INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010021-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 27, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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ent 25X1
Assessm
Center
International
Issues Review
Confidential
RP IIR 78-002
27 September 1978
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CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW
27 September 1978
CONTENTS
TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1978: PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Developments have included growing sophistication
of terrorist weapons, the spread of international
terrorism to Central America, and setbacks to
several major terrorist organizations. Intergov-
ernmental antiterrorist cooperation has led to a
major antihijacking agreement.
THE LOT AIRLINES HIJACKING: SORTING OUT THE
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The American preference for a West German trial
of hijackers has met with strong British, French,
and West German opposition. The case involves a
morass of legal and political complications, in-
cluding East-West relations, allied supervision
of Berlin, and international cooperation against
terrorism.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNESCO: PROSPECTS FOR THE 20TH GENERAL
CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Next month's conference may be the most divisive
in several years. Contentious topics include a
draft declaration on mass media and several issues
growing out of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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THE DEVELOPING NATIONS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY--
FOUNDERING COOPERATION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The LDCs are frustrated over what they regard as
a sluggish response by industrial countries to
their demand for a greater share of political and
economic power. Their frustration could lead to
verbal slugging matches at this fall's session,
but probably not to a full-scale clash.
ARMS TRANSFERS
THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE AT THE SSOD . . 28
The recent UN Special Session on Disarmament en-
dorsed the limitation of conventional arms trans-
fers. This action will help to legitimate bila-
teral and regional efforts to implement arms
transfer restraints.
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
MEETING GLOBAL FOOD NEEDS: MODEST PROGRESS,
CONTINUING-PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Agricultural production in the food-importing
poorer countries is still generally not able to
keep pace with population growth, and their depen-
dence on imports is growing. Some countries have
been able to build substantial reserves, however,
and the UN system is better equipped to deal with
a future food crisis than it was in 1972-74.
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1978: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Most established patterns of international ter-
rorist behavior in 1977 have continued into 1978, in-
cluding attacks on Western diplomatic and business
facilities, an emphasis on simple types of opera-
tions, and a preference for striking targets in in-
dustrialized democracies.* Significant changes have
included attacks involving mass casualties, the
spread of international terrorism to Central America,
and setbacks to several major European and Palestin-
ian terrorist organizations. The year so far has also
seen East European antiterrorist cooperation with the
West and the first international antihijacking agree-
ment with potentially effective enforcement measures.
Techniques and Targets
Despite the publicity given to occasionally sophis-
ticated operations (e.g., the kidnaping of Italy's Aldo
Moro, the reciprocal assassination campaign between Fatah
and the Iraqis, and the Sandinist takeover of Nicaragua's
legislative chambers), most terrorist attacks continue
to be simple bombings, arsons, snipings, or threats.
Officials and businessmen--especially individuals that
are symbols of Western power and wealth--are still the
primary targets. Tourists and other private citizens
are victimized only incidentally (e.g., as passengers
on a hijacked airliner).
One innovation in technique and targeting that
caused widespread alarm was the poisoning of Israeli
oranges in Western Europe. This operation--believed to
be the work of Arab terrorists--showed an unusual will-
ingness to relinquish control over the choice of indi-
vidual targets. The Abadan, Iran, theater fire in which
27 September 1978
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at least 377 died--an equally indiscriminate operation--
as well as the downing of a Rhodesian civilian airliner
with heat-seeking missiles, may indicate that at least
some groups are becoming less worried about harming po-
tential supporters or innocent bystanders. This devel-
opment has disturbing implications for the debate on
whether terrorists would ever resort to atomic, biologi-
cal, or chemical (ABC) weapons. Up to now, arguments
against the likelihood that terrorists would use ABC
weapons hinged on their previous unwillingness to in-
flict mass casualties or to give up the ability to
select specific targets.
Regional Patterns
Most attacks still occur in the major industrialized
countries. But in Latin America the geographic locus of
terrorism shifted. While guerrilla violence has declined
in its historic arena--the Southern Cone--it has spread
to Central America, most notably Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. Kidnapings in San Salvador of Swedish,
Japanese, and local business executives have severely
diminished corporate confidence in El Salvador. In Nic-
aragua, the Sandinist National Liberation Front's take-
over of the National Palace in August was that group's
greatest success. It secured the release of imprisoned
comrades, filled the organization's coffers, and directed
enormous international attention to its activities and
the Nicaraguan political situation. The new round of
civil violence that was sparked by the incident has
presented the Somoza government with its most serious
challenge in years.
Fortunes of Major Groups
The Italian Red Brigades succeeded in generating
international publicity by kidnaping Aldo Moro, the na-
tion's leading political figure. Terrorists also carried
out less dramatic attacks against judges, newsmen, police
officers, employees of large industries, and middle level
political figures, including two attacks on Italian ex-
ecutives of American firms, a target that had previously
been spared. Despite press speculation, it is still un-
certain whether foreign intelligence services or non-
Italian terrorist groups were involved in these actions.
27 September 1978
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Other major groups have been less successful than
the Red Brigades. West German radicals, while embarrass-
ing governmental officials by conducting a daring prison
escape, suffered severe setbacks when a number were ar-
rested in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France, the
Netherlands, and the United States. While still a po-
tential threat, these anarchists have yet to mount a
major international attack this year.
Fatah, generally believed to be the most moderate
Palestinian guerrilla group, seized, the headlines be-
cause of its feud with Iraq and the Black June organiza-
tion, headed by Fatah dissident Abu Nidhal. Both sides
have mounted attacks on each other in capital cities on
three continents, with no early end in sight to the feud.
Although the vendetta's violence has decreased from the
daily battles seen in early August, verbal barrages from
both sides continue unabated. Fatah denounces the Bagh-
dad regime almost daily, while Abu Nidhal, already under
a 1974 Fatah death sentence, has pledged to assassinate
PLO leader Yasir Arafat.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
was dealt a setback with the apparent death by natural,
causes of Wadi Haddad, noted planner and facilitator of
transnational terrorist operations. Although individuals
claiming PFLP membership mounted bloody attacks at Orly
Airport and on a London street, the future of the Haddad
faction remains unclear. It is not yet clear who will re-
place Haddad, and there is no indication that the major-
ity of the PFLP, led by George Habash, has been success-
ful in wooing the Haddad wing back into the fold.
Revolutionaries around the world, including terror-
ists, mourned the loss of Henri Curiel, leader of a Paris-
based support apparatus that funneled money, arms, docu-
ments, training, and other services to scores of leftist
groups. While his organization will probably continue
to function, no successor has emerged with the contacts
and charisma Curiel was able to muster.
The Japanese Red Army continues to be relatively
quiescent. The JRA recently sent reminders of their ex-
ploits to their former hostages, but have not mounted an
operation since last fall's Japanese Airlines hijacking,
during which it freed imprisoned comrades, obtained a $6
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million ransom, and embarrassed the Japanese Government.
Although authorities feared that the JRA would seize upon
local Japanese political issues--such as the Narita Air-
port controversy--to forge links with domestic radicals,
no local operations have occurred.
The whereabouts of Carlos--the infamous Venezuelan
terrorist who led the PFLP - West German team in the
1975 OPEC raid--remain a mystery. His German cohort
from that mission claims that Carlos has retired.
The Ananda Marg--an India-based religious group
that first appeared last year--seems to have been molli-
fied with the release from an Indian prison of its spirit-
ual leader, Prabhat R. Sarkar. During 1977, activist
members of this group conducted attacks against Indian
nationals on several continents.
Patron State Support
Radical Arab states opposed to a political settle-
ment with Israel have continued to work closely with ex-
tremist Palestinian terrorist groups. Iraq's use of
such surrogates in battling the moderate Fatah was par-
ticularly noteworthy.
After having previously used support for national
liberation movements as an excuse for footdragging in
antiterrorist efforts, East European governments have
shown a new spirit of cooperation in combating terrorism.
The Bulgarians, clearly with Soviet approval, allowed a
West German team to arrest Red Army Faction member Till
Meyer and his anarchist associates. The Yugoslavs also
arrested four West German terrorists, but are apparently
delaying their extradition until Bonn grants Belgrade's
request for the return of several Croatian terrorists.
Finally, tourists have noted photos of terrorists being
checked against incoming passengers by East European
guards at border checkpoints. Despite these favorable
signs, it is not clear whether the Soviet and East Euro-
pean governments will expand their concern beyond West
German radicals and also help to curb Arab terrorist ac-
tivities.
27 September 1978
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Antiterrorist Countermeasures
The development of antiterrorist paramilitary squads
may have deterred terrorists from holding hostages for
prolonged periods, a type of incident that has been com-
paratively rare this year. In the one instance that a
rescue team was used, however, it proved a dismal failure.
An apparent breakdown in communication between Cyprus
and Egypt led Cypriot troops to fire on an Egyptian com-
mando contingent that was storming a hijacked airliner
in Larnaca Airport.
The most notable development in international co
operation to combat terrorism was a surprise antihijack-
ing proposal by Japan at the Bonn economic summit con-
ference in July. The seven participants agreed to cut
off air commerce with nations refusing to extradite or
prosecute hijackers and/or to return hijacked planes.
This is the first antihijacking agreement that includes
an enforcement mechanism. Although many technical and
legal questions regarding implementation remain to be
answered, the international response has been generally
favorable.
27 September 1978
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The LOT Airlines Hijacking: Sorting Out the
Jurisdictional Issues
On 30 August, a Polish Airlines (LOT) flight to
East Berlin was hijacked by East German citizens and
forced to land at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin.
Extradition of the offenders to East Germany has been
all but ruled out. Nonetheless, the case raises legal
issues--centering around who should try the case--that
are complicated by political considerations of East-
West relations, Allied supervision of Berlin, and the
effectiveness of the Bonn antihijacking agreement.*
Pending resolution of these issues, the hijackers re-
main in the custody of US military police.
East European Perspectives: The Extradition Issue
On 31 August, the Poles requested that the US Com-
mandant in Berlin extradite the hijackers to Poland. In
similar cases of East European hijackings to the West,
extradition has been rejected by Western governments,
who have preferred to prosecute. American failure to
extradite in the present case has offered the East Germans
a new opportunity to charge that the US and West Germany
are not adhering to the Bonn antihijacking agreement.
This attack is off the mark: the Bonn agreement calls
for extradition or prosecution of hijackers.
The East German regime is also upset because several
East German passengers decided to stay in West Germany.
It has demanded their return, but the West Berlin Senat
replied that the matter was up to the three Allied powers
(UK, France, US). The East German passengers do not need
to apply formally for political asylum because under
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West German law they have an automatic right to West
'German residence. The issue of their return has been
quietly dropped by East German officials, who are mainly
concerned about the fate of the hijackers.
The Soviets also seized on the LOT case and have
issued statements supporting the East German position.
Debate Among the Allied Powers: Who Should Try the Case?
The American preference for a West German trial of
the hijackers has been met with strong objections by the
French, British, and West Germans.
The French believe that hijacking in Berlin is an
Allied matter, since it affects security and air traffic,
both areas of reserved rights. They argue that the US,
rather than the Germans, should try the hijackers and
point to a 1969 precedent in which a specially established
French court tried two East Germans who hijacked a LOT
plane to Berlin. In addition, the French suggest that
a West German court trying the present case would find it
difficult to obtain statements and other evidence from.
the plane's East German passengers.*
The British believe that although the plane landed
in the American sector, the interests of all the Allies
in Berlin are involved. While they are willing to con-
sider extradition to Poland, they also prefer an American
trial. London believes that a West German court might
be more lenient than a US court and that an American
trial would be perceived by the East as being a better
deterrent to potential hijackers. The British--in con-
trast to the French--believe, however, that conditions
have changed since 1969 and note that the Hague and
Montreal antihijacking conventions, which have now beer.L
signed and extended to Berlin, give the West Germans the
legal authority to try the hijackers.
*It is not clear how a non-German court would be able to overcome
this particular difficulty.
27 September 1978
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The View from Bonn: Domestic Pressures
The LOT hijacking puts West Germany in a politically
uncomfortable position. The US wants a West German trial,
but several countervailing domestic and international po-
litical concerns lead Bonn to prefer that the US assume
jurisdiction.
The West Germans are also concerned about Eastern
claims that a West German trial would be an impermissible
Allied delegation--if not abrogation--of reserved rights
in Berlin, particularly in civil aviation. Bonn fears
that such a trial could trigger a Soviet - East German
campaign to reduce Allied control over the air corridors
to Berlin, a subject to which West Germans are highly
sensitive.
Hoping to avoid these difficulties, West Germany
has argued that a US court should try the case. Bonn
contends that assumption of jurisdiction by West Germany
would be counterproductive to Allied interests in several
areas:
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-- A lenient West German verdict would damage
efforts to gain international acceptance
for the Bonn antihijacking declaration.
A West German court might find that the
constitutional right of free movement
would take precedence over the crime of
hijacking. The Bonn administration would
not be able to direct the court to rule
otherwise and hence would not be able
to ensure a severe sentence. This, the
West Germans contend, would impair their
negotiations with East Germany, which is
not sympathetic to problems caused by
the independence of the West German ju-
diciary. The inter-German talks, however,
include issues more important to East
Germany than a hijacker's trial.
-- The Soviets and East Germans would object
to a Berlin court trial as being an un-
acceptable exercise of West German sov-
ereignty over West Berlin. The US
believes, however, that to agree to an
American trial would be tantamount to
accepting the validity of Soviet protests
against the extension to Berlin of West
German ratifications of the Hague and
Montreal antihijacking conventions.
While a West German trial might be unpalatable to
both West and East Germany, existing legislation provides
sufficient authority for the West Germans to prosecute.
The principal hijacker has confessed to acts punishable
under criminal law in force in West Berlin. An Allied
trial would be required only if members of Allied forces
or Allied interests were involved. Moreover, the West
Germans have quietly admitted that they would probably
insist on their right to prosecute under the Hague and
Montreal conventions if the hijackers were non-German,.
The West German representative in the Bonn Group has
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stated that West German authorities will cooperate--
reluctantly--if the US directs that the hijacker be
turned over to them.*
Conclusion
The effects of the LOT case on the Bonn antihijack-
ing declaration have been minimal. According to the
Canadians, West Germany seems to be losing some of its
initial enthusiasm for the Bonn declaration, which the
West Germans fear may violate international law with its
ambiguous and vague phrasing. Despite these second
thoughts and the Allies' jurisdictional debate, there
have been no perceptible signs of serious erosion in
Allied support for the Bonn declaration. The Allied
agreement to prosecute, in whatever forum, tends to sup-
port this conclusion. No nation outside the Eastern bloc
has raised the LOT case in diplomatic channels with any
of the seven participants in the Bonn summit. Indeed,
the seven nations have been successful in their efforts
to increase the number of adherents to the antihijacking
declaration.
As expected, the East has reacted adversely to the
Western decision not to extradite, claiming that non-
extradition of hijackers indicates Western sympathy and
aid to "terrorists." This attitude stems from the legacy
of incidents in the late 1940s and 1950s, when East
European dissidents seized airliners to escape to the
West. Lenient Western court sentences for the perpetrators
have been a source of irritation to the Soviet and East
European regimes ever since. This fundamental disagree-
ment with the Western treatment of Soviet and East Euro-
pean hijackers, has, in turn, affected the possibilities
for East-West cooperation against other forms of polit-
-The Bonn Group is a four-power consultative working-level group
composed of representatives from the West German Foreign Office
and the three Western Allies, attended, on occasion, by an ob-
server from the West Berlin delegation to Bonn. Formed in the
late 1950s, the Bonn Group has played an increasingly important
role in coordinating negotiations on all-German matters and the
special status of Berlin.
27 September 1978
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UNESCO: PROSPECTS FOR THE 20TH GENERAL CONFERENCE
At its 20th General Conference in Paris next
month, the UN Educational, Social, and Cultural Organ-
ization (UNESCO) may be facing its most divisive meet-
ing since 1974 when the membership barred Israeli par-
ticipation in the European regional group. That act
led to a decision by the US Congress temporarily to
suspend payment of US dues, amounting to 25 percent of
the overall budget. The US has since resumed paying
its dues. In introducing or supporting a number of
highly contentious issues for consideration by the
conference, the UNESCO leadership and some of the less
developed countries may be underestimating the impact
that adoption of these proposals would have on the in-
dustrialized countries in general and on US public and
Congressional opinion in particular.
One of the most contentious issues at the General
Conference will be approval of the final draft of the
declaration on mass media, a document that establishes
the principle of state responsibility for all media
that enter into or circulate within a country. Di-
rector General M'Bow will submit the final draft, and
UNESCO will probably adopt a version of it.
-- It is likely that the provisions in the declara-
tion will be less stringent than. those tabled in
previous drafts.
-- Significant opposition to the current draft still
exists among industrialized nations, and this op-
position will diminish only if Director General
M'Bow modifies part of the current draft.
-- Most of the key LDCs support the draft and are
not likely to vote against it. Some of them may
be willing to act as a moderating force in be-
hind-the-scenes negotiations.
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The Soviet Union and its allies will strongly
support the draft and will probably attempt to
include more stringent provisions.
Other divisive topics that will be discussed at
the UNESCO General Conference this year are not new;
they have been the source of tension at previous con-
ferences, and several of them are rooted in the con-
flict between the Arabs and Israelis. Although no
UNESCO body has condemned Israel since 1976, there
will be a concerted effort to include anti-Israel pro-
posals in some of the resolutions. Support for this
Arab effort will depend to some extent on perceptions
of the outcome of the Camp David summit.
Draft Declaration on Mass Media Principles
A draft declaration on mass media principles has
been a contentious issue in UNESCO since it was first
suggested by the Soviets at the 1972 UNESCO General Con-
ference. The declaration became a subject of dispute
during the next two conferences, and in 1976 a vote on
it was postponed. Industrialized nations objected stren-
uously to the draft introduced at the meeting in 1976,
and the Director General was charged with holding "further
broad consultations with experts with a view to preparing
a final draft which could meet the largest possible meas-
ure of agreement." The text that the Director General
issued on 21 August is his most recent attempt to present
an acceptable draft.
The preamble of the most recent draft emphasizes
limitations on freedom of expression. It also includes
an implicit reference equating Zionism with racism. The
provisions of the draft lay the groundwork for state con-
trol of domestic media, state responsibility for its news
media overseas, and regulation of local correspondents
of foreign news media.
LDC Perspectives: Increased awareness of what the
LDCs perceive as an "information imbalance" will hamper
possible attempts by the industrialized nations to defer
a vote on this issue next month. LDC interest in the
declaration has grown in the past few years as they have
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attempted to organize their own news pools and promote!
exchanges with international news agencies. The non-
aligned foreign ministers endorsed these efforts at their
meeting in Belgrade last July. The coordinating council
of the nonaligned news agencies' pool resolved last April
that the UNESCO Director General should submit a mass
media declaration to the 20th General Conference for a
vote. The council also asked that the principles of the
declaration be expanded to include a reference equating
Zionism with racism.
Most LDCs probably view the language in the most
recent mass media declaration as much milder than in
previous drafts. Consequently, they will probably have
difficulty comprehending the industrialized countries'
objections to it.
The overwhelming majority of LDCs advocate adoption
of the draft, but their reasons for doing so vary. Even
among the group of LDCs whose long-term involvement in
mass media questions precludes any doubt that they will
strongly support the text, there are different reasons
for supporting the draft.* Some, such as Cuba, Libya,
and North Korea, that are active in the coordinating
council of the nonaligned news agencies' pool may pro-
pose language in the declaration that would further re-
strict the role of the media and will probably instigate
a call for a vote even if the Director General does not
introduce the declaration. Others in the group like
Mexico and Venezuela are more concerned with correcting
the information imbalance through more practical and
less rhetorical means and will probably not be active
leaders in organizing LDC support for the declaration.
A second group of LDCs will support the draft mainly
to ensure their status within the nonaligned movement.
Countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania will probably vote
for the declaration even though they might not actively
"This group--composed of such countries as Cuba, Algeria, Libya,
Vietnam, North Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela--has long espoused the
need for a broad series of changes in international communications
that are informally termed the New World Information Order. Many
of these countries have played a major role in nonaligned or re-
gional news agencies' pools.
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participate in the debate or in the working group nego-
tiations. These LDCs will be the target of persuasion
by the activists in the nonaligned news agencies' pool
and may be influenced--for extraneous tradeoffs--to push
hard for the declaration.
A number of LDCs in the nonaligned movement could
work as a moderating force in behind-the-scenes maneuver-
ing on the declaration or in a procedural vote. These
countries--which include Yugoslavia, Jordan, and the
ASEAN nations--would be unlikely to take a public stand
against the declaration, however, for fear of compromis-
ing their influence among the nonaligned.
To some LDCs, such as Saudi Arabia, the mass media
declaration is a low-priority item. Any attempt to de-
termine the degree of support they will give to the dec-
laration is complicated by the prospect that their poli-
cies are likely to be affected by extraneous concerns.
A small but vocal group of LDCs will probably join
the Western nations in opposing the draft. Countries
like Ivory Coast, Togo, Liberia, Haiti, and Costa Rica
have supported Western initiatives in previous confer-
ences and are expected to do so in October. These nations
support the ideal of a free press despite, in some cases,
government-imposed restrictions on their own press organ-
izations.
Soviet and East European Views: The Soviet Union
and the East European countries strongly support the
declaration on mass media principles, but their motives
differ from those of the LDCs. The Soviets were the
first to request UNESCO action on a declaration, and
they have a special interest in its adoption. They have
also organized several joint projects between the Soviet-
sponsored International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
and UNESCO.
The Eastern countries perceive information as es-
sentially a tool of state policy, and they hope to obtain
international acknowledgement that all governments have
the right to control communications. The Soviets and
their allies fear technological changes that open up new
means of communication. This concern is reflected in
their position in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, where they advocate permitting receiving
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nations to place restrictions on the content of broad-
casts transmitted from satellites. These countries also
believe that the mass media issue gives them a common
ground even with those LDCs that are heavily influenced
by the West. The Soviets and their allies will probably
join the more radical LDCs in proposing more restrictive
language on media freedom.
Industrialized Nations' Attitudes: The industrial-
ized nations--the EC Nine, t e Scandinavian countries,
Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and Japan--were instru-
mental in deferring a vote on the declaration during the
last two general conferences. They have issued no offi-
cial statements on the draft of 21 August, although sev-
eral have indicated that they view it as an improvement
over previous drafts. The EC Nine will meet in Bonn on
2 October to discuss the draft, and members of the Euro-
pean media community will join them.
Western media representatives criticized the draft.
at a meeting on 5 September in London, and they will
probably reiterate their objections to their governments.
Media representatives object to the draft because it en-
dorses state control of the media and provides no specific
measures to protect journalists. The vagueness of the
requirement in the declaration to respect the rights of
all nations bothers them as does the requirement to de-
nounce the evils of racism, apartheid, colonialism, and
neocolonialism.
Industrialized nations will probably find unaccept-
able the implicit reference in the mass media declaration
equating Zionism with racism. They may also oppose the
lack of explicit recognition of the need for a free flow
of information. They differ, however, on what defines
a free flow of information and what constitutes restric-
tions on it. The major question is whether the indus-
trialized nations will attempt to amend the draft or de-
cide to oppose it completely.
Some of the industrialized countries, such as Switz-
erland and the UK, oppose a draft in any form. They
question the propriety of UNESCO's role in mass media
issues, and they perceive the declaration as a harmful
diversion from the practical assistance that they would
prefer to give to the Third World.
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wivr1L) FJ11AL
Other developed nations, like Sweden and Norway,
probably oppose the current draft but might be persuaded
to vote for an amended version. If the Zionism-racism
equation were removed and if the draft gave more weight
to the free flow of information, the declaration might
be acceptable to them. Amendments such as these, which
would largely reverse the direction of the declaration,
are unlikely, however, and the chances are good that the
industrialized nations will once again form the core of
the opposition to the declaration.
Arab-Israeli Issues
Race and Racial Preudice: Item 20 on the provi-
sional agenda for t e con erence is the Draft Declara-
tion on Race and Racial Prejudice. The declaration was
adopted at the UNESCO Conference on Race and Racial Prej-
udice last March and is up for approval by all UNESCO
members. While it currently includes no reference equat-
ing Zionism with racism, the Arab states will probably
try to add one, as they did at the meeting in March.
Their success, however, may be impeded by Director Gen-
eral M'Bow's influence over the African nations, whose
stance against an anti-Israel proposal in March prevented
the adoption of the Zionism-racism clause.
Jerusalem: The second area in which the Arab-Israeli
conflict wil appear is Item 21, the Director General's
report on Jerusalem. This resolution, which originated
at the 1974 General Conference, not only condemns Israel
for altering the character of Jerusalem by constructing
high rise buildings and carrying out archeological exca-
vations but also withholds UNESCO financial aid. At the
1976 conference, the resolution on Jerusalem was reaf-
firmed despite strong Western objections.
This year the Director General will again report on
the situation in Jerusalem, and because new plans for ex-
cavations were announced during July in the Jerusalem
Post, his report will probably trigger an effort y the
Arabs to reaffirm the 1974 resolution against the Israelis.
Furthermore, an effort to include harsher sanctions and
more radical anti-Israel language may occur. The views
of the Africans will again determine the success of an
Arab move to include a Zionism-racism clause in the reso-
lution on Jerusalem.
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Occupied Territories: In a resolution passed at
the 1974 UNESCO General Conference, the Director General
was instructed to take full responsibility for the edu-
cational and cultural institutions of the inhabitants of
the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, a task that re-
quires Israeli cooperation. At the 1976 conference,
M'Bow was reminded of his responsibility by the reaf-
firmation of the 1974 resolution, and he will report on
the status of Arab education and culture in the occupied
territories next month. M'Bow has received approval from
the UNESCO executive board for a plan including several
proposals that could be implemented only by Israel. The
Israelis will probably object to M'Bow's ideas, among
which is the recommendation to place a high-level UNESCO
official in the territories. M'Bow's determination to
fulfill his responsibility despite Israeli objections
will probably introduce a third area of conflict where
Arab attacks on Israel--perhaps even an effort to exclude
it from UNESCO--may develop.
Other Influences on the Proceedings
Impact of Multilateral Meetings: The results of
other recent multilateral meetings could also affect
anti-Israel activities at the General Conference. In
late July, the nonaligned foreign ministers included
several references equating Zionism with racism in the
final document of their meeting in Belgrade, and the
World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimina-
tion closed late last month by approving a final document
that includes several references to Israel that are
highly objectionable to the Western nations. The US did
not take part in the meeting, and the LDCs were unable
to negotiate an acceptable text with the Western coun-
tries. The EC Nine, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
left the meeting. Any attempts by the LDCs to include a
reference to the final document from the August meeting
on racism in the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial
Prejudice will trigger a strong reaction from the Western
countries at the General Conference.
The atmosphere of the UN General Assembly and the
discussion there of topics such as the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) may also affect the UNESCO meeting.
General LDC interest in the NIEO and the influence of
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various high-level UNESCO officials such as M'Bow and
delegates such as former Mexican President Echeverria sug-
gest that discussion of the NIEO may occupy a significant
part of the debate on general policy issues.
Internal Factors: Several internal factors will
probably influence activities at the General Conference.
The election of a president of the conference presented
no problems a few months ago when the Canadians proposed
the only candidate. Since then, however, the Arabs have
advanced a contender, and his selection could aggravate
the already tense situation concerning possible anti-
Israel resolutions.
The order of the agenda could also affect how var-
ious delegates will vote. For example, if tempers are
aroused over the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice,
this might influence the vote on the mass media declara-
tion.
On some issues the composition of the delegations
will have a significant impact. For example, the Tunis-
ian Foreign Minister fully supported the Yugoslav draft
on mass media at the nonaligned foreign ministers' meet-
ing in Belgrade, a document that only mildly criticizes
the Western nations. If he attends the General Confer-
ence, he might exert a moderating influence at the work-
ing group level. on the mass media question. Should
Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Masmoudi at-
tend, his primary goal would be to amend the draft dec-
laration to include more strident language.
Pressures on M'Bow: There are many pressures on
M'Bow. To have a productive meeting, he must not only
stop the Africans from voting with the Arabs on anti-
Israeli proposals--as he did at the conference last
March--but he must also try to secure continued support
from the Western nations, whose financial assistance is
essential for many specific UNESCO activities. He is
also caught between conflicting demands on the mass media
issue. If he introduces a draft that is objectionable
to the industrialized nations, he risks splitting the
meeting; if he fails to introduce a draft, he may lose
the support of his largest constituency, the LDCs.
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Outlook
The UNESCO conference is likely to be one of the
most difficult international meetings for the US in some
time. The substance of the issues under consideration,
the likelihood of sharp rhetorical confrontation over
sensitive Arab-Israeli problems, and the limits on US
influence over the proceedings will make it difficult
for the US to attain even its current limited objectives.
The debate over the mass media declaration strikes
at the heart of a deeply held US value--the free flow of
information--leaving little room for negotiating flexi-
bility. At the same time, most Third World countries
favor a concept of balanced information flows, and even
some of our OECD partners view the question of the free
flow of information in terms that are not as all encom-
passing as those of the US.
A sober debate on these issues would be difficult
under the best of circumstances. At UNESCO, the debate
will become embroiled in a host of tangentially related
issues, the most contentious of which will highlight the
same Arab-Israeli tensions that once before led to US
action inimical to the organization and limited the abil-
ity of the US to project its influence in it.
At the conference, trade-offs through concessions
on some other issues may be important if the US is to se-
cure its objectives on the mass media declaration. The
US has little to offer on the declaration itself that
most LDCs will find acceptable. Many LDCs may believe
that the draft has already been significantly weakened
and that further modifications would result in a resolu-
tion reaffirming a status quo they find increasingly
difficult to tolerate. Possible concessions on economic
issues at the conference, such as promises of increased
communications aid, would probably only have limited impact.
Little has been done so far to carry out US offers at the
1976 UNESCO General Conference to increase communications
aid, and the generally slow pace of other North-South
negotiations could also tend to limit US credibility.
A final factor that could affect attitudes toward
reaching an accommodation with the US and other indus-?
trialized countries on contentious issues is a possible
insensitivity to US domestic politics. Notwithstanding
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l.V1&r ?IJ N 11L]L
the experience of 1974 when Congress suspended the pay-
ment of US dues to UNESCO, some LDCs may underestimate
the extent of a possible backlash of US public and Con-
gressional opinion in the event the conference adopts
positions sharply in conflict with US goals and inter-
ests. Moreover, most LDCs will perceive that the pre-
vious withholding of US dues from UNESCO did not seri-
ously disrupt the organization. The LDCs will also be
aware that the US withdrawal from the International Labor
Organization has not crippled that body. Thus, US lever-
age at the 20th General Conference will be limited be-
cause even the extreme prospect of US withdrawal may be
perceived by most members as more damaging to US inter-
ests than to those of UNESCO.
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t UNV IUL 4.L
The Developing Nations at the UN General Assembly--
Foundering Cooperation?
The UN General Assembly opened its 33rd annual
session on 19 September in an atmosphere of apparent
cordiality, but underlying tension. In the eyes of
some developing countries, only glacial advances have
been made toward solving some of their outstanding
problems. Although they are questioning the utility of
moderation in their dealings with industrial states,
their frustration is unlikely to lead to the full-
scale clash that occurred in 1974. The developing
states recognize that the General Assembly is a forum
that can discuss--but not necessarily resolve--major
problems. The outcome of the session will depend
largely on how issues develop outside the UN forum.
The delegates' attention will probably be dominated by
the perennial questions of the Middle East, southern
Africa, disarmament, and economic concerns. A host of
apparently secondary matters, such as the status of
Puerto Rico and the mass media declaration at the
UNESCO General Conference in October, could transcend
their objective importance if they become issues in
the Assembly.
This year the General Assembly welcomes the United
Nations' 150th member, the Solomon Islands. Later in
the session, Dominica may join. The overwhelming major-
ity of members are so-called developing countries. Since
the 1960s, their steadily increasing numbers and influence
have meant that their interests and ambitions have become
the predominant themes of Assembly sessions and of UN
diplomacy generally.
The atmosphere of this session is difficult to pre-
dict. On the one hand, the developing states believe
that the industrial states--and especially the US--lack
the political will to create what they see as a more
equitable international political and economic system.
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Their consequent state of frustration suggests a rocky
road ahead. On the other hand, concessions gained from
the industrial states at the recent UN Special Session
on Disarmament may help to smooth out some of the bumps.
In any case, the sheer volume of items to be debated
will limit the time that can be devoted to any one issue
and may in fact force the delegates to seek ways to avoid
lengthy debate on contentious issues.
Middle East
If the language on the Middle East and Palestine
endorsed at the recent Belgrade nonaligned foreign minis-
ters' meeting is any indication, the debates on these
issues are likely to be very harsh and polemical. The
presence of a new Israeli chief delegate, Yehuda Blum,
who is more doctrinaire than his predecessor, may con-
tribute to sharper debates than in the past. Even the
successful conclusion of the Camp David summit might not
help since it will anger the intransigent Arabs. Last
year the rejectionist Arab states succeeded in prevent-
ing any mention of Egyptian President Sadat's peace ini-
tiative in Assembly resolutions. They could treat the
results of Camp David the same way or use it to condemn
Egypt as well as Israel.
Among the issues the rejectionist states are likely
to attempt to place on the agenda are the convocation of
a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the
Palestinian situation, the equation of Zionism with rac-
ism, and condemnations of Israel's economic and military
links with South Africa--issues that virtually assure
black African support for the Arab cause.
An Iraqi resolution regarding military and nuclear
cooperation with Israel is expected to be raised in com-
mittee and could adversely affect the atmosphere of the
entire session. The resolution, introduced but then
withdrawn at the Special Session on Disarmament, called
for a mandatory arms embargo against Israel.
Southern Africa
Moderate black Africans appear to be effectively re-
sisting radical pressures, as witnessed by the outcome
of the recent OAU summit. This bodes well for a balanced
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approach at the UN on issues of direct concern to the
Africans. Nevertheless, apparent South African rejec-
tion of the Namibian settlement proposal will fuel their
mounting frustrations over their inability to control
events in the region.
As the General Assembly opened, a Security Council
solution to the Namibian independence issue seemed close
to realization. South Africa's rejection of aspects of
the Secretary General's recommendations concerning the
settlement proposal, however, portends more hard bargain-
ing ahead in the UN. Pretoria's announcement of a plan
to hold elections in late November without UN participa-
tion will certainly rile the General Assembly and renew
pressures for economic sanctions against South Africa.
The question of funding the UN force in Namibia is
likely to be hotly debated. The Soviets, who see the
force as a Western initiative, have indicated they will
not agree to financing it either through the regular budget
or by special assessment. There are also a number of
Third World countries who on principle oppose funding
special endeavors from the regular budget. Ultimately,
the financial burden will probably fall on the Western
states.
South Africa's apartheid policy will continue to be
the object of black African wrath. The US is also likely
to draw heat because it refused to participate in the
African-initiated World Racism Conference, which equated
Zionism with racism. The Africans' disappointment over
the walkout by the European Community from the meeting
is certain to be expressed in harsh rhetoric.
The July nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting con-
demned Western nations--including the US--for continuing
military, economic, and nuclear cooperation with South
Africa. Their declaration calling for the UN to apply
mandatory economic sanctions and an arms and petroleum
embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter may come up in the Assembly. South African in-
tention regarding development of nuclear weapons, an
issue that has been bubbling beneath the surface for some
time, may also be raised.
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Disarmament
Progress in arms control negotiations--particularly
on strategic arms limitation and a comprehensive test
ban--will affect the atmosphere in the First Committee,
which will consider only disarmament and security matters.
The debates could be complicated by several thorny topics,
such as Iraq's resolution to cut off arms to Israel,
India's proposal for a complete ban on nuclear testing,
France's proposal for a satellite verification agency,
and the Soviet Union's recent draft convention on strength-
ening security guarantees to nonnuclear states. The
first three initiatives were introduced at the Special
Session, but were withdrawn to allow adoption of a single
document by consensus. The Soviet proposal is an obvious
response to the demands of the nonaligned countries for
assurances against the use of nuclear weapons.
Discussion of so-called zones of peace--particularly
the Indian Ocean--may be controversial. The Soviets may
use the occasion to blame the US for lack of progress in
the Indian Ocean talks. Malta is pursuing the creation
of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean, a proposal that
was rejected by the West at the Special Session on Dis-
armament.
The First Committee will also consider the creation
of a preparatory committee for the second Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) review conference to be held in 1980.
There is some concern that states not party to the NPT
may use the opportunity to seek ways to amend it. Many
states argue that certain countries' export controls on
sensitive nuclear technologies undermine a key portion
of the treaty that guarantees access to nuclear materials
for peaceful purposes under international safeguards.
If the UN debate cannot be kept within moderate bounds,
prospects for an acrimonious and possibly counterproduc-
tive NPT review conference will be significantly increased.
Economic Issues
The recent suspension of meetings of the UN Commit-
tee of the Whole created to oversee and monitor the
North-South dialogue could lead to a confrontational at-
titude in the economic debates. Since its inception
last year, the committee has been beset by differences
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LUI'W IULfi 11HL
over whether it should have a negotiating role. If some
elements of the Group of 77--the developing states caucus--
succeed in pushing their view that the failure of the
meeting is another indication of the loss of momentum in
the dialogue, the discussion of North-South issues could
return to the General Assembly, thus complicating negoti-
ations elsewhere.
In addition to deciding the mandate for the over-
view committee, the main economic items presently on the
agenda are a recommendation to convene a UN conference
on new and renewable sources of energy (excluding oil),
establishment of machinery to draft a new International
Development Strategy for the 1980s, and consideration of
the annual report of the UN Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD). With the sour taste left from sus-
pension of the meetings of the economic overview committee,
discussion of UNCTAD-related items could provide the
Group of 77 with a pretext for the introduction of reso-
lutions that are critical of the West for the slow prog-
ress on such issues as the common fund and debt relief.
Because of its size and the limitations of its char-
ter, the Assembly is not an effective forum for reaching
economic agreements. The developing states may defer
discussions on specific economic issues to the November
common fund negotiations and to the fifth session of
UNCTAD in 1979.
Other Issues
This year, the 30th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights may provide a good opportu-
nity for assessing the UN's human rights record. The ap-
parent new interest in human rights among the nonaligned,
as expressed in their foreign ministers' declaration and
the new UNESCO human rights procedures, indicates a will-
ingness among UN members to be more involved in human
rights activities. Nevertheless, the West could come
under fire on the human rights issue if last year's
General Assembly resolution, giving priority to economic,
social, and cultural rights over civil and political
rights, becomes the basis for a Third World--or Soviet.--
human rights offensive. Furthermore, the Soviets have
already made demarches against a proposed US resolution
to reinforce the Secretary General's role in human rights
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and improve coordination of the various UN human rights
programs. The Soviets' chief concern probably is the
authority the proposal gives the Secretary General. The
Costa Rican proposal for creating a high commissioner
for human rights--which has surfaced periodically for
several years--still lacks sufficient support and is
likely to be defeated by procedural moves.
The West German proposal for a convention contain-
ing measures against taking hostages will probably again
fail to win approval, but the mandate for the ad hoc
committee to consider such a convention is likely to be
renewed. The antihijacking declaration by the seven na-
tions at the Bonn summit may receive endorsement by
several countries in their opening remarks.
The developing states are concerned that the US may
pass legislation authorizing deep seabed mining. As a
result, they are considering adding to the agenda an item
to deal with potential unilateral violation of a 1969 UN
resolution on law of the sea that established a moratorium
on seabed exploration.
The issue of Puerto Rico's status could be inscribed
on the agenda, following the Decolonization Committee's
recent approval of a revised Cuban resolution. The reso-
lution, although considerably tamer than previous ones
introduced by Cuba, calls for independence for Puerto
Rico before it decides whether to opt for some form of
association with the US. Most countries would probably
rather not have to deal with the issue at the Assembly,
but if pressed to a vote most of them would probably be
unable to oppose a measure billed as an attack on
colonialism.
The revelation of "sanctions-busting" in Rhodesia
by international oil companies could damage the climate
of trust essential to Anglo-American efforts to seek a
Rhodesian settlement. The revelation came when a report
commissioned by the British Foreign Office apparently
was leaked to the press. The Africans could decide to
use the report as another example of lack of integrity
among developed countries in their efforts to curb the
activities of their multinational companies.
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Outlook
The developing countries' spirit of cooperation in
negotiating with industrial states appears to be flagging,
but they realize they have made some advances during the
past year toward resolving issues of concern to them.
The General Assembly is a forum in which developing states
can air--but not solve--their problems, and it seems un.-
likely they would risk alienating the West by being wholly
intractable. Nevertheless, emotions will run high and
grievances will be harshly expressed in resolutions that
will often conflict with US positions. More important
than the public posturing, however, will be backstage
activity in a setting more conducive to compromise.
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THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE AT THE SSOD
The final document of the recent UN Special Ses-
sion on Disarmament (SSOD) includes the first endorse-
ment by a global forum of the concept of limiting con-
ventional arms transfers (CAT). Although several res-
ervations about CAT restraints were expressed during
the debates, they did not prevent the General Assembly
from determining that limiting arms transfers should
be a goal in its own right, not merely a means to im-
plement other arms control objectives. Disagreement
on the issue persists, but its treatment at the SSOD
will help to legitimate bilateral and regional ef-
forts to implement specific CAT restrictions.
The Declaration on Disarmament adopted at the SSOD
calls for "negotiations on the limitation of interna-
tional transfer of conventional weapons." The accom-
panying Program of Action also mentions CAT limitation
and recommends consultation on the subject among major
arms suppliers and recipient countries. These refer-
ences to CAT restraint represent a significant conces-
sion by the majority of nonaligned states. In its
draft documents submitted to the SSOD preparatory com-
mittee, the nonaligned contact group had made no men-
tion of arms transfers. Its proposed paragraph on con-
ventional arms focused instead on limiting the develop-
ment of new types of weapons and on the reduction of
armaments in Europe. During negotiations in the pre-
paratory committee, the nonaligned delegations accepted
references to CAT restraint, but tried to link them to
limitations on production of weapons, a linkage they
finally abandoned during the SSOD itself.
Many of the nonaligned and other less developed
countries view CAT restraints with suspicion as an in-
fringement on their ability to provide for their defense
and an effort by the developed states to divert atten-
tion from their own arsenals. Nevertheless, the non-
aligned states considered CAT less important than several
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other issues at the SSOD. They were thus willing to ac-
cept the principle of CAT limitation in return for con
cessions on other points, including a separate paragraph
in the Program of Action that assigns "special responsi-
bility" for reducing conventional armaments to states
with the largest military arsenals. In addition, the
endorsement of CAT restraint is qualified by the state-
ment that the security needs of all states and the right
to self-determination and independence of peoples under
colonial or foreign domination should be "taken into ac-
count." At US insistence, however, these rights are men-
tioned only "in accordance with" the UN Charter and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States; this
avoids any implication that the SSOD document goes beyond
earlier documents in approving arms transfers to insurgent
movements.
Debate over the issue of CAT restraint at the SSOD
took place largely between the Western and nonaligned
groups, with the Soviets and Chinese remaining relatively
passive. Nevertheless, there were significant differences
within each group.
Western Views
Japan, which had sponsored an unsuccessful resolu-
tion on the issue at the 31st General Assembly in 1976,
was the most aggressive supporter of CAT restraint at the
session. The Japanese held out longer than the rest of
the Western group for inclusion of arms transfers in the
portion of the Program of Action that calls for "reso-
lute pursuit" of agreements on other measures aimed at.
limiting conventional weapons. This would have meant
an endorsement of CAT restraints stronger than the ref-
erence to "consultations" that is in the final version
of the document. Japan's strong interest in the issue
continues, and Tokyo intends to introduce another CAT
resolution at the 33rd General Assembly.
Most West European states spoke in favor of CAT
restraint, with some of them explicitly welcoming the
US-USSR talks on the subject, but were more cautious
than Japan. They also emphasized that restraint by a
few suppliers is not enough and that regional consulta--
tions are more apt to lead to effective limitations on
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arms transfers. Some of the West Europeans envisioned
consultations that would include both recipients and
extraregional suppliers; others preferred that recipients
take the lead, with the suppliers then committing them-
selves to observe whatever agreements the recipients
could reach.
LDC Views
Differences on this issue among the nonaligned
nations, and among less developed countries generally,
were more pronounced. Their views were conditioned pri-
marily by the roles they play, or expect to play, in
local armed conflicts. The smaller and more lightly
armed states (e.g., Sri Lanka) were most sympathetic to
broad-based CAT restraint. Countries with a more direct
interest in a continuing conflict tended either not to
mention CAT restraint at all or to criticize arms trans-
fers to their enemies. For example, Chad attacked the
shipment of arms to rebels in northern Chad, Israel
criticized the supply of arms to Arab states, the Arabs
attacked military support for Israel, and several Afri-
can states criticized arms shipments to South Africa.
Such remarks do not indicate a lessening of LDC
concerns about CAT limitations. Some of the same states
that made them also expressed support for keeping cer-
tain arms transfers free of restrictions. In particular,
the African states stressed their interest in ensuring
the supply of arms to resistance movements in southern
Africa. One of these states, Ghana, led the push to
include the references to the right of self-determina-
tion and independence of "peoples under colonial or
foreign domination" as justifications for continuing to
receive arms.
LDC attitudes on the CAT issue also vary because
some of the larger LDCs are producers as well as pur-
chasers of arms. The desire of Argentina and Brazil
to nurture their arms industries--and the exports on
which these industries depend--helps to account for their
failure to mention CAT restraint in the general debate.
Despite its generally negative attitude toward CAT re-
straint, India's role as the only significant arms pro-
ducer on the Asian subcontinent led it to join with
the West in opposing a link between CAT limitations and
limits on production. India's regional rival Pakistan
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spoke ostensibly in favor of CAT limitation, but in-
cluded a lecture on the needs of states that do not
produce their own arms and on the dangers of instability
if such needs are not taken into account.
The views expressed at the special session indicate
greater differences among the LDCs on CAT restraint than
on many other disarmament issues. They also suggest
some reasons why these views, and the patterns of sup-
port for CAT restraint in the less developed world, might
change. Alterations in local military balances, the
resolution of longstanding conflicts like that in the
Middle East, or the development or decline of budding
arms industries would affect the future responsiveness
of individual governments to proposals for curbing arms
transfers.
Regional Restraint
The SSOD has encouraged, in two ways, efforts to
control conventional arms and arms transfers on a re-
gional basis. First, the session helped to stimulate
the attempt by President Perez of Venezuela to revive
the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho as a basis for arms con-
trol in Latin America. It also stimulated indirectly a
competing regional initiative by Mexico. Second, the
Program of Action mentions regional "consultations and
conferences" as a means of considering conventional dis-
armament and cites Ayacucho as an example.
The negotiation of this portion of the Program of
Action was complicated by the USSR's attempt to insert
a reference to the Warsaw Pact's 1976 Declaration of
Bucharest. Although this declaration makes approving
references to conventional arms control, it is not com-
parable to the Ayacucho document because it embodies no
commitment by the signatories to work among themselves
to restrict conventional arms in their own region. The
Soviets made clear that the reference to Bucharest was
a bargaining chip they would gladly give up if mention
of Ayacucho was also omitted. They eventually dropped
it anyway, but their effort suggested a dislike on their
part for the Ayacucho initiative, perhaps because it
is sponsored by a pro-Western state and the USSR has had
no role in it.
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Impact on Future Efforts at Restraint
The SSOD document does not provide a clear blueprint
for specific CAT restraint measures. Nor does it resolve
significant differences of opinion on the issue. It
will, however, assist future attempts at restraint by
serving as a visible endorsement of CAT limitation that
the General Assembly adopted by consensus. Like other
multilateral endorsements, it can be invoked by a govern-
ment wishing to demonstrate that its participation in
a negotiation is neither inconsistent with its past
diplomacy nor contrary to the global climate of opinion.
The Soviet Union has already referred approvingly to the
SSOD document in justifying its negotiation of CAT
limitations with the US. The endorsement of CAT restraint
at the SSOD also makes it more likely that the issue will
be on the agenda of future multilateral discussions of
disarmament, as in the UN Disarmament Commission or the
General Assembly itself.
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Meeting Global Food Needs: Modest Progress,
Continuing Problems
Hunger and malnutrition continue to be a problem
in almost all developing areas of the world, even
though world grain harvests have generally been good
in recent years. The World Food Conference of 1974
urged national governments and international agencies
to assign greater political priority to solving food
problems within the context of domestic development
and international economic cooperation. This ambitious
shift in priorities has not yet taken place. In coun-
tries of particular concern to the Conference--those
food deficit countries that lack foreign exchange to
finance import needs--progress in stimulating food
production has been slow, and population growth rates
continue to exceed agricultural production growth
rates.
The World Food Conference was convened by the
United Nations in response to the harmful effect of
the world grain shortage of 1973-74 on cereal-deficit
countries. This article reviews the status of the in-
stitutions set up as a result of the Conference and
finds that limited progress is being made toward Con-
ference goals. The World Food Council functions as a
forum for the international dialogue on food and agri-
culture, although it is generally recognized that the
Council's limited authority is incommensurate with its
responsibility for overseeing food policy and the im-
plementation of international food programs. Negotia-
tions continue on a new International Wheat Agreement,
though at a slower pace than the developing countries
would like. The OPEC- and OECD-funded International
Fund for Agricultural Development went into operation
in December 1977, but it is expected to disburse only
a relatively insignificant amount of money in its
first year.
The key finding of this study is one of modest
progress amid continuing problems in international ef-
forts to cope with global food needs. Even if the
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general tone of North-South relations becomes more
strained during the coming year, as now seems likely,
a joint effort to meet global food needs will probably
be one of the few instances of productive cooperation
between LDCs and the OECD states. This record of per-
ceptible progress will be an incentive to keep the
North-South dialogue going.
The World Food Council
The World Food Council, the food policy oversight
and evaluation body for all agencies affiliated with the
UN, was established in 1975 on the recommendation of the
World Food Conference. After a slow start, in which min-
isterial sessions became mired in bloc politicking, the
Council issued a comprehensive food policy statement in
1977. Both the developing and the industrialized coun-
tries consider this document, the Manila Communique, to
be a good compromise on food production, security, aid,
and trade.
The Manila Communique recommends a commitment by
the developed countries to provide $8.3 billion annually.
This is the amount of external assistance that the Coun-
cil Secretariat estimates is needed to achieve a 4 per-
cent rate of growth in food production in developing
countries. Traditional and potential new food aid donors
are requested to increase their food aid commitment to
ensure that a minimum annual level of 10 million tons in
cereals is available for delivery in 1977-79. The com-
munique recommends establishing an international system
of nationally held grain reserves. It calls on all coun-
tries, particularly those that are developed, to stabi-
lize, liberalize, and expand the world food trade, and
urges national governments and international agencies
to give higher priority to nutrition and rural develop-
ment in development plans. It also recommends that gov-
ernments and international agencies support the basic
human needs approach to foreign aid.*
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The generally constructive pattern of the 1977 meet-
ing in Manila, the tone and substance of the Manila Com-
munique, and the election of a potentially strong Council
president from a developing country (Arturo Tanco of the
Philippines) raised hopes that the organization would be
able to function as the world food security agency that
the World Food Conference had envisaged. Basic structural
problems became especially evident at the June 1978 meet-
ing, however, and now inhibit the agency from performing
a command function. In particular, the Council was not
given direct authority on food policy matters over other
UN entities or members, as the Conference had recommended.
Although a number of UN agencies are requested to make
periodic reports to it, many comply only minimally.
The fourth ministerial session of the Council was
held in Mexico City from 12 to 15 June of this year.
The meeting was devoted almost entirely to the line-by-
line drafting of "the Mexico Declaration," to the in-
tense dissatisfaction of some high-level participants.*
In informal discussions in Mexico City, the ministerial
and plenipotentiary-level delegates demanded fuller par-
ticipation in substantive preparations for the Council's
Ministerial meetings by governments of developing coun-
tries and by regional bodies, as well as the World Bank,
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the
UN Development Program. They emphasized the need to de-
velop information on internal resource commitments to in-
creased food and agriculture production and on plans to
reduce food losses due to inadequate storage facilities.
They suggested that future meetings of the Council would
be more productive if they concentrated on recording
varying country viewpoints rather than producing a fully
agreed text. If these recommendations are not implemented,
it is likely that a drop in the level of representation
at council meetings will occur, thus reducing its useful-
ness.
*The Mexico Declaration is a long, innocuous document that repro-
duces most of the substance of the Manila Communique, but with in-
creased emphasis on the difficulties of increasing food production
in developing countries and in formulating national food plans.
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Multilateral Aid for Agricultural Development
The 1974 World Food Conference heavily emphasized
the need to intensify cooperative international efforts
directed toward the goal of food self-sufficiency for
developing countries. Primary responsibility for rapid
rural development and population control was declared to
rest with the developing countries, with sustained tech-
nical and financial support from the developed countries.
The outlook for this Conference goal is not encouraging.
In 1977-78, cereal imports for all developing countries
are expected by the FAO to achieve record levels in ex-
cess of 65 million tons. More important, however, de-
pendence on imports among the countries the UN considers
to be "most seriously affected" by recent adverse eco-
nomic conditions is projected to increase to 17.4 mil-
lion tons in 1977-78, or some 7 percent above the pre-
vious year's levels.* According to the World Food Coun-
cil, the growth of food production in these countries
fell from 2.5 percent annually during the 1960s to 2 per-
cent during 1970-77. While a 2 percent agricultural growth
rate is historically acceptable, production has not kept
pace with population growth. Per capita production growth
in these countries has thus continued to decline in this
decade.
External financial assistance for increasing food
production is still substantially below the recommended
target of $8.3 billion, but international efforts to
stimulate and divert funds to food production continue.
The World Food Council's most important contribution has
been its role in the creation of the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), with a $1 billion
commitment from the OPEC and OECD countries. The Fund
will provide grants and low interest loans to stimulate
food production in low income, food deficit countries.
The Fund's contribution to agricultural investment, while
not impressive in terms of the amounts already being spent,
is expected to act as a catalyst, spurring other finan-
cial flows. Another objective of the Fund is to help the
poor and landless by fostering the use of appropriate
technologies and generating employment. So far, however,
*This group of countries includes India, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethio-
pia, and Egypt.
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the Fund's executive board has approved only two projects,
and it is expected that less than $100 million will be
disbursed in the first year of operation. IFAD commit-
ments are expected to average less than $350 million a
year, at least during the first three years.
World Bank loans for agriculture and rural develop-
ment increased from $956 million in 1974 to an estimated
$3.3 billion in 1978. This occurred as part of a World
Bank rural development strategy, established in 1973,
which is aimed at sustaining increases in per capita
output and incomes, expanding productive employment, and
achieving greater equity in the distribution of the
benefits of growth. For example, about 25 percent of
the Mexican rural development program during 1977-79 is
being financed by World Bank and Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank loans. Most of this foreign money will go
into directly productive infrastructure, such as irriga-
tion, livestock, and development credit.
Another international activity to stimulate food
production is the FAO's International Fertilizer Supply
Scheme to expand fertilizer and pesticide production in
developing countries. In addition, a number of countries
have informed the World Food Council that they are will-
ing to provide a wide range of technical agricultural as-
sistance such as irrigation, to countries with serious
food shortages.
Grain Reserve Negotiations
The most important food-related issue to develop-
ing countries probably is the attempt to establish a
multilateral system of grain reserves intended to sta-
bilize prices and assure adequate supplies even during
bad crop years. Such reserves were first proposed in
the 1940s, and the FAO revived the idea in 1973 when
North American grain stocks became depleted and the
United States declared its intention not to build up
government stockpiles again. The 1974 World Food Con-
ference recommended the establishment of food security
stocks, and subsequent meetings of the World Food Coun-
cil have emphasized the importance of establishing such
a system of reserves.
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Extensive discussions--intended to reach a new ac-
cord to replace the International Wheat Agreement (IWA)
of 1971--have taken place in the International Wheat
Council in London, to some extent in the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations in Geneva, and most recently in a
United Nations Negotiating Conference held in February
and March 1978. The proposed agreement represents a
substantial departure in concept from earlier ones,
which had no provisions for price stabilization or buffer
stocks. The emphasis in the current discussion is on
specific obligations regarding reserve stocks or other
measures to influence supply and demand on international
markets, such as production adjustments and assurance
that export markets remain open. Such measures are in-
tended to meet the primary objectives of price stabiliza-
tion and food security.
So far, about the only concurrence of views in these
discussions has been on a target for food aid of 10 mil-
lion tons of wheat and other grains annually and on the
desirability of a wheat buffer stock. The Interim Com-
mittee of the Negotiating Conference, which met in June
in London and in July in Geneva, has been trying to re-
draft the substantive economic provisions of the wheat
trade convention and coarse grain trade convention; no
substantive work on the food aid convention has been
undertaken since the Negotiating Conference. Some prog-
ress has been made with the wheat trade convention on
"trigger" price mechanisms by which decisions to release
from, or add to, reserves are made, but no further prog-
ress has been made on target size and appropriate alloca-
tion of reserve stocks. The Interim Committee will re-
convene on 16 October, and a full Negotiating Conference
is planned for November in London, unless the Interim
Committee decides otherwise.
Food Aid
Food aid is a vital but relatively small element in
the global food situation. Large-scale dependence on
food aid is considered an inhibition to agricultural de-
velopment, although there are cases, as in Bangladesh
and some Sahelian countries, where food aid is necessary
regardless of its effect on development. The logistics
of emergency food aid are complicated by the location of
cereal stocks (which are concentrated mainly in a few
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grain-exporting countries), by donor delay in responding
to requests for food aid, by weak delivery and distribu-
tion infrastructures in poor countries, and by a tendency
on the part of governments to delay official announcement
of emergency situations.
The UN World Food Program seeks to stimulate eco-
nomic and social development through aid in the form of
food that may, for example, be used as a partial sub-
stitute for cash wages paid to workers in development
projects. It also tries to meet emergency food needs.
Allocations to the international emergency food reserve
scheme, operated through the World Food Program, increased
substantially in the last year, reaching a level of
421,000 tons of cereals, just under the 500,000-ton target.
There was general agreement at the 1978 ministerial ses-
sion of the World Food Council on the need to establish
a more permanent reserve, with yearly replenishment and
commitments by governments for more than one year in
advance.
The Manila Communique recommended that a Food Aid
Convention of the International Wheat Agreement be es-
tablished to contribute to the attainment of the 10
million ton target, and that negotiations provide for
an increase in the amount of food aid moved through the
World Food Program. In the IWA negotiations the US has
endorsed the 10 million ton target, and has proposed that
a new "Special Provision for Emergency Needs" be negoti-
ated as part of the Food Aid Convention, providing for an
increase in the flow of food aid of up to 20 percent
above the minimum level in times of critical or excep-
tional food needs in developing nations. If the Con-
vention with this special provision is negotiated and
ratified, the US would be obligated by treaty to provide
at least 4.47 million tons of grains for food aid an-
nually, and perhaps as much as 5.4 million tons under
extreme circumstances. To cover this possible obligation,
the Carter administration has proposed legislation that
would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to buy and
hold an International Emergency Wheat Reserve of up to 6
million metric tons of wheat.
The IWA negotiations are complex and have been been
going'on since 1975. The Group of 77, the UN caucus of
the developing countries, has expressed concern at the
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slow pace of the talks. The group suggested at the 1978
World Food Council ministerial session that, in the event
a new IWA cannot be concluded by the end this year, a
food aid convention should be negotiated independently
of the new trade convention, and that it be incorporated
in the trade convention when that is concluded.
A major component of the world food security system
is the FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System
on Food and Agriculture. This system, which operates to
alert food donors to emerging critical food shortages,
worked well during the recent food crisis in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has been on the FAO's list of food-shortage
countries for the last two years. In March the FAO,
using data from monitoring stations it had set up in
Ethiopia late last year, alerted foreign donors to the
probability of a major food emergency, even though the
Ethiopian Government was still issuing optimistic reports.
When foreign donors responded too slowly to this appeal
to be of immediate help--mostly because they feared that
the food they sent would rot on ships waiting to be un-
loaded in Ethiopia's clogged port--the FAO quickly sup-
plied an emergency 10,000 tons of cereal in early June.
Outlook
Several years of good crops and the accumulation of
substantial reserves in several countries have lessened
the pressure on both developed and developing countries
to make the necessary changes in national and multi-
national policies to solve food distribution problems.
Nonetheless, the world is somewhat better equipped to
deal with another food crisis--in terms of food aid--
than it was in 1972-74: a food policy oversight mech-
anism is now operating, and talks on reserves are under
way. Food production in the food-importing poorer coun-
tries is growing, and some countries, such as India, have
been able to build substantial reserves. Food production,
however, is still generally not able to keep pace with
population growth in these countries. The aid commit-
ment by developed countries to agricultural development
has increased, but a larger commitment is needed to
adequately support developing country efforts toward
food self-sufficiency. International financial institu-
tions have increased their efforts in rural development,
but the increase in funding recommended by the Manila
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Communique has not materialized. Most important, how-
ever, channels for international cooperation, negotia-
tion, and discussion, laboriously set up since 1974,
are now open. Progress in the coming year will be meas-
ured by developments within the IWA negotiations in Lon-
don and by the World Food Council's attempts to gain
the active cooperation of governments and agencies for
its programs.
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