INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 31, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
International
Issues Review
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
RP HR 79-001
31 January 1979
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
31 January 1979
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE OUTLOOK
FOR 1979 . . ? .
This article, based on a forthcoming ORPA study,
International Terrorism in 1978, discusses Lhe
short-term outlook for terrorist activities.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS
PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER
RESTRAINTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1 1. . 16
Despite the low volume of arms sales to South-
east Asia and the absence of an arms race among
either the recipients or the supplier states,
political and ideological competition divides
the region into rival supplier-recipient groups
and presents obstacles to effective restraints
on conventional arms transfers to the area. This
situation has been intensified by the Vietnamese
invasion of Kampuchea.
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NUCLEAR POLITICS
OVERVIEW OF LDC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INTER-
NATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 27
Growing LDC interest in nuclear energy and
changes in international nuclear politics rein-
force North-South, supplier-consumer tensions
inherent in the international nonproliferation
regime. This article outlines general develop-
ing-country attitudes and demands in the nuclear
arena that threaten to complicate u comin mul-
tilateral conferences.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
SOFIA: TOWARD A WORLD COMMUNIST
CONFERENCE? . . . . . . . . 34
At a Communist conference in Sofia last month
the Soviets expressed interest in convening a
high-level gathering of Communist leaders. The
interparty disputes that surfaced at Sofia sug-
gest, however, that the preparations for and
holding of such a conference will reflect more
preoccupation with current internecine disagree-
ments than with broader North-South
issues.
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International Terrorism: The Outlook For 1979*I 25X1
Although 1978 recorded an increase in the number
of international terrorist attacks and their attendant
casualties (see figure 1 and table 1), most estab-
lished patterns of terrorist behavior continued. Ter-
rorists concentrated on attacking Western diplomatic
and business facilities, emphasized simple types of
operations (see table 2), and preferred to strike
targets in the industrialized democracies. There was
some improvement in intergovernmental cooperation
against terrorism, as represented by the Bonn Anti-
Hijacking Agreement formulated last June. This ar-
ticle discusses what these and other recent develop-
ments portend for the near term. 25X1
Several trends seen in 1978 are expected to carry
over into the new year:
-- Regional patterns of victimization and location
of operations are likely to remain virtually
unchanged. Representatives of affluent coun-
tries, particularly government officials and
business executives, will remain attractive
targets. Western Europe, Latin America, and
the Middle East--probably in that order--again
are likely to be the main trouble spots.
American persons and property will continue to
be attacked on occasion, although improvements
in US official and corporate security should
deter many potential attacks.
*This article summarizes conclusions of a forthcoming ORPA study,
International Terrorism in 1978.
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Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,'
1968-78
. Wounded Total: 5,078
Killed Total: 2,102
Figure 1
1. Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents, e.g.,
exclusion of the 1978 explosion at a Beirut building housing Palestinian guerrilla organizations, which some reports
credited to rival terrorists, would subtract 150 deaths from that year's total. Inclusion of the mass suicide/murder
by the Peoples' Temple members in Guyana in November 1978 would add more than 900 deaths.
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-- Acts of terrorism related to the Palestinian
issue will almost certainly continue. Despite
recent statements by moderate Palestinian
leaders regarding the possibility of living
in peace with Israel if a Palestinian mini-
state is created, extremists can be expected
to demonstrate their rejection of a political
solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Attacks
within Israel, at times victimizing nationals
of third countries, were undertaken even by the
moderates during 1978.
-- The vast majority of incidents will continue to
involve bombings and incendiary attacks, in
part because neither poses great risk to those
who cause them. Although added security pre-
cautions at sensitive facilities, a business
exodus from unstable areas, and paramilitary
rescue squads may deter spectacular confron-
tational attacks, these measures clearly can-
not protect all potential--if less sensitive--
targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
Businesses will continue to search for defensive
methods. In 1978, several multinational corporations
preferred to pay off terrorist ransom and publicity de-
mands rather than cooperate in government-declared no-
concessions policies. Many organizations were formed
solely to advise executives on how to cope with politi-
cal violence. Representatives of other nongovernmental
organizations, including educational institutions and
the media, explored ways of cooperating with governmental
efforts to combat terrorism. 25X1
Despite success in obtaining support for several
antihijacking agreements, the development and implemen-
tation of more effective international countermeasures
will continue to be impeded by differing moral perspec-
tives among states, a broad resistance to the perceived
infringement of sovereignty in any curtailment of the
right to grant political asylum, and a natural reluctance
on the part of many states to commit themselves to any
course of action that might invite retribution--either
by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the
terrorists' cause. This divergence in perspectives
makes the chance of passage of a West German - sponsored
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UN convention against the taking of hostages relatively
low. On the other hand, regional cooperation by like-
minded governments faced with similar problems is ex-
pected to expand. West European successes may set an
example for governments in other regions. 25X1
International pressures to halt governmental aid to
terrorists is likely to meet with mixed degrees of success.
Libya, often characterized as a major patron of various
terrorist groups throughout the world, has recently taken
steps toward improving its image in the West. In
November, Colonel Qadhafi met with the West German
Interior Minister to discuss closer cooperation against
terrorists. The Libyans also expressed interest in
discussing international terrorism with high-ranking
US representatives. In December, the Libyan Interior
Minister vowed to arrest and extradite any German
terrorists seeking refuge. Since 1977, the Libyan
have refused to grant asylum to airline hijackers
The coming year is expected to be characterized by
some new developments as well. Terrorists will try to
adapt their tactics to counter the countermeasures
adopted by government and private security services.
These adaptations probably will include changes in
target selection, improvements in terrorist planning
and other aspects of tradecraft, and, possibly, an
overall increase in technological sophistication, (for
example, use of more compact conventional explosives).
West German terrorists, having suffered reverses
during the past year, are likely to feel greater pressure
to remind their domestic and international sympathizers
that they remain revolutionary leaders by engaging in
operations at home or overseas.
Although the oscillations in the overall level of
terrorist activity in recent years render predictions
hazardous, it is doubtful that there will be many more
terrorist incidents in 1979 than in 1978. A cyclical
pattern seems to have been established. For the
typical terrorist group, a period of considerable
activity lasting several weeks or months usually is
followed by a lull, as governments adapt to terrorist
tactics, group leaders are arrested, problems of logis-
tics or morale arise, and popular sympathy wanes. In
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time new terrorist recruits may appear, new methods may
be developed, and a more favorable political climate
may return. Then a new cycle for that group may begin.
But as new or revitalized groups arise, others become
dormant, and some eventuall disappear.
I y-
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TABLE 1
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1968-78
Target
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
TOTAL*
North America
35
7
23
24
18
18
38
51
37
23
20
294
(9.7)
Latin America
41
105
46
61
808
(26.6)
Western Europe
16
151
109
179
129
166
1,130
(38.1)
USSR/Eastern Europe
0
0
2
3
12
(0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
16
20
24
114
(3.7)
Middle East and
North Africa
18
32
60
52
35
21
47
56
62
48
61
492
(16.1)
Asia
1
12
19
24
43
10
11
13
14
8
16
171
(5.6)
Oceana
0
5
1
2
3
1
1
0
0
3
3
19
(0.6)
Transregional
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
(0.1)
Total
111
166
282
216
269
275
382
297
413
279
354
3,044
*Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1968-78, BY CATEGORY OF ATTACK
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
TOTAL1
Kidnaping
1
3
32
17
11
37
25
38
30
22
27
243
(8.0)
Barricade-hostage
0
0
5
1
3
8
9
14
4
5
11
60
(2.0)
Letter bombing
3
4
3
1
92
22
16
3
11
2
5
162
(5.3)
Incendiary bombing
12
22
53
30
15
31
37
20
91
57
69
437
(14.4)
Explosive bombing
67
97
104
115
106
136
239
169
176
131
133
1,473
(48.4)
Armed attack
11
13
8
8
9
10
21
11
21
14
36
162
(5.3)
Hijacking2
3
11
21
9
14
6
8
4
6
8
3
93
(3.0)
Assassination
7
4
46
12
10
18
12
20
48
23
29
199
(6.5)
Theft, break-in
3
7
22
10
1
0
8
8
5
0
12
76
(2.5)
Sniping
63
(2.1)
Other actions3
1
3
11
10
4
4
4
1
7
11
20
76
(2.5)
1Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.
2Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist
hijackings.
3iticiudes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and
sabotage.
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Prospects for Conventional Arms Transfer Restraints
in Southeast Asia
The outlook for cooperation among less developed
countries (LDCs) in developing effective regional arms
control regimes in various parts of the world falls
among the more important factors that must be consid-
ered when charting US efforts to curb international
conventional arms transfers (CAT). This general sub-
ject will be addressed again in a forthcoming assess-
ment of the climate for arms control in Southeast
Asia.
Trade in conventional arms has been relatively less
active in Southeast Asia than in other regions, but is
growing steadily in both volume and number of suppliers.
Total arms sales and assistance to the nine Southeast
Asian states during the 1973-77 period was approximately
US $2.8 billion, or 3.5 percent of total world sales over
that five-year period.** The five members of the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations--Indonesia, Malaysia,
*'The nine are Burma, Indonesia, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia,
Philippines Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See Tables 1-5 for
details.
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Major Arms Suppliers to Southeast Asia (1973-77)
Total Sales and Percentages
(Millions of US Dollars)
Percent
Laos*
(51.1)
Singapore
(237.6)
FRG 2%---\ -Other 4%
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Australia 3%
France 4%-T
Switzerland 9%
Australia 6%
Indonesia
(691.2) Yugoslavia 2%
South Korea 5% -Other 2%
(276)
Yugoslavia 3%
Australia 6%-i
Kampuchea*
(0.7)
Phillippines Italy 2%
Netherlands 2% (323.9) Spain 1%
Other 2%
IF they 1% Singapore 7%~
IF
1 Belgium 2%
I a '-
Thailand
(487.1)
Israel 5%-\
Singapore 7%
I
Vietnam*
(686.6)
Other 3% GDR 2%
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the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand--received 72 per-
cent, the three Indochina states--Kampuchea, Laos, and
Vietnam--27 percent, and Burma, one percent of the total
transfers. The United States dominated the ASEAN market
(51 percent), while the Soviet Union dominated the Indo-
china market (82 percent). Other suppliers--mainly West
European nations, Australia, and several LDCs to the
ASEAN states, and China to the Indochina states--provided
smaller amounts of military assistance and equipment on
cash or credit terms. For the near future, arms trans-
fers will probably continue to flow along already es-
tablished supply lines. F_ I
Despite the small volume of arms sales to Southeast
Asia and the absence of an arms race among the recipient
or the supplier states, political and ideological com-
petition divides the region into rival supplier-recipient
groups and presents significant obstacles to establishing
broad and effective restraints on conventional arms
transfers. The extent to which arms restraints win the
voluntary cooperation of the regional and other states
concerned will depend on the nature and strength of the
motives driving both suppliers and recipients, the nature
of such restraints, and the manner in which the are
negotiated and implemented.
Motives for Buying Arms
Recipient states buy--and produce--arms for complex
reasons involving internal security against insurgencies,
national prestige and pride, self-reliance and independ-
ence from foreign sources, and defense against external
threats. There is currently no arms race and little
chance of armed conflict between the two groups of
recipients--ASEAN and Indochina.
The emergence of a new and pro-Vietnam regime in
Kampuchea has had a significant impact on ASEAN per-
ceptions of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and of Vietnamese
ambitions in the region--largely by confirming sus-
picions. In the short term, the ASEAN states are not
likely to react to the Vietnamese move in Kampuchea
by heavily arming themselves or by forming a mutual
defense pact. Nonetheless, over the longer term, this
development adds pressure on these nations to continue
to buy arms and, possibly, to accelerate their purchase
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schedules. The volume and sophistication of these arms
purchases will be constantly constrained, however, b
supply and budgetary restrictions. F__ I
Although they have always been suspicious of the
ASEAN nations' relationship with the United States, the
three Indochina states do not consider the ASEAN states
a serious military threat. Their main reasons for ac-
quiring arms have been to build military capabilities
against each other, the USSR or China. Vietnam and Laos
will probably continue to receive military assistance,
possibly of increasingly higher sophistication and
volume, from the USSR. The new regime in Kampuchea will
benefit indirectly from Soviet assistance to Vietnam.
Supply of Arms
Supplier states supply arms to promote existing or
expanding political and economic leverage. Strategic
concerns are of relatively minor importance in motiva-
ting arms sales to the ASEAN states but they are a
factor of rowin importance in Soviet assistance to
Vietnam.
West European and LDC arms suppliers to the ASEAN
states have indicated growing interest in expanding re-
lations--and arms sales--to this market. Specific prob-
lems with US sales restrictions and general dissatisfac-
tion with the high cost and unreliability of the US
supply line have motivated the ASEAN countries to shop
elsewhere. ASEAN decisions to buy more from non-US
suppliers could enhance the potential for competition
among these suppliers for the US share of the market.
Conditions Influencing Possible Arms Restraint
The implicitly hostile division of supplier-
recipient relationships into rival groups would, on.
the one hand, make it essential that all participate in
an arms restraint regime and, on the other hand, make it
difficult to reach an agreement on broad and effective
CAT curbs in Southeast Asia. This problem has several
components:
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-- While the non-Communist suppliers--the West
European nations and the LDCs--might be
persuaded to agree to some form of restraint,
the intensity of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in
the region would make it difficult for both
China and the USSR to reach an agreement on
CAT controls.
-- With the recent emergence of a pro-Vietnamese--
and by extension, pro-Soviet--regime in
Kampuchea, China has lost its closest ally
in Southeast Asia and an important battle in
its efforts to curtail Soviet influence in
Indochina. Although China is not currently a
major arms supplier to the region, it is con-
sidered a major power and would have to be
included in any negotiations on restraining
arms sales.
-- The USSR might be willing to discuss CAT re-
straints in Southeast Asia if it can protect
its special interests in Vietnam, Laos, and
Kampuchea, and if it sees an opportunity to
exploit conflicts of interest between China
and the West or among Western arms suppliers.
Under such conditions, however, CAT negotia-
tions would be meaningless.
-- Vietnam's attitude toward CAT controls will be
influenced by both its own and Soviet interests.
Despite its friendship and cooperation treaty
with the USSR, Hanoi has attempted to maintain
a degree of independent action and would prob-
ably be reluctant to restrict its ability to
acquire arms from either the Soviets or other
suppliers.
-- The ASEAN states would not accept CAT controls
without the full participation of the Soviet
Union, China, and Vietnam.
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Implications for the United States
At present, the major implication for US policy
lies in the impact of a CAT restraint proposal on rela-
tions with the ASEAN countries. Gaining a sympathetic
hearing by the ASEAN states on arms matters will depend
not only on the substance of the proposed restraints,
but also on the manner in which the proposal is pre-
sented and the extent to which the respective govern-
ments are consulted during the process. The five states
would probably oppose any restrictions on their abilities
to improve the quality of their forces in accordance with
their own perceptions of their requirements for individual
and collective self-defense, but they might be inclined
to support controls on the introduction of highly sophis-
ticated or clearly provocative types of weapons to the
region--largely because none currently plan to acquire
them.
Their preference for relying on the United States,
not only for arms but also for political and security
support, their general dislike of the USSR, and their
desire not to antagonize Vietnam (which has the largest
military establishment in Southeast Apia) or China
(whose intentions they suspect) would make the ASEAN
states especially sensitive to extraregional initiatives
without close prior consultation. 25X1
In the long run, a US-initiated or sponsored pro-
posal to restrict arms sales to Southeast Asia could
have the adverse impact of straining relations with the
ASEAN group. Military assistance from the United States
has long been regarded by the ASEAN states as a key
symbolic barometer of US concern for their security and,
by implication, for regional stability. US security
assurances have helped to obviate the need for these
nations to depend on alternate suppliers or to main--
tain large arms inventories. 25X1
During the past few years, however, the ASEAN
governments have voiced an uncertainty about the US
commitment to their security, and about US military
capabilities (particularly, naval forces) in the
region. While the ASEAN states clearly prefer US
equipment, they have already demonstrated a readiness
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to turn to other suppliers and to undertake local pro-
duction. Under these circumstances, attempts to place
restraints on arms sales, particularly if initiated or
sponsored by the United States, could further undermine
confidence in Washington's reliability and could moti-
vate these states to increase their arms purchases
generally and to rely more heavily on non-US sources
of supply.
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TABLE 1
Arms Sales to Southeast Asia*
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)
YEAR
1973
1974
1975 1976
1977
TOTAL
(1973-1977)
Percentage, of
t
A
%SEA
Amt
%SEA
Amt
%SEA
Amt
%SEA
Amt
%SEA
Amt
%SEA
Worldwide Sales
SUPPLIER
m
United States
110
24
114.2
22
172.5
39
217.5
30.3
406.6
74 1,020.8 37
3
USSR
210
46
169
33
124.4
23
97.2
13.5
8.4
1.3
609
22
2.3
Netherlands
--
--
35.6
7
--
--
174
24.3
--
--
209.6
7.5
42
West Germany
9.9
2.2
9.3
2
30
5.6
10.5
1.5
100
18.5
159.7
5.5
3.5
Spain
--
--
6
1.2
100
19
--
--
4.5
.9
110.5
4
26
China
47.3
10.3
53.9
10.6
8.8
1.6
--
--
--
--
110
4
13
Sweden
2.7
0.6
21.3
4
--
--
79.3
11
--
--
103.3
3.7
32
Australia
7.3
1.6
59
12
6.7
1.2
1.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
74.4
2.6
36
United Kingdom
1.7
0.4
19.8
4
24.2
4.5
11.4
1.6
17
3
74.1
2.6
1
Italy
4.6
1
2.5
0.5
3.7
0.7
60
8
--
--
70.8
2.5
2.5
France
23.3
5.1
--
--
14
2.6
4.5
0.6
--
--
41.8
1.5
0.4
Singapore
30.1
6.6
6.5
1.3
4
0.7
--
--
--
--
40.6
1.5
95
Rep. of Korea
--
--
--
--
--
--
35
5
0.9
0.2
35.9
1.3
2.3
Israel
5
1.1
--
--
1.2
0.2
13.5
2
4.4
0.9
24.1
1
8
Yugoslavia
1.8
0.4
2.2
0.4
5.3
1
10.9
1.5
0.3
0.05
20.5
0.7
2.4
Other
3.3
0.7
10.2
2
4.7
0.9
3.8
0.5
6
1.1
71.6
2.6
TOTAL
457
509.2
499.5
718.8
548.3
2,776.7
*Sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries. US sales by fiscal year, all others by calendar year.
Excluding US sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook; OER Trade and Aid Statistics
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TABLE 2
Arms Sales to ASEAN
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)-
Percentage(Amount
WorldSupplier's
SupplierASEAN,
sales Percentage
Non-Communist to Third ASEAN,
Sales)
1975
1976 1977
SUPPLIER
Amt
%ASEAN Amt
AS
%
EAN Amt /,ASEAN
Amt
%ASEAN Amt %
ASEAN
%Non-Communist
U
it
,
TOTAL
%ASEAN
%WW
Third World
n
ed States*-109.7 56 114.1 40 172
4 52
2
Netherlands
.
17.2
36 406 75
1,019.4
51
3
25
--
-- 35.6 12.5 -- --
174
29
West Cerr.:ar.
.5
5 7
9 3
--
209.6
10
42
52
Spain
-
.
30
7.5
-
- 100 19
147.4
7
3
5
6
Sweden
-
2
7
-- 6 2 100 25
1
-
4.5 1
110.5
5.5
.
26
27
.
21.3 7 -- --
79.3
13 -
-
Australia
7.3
3.5 59 21
--
103.3
5
32
63
United Kingdom
1
7
6.7 2
1
1.2
0.2 0.2 0.05
74.4
4
36
36
.
19.8 7 24.2 6
11.4
1
8
17 3
Ital
Y
4
6
2
.
.1
74.1
4
1
1
.
2.5 1 2 0.5
60
10
--
Singapore
30.1
15 6.5 2
4 1
--
69.1
3
2.5
3
France
23.3
12
14 3
7
-- --
40.6
2
95
96
Rep. of Korea
.
37.3
2
0.4
0.5
Israel
5
-- '- -
2
35
5.5 0.9 0.1
35.9
2
2.3
2.3
Yugoslavia
1.8
-- -- 1 0.3
1 2
2
13.5
2.1 4.4 0.8
23.9
1
8
8.5
Other
3
2
.
1 5.3 1
10.9
2 0.3 0.05
20.5
1
2
4
2
4
TOTAL
.
199
0
1.5 10.2 3.5 3.9 1
27.1
0.4 5.4 0.9
49.8
2.5
.
.
.
285.2 364.3
604.8
538.7
2,015.8
-Sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries. US sales by fiscal year, all others by calendar year; percentages
rounded off.
**Excluding sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook, March 1978; OER Trade and Aid Statistics
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Arms Sales to Indochina*
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)**
(Amount to Indochina, Supplier's Percentage of Total to Indochina,
Percentage of Supplier's Worldwide Sales)
YEAR
1973
1974 1975
1976
1977
1973-1977
SUPPLIER
Amt %Indo
Amt %Indo Amt %Indo
Amt ?%,Indo
Amt
%Indo
TOTAL %Indo
USSR
210
78
168.7
76
124.4
93
97.2 92
8.4
88
608.7 82
2.3
China
47.3
18
53.9
24
8.8
7
-- --
--
--
110 15
13
Other
10.3
4
--
--
--
--
8.1 8
1.3
12
19.7 3
TOTAL
267.6
222.6
133.2
105.3
9.7
738.4
*Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam; excluding US sales to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1973-1975.
Arms Sales to Burma
1973-1977, by Supplier
(Millions of US Dollars)**
YEAR
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1973-1977
SUPPLIER
Amt
Amt
Amt
Amt
Amt
TOTAL
West Germany
0.4
10.5
--
12.3
France
--
4.5
--
4.5
Switzerland
--
-
1.5
0.6
2.1
Italy
--
1.7
--
--
1.7
United States
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.6
1.4
USSR
--
0.3
-
--
--
0.3
Israel
--
0.2
--
--
0.2
TOTAL
0.7
2
16.8
1.2
22.5
**All sales by calendar year; percentages rounded off; sales are understood to mean agreements not deliveries.
by
SOURCE: DIA Foreign Military Assistance Handbook, March 1978; OER Trade and Aid Statistics
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Arms Sales to Southeast Asia
1973-77, By Recipient
(Millions of US Dollars)
Recipient
1973
1974 1
975
1976
1977
TOTAL
TOTAL (Percent)
Indonesia
17.6
99.5 19
4.7
255.1
124.3
691.2
25
Vietnam*
267.6
222.6 13
1.4
55.3
9.7
686.6
24.7
Thailand
88.6
58.6 4
7.4
141.8
150.7
487.1
17
Philippines
31.5
48.3 7
8.5
71.7
93.9
323.9
12
Malaysia
41
61.2 2
2.1
102.3
49.4
276
10
Singapore
20.2
17.5 2
0.8
58.7
120.4
237.6
8
xd
a
Laos*
1
1
50
--
51
1
2
ri
y
.
1.9
16.5
0.6
.
22.5
1
Kampuchea*
$2,776.7
Source: DIA Foreign Military Assistance
Handbook,
March
1978
OER Trade and Aid Statistics
*Excluding US sales.
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Overview of LDC Attitudes Toward the International
Nonproliferation Regime
Developing countries will raise many of their
concerns--especially calls for transfer of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes and an end to the
superpower arms race--at the Second Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference, to be held in May 1980. In-
creasing demand by less developed countries (LDCs) for
nuclear power, in particular, may split the conference
along North-South lines on a number of issues impor-
tant to the United States.* In preparation for the
conference, the International Issues Division of the
Office of Regional and Political Analysis will publish
a series of profiles examining the views of selected
LDCs on nuclear affairs. This article begins the ser-
ies by outlining the general attitudes and demands of
the developing countries.
The Changing Energy Environment
While the interest of developing countries in nu-
clear energy and disarmament long predates the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), their early efforts in
the nuclear power field were largely symbolic--centering
on the acquisition of small research reactors that were
generally as important for prestige purposes as they
might have been for scientific applications. The LDCs
attached little urgency to building nuclear power plants
until the 1973 oil embargo demonstrated the suscepti-
bility of their traditional energy supplies to external
events. As oil prices rose and the developing countries
found themselves unable to win price concessions from
OPEC, they began to consider turning to nuclear power
as a desirable alternative. The nuclear supplier states,
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competing for profitable contracts, encouraged this
trend. The developing world now has 28 nuclear power
plants in existence or under construction.
The turn to nuclear power, accompanied by demands
for increased access to nuclear technology, has compli-
cated LDC relations with the nuclear supplier states.
Only a few countries--advanced Western nations and the
Soviet Union--have the industrial base necessary to
produce nuclear power reactors for export. (Several
others have successfully constructed power plants for
domestic use.) The same set of developed nations
generally controls nuclear supplies, such as fuel and
heavy water. Moreover, nations within this group also
control the bulk of existing nuclear weapons. This con-
trol--"monopoly"--over the world's nuclear assets has
drawn increasing fire from the developing world, giving
a North-South dimension to nuclear affairs that is be-
coming increasin 1 troublesome, particularly to the
United States.
Access to Technology
In pushing for access to peaceful nuclear technol-
ogy, the LDCs cite Article IV of the NPT. This article
acknowledges the "inalienable right" of all treaty
parties to develop nuclear technology for peaceful pur-
poses, with special attention to be devoted to nonnuclear
weapons states (NNWS) and developing countries.*
The growing LDC interest in nuclear energy has
triggered changes in international nuclear politics that
reinforce the North-South, supplier-consumer tensions
inherent in the international nonproliferation regime.
Since the conclusion of the NPT, the views of supplier
25X1
*Article IV was included in the NPT to induce NNWS to undertake
the formal commitment to forgo nuclear weapons development by
balancing NNWS rights and obligations. In a similar balance, the
International Atomic Energy Agency was given the dual responsibil-
ity of promoting peaceful use of nuclear ener and inspecting for
compliance with international safeguards. 25X1
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countries concerning peaceful applications of nuclear
technology have undergone considerable revision. Led
by the United States, these countries have evinced a
growing reluctance to export the most sophisticated
technology to developing nations because of its possible
use in nuclear weapons development programs. Require-
ments for renegotiation of nuclear contracts in com-
pliance with the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978 heightened the sensitivity of nuclear consumer
countries to their vulnerability to changes in supplier
policy.
The LDCs view the curbs on nuclear exports as di-
rect violations of Article IV obligations. At the
coming review conference, these countries are certain
to demand an end to such discriminatory treatment and
a return to the Article IV undertaking. Continued
failure of the advanced countries to live up to the
LDCs' expectations in this area could cause them to
reconsider their commitments to the NPT, possibly lead-
ing to the eventual withdrawal of some of them and the
consequent weakening of the international nonprolifera-
tion regime.*
Nuclear Discrimination
Nuclear programs have become a symbol of national
development and status in the Third World. This has
contributed to LDC sensitivity to the preferred treat-
ment accorded to the nuclear weapons states under the
terms of the NPT. The requirement for the application
of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,
reinforced by on-site inspections, to the nuclear fa-
cilities of NNWS signatories of the NPT has been a
source of irritation to the LDCs. To be equitable, in
their view, the NPT should place safeguards on the nu-
clear facilities of all signatory states, regardless of
nuclear weapons status. The United States and the
United Kingdom have offered to place their civilian
nuclear facilities under safeguards, but the Soviet
Union--the other nuclear weapons state signatory to
%All parties to the NPT have the right to withdraw from the Treaty
'
notice.
with cause after giving three months
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the NPT--has not.* The US-UK offer is unlikely to de-
fuse LDC objections to this aspect of the Treaty in any
case, since the two countries continue to exempt mili-
tary facilities and nuclear weapons stockpiles from
international ins ection th erpetuating their priv-
ileged status.
The developing countries have also attempted to
gain greater representation on the IAEA executive organ,
the Board of Governors. At present, LDCs hold 18 of
the 34 Board seats. By increasing their ability to
dominate the Board, expanded LDC representation would
enhance the influence of developing countries on nuclear
affairs and their ability to promote their particular
concerns. Furthermore, it would confirm the le itim
of their interest in nuclear development.
Nuclear Disarmament
Demands by the LDCs for increased access to nuclear
technology are complemented by their calls for nuclear
disarmament. Their demands on this issue frequently
cite Article VI of the NPT, which represents an effort
to balance the obligation of the NNWS to forgo nuclear
weapons development with pledges that the nuclear wea-
pons states signatory to the Treaty will seek an end
to the nuclear arms race with the ultimate objectiv
of achieving complete disarmament.
As one means of furthering realization of the
Article VI undertaking, the LDCs have specifically
urged the superpowers to conclude a second strategic
arms limitations treaty and a comprehensive test ban
(CTB). Signature of these treaties could take place
before the NPT Review Conference. If it does, some
developing countries may express qualified approval
of these treaties, but the more outspoken LDCs may de-
nounce them as inadequate, especially if they are for
limited terms. LDC skepticism about the disarmament
value of the treaties will probably be reinforced by
-France and the I R Peon] p epublic of China have not signed the
NPT.
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public debate on the merits of such arms control agree-
ments. Developing country critics of the US-USSR agree-
ments will demand the destruction of remaining nuclear
stockpiles of the weapons states and a permanent end
to what they term vertical proliferation, that is, the
development of increasingly sophisticated nuclear cap-
abilities by the nuclear weapons states. Neither a
second strategic arms treaty nor CTB is thus likely
substantially to defuse LDC demands for superpower
nuclear disarmament. F__ I
Traditionally, the developing countries have made
nuclear disarmament a precondition to their willingness
to discuss conventional arms control. This linkage is
now eroding, possibly because of the progress--however
slow and inadequate--in nuclear arms control. In the
Program of Action issued at the conclusion of the UN
Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in June 1978, the
LDCs agreed to recognize conventional armaments as a
"priority" item for disarmament discussion. Neverthe-
less, they continue to stress nuclear weapons in t eir
call for arms reduction.
LDC statements also link superpower arms control
arrangements with an increase in the money that they
believe should be available from those countries for
Third World development programs. They argue that
military buildups divert funds that by rights should
be devoted to improving conditions in the developing
world and that therefore they are entitled to any money
saved through arms control arrangements. They have
attempted--and failed--to gain formal acceptance of
this linkage at a variety of international meetings,
including the SSOD, but can be expected to continue to
pursue this goal at the NPT Review Conference. Thus,
even though they will probably be dissatisfied with
the strategic arms control treaties, they will still
demand increased superpower or development
projects.
Negative Assurances
To offset the lack of satisfactory progress toward
nuclear disarmament and the perceived disadvantages of
NNWS status, the LDCs have urged the nuclear weapons
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states to undertake negative assurances, that is, to
enter into agreements not to use nuclear weapons against
NNWS.* The nuclear weapons states have been willing to
make qualified unilateral statements that limit their
individual freedom to use their nuclear arsenals but
that generally fall short of the sweeping commitments
desired by the developing countries. The final declara-
tion issued by the SSOD acknowledged these unilateral
statements but called for more effective measures to
avoid the use of nuclear wea ons, particularly against
NNWS.
The NPT presently does not contain any provision
governing, or limiting, potential use of nuclear weapons.
The developing countries, having failed to convince the
nuclear weapons states to accede in their demands for
negative assurances at the SSOD, are likely to attempt
to force incorporation of negative assurance language
into the NPT itself, or, at a minimum, into the Con-
ference Report.**
Role of the Nonaligned Movement
The developing countries voice their nuclear de-
mands in a variety of international forums, with India
and Yugoslavia as their most aggressive representatives.
Yugoslavia is a signatory of the NPT, but India has re-
fused to sign because of the treaty's alleged "dis-
criminatory nature." F7 I
Yugoslavia has been trying to create a consensus
on nuclear energy within the nonaligned movement. Last
month, Belgrade hosted a meeting of nonaligned countries
calling themselves the Nonaligned Countries Coordinating
**The NPT can be amended with the approval of a majority of all
parties to the Treaty, including all the nuclear weapons states
party to the Treaty and all members of the IAEA Board of Govern-
ors. F77 I
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Group for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.* The
conference was attended by most of the group's 14 member
states but was boycotted by other major developing coun-
try nuclear users, such as India. The final confer-
ence document reiterated traditional LDC demands con-
cerning nuclear energy and disarmament. Significantly,
it also called for coordination of the LDC positions to
be taken at the NPT Review Conference.
The developing countries can be expected to ac-
celerate their preparations for the review conference
during the coming months. Nonaligned demands, particu-
larly for increased access to advanced nuclear technology
and more progress in superpower disarmament, promise to
be a troublesome factor at the NPT Review Conference.
The United States, as a major power behind the drive to
curb the export of sensitive nuclear technology, will
probably be singled out for particular criticism by the
LDCs in that forum.
'Members of the group are Algeria, Argentina, Central African
Empire, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Morocco,
Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. India was invited to
join the group but decided not to. The Central African Empire
and Niger did not attend the December meeting. The next group
meeting is slated to be held in Algeria this spring. 25X1
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Sofia: Toward a World Communist Conference?
From 12-15 December 1978, delegations from 73
Communist or pro-Communist parties, including 21 party
chiefs and 79 politburo, secretariat and central com-
mittee members, attended a conference at Sofia, Bul-
garia, held under the rubric "Construction of Social-
ism and Communism and World Development." The confer-
ence appears to have been a prelude to further multi-
lateral party gatherings over the next year or so. As
the theme of the December meeting suggests, the So-
viets and their Communist party colleagues may attempt
to use such conferences to focus attention on a number
of global issues, such as detente, disarmament, rela-
tions between industrially advanced and less developed
countries, and human rights. If the Sofia experience
is an indication, however, such substantive issues are
likely to receive less attention than inter-Communist
The Soviets appear to be trying to organize a high-
level worldwide gathering of Communist parties, despite
the troubles encountered at a lower level meeting held
last month in Sofia.
F--
Even before the
Sofia meeting, the Soviets began sounding out the idea
of holding such a conference in the near future. Whether
the Sofia conference was a positive step toward this goal
is not clear, but the kind and the extent of the coverage
given to it by Soviet media suggest that the Soviets feel
that the results of the Sofia meeting were not entirely
negative, and that a further and more ambitious effort
to convene a world gathering is worthwhile.
The Sofia meeting, apparently hastily arranged by
the Soviets sometime in late October, was largely devoted
to a broad attack on China and thinly veiled criticism of
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Romania for being out of step with the rest of the 'War-
saw Pact countries on such issues as opposition to China
and increasing military expenditures. All East European
delegations and most of the other pro-Soviet parties
represented were led by high-ranking party officials.
By contrast, the delegations from the major West European
Communist parties that have kept the Soviets at arms
length for some time--including the Italian, French, and
Spanish--were headed by their relatively low-ranking
representatives to the editorial board of the journal
"Problems of Peace and Socialism."
Available information on the Sofia meeting and the
continuing polemical exchanges between Moscow and Bucha-
rest indicate that the conference did not change the
attitudes or tactics of the independently minded Commu-
nist parties with regard to such key issues as opposition
to China and increasing Warsaw Pact military expenditures.
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An additional sign of Soviet difficulties at Sofia was
the absence of Yugoslavia, signalin Belgrade's continu-
ing opposition to Soviet policies. 25X1
The difficulties the Soviets encountered at Sofia
are likely to bedevil any attempt in the near term to
convene a major international Communist gathering. The
last worldwide meeting was in Moscow in 1969, while the
last gathering of European Communist parties was held
in East Berlin in 1976. The latter, initiated by the
Soviets to mobilize the European parties against the
Chinese, was preceded by two years of intense consulta-
tions and was convened only after the Soviets agreed to
Romanian, Yugoslav, and Eurocommunist demands to recog-
nize the independence of each Communist party. Soviet
attempts to hold another summit conference will be viewed
by these parties as an effort by Moscow to erode the
earlier progress toward independence. The leaders of
the Italian and French Communist parties have recently
reasserted their categorical opposition to either a
world, or even an all-European, gathering of Communist
parties under Soviet sponsorship. Failure of the Sofia
participants to issue a joint communique testifies to
the determined resistance of several of the Communist
parties in attendance to Soviet attempts to bring them
in line. Some of the parties that did not attend the
Sofia conference (for example, the Yugoslavs) may try
to organize a boycott of any Soviet-sponsored, worldwide
Communist summit meeting. Even some of those who were
represented at Sofia (especially those who sent lower
level representatives) may join such a move. 25X1
The Soviet media have not only described the Sofia meet-
ing as marking a "new stage" in the Communist movement,
but have dropped hints that Moscow would like to repeat
the experience on a larger scale. The Soviets may be-
lieve that they have little choice but to make such an
effort. They may be sufficiently concerned over China's
opening to the West--both to Western governments and
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West European Communist parties--as well as over increas-
ing Chinese diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe to
settlp- fn-r whatever vocal support they might be able to
get.
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PARTICIPANTS AT THE SOFIA IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE
Ruling- Parties (12)
Bulgarian Communist Party
Communist Party of Cuba
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
Socialist Unity Party of Germany
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
Polish United Workers' Party
Romanian Communist Party
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of Vietnam
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)
Non-Ruling Parties (6)
Socialist Vanguard Party (Algeria)
Communist Party of Argentina
Communist Party of Austria
Communist Party of Bangladesh
Communist Party of Belgium
Communist Party of Bolivia
Brazilian Communist Party
Communist Party of Canada
Communist Party of Chile
Communist Party of Colombia
Congolese Labour Party
Popular Vanguard Party (Costa Rica)
Reconstruction Party of the Working
People (Cyprus)
Communist Party of Denmark
Dominican Communist Party
Communist Party of Ecuador
Communist Party of Egypt
Communist Party of El Salvador
Level of Representation
Politburo
Central Committee
Politburo; Secretariat
Provisional Military Council
Politburo; Secretariat
Secretariat
Secretariat
Secretariat
Executive Council
Politburo
Central Committee
Central Committee
(Unknown)
Central Committee
Chairman
Secretariat
Central Committee
Central Committee
Secretary General
Secretary General
Central Committee
(Unknown)
(Unknown)
Politburo
Deputy Secretary General
Chairman
Central Committee
Politburo
Politburo
PPS*
*Member of Editorial Board of Problems o
Peace and Socialism.
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Non-Ruling Parties (Cont.)
Communist Party of Finland
French Communist Party
Communist Party of (West) Germany
Communist Party of Great Britain
Communist Party of Greece
Guatemalan Party of Labor
People's Progressive Party of Guyana
Unified Party of Haitian Communist
Communist Party of Honduras
Communist Party of India
Communist Party of Indonesia
Tudeh Party of Iran
Iraqi Communist Party
Irish Workers' Party
Communist Party of Israel (Rakah)
Italian Communist Party
Japan Communist Party
Jordanian Communist Party
Lebanese Communist Party
Communist Party of Luxembourg
Communist Party of Malta
Mexican Communist Party
Party of Progress and Socialism (Morocco)
Communist Party of the Netherlands
Communist Party of Norway
People's Party of Panama
Paraguayan Communist Party
Peruvian Communist Party
Philippines Communist Party
Portuguese Communist Party
South African Communist Party
Communist Party of Spain
Sri Lanka Communist Party
Sudanese Communist Party
Left Party Communists (Sweden)
Swiss Party of Labor
Syrian Communist Party
Communist Party of Turkey
Communist Party, USA
Communist Party of Uruguay
Communist Party of Venezuela
Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Socialist Party of Yemen
Level of Representation
Politburo
PPS
Chairman
PPS
Secretary General
Central Committee
Secretariat
(Unknown)
Politburo, Chairman
Secretariat
(Unknown)
First Secretary
First Secretary
Secretary General
Secretary General
PPS
Central Committee
Politburo
Secretary General
Central Committee
Central Committee
Executive Commission of Central
Committee
Central Committee
(Unknown)
Chairman
Central Committee
First Secretary
Secretary General
PPS
Secretary General
Politburo, Secretariat
Below Central Committee Level
Politburo
Politburo
(Unknown)
Politburo, Secretariat:
Politburo
Secretary General
Secretary General
First Secretary
Politburo, Secretariat
Chairman
Central Committee
31 January 1979
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NONPARTICIPANTS AT THE SOFIA IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE
(UNCLASSIFIED)
12 - 15 December 1978
Ruling Parties (6)
Albanian Party of Labor
Communist Party of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
Chinese Communist Party
Korean Workers' Party
Laos People's Revolutionary Party
League of Communists of Yugoslavia
Non-Ruling Parties (21)
People's Democratic Party (Afghanistan)
Socialist Party of Australia
Burma Communist Party (White Flag)
Faroe Islands Communist Party
Guadeloupe Communist Party
Jamaican Communist Party
Communist Party of Lesotho
Communist Party of Malaya
Martinique Communist Party
Communist Party of Nepal
New Zealand Socialist Unity Party
Socialist Party of Nicaragua
"Nigerian Marxist-Leninists"
Communist Party of Pakistan
Puerto Rican Communist Party
Reunion Communist Party
Communist Party of San Marino
Saudi Arabian Communist Party
African Independence Party of Senegal
Communist Party of Thailand
Tunisian Communist Party
31 January 1979
40
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010025-7
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010025-7
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO02300010025-7