in general view ECDC as a partic-
ularly promising approach to the NIEO because it has the
potential to keep debate focused on LDC development poli-
cies rather than leading to increasingly futile discus-
sions of unilateral concessions that LDCs demand from
industrial countries. It is also viewed as a device for
inducing richer LDCs, such as the member nations of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, to transfer
resources to poorer countries. Finally, many developed
country experts believe that ECDC has the potential,
through promoting greater efficiency and appropriateness
in the use of international resources, to increase the
absorptive capabilities of poorer as well as richer LDCs.
They hold that these possibilities for increased world
trade substantially outweigh possible drawbacks from an
initial trade diversion from developed country suppliers
to LDC suppliers. Moreover, because of the political
weight that ECDC carries for LDCs, most developed coun-
tries consider it prudent to support related activities
to the greatest extent possible.
Despite these generally favorable views, discussions
of the subject by Western industrial countries (Group B)
have focused almost exclusively on the political question
of general. UN funding for meetings to which only LDC'Cs are
admitted rather than on the substance of ECDC. Nonethe-
less, as a result of these recent deliberations, unified
opposition to the LDC drive for more influence over dis-
position of UN resources has begun to erode. Most Group
B countries, with the exception of the United States, now
favor a compromise position which would permit funding
exclusive meetings from voluntary rather than assessed
funds but would make reports from these meetings generally
available to nonattendees.
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The view of most Group B countries is that signifi-
cant benefits may come from permitting LDCs some exclu-
sive use of UN administrative resources. For one thing,
it is possible that UN funding and staff support of LDC
meetings might lead to better informed--and more accept-
able--LDC bargaining positions. For another, officials
of Group B countries share the misgivings of the more
advanced LDCs that if the LDCs are prevented from using
UN resources they will turn to the alternative, fre-
quently discussed in LDC caucuses, of creating an orga-
nization in the style of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development for the LDCs independent of
the UN. It is generally believed that the cost of set-
ting up and running such a bureaucracy, which would fall
primarily on the richer LDCs, would almost certainly be
greater than that of supporting existing institutions.
At the same time, the actions of an independent organiza-
tion would probably be more difficult to reconcile with
the interests of the advanced LDCs and the Group B coun-
+
,
..
r
e
Outlook
Recent efforts to promote economic and technical
cooperation among LDCs have so far been confined to the
largely rhetorical context of multilateral forums and
jockeying for position within international organizations.
There has been little actual movement toward a greater
exchange of experts and expertise among LDCs or the es-
tablishment of new organizations to develop cooperative
projects. In view of the wide cultural, economic, and
political diversity among LDCs it would be some time, at
best, before "cooperative self-reliance" could contribute
measurably to LDC development in any case.
Nonetheless, the new LDC focus on expanding techni-
cal and economic cooperation among developing states will
increasingly have an impact on North-South relations. As
signaled by the policy declaration drawn up by the Group
of 77 ministerial meeting at Arusha in February, it will
be introduced as a major item for debate at UNCTAD V, and
in future Common Fund, multilateral trade, and technology
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The potential consequences of a serious LDC effort
to increase their autonomy by depending more on their
own resources are uncertain, but some early trends are
evident:
-- First, ECDC and TCDC seem to be platforms from
which the politically moderate, more advanced
LDCs can exercise greater influence over LDC
caucuses and meetings. Both the Buenos Aires
UN meeting on technical cooperation and the
Arusha Group of 77 ministerial meeting were
dominated by the moderates. Both conferences,
while showing a concern for LDC unity, were
well prepared and managed and were characterized
to an unusual degree by rhetorical restraint
and reasonable discussions of substantive
issues.
Second, it is apparent that the LDCs recognize
that their technical preparations for economic
negotiations with the industrialized countries
have generally been uneven or weak, and that
they have seized upon the strategy of trying
to commandeer support services from UN staffs
and technical agencies to overcome this problem.
It is clear that they have already had some
success in gaining these services from those
UN agencies staffed largely by developing coun-
try nationals and that both their need and
their efforts to obtain this kind of help will
grow as international negotiations become more
complex and technical.
-- A third conclusion is that greater LDC emphasis
on self-reliance will not, perhaps paradoxically,
lessen the demands they make on industrialized
countries for material support, although the
nature of those demands may change somewhat as
it becomes more apparent to the LDCs what they
need to support their own programs.
-- Finally, one trend that is suggested by the LDC
effort to turn the work of UN staffs and admin-
istrative resources more to their needs is that
their political demands on the international
system and on the industrialized countries may
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become more explicit in the future. The demands,
in this event, would probably take the form of
requests for expanded control over the decision-
making functions of multilateral organizations,
including how they set their priorities and
disburse their resources.
The new LDC emphasis on "collective self-reliance"
poses some challenging issues for the industrialized coun-
tries. On the one hand, ECDC-TCDC implicitly responds
to the demand of the industrialized countries that the
richer LDCs shoulder a larger share of the LDC development
burden. It also acknowledges that development is an im-
portant responsibility of the LDCs themselves. In addition,
to the degree the LDCs can draw upon the resources of trained
specialists in international institutions, their negotiat-
ing positions would become more informed and, potentially
at least, lead to sounder economic results.
The other side of the coin, however, is that--as
the Arusha Declaration makes clear--the LDC demands for
direct and indirect resource transfers will probably in-
crease or at least will become more explicit and harder
to put off. In addition, some of the concessions the
LDCs want to improve their competitive position, such as
a lowering of trade barriers, center upon issues of great
domestic sensitivity for the developed countries. In each
of these cases, as LDC demands become more explicit, touch
on more sensitive issues, and have greater political con-
tent, the potential for tension among industrialized coun-
tries as they try to cope with these issues will probably
grow. Lastly, the more knowledgeable the LDC approach to
negotiations becomes, even while it reinvigorates North-
South relations and reduces the influence of radicals
interested primarily in confrontation, the more difficult
the negotiations will be for the industrialized countries
and the more they are likely to have to concede in eco-
nomic and political resources if they hope to sustain a
cooperative dialogue.
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Indian Ocean Security Issues: Differing Perspectives
Among South Asian Littoral States
Over the last few years, changes in leadership
and foreign policy orientation of a number of states
in the region and, in the case of India's neighbors,
increasing concern over New Delhi's regional ambi-
tions, have altered the views of most South Asian lit-
toral states toward key Indian Ocean security issues.
These changes, coupled with concern over recent devel-
opments in Afghanistan and Iran, could complicate the
first UN Conference of Littoral and Hinterland States
on an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (scheduled for next
July) and reduce pressures for prompt withdrawal of
superpower military forces from the area. Although
the Zone of Peace concept has tended to overshadow
other regional security issues, the latter--including
the questions of the recessed US-Soviet Indian Ocean
talks and the establishment of a regional nuclear-free
zone--are interrelated.
Introduction
Support for the creation of an Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace has been a common theme in the foreign policy of
the South Asian littoral states for the past decade or
so. Initially, this concept was based primarily on the
concern that instabilities among the littoral states
could be exploited by outside powers to advance their
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own national goals.* It followed that curbing foreign
influence and activity would ease regional tensions. The
Zone of Peace idea has, in fact, most often been invoked
to legitimize and popularize the efforts of the littoral
states to curtail or eliminate the military (primarily
naval) presence of outside powers in their region--a
campaign waged mostly within the framework of the United
Nations and the nonaligned movement and through bilateral
diplomacy.**
Despite similarities in rhetoric, however, there
have been from the outset important differences--re-
flecting intraregional conflicts and rivalries--among
the South Asian littoral states both in interpretation
of, and support for, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace con-
cept. As a result, the proposal. has never been cast
solely in terms of the militarily weak regional states
asserting themselves against the militarily strong extra-
regional states. For example, the Indian Ocean Zone of
*This concern is best illustrated in the initial report of the
three experts appointed by the UN Secretary General to study the
problem. The report dated 3 May 1974, stated: "The vast majority
of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean area are
still developing socially, economically and politically. :During
this period of development there is, unfortunately, a considerable
potential for local conflicts. . . . Any attempt to derive advan-
tage from this unstable situation by one great power will inevita-
bly lead to a countermove by the other great power. Moreover, any
attempt by one of the great powers will probably in turn lead to
some other littoral or hinterland state seeking countervailing
support from the other great power. For these reasons, all the
hinterland and littoral states perceive it to be in their common
interest to eliminate great power rivalry from the area."
**Since 1968 there has been a gradual buildup of Soviet presence
in the Indian Ocean. Its activity has fluctuated in response to
regional developments and US deployments but has stabilized at a
force of about 15-20 ships. The US presence is small, but when
the shore facilities potentially available to either navy in a
crisis are considered, the Soviets appear to be at a disadvantage.
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Peace resolution--initially adopted at Sri Lanka's ini-
tiative at the 26th (1971) session of the UN General As-
sembly, and revalidated since then at every subsequent
UNGA session--had a dual aim. First, it called on the
outside powers, in consultation with the littoral states,
to attempt to halt escalation of their military presence
in the Indian Ocean and to eliminate bases "conceived in
the context of great power rivalry." At the same time,
though less conspicuously, the resolution called for the
littoral states to cooperate toward the creation of a
mutually advantageous regional security arrangement.
The latter aspect of the resolution reflected the con-
cerns of Pakistan, and to a lesser extent of Sri Lanka,
about their larger and more powerful neighbor, India.
The View From Islamabad
Developments over the past decade have reinforced
Pakistan's original inclination to emphasize the second
aspect of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal.
Since 1971 India more than doubled its inventory of
tanks through Soviet deliveries and its own production
of Vijiayanta tanks. It has added to its naval strength
by acquiring more submarines and surface ships from the
Soviet Union. India has also significantly augmented
its airpower through its recent purchase of British-made
Jaguar fighter-bombers. Overall, India has become mil-
itarily strong enough to defend itself successfully
against a conventional attack by any likely opponent,
including China. The continuing growth and moderniza-
tion of India's armed forces and expansion of its arms
production capability have reinforced Pakistan's suspi-
cion that India will be the main beneficiary if naval
forces of outside powers are excluded from the region.
Consequently, Pakistan has consistently advocated a se-
curity arrangement that requires not only the elimina-
tion or reduction of the military presence of outside
powers but also the creation of a mutually acceptable
balance between the military and naval forces of the
major littoral states.
While there have recently been signs of improvement
in Indo-Pakistani relations, the tension between the two
still constitutes a major potential security problem in
South Asia. Each country continues to perceive any
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accretion to the military strength of its opponent. as
detrimental to its own security. The radical coup in
Afghanistan in April 1978 and the continuing turmoil
in Iran, which the Pakistani Government believes to be
the result of either direct or indirect machinations by
India's Soviet ally, heightened Islamabad's insecurity
and reinforced its sense of encirclement. Pakistani of-
ficials are convinced that both developments have in-
creased their political and military vulnerability and
reflect growing Soviet, and by association, Indian influ-
ence in South Asia. Pakistan believes that the Soviets
and the Indians intend to split its territory further
and destroy its independent existence either by encourag-
ing the separatist Baluchi and Pushtuni movements or by
direct invasion. In view of these circumstances, Paki-
stan would obviously prefer to see the Soviets reduce
their presence in the region. Just as clearly, it does
not wish the United States to reduce its presence in the
area. Moreover, Pakistan's own tendencies are to some
extent reinforced by the views of its longtime supporter,
China. As a result, although Pakistan, like other Indian
Ocean littoral states, ostensibly continues to support
the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal and to favor US-
Soviet Indian Ocean naval arms limitation negotiations,
it has not actively encouraged these bilateral talks
either publicly or privately since mid-1978.
While India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 was
primarily aimed at demonstrating India's nuclear weapons
capability to China, it added a new dimension to the
Indo-Pakistani rivalry as well. The Indian nuclear test
has led to such Pakistani responses as a proposal in the
United Nations to create a nuclear-weapons-free zone in
South Asia, pursuit of its own nuclear capability, and
intensified efforts to gain better access to Western con-
ventional arms suppliers. The results of these efforts
have been mixed. Although Pakistan's 1974 proposal for
a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia was adopted by
the UN General Assembly and is gaining support from more
states in the region, India's opposition to such a zone
makes its realization unlikely, at least in the near term.
Pakistan's efforts to purchase a French nuclear reproc-
essing plant are also encountering many difficulties.
Pakistan has, however, been able to persuade various
Western suppliers to sell it arms and spare parts al-
though not in the quantity nor quality that it had hoped
For F_ I
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The Change in Indian Perspectives
India perceives itself as a regional power, with
its due role in the region stinted by the presence of
outside forces. As a result, it traditionally has been
the most active advocate of the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace proposal and has vociferously supported superpower
efforts to negotiate a reduction of their military pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean. Although India's armed forces
are by far the largest in the area and it enjoys basic
military security, its Navy is not capable of standing
up to the naval contingents of the superpowers in the
Indian Ocean. New Delhi thus regards the competitive
naval presence of the outside powers as a continuing
challenge to its regional leadership.
Initially, the pro-Soviet tilt of former Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi led New Delhi to accept at face
value the Soviets' claim that they had no military bases
in the Indian Ocean and to blame the United States for
failure to achieve greater progress in the US-Soviet
Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks. Since Morarji
Desai took office in March 1977, however, New Delhi has
assumed a more balanced view on the relative merits of
Soviet and US claims, and no longer exempts the USSR
from its criticism. Its policy now is to encourage the
Soviets and the United States to resume their negotia-
tions as a first step toward the complete neutralization
of the area. India is likely to support, at least for
the near term, force stabilization measures proposed by
the superpowers, but its long-term goal is still the
complete elimination of outside military forces from
the region.
The Shifting States: Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
Despite the apparent consensus among all the South
Asian littoral states against the expansion of great
power naval rivalry in the region, in recent years the
attitudes of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka toward neutraliza-
tion of the Indian Ocean have become more ambivalent.
Because of their limited military capabilities, they
have looked toward outside powers, including the United
States and China, to check what they regard as India's
hegemonial aspirations. This has created tension be-
tween their desire for neutralization of the Indian
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Ocean and their determination to remain free of Indian
domination. Consequently, their postures toward secu-
rity issues in the area, such as the presence of outside
forces, support for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South
Asia, and the Zone of Peace proposal, tend to fluctuate
with the degree of tension in their bilateral relations
with India.
The current leadership in Bangladesh came to power
in 1975 following a series of coups in which some anti-
Indian sentiment was expressed. Although relations have
improved considerably since 1975, Bangladesh continues
to be concerned about India's regional intentions and
has reassessed its views on some security issues in the
Indian Ocean. Signs of this reassessment were evident
at the nonaligned movement's summit meeting at Colombo
in November 1976. Bangladesh tried in vain to insert
references, in the political declaration issued at the
end of the meeting, to the threat to peace and stability
in the area posed by the hegemonial designs of the re-
gional states and the need for regional states to re-
nounce nuclear weapons. The latter demand constituted
an endorsement of an addition to the Indian Ocean Zone
of Peace resolution that Pakistan had proposed after
India's nuclear explosion in 1974. In December 1978,
Dacca voted for the first time in the United Nations,
despite India's protest, to support a Pakistani proposal
for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia.
Since the political eclipse of Prime Minister
Bandaranaike and accession to power of the more conserva-
tive Junius R. Jayewardene in July 1977, there are signs
that Sri Lanka's position toward the presence of outside
powers in the area and toward the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace idea has also been modified.* Like Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka traditionally tended to follow India's lead
in foreign policy. It has been second only to India in
*Sri Lanka voted in favor of the Pakistani proposal for a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in South Asia in November 1974.
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advocating the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace idea in re-
gional and international forums. But, Jayewardene, in
contrast to his predecessor who actively helped advance
the broader demands of the nonaligned movement, is more
concerned over India's intentions in the region and con-
siders foreign policy mainly as an instrument for meet-
ing Sri Lanka's immediate security and developmental
needs. It appears that the members of Sri Lanka's for-
eign policymaking elite share this perception. While
they favor demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, they
are equally concerned over the political-military vacuum,
favoring India, that would be created b a US-Sovi
naval withdrawal.
Conclusions
Although the replacement of Indira Gandhi by Morarji
Desai in New Delhi has blunted the East-West dimension
of conflict in South Asia, tensions between India and
Pakistan persist.* As a result, the changes in their
respective positions toward the presence of outside
forces in the region, the nuclear-weapons-free zone in
South Asia, and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace over the
last decade or so have been marginal. The most notice-
able shifts in attitude toward these security issues in
the area have taken place in Dacca and Colombo. The
views of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka today appear to be
motivated increasingly by concern for their immediate
security while the broader notion of reconstructing the
international power structure, upon which the "zone of
peace" was largely based, has taken on a lower priority.
*The Indo-Pakistani conflict was given an added dimension by the
Soviet support of Indian efforts to contain Chinese influence in
Asia. This in turn drew Pakistan into closer alliance with China,
who desired to curb Soviet influence in a region that it considers
as its own preserve. In recent years, India's efforts at improv-
ing relations with China have, to some extent, also blunted the
Sino-Soviet dimension of the conflict in South Asia.
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These developments would appear to cloud the pros-
pects for much progress toward establishment of a Zone
of Peace at the first UN conference on the Indian Ocean
of littoral and hinterland states that (after four years
of preliminary discussion and debate) will convene in New
York in July 1979. The increasing preoccupation of the
smaller South Asian littoral states with intraregional
power relations, Pakistan's heightened sense of insecu-
rity, and India's more balanced stance toward the United
States and the USSR also suggest that local pressures for
the reduction or withdrawal of the military presence of
the superpowers in the Indian Ocean area ma continue to
decline.
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Terrorist Adaptation To Countermeasures
US and Chinese diplomatic missions in Europe have
recently received letters from an unknown group which
threatens reprisals for alleged US-Chinese collusion
in China's incursion into Vietnam. The group's
threats illustrate a growing tendency by terrorists to
revise their tactics according to their awareness of
governmental countermeasures.
Since 7 March, a large number of US diplomatic
missions in Europe have received letters threatening re-
taliation for alleged American orchestration of the
Chinese incursion into Vietnam.* Chinese diplomats in
Vienna have received two such letters from the previously
unknown Secret Trans-World Organization for Punishment
(STOP).
Some clues are available to the identity of the
group. All envelopes were neatly prepared in accurate
English, leading most observers to rule out that cranks
or pranksters had prepared the material. The paper used
for the mimeographed leaflet shows a watermark of three
pagodas and "Neusiedler Japan Post" written in an oriental
script. Outside the black border are listed cities
throughout the world that have been the scenes of
terrorist activity. All of the letters were mailed at
Vienna's South Railroad Station. While a final deter-
mination of the source of the paper has not been made,
a similar watermark appears on paper of Austrian manu-
facture.
*Vienna, Stockholm, Brussels, Munich, Geneva, Athens, Sofia,
Belgrade, Prague, Berlin, Ankara, Rome, and Warsaw. 25X1
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No known terrorist organization has ever made threats
against Chinese diplomatic facilities, and none of the
presently operating groups have shown hostility toward
both the Chinese and Americans. This raises the possi-
bility that the letters are part of a covert intelli-
gence operation by a government hostile to US-Chinese
rapprochement. On the other hand, if damage rather
than intimidation is the goal, the possibility should
not be discounted that the letters could be a feint for
a letter-bomb campaign to follow in a second mailing by
Implications
In addition to a sophomoric sense of humor (the
group's logo is the international road stop sign), the
letters may demonstrate a growing effort on the part of
terrorists to analyze the responses of governments to
previous terrorist incidents and to adjust their tactics
accordingly. STOP's letters referred to past attacks on
American diplomats and warned that such measures as
armed bodyguards, armored cars, varying routes, and keep-
ing schedules secret would not prevent future anti-American
attacks. The letters that the pseudohijacker of a TWA
flight to Geneva deposited on the lap of a stewardess
last year also demonstrated close attention to government
antiterrorist tactics, as have recent statements by South
Moluccans, West German anarchists, and Palestinians.*
This terrorist scholarship has two important impli-
cations for the tactical and strategic responses of
governments. First, the behavior of governments in dis-
crete hostage-negotiation situations, such as patterns
of attempted deception, bad-faith bargaining, and tactics
that lead to capitulation, will be studied by terrorists
in order to revise their own calculations of how govern-
ments can be expected to behave in future confrontations.
",-For example, the behavior of hostage-takers in the past two years
has suggested a heightened sensitivity to the tendency for sympa-
thetic psychological bonds to form between captors and hostages
over time. To counter this phenomenon, South Moluccans refused to
talk to their hostages and a group of Palestinian hijackers delib-
erately mistreated passengers and killed the pilot.
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Second, terrorists may sometimes draw the wrong conclu-
sions, particularly if they depend on the open literature
on the paramilitary rescue capabilities of governments,
much of which is distorted and sensational. The US
Defense Attache in Bonn, for example, has reported that
a widely read account of West German, Israeli, and US
quick reaction teams is three years out of date, and
misrepresents the tactics, doctrine, and hardware em-
ployed by these units.
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Multilateral Legal Efforts To Combat Terrorism
Attempts to deal with international terrorism
through multilateral measures have been hampered by
the controversy over "just" versus "unjust" political.
violence and by broad resistance to those infringe-
ments of national sovereignty implicit in any curtail-
ment of the right to grant political asylum. Some
governments are also reluctant to engage in actions
that might provoke retribution by terrorists or by
states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
Although general international measures against
terrorism have been resisted, there has been some suc-
cess in requiring states to extradite or prosecute
perpetrators of specific terrorist acts. Experiences
in drafting and implementing antihijacking and other
conventions serve as benchmarks for evaluating the
prospects for further efforts to combat terrorism.
False Starts
Traditionally, the international legal response to
terrorism has been marked by disagreements over the defi-
nition of international terrorism as well as by conflict-
ing attitudes about the legitimacy of political violence
by organized groups.
After the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, Russia
called for an international conference for the prevention
of political terrorism; it never materialized. In :1934,
French requests for the extradition of the assassin of
King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister
Barthou were turned down because Italy believed the of-
fenses had a political motivation. Three years later,
at French insistence, the League of Nations adopted a
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terror-
ism, which treated conspiracy, incitement, and partici-
pation in terrorist acts as criminal offenses for which
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extradition would be granted. A supplementary agreement
called for the creation of an International Criminal
Court. The two conventions failed to receive enough rat-
ifications to enter intp force, mainly because of o ec-
tions to the sweeping definition of terrorism.
The UN response to the general problem of interna-
tional terrorism has been even more hesitant. Under the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States,
states have a responsibility to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts on the territory of another state.* Third World
coalitions have, however, consistently argued that there
is a greater duty to assist groups struggling for "equal
rights" and "self-determination" and have used this argu-
ment to thwart most efforts to achieve antiterrorism
conventions.
In the wake of the September 1972 attack on Israeli
athletes in Munich, the United States proposed a draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism. The draft aimed to
limit the export of terrorism; called for international
cooperation and information sharing; and proposed prose-
cution or extradition for any unlawful killing, maiming,
or kidnaping when that act is of international signifi-
cance. Even though its enforcement provisions would have
been hobbled by various restrictions, the draft was vigor-
ously opposed and effectively stifled by an Arab-led coa-
lition that argued against interfering with the right of
self-determination.
Further discussions by an Ad Hoc Committee on In-
ternational Terrorism in the summer of 1973 failed to
produce any agreed solution. Hoping to avoid antagoniz-
ing the West by disbanding the Committee, yet still at-
tempting to derail action, radical states were able to
broaden the Committee's mandate from combating terrorism
to studying its underlying causes as well. The 1975
raid on an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) meeting in Vienna and the kidnaping of some of
The Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly without
vote in October 1970.
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the delegates led Venezuela and Colombia to propose re-
newed consideration of countermeasures. The General
Assembly, however, once again failed to develop any sup-
port for a new convention.
An Incremental Solution
Despite the absence of a global consensus on a
general definition of international terrorism, states
wishing to combat it have been successful in proscribing
several manifestations of terrorism. Their approach has
been to limit the types of crimes for which political
motives can be clearly ascribed and extradition, there-
fore, denied. This effort began with conventions on
offenses against civil aviation, and has moved on to
issues dealing with attacks on diplomats, hostage-taking,
and other offenses.
Aerial Hijacking
The advent of hijackings in Western states, includ-
ing diversions of US planes to Cuba, demonstrated that
the international law of the early 1960s was unclear on
the status of these crimes. The international effort
to amend this deficiency has served as a model for com-
bating other forms of terrorism while balancing conflict-
ing political perspectives.
The Tokyo Convention (Convention on offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft)
Hoping to fill part of the legal gap, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) drafted t:he
Tokyo Convention.* It specifies the powers of the com-
mander of an aircraft engaged in international flight.
States are to make every effort to restore control of
the aircraft to its lawful commander and to arrange for
*Although the draft was completed in September 1963, the 12 rati-
fying signatures required for its entry into force were slow in
coming, and the Convention did not enter into force until December
1969. As of January 1979, 42 governments have signed and 99 have
adhered (ratified, acceded, or succeeded) to the Convention.
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the prompt onward passage of the aircraft, passengers,
cargo, and crew. Nonetheless, the Convention provides
no effective means to bring the hijacker to justice as
it does not obligate a state either to extradite or to
prosecute an offender.
The Hague Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft)*
The Tokyo Convention was judged inadequate to halt
the spate of hijackings that occurred after its signing.
As a result, members of the ICAO met at The Hague to
establish hijacking as an offense and to set rules for
the disposition of the offender. The ideals of legal
precision, however, were frequently subordinated to po-
West European delegations rejected Soviet calls
for mandatory extradition, arguing that they would have
constitutional problems with such inflexibility, and
that it would harm the tradition of granting political
asylum. A compromise called for either extradition or
submission of suspects to com etent authorities "for
the purpose of prosecution."
The Hague Convention went further than any other
modern treaty in delineating jurisdiction. Previously,
in regions of the world where high-speed aircraft cross
several national borders within minutes, judges found
it impossible to determine the country in which the of-
fense was committed. The Hague Convention established
universal jurisdiction for the offense of hijacking,
thus allowing any country holding a suspect to try him.
It was hoped that potential hijackers would be deterred
by the Convention's call for severe penalties.
The Hague Convention also solved the problem of
extradition in the absence of a specific extradition
treaty. It allows a party the option of considering
The Convention was presented at The Hague in December 1970 when
49 of the 77 states present signed it. It entered into force in
October 1971. As of January 1979, 81 states have signed it, and
a total of 103 countries have adhered to the Convention.
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the Convention to be an extradition treaty. This dis-
cretionary language was requested by Zambia, which felt
it dishonorable to have an extradition treaty with South
The Montreal Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation)*
The International Civil Aviation Organization in
1971 drafted a companion treaty to The Hague Convention,
which deals with acts committed on the ground against
aircraft in service and against air navigation facilities.
It includes sanctions against the perpetrators of sabotage
and other offenses committed against these targets, and
requires contracting parties to make such offenses sub-
ject to severe penalties. It also employs The Hague
Convention's extradite-or-prosecute formula.
UN General Assembly Resolution on the Safety
of Civil Aviation
After Palestinian hijackers killed a Lufthansa
pilot on 13 October 1977, the International Federation
of Air Line Pilots Associations threatened a 48-hour
strike to protest ineffective action against terrorists.
In response, on 3 November 1977, the UN General Assembly
adopted a consensus resolution condemning air piracy,
encouraging improved aviation security, and urging all
states that had not already done so to become party to
*The Convention was drawn up at Montreal in September 1971, and
came into force in January 1973. It has been signed by 63 coun-
tries, and adhered to by 98.
**The original text was modified to meet objections from Arab and
other Third World countries. One change, directed against. Is-
rael's rescue operation at Entebbe, said that antihijacking ef-
forts should be "without prejudice to the sovereignty or territo-
rial integrity of any state."
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A "Contact Group" coordinated a campaign of demarches
to governments that had not yet adhered to the three
conventions. The general response to this marketing ef-
fort has been favorable--most governments contacted have
expressed sympathy for the spirit of the conventions, and
over 20 have subsequently adhered to one or more of them.
Moreover, refusal by a government to accede to any given
convention does not necessarily reflect disagreement with
the aims of the convention's provisions. Several coun-
tries may not wish to be compelled to extradite to states
imposing death penalties, while others may believe that
some of the provisions of the conventions do not go far
enough. What is of overriding importance is the action
of states in carrying out the intention of the agreements.
For example, although Cuba has not yet signed the con-
ventions, it has nonetheless joined in several bilateral
agreements on the disposition of hijackers.
The Bonn Economic Summit Antihijacking
Declaration
One basic difficulty with the antihijacking conven-
tions has been the absence of sanctions against states
that refuse to comply with the conventions' provisions.
At the July 1978 Economic Summit in Bonn, the participat-
ing heads of state (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany) agreed
to halt all air traffic with any country either harboring
a hijacker or refusing to return the plane and passengers.*
The original signatories have subsequently attempted
to obtain global support for the agreement. Privately,
most countries have responded favorably, and there have
been several public expressions of support.**
%The agreement's potential effectiveness lies in the fact that
airlines of the seven participants together account for 69 percent
of the total airline passengers carried in the non-Communist
**For those who support it, the declaration is technically
statement of aspiration rather than a legally binding document.
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Protection of Diplomats
The principle of diplomatic inviolability has been
one of the foundations of modern international law.
This universally accepted rule is based upon the neces-
sity of permitting free and unhampered exercise of the
diplomatic function. Those terrorists attempting to
demonstrate their rejection of the international order
have not felt constrained by this rule, however, and
have frequently attacked diplomatic representatives.
Organization of American States tOAS) Convention
(Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion That Are of
International Significance)*
Although the Convention calls for international co-
operation against acts of terrorism, it covers only cer-
tain specified common crimes against the life or personal
integrity of protected individuals. It employs The Hague
Convention's extradite-or-prosecute language, while safe-
guarding the right of asylum, which is well established
in Latin American legal practice.
The United Nations Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic
Agents**
Like its OAS precursor, this Convention requires
the contracting states to define certain specified acts
against protected persons (or against the official prem-
ises, private accommodations, or means of transport of
such a person) as crimes under internal law. Once again,
*The Convention was signed in February 1971, and entered into
force in October 1973. It has been signed by 13 nations, and ad-
hered to by seven. Although it was drafted by a regional orga
zation, it is open to participation by nonmembers of the OAS.
**The Convention was drawn up in New York in December 1973, and
entered into force in February 1977. It has been signed by 28
states, and adhered to by 40.
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the extradite-or-prosecute formula is employed, and the
right of asylum is specifically safeguarded. In addition,
the UN General Assembly resolution adopting the Conven-
tion contains a paragraph backed by Third World states
reiterating the rights of those aspiring to self-deter-
mination and independence.
The Convention has been criticized for not including
other types of individuals (for example, children, inno-
cent bystanders, ordinary tourists) who do not enjoy the
physical protection available to diplomats, but who are
nonetheless potential targets of terrorists.
Hostage-Taking
One major piece of unfinished business is the adop-
tion of an international convention against the taking of
hostages.* A UN ad hoc committee, established in December
1976, has studied a West German draft requiring the extra-
dition or prosecution of anyone who detains another per-
son in order to force action from a state, international
organization, or corporate body. The proposal's initial
difficulties were typified by the obstructive behavior of
the Soviets, Arabs, and Africans, who tried to exempt the
actions of national liberation groups. This issue was
apparently resolved (through linguistic compromise) at
the ad hoc committee's meeting in February 1979. Only a
few peripheral issues remain outstanding. The committee
has recommended that the General Assembly consider and
adopt this draft convention against hostage-taking at its
Other Offenses
The members of the Council of Europe, faced with
the common problem of European terrorism, have been able
to overcome most of the impediments to global agreement
and have taken concerted action against a host of terror-
ist actions. Its European Convention on the Suppression
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of Terrorism,* a joint initiative of France and West Ger-
many, declares that certain violent crimes, including
kidnaping, hijacking, "an attack against the life, physi-
cal integrity or liberty of internationally protected
persons, including diplomatic agents," and the use of
bombs will not be considered to be political acts ex-
empt from extradition requirements, whatever the motive.
Although a nation may grant political asylum to offend-
ers if it believes that the extradition demand is made
in order to persecute on account of race, religion, na-
tionality or political opinion, it must prosecute under
its own laws.
In October 1978, the Ministers of Justice of members
of the European Community made a supplementary agreement
calling for extradition or prosecution "without undue
delay" of persons perpetrating offenses that include air-
craft hijackings, attacks against internationally pro-
tected persons, kidnaping or the taking of hostages,
and the use of bombs, grenades, letter and parcel bombs,
and automatic firearms. The agreement gives more dis-
cretion to a state than does the convention in deciding
whether an offense is political (and the offender there-
fore exempted from extradition). The Ministers also set
up a working group to discuss French proposals to estab-
lish a "common judicial zone."
Implications
Despite the refusal by some lesser developed coun-
tries and East European states to subscribe to broad con-
demnations of political violence, the incremental approach
to combating terrorism has led to several positive devel-
opments. Regional agreements can be expected to serve as
indicators of what can be achieved in universal forums.
*Drafted at Strasbourg in November 1976, the European Convention
was signed in January 1977 by all of the Council members except
Ireland and Malta. It came into force in August 1978, and has
been ratified by five nations. Ireland claims to have constitu-
tional difficulties with the Convention's language and argues that
a suspect is entitled to be tried in his country of origin. Malta
does not want to antagonize Libya.
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The efforts of the Contact Group and the Bonn Seven
to secure adherence to antihijacking agreements will prob-
ably continue to meet with some successes, and additional
adherences and declarations of support can be expected.
Following the precedent of incrementally legislating
against terrorist actions, future conventions may be di-
rected against other types of attack, for instance, letter
bombs (although discovering the perpetrator has proved
to be difficult), or on behalf of a class of victims,
for instance, children, or in order to prevent the export
of violence to countries not party to a conflict.
All of the multilateral conventions concluded so
far have concentrated on ex post facto responses to ter-
rorism. There remains room for concerted action against
states aiding terrorists before the fact--the patron
state phenomenon. It is doubtful that multilateral action
on this issue will soon be taken because the phenomenon
is so complex; but bilateral diplomatic approaches have
already been tried and have met with some success, reflected
most notably in less fervent Libyan support for terrorism.
Finally, despite recent attention by several commen-
tators, the venerable proposal to establish an interna-
tional criminal court to try terrorists (and incarcerate
them if convicted) is likely to remain purely academic.
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