INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 26, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign . 25X1
Assessment
Center
International Issues
Monthly Review
Secret
RP IIMR 78-006
26 July 1978
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW
26 July 1978
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OUTCOME OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON
DISARMAMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Session stimulated more active and wide-
spread debate of disarmament issues. Its sub-
stantive impact will be tested in future negoti-
ations among the nuclear weapons states.
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: LOOKING BEYOND
BELGRADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The growing tensions between opposing forces
within the Movement are unlikely to erupt at the
foreign ministers' meeting in Belgrade. Unless
the moderates maintain an effective unified
front, however, the delay in addressing key is-
sues is likely to serve the radicals, currently
led by Cuba.
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DISARMAMENT
ZOPFAN OR ZOIPN--A ZONE OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Vietnam's acceptance in principle of the concept
of a zone of peace signifies a new willingness
to cooperate with the non-Communist members of
ASEAN. Nevertheless, a zone of peace is not
likely to be established in the near future.
TERRORISM
Based on a larger study, this article looks at
trends prevalent in international terrorism in
1977 with a projection of the implications for
the remainder of 1978.
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Divi-
sion, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional
contributions from other offices within the National Foreign As-
sessment Center. The views presented are the best judgments of
individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they
discuss are subject to alternative interpretation. Comments and
queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of
the individual articles.
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OUTCOME OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT
The UN Special Session on Disarmament concluded
on 30 June by adopting a final document that places
the main responsibility for future disarmament
measures exactly where the session's nonaligned spon-
sors intended to place it: on the nuclear weapons
states. Because several particularly contentious
issues were avoided and the nonaligned states made
many concessions of their own, the document was
approved by consensus. The session saw few signifi-
cant shifts in the position of member states, but it
marked the entry of France and China into disarmament
deliberations, stimulated some regional arms control
initiatives, and reshaped multilateral institutions in
a way that will encourage more active and widespread
debate of disarmament issues in the future.
Program of Action
The portion of the program of action dealing with
nuclear disarmament was widely considered to be the most
important part of the entire document. The nonaligned
states insisted, as a matter of principle, that the
program call for "urgent" negotiation of agreements on
this subject. The specific topics to be negotiated in-
clude cessation of the improvement and development of
nuclear weapons systems, the production of nuclear
weapons and their means of delivery, and the production
of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The list
mentions as well the reduction and eventual elimination
of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery.
The paragraphs on nonuse of nuclear weapons and on
nuclear nonproliferation also stress the responsibilities
of the nuclear weapons states. The program of action
recommends consideration of proposals "designed to
secure" the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons,
a gesture toward the dissatisfaction of the nonaligned
with the unilateral assurances on nonuse of nuclear
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weapons offered so far by the United States, USSR, and
the United Kingdom. The language on nonproliferation
links the proliferation problem to the obligation of the
present nuclear powers to disarm and asserts the "in-
alienable right" of all states to develop programs for
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In exercise of this
right, all states are declared free to acquire technology,
equipment, and materials for peaceful nuclear programs,
regardless of their policies on fuel cycles and inter-
national cooperation. The leaders in pushing for this
language were Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan;
all have significant nuclear energy programs, and none
is a party to the nonproliferation treaty.
Although the nonaligned states were adamant on key
nuclear issues, they realized that to prevail by using
their voting strength would be counterproductive. The
chief purpose of the session, in their view, was to get
down on paper a commitment by the nuclear weapons states
to accelerate their disarmament efforts, and this meant
achieving a consensus. Accordingly, the nonaligned
delegations were much more pliable on the phrasing of
other sections, such as that on conventional weapons.
It endorses limitations on conventional arms transfers
without linking them, as an earlier nonaligned draft did,
to limitations on production.
Disarmament Machinery
The nonaligned also deferred to the nuclear weapons
states on several questions pertaining to the reform of
disarmament machinery. This was particularly true of
the effort to restructure the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament (CCD), the multilateral negotiating body
in Geneva, into a new Committee on Disarmament. The
paragraphs on this subject were refined in private dis-
cussions among the US, Soviet, British, and French dele-
gations. By the end of the session, the chief stumbling
block to agreement had become the legal form of the new
committee's "birth certificate": the French wanted the
General Assembly to create an entirely new body, while
the Soviet view was that the CCD could reform itself.
The formulation finally adopted was for the General
Assembly to "welcome" the arrangements worked out through
consultations among committee members.
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The Committee on Disarmament will incorporate several
changes favored not only by the nonaligned but by many
Western states as well: a small expansion of membership;
replacement of the US-Soviet cochairmanship by a rotating
chair; access to the Committee by nonmembers wishing to
make proposals; and opening of plenary sessions to the
public. Nevertheless, the operation of the Committee,
which retains its character as a limited negotiating
body, will not be greatly changed. Most states recognize
that, even without the cochairmanship, the superpowers will
continue to negotiate privately with each other before
presenting draft agreements to the Committee.
The nonaligned states will continue to use larger
forums, including the General Assembly and its First
Committee (which henceforth will consider only disarma-
ment and security matters) to expound their views. 'Their
opportunities will be further expanded with the resurrec-
tion of the UN Disarmament Commission, a body consisting
of all UN members that last met in 1965. At the behest
of the Western group, however, the nonaligned accepted
terms of reference for the Commission that clearly
identify it as a deliberative body with powers to
recommend and review but not to negotiate.
Avoidance of Divisive Issues
Several nonaligned initiatives that were objectionable
to the West were withdrawn rather than being pressed to
a vote. The principal one, an Iraqi resolution con-
demning military assistance to Israel, attracted wide-
spread sponsorship, especially after it was amended to
remove specific references to the United States. It
posed the danger, however, of unraveling the consensus
procedure and stimulating the raising of other trouble-
some issues, such as Nigeria's concern with South Africa's
nuclear weapons potential. The same was true of two
resolutions introduced late in the session by India, one
declaring the use of nuclear weapons a crime against
humanity and the other calling for an immediate nuclear
test moratorium. The Indians explicitly threatened to
bring these resolutions to a vote unless they were satis-
fied with the portions of the program of action dealing
with major nuclear issues.
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Partly because the delegates managed to keep the lid
on questions like military aid to Israel, the session was
largely free of clear-cut East-West confrontations. It
was far more of a North-South debate, in which the USSR
was saddled with as much of the onus for the arms race
and the obligation to disarm as was the United States.
The Soviets had little opportunity to score political
points in competition with the West because their pre-
ferred positions were frequently as far removed from
nonaligned objectives as were Western positions.
Regional and Unilateral Initiatives
The session provided the occasion for some signifi-
cant departures in regional arms control. One was
Venezuela's effort to revive the eight-nation Declaration
of Ayacucho of 1974 as a basis for controlling conventional
arms in Latin America. Ayacucho received mention by name
in the final document. Another was Vietnam's proposal
for a Southeast Asian zone of peace--an obvious bid for
support from its ASEAN neighbors in its current diffi-
culties with China.
France's active participation in the session featured
the offering of several original proposals, including an
international verification agency, a fund for disarmament
and development, and an international institute for re-
search on disarmament. Because of Soviet objections,
most of the proposals failed to win approval, even after
France accepted some changes designed to alleviate US
concerns. They did, however, facilitate French reentry
into a disarmament debate that Paris had other reasons
for wanting to join and, in the eyes of the nonaligned,
put the Soviets on the defensive. China also participated,
but its deep concern over being frozen into permament
military inferiority to the USSR and the United States
continues to preclude its active support for all but the
most far-reaching disarmament proposals. Peking was
probably pleased, though, by a session in which most of
the heat was directed jointly at the two superpowers.
Outlook
The entry of France and China into the disarmament
arena, the stimulation of regional initiatives, and the
revamping of disarmament machinery (particularly the
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revival of the Disarmament Commission) will help to keep
disarmament in the forefront of multilateral diplomacy
for the next several years. The session demonstrated
that for the nonaligned states, disarmament is a subject
of importance in its own right and not merely an excuse
for voicing their economic concerns. It also demonstrated
that a consensus approach on the whole range of disarma-
ment issues can work in a forum as large as the General
Assembly. As a result, the nonaligned states will probably
attempt to continue this approach at the second special
session (the date of which has yet to be determined) and
perhaps in the Disarmament Commission. Much will depend,
however, on the progress made in substantive negotiations
among the nuclear weapons states. It is there that the
nonaligned states hope to see achievement of the break-
through in disarmament talks that the special session
was intended to stimulate. The less satisified they are
with what they see, the more inclined they will be to
discard consensus for confrontation.
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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: LOOKING BEYOND BELGRADE
A confluence of trends seems certain to result in
a major confrontation between radical and moderate
members for leadership of the nonaligned movement
(NAM)--but only after the conclusion of the meeting in
Belgrade in late July of nonaligned foreign ministers.
In effect, over the next year or so Cuba will be seek-
ing to eclipse the influence of Yugoslavia and other
moderates. But both sides are likely to concentrate
at Belgrade on tactical maneuvers and issues that
unite rather than divide the movement. Unless the
moderates demonstrate a unified front at Belgrade, the
delay is likely to serve the radicals' interests the
most. Cuba is soon to gain additional prestige and
power as titular head of the movement; Yugoslavia is
likely to be increasingly preoccupied with its succes-
sion problems.
Cuban success after Belgrade would probably lead
the NAM to a more blatantly anti-Western posture
rather than the more balanced "third force" designs of
Tito and other moderates. The significance of any
Cuban success, however, is likely to be limited by its
inherently divisive character. A backlash from con-
cerned moderates could split the movement, thereby
causing it to lose its major source of influence in
world affairs--the breadth and ideological diversity
of its membership.
The atmosphere at the late July nonaligned foreign
ministers' meeting in Belgrade promises to reflect
the continued clash of interests between the "mod-
erates"--who want the Nonaligned Movement to advance
their interests with both the Soviet bloc and the West--
and the "radicals" who wish to infuse the NAM with a
sharply anti-Western posture. Heightening the tension
will be the friction caused by a leadership struggle
between Cuba and Yugoslavia.
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Nonaligned foreign ministers' meetings serve as
preparatory sessions for the major nonaligned event-.-
the triennial conference of chiefs of state. Besides
the importance of the meeting in establishing the
agenda for the summits and discussing the political
and economic statements that are later issued, they are
often indicators of the direction in which the Movement
is going.
The tension generated by the clash of wills
between opposing forces has on occasion exploded at the
nonaligned meetings in debates over particularly con-
tentious issues. This year's meeting must address
and attempt to reach some compromise on intraregional
disputes between nonaligned members and the more
philosophical and global issues of defining nonalign-
ment, disarmament, detente, mass media, and the inter-
national economic system.
How the nonaligned collectively view some of these
issues was hotly debated, but left unresolved, at the
May nonaligned Coordinating Bureau meeting in Havana.
As the host, Cuba drafted a communique that contained
inflammatory "anti-imperialist" rhetoric, but when faced
with strong opposition from the aroused moderates, it
had to settle for less than it wanted. Under Indian
and Yugoslav leadership, the moderates were able to add
some balance to the draft which had cast the West in
the role of villain, to reaffirm the definition of non-
alignment as standing apart from both power blocs and
to excise Soviet-inspired portions, such as linking
reference to a world disarmament conference with the
neutron bomb controversy. Nevertheless, Cuba has not
changed its attitude, and the importance it attaches
to controlling the nature of the NAM suggests that it
will try again both at Belgrade and at the summit in
Havana in 1979.
Cuba believes the NAM has not achieved its potential
because of the failure of a number of its members to
follow a truly revolutionary path. To Cuba, nonalign-
ment means opposition to imperialism, racism, and neo-
colonialism, which translates into an anti-West posture.
The Cubans have consistently tried to present the
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Soviet bloc as the natural ally of Third World coun-
tries, thus dividing the world into only two camps:
the progressives (led by Moscow, Havana, and the non-
aligned states) versus the imperialists and reaction-
aries (meaning the US, Western Europe, Japan, and
China).
To Yugoslavia, Cuba represents a direct assertion
of Soviet influence in the world forum that helps
Yugoslavia stake out an independent course in inter-
national affairs. Besides providing Yugoslavia a
forum in which to express its independent foreign
policy goals, Tito believes the NAM should seek to
frustrate the policies of both power blocs. In
Yugoslavia's view, the large Third World membership
spanning the political spectrum is the source of the
NAM's strength and influence on the world scene.
Yugoslavia has only recently regained a foothold
in the leadership of the movement, having had to defer
to Algeria's strong leadership during its tenure as
chairman of the group from 1973 to 1976. Yugoslavia
occasionally plays a moderating role at nonaligned
meetings, seeking to reconcile differences and scale
down radical or confrontational proposals to avoid
open splits in the group.
The state of nonaligned unity, shaky at best, is
further threatened by the issue of Cuba's military in-
volvement with the Soviets in Africa, which raises
questions among some members of how much influence the
Soviets may have in the Movement through Cuba. This
concern is heightened by the fact that Cuba's standing
will automatically rise in 1979, when it hosts the
summit in Havana and becomes titular head of the Move-
ment until the next summit. Typically the nation oc-
cupying the chair can strongly influence the tone and
attitudes of the Movement throughout its tenure.
Yugoslavia is concerned because the rise in Cuba's
influence could coincide with the Tito succession
when Belgrade may not be able to react effectively to
Cuban moves. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia finds itself in
a dilemma. It does not want to foster a split between
the pro- and anti-Cuban factions, but neither does it
want Cuba's influence to grow.
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At Belgrade, Yugoslavia is neither likely to
challenge openly nor support a challenge to Cuba's
credentials as a nonaligned country. Because of its
desire to maintain a semblance of a third force in
international relations, Yugoslavia is often willing
to dampen its reservations about individual political
stands of the majority to keep the group together.
Additionally, questioning Cuba's credentials might set
loose unrestrained acrimony between other ideologically
incompatible countries.
At present there does not appear to be any strong
country within the Movement willing to risk the con-
sequences of questioning Cuba's nonalignment.* India,
a leading moderate in the Movement and also concerned
about Cuban motives, has reportedly refused to lead
any move against Cuba, citing as one reason its bi-
lateral relations with the Soviet Union. India's
position is that it condemns foreign intervention, but
not assistance in clear cases of aggression.
On the Cuban issue, the most that can be expected
at Belgrade is an indirect criticism, which might in-
fluence Cuba to soften its hard-line positions at
nonaligned meetings. Egypt had suggested--but will
not pursue--introducing a motion calling for indefinite
postponement of the 1979 summit. Cairo thought that
even if the motion did not carry, which almost certainly
would be the case, it would put the Cubans on notice
that a number of states look critically at their
activities.
To minimize ideological disunity, the membership
at Belgrade will be looking for an issue around which
it can rally. Economic issues, largely ignored since
the Algiers summit, when the declaration for a new
*Cuba is clearly aware of the dangers and went out of its way to
leave the door open to countries like Zaire and Somalia earlier
this year in hopes that they would not bolt the NAM. The Cubans
are confident they can handle friction from such outcasts as
Zaire without damaging the Movement. They are keenly aware that
many NAM members--although wary of Cuba's aggressiveness--are too
fearful of destroying the NAM's fragile unity to press the issue
of the Cuban-Soviet axis.
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international economic order was drafted, might meet
that need. Although they probably would not expect
any substantive outcome from a renewed emphasis on
economics, the symbolic benefits could make it attrac-
tive. The "New World Information Order" slogan could
also be an issue that some members may try to raise
to a level equal to the "New International Economic
Order." The essential characteristics of the NWIO--
viewing the transnational communication apparatus as
a vestige of colonialism and a threat to LDC sovereignty
and cultural integrity--will surely appeal to the
emotions of most nonaligned members.
The most likely outcome at Belgrade, however,
will be no clear judgments about the status of Cuba,
the definition of nonalignment, or what the focus of
the Movement should be. The ensuing confusion could
represent an advantage to the radicals, since Cuba's
position to influence the NAM will increase with its
assumption of the chairmanship. But unless Cuba slows
its aggressive drive to transform the Movement, its
success is likely to be limited by the divisive effect
of its goals on the NAM. If Cuba pushes too hard,
even some radicals may join an anti-Cuban backlash.
If Cuban actions were to result in conversion of the
NAM into a smaller, clearly revolutionary, and anti-
Western group, the loss of membership would greatly
reduce the influence of the body.
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ZOPFAN OR ZOIPN--A ZONE OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA?
A recent. proposal by Vietnam for a "zone of inde-
pendence, peace, and neutrality" (ZOIPN) in Southeast
Asia, introduced as an amendment to the draft program
of action of the UN Special Session on Disarmament,
has met with favorable but cautious reactions from the
five non-Communist members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While Vietnam's pro-
posal goes no further than ASEAN's initiative for a
"zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality" (ZOPFAN),
it actually signifies a new willingness to cooperate
with ASEAN and an acceptance of the concept in prin-
ciple.
Vietnam's unexpected statement supporting the con-
cept of a Southeast Asia zone of peace in the UN Special
Session on Disarmament (SSOD) program of action caught
the ASEAN members by surprise. For years, Vietnam and
Laos have criticized ASEAN and opposed the ZOPFAN pro-
posal, Also known as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration,
ZOPFAN is the brainchild of the late Malaysian Prime Min-
ister Tun Razak, and by the early 1970s it had become
a major objective of Malaysian foreign policy. ZOPFAN
was formally adopted as a goal by ASEAN in November 1.971
at its meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and a working group of
experts was established to draw up a conceptual blue
print of the zone and a plan of action for its imple-
mentation. The zone would consist of the nine Southeast
Asian nations (ASEAN plus Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam), and would be recognized and guaranteed by the
international community.
Until 1975, the ASEAN nations as a group did not
actively pursue ZOPFAN. Thailand and the Philippines
were members of SEATO; and Malaysia and Singapore were
signatories of the Five-Power Defense Arrangement with
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. The
Communist victories in Indochina and the withdrawal of
US forces from Southeast Asia rekindled serious interest
by ASEAN in obtaining both regional and international
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support for ZOPFAN. Malaysia sought international en-
dorsement of the ZOPFAN idea at the 1976 Nonaligned
Conference in Colombo. Vietnam and Laos were so antago-
nistic to ASEAN and to the ZOPFAN, however, that Malay-
sian Foreign Minister Rithaudeen was not permitted to
read his prepared statement. To avoid subsequent con-
frontations Malaysia began a policy of prior consulta-
tion with Vietnam and Laos on ZOPFAN. In 1977 initial
Vietnamese and Lao hostility toward Malaysia's plan to
raise ZOPFAN on behalf of ASEAN at the Nonaligned Coor-
dinating Bureau meeting in New Delhi caused Malaysia to
withdraw the issue from the agenda. ASEAN's plans to
submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly in 1976
and 1977 were similarly canceled for fear of jeopardiz-
ing its gradually improving relations with the Indochi-
nese states.
The UN Special Session on Disarmament presented
ASEAN with a unique opportunity to gain international
recognition of ZOPFAN. Early in 1978 Malaysia initiated
efforts to have Southeast Asia mentioned in the section
on zones of peace in the program of action. Malaysia
was careful, however, to couch the concept in very gen-
eral terms (the words "freedom and neutrality" were
dropped), to omit any reference to the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration or to ZOPFAN, and to present it as a Malay-
sian rather than an ASEAN initiative. Preliminary con-
sultations indicated that Vietnam and Laos would accept
this approach, but not that Vietnam would present its
own proposal.
In an obvious bid to improve its relations with
ASEAN and to defy China, Vietnam circulated a document
in early June to the SSOD setting forth four principles
on which to base a definition of a Southeast Asian zone
of peace. On 13 June, at a dinner for Burmese, Lao, and
ASEAN diplomats attending the SSOD in New York, Deputy
Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang announced a Vietnamese
proposal for a new "zone of independence, peace, and
neutrality" in the region. Timed to coincide with the
annual ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, the Vietnamese
announcement came just a day before the meeting was to
discuss Indochinese participation in ZOPFAN.
The ASEAN foreign ministers reacted cautiously.
They welcomed the initiative, but noted Vietnam's motives
and the differences between the Vietnamese proposal and
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ASEAN's formulation. In particular, while the four-point
definition of the ZOIPN* is similar to the four-point.
statement of objectives for ZOPFAN, Vietnam uses the
words "genuine independence" instead of "freedom." The
Singapore and Thai foreign ministers were especially
skeptical of Vietnam's motives and emphasized that ASEAN
should be careful not to become trapped in a Vietnamese
effort to outmaneuver and oppose Chinese influence and
to act: as a surrogate for Soviet influence in the region.**
Malaysia, as the major sponsor of ZOPFAN, and Indonesia
were more positive and optimistic that further consulta-
tions could produce a zone of peace proposal acceptable
to all. states in the zone.
The Future of a Zone of Peace
Both ASEAN and Vietnam are pleased with the lan-
guage of the SSOD program of action on zones of peace,***
(1) Respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity,'- nonaggression and noninterference in each
other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence.
(2) Not to allow foreigners to use one's territory as a base
for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against another
country or countries in the region.
(3) Establishment of friendly and good neighborly relations,
economic cooperation and cultural exchange on the basis of equal-
ity and mutual benefit, and settlement of disputes among the coun-
tries in the region through negotiation in a spirit of equality,
mutual understanding, and respect.
(4) Development of cooperation among the countries in the
region for the building of prosperous countries in keeping with
each country's specific condition for the benefit to genuine inde-
pendence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia and, thereby, to
peace in the world. (Underlining added.)
**China has endorsed ASEAN and ZOPFAN. The USSR approves of
regional zones of peace and is apparently supporting the Vietnam-
ese proposal.
***"The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the
world, under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and de-
-rmined freely by the states concerned in the zone, taking into
.i count the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the
charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with interna-
tional law, can contribute to strengthening the security of states
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though they see it as only a first attempt. The Non-
aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference, meeting in Bel-
grade from 25 to 29 July, will also consider proposals
on zones of peace. Vietnam has already indicated that
it intends to submit a resolution, and Malaysia and
Indonesia have supported this initiative. It is not
yet clear, however, whether Vietnam will propose the
SSOD formulation or present its own version. Malaysia,
on behalf of ASEAN, may also decide to resurrect ZOPFAN
and thus risk reopening the controversy of the 1976
Colombo nonaligned meeting.
Support of the principle by the other states in the
area is necessary to establish any zone. In the past,
Burma has expressed acceptance of a zone in principle,
although not of ZOPFAN in particular; it has not voiced
an opinion on Vietnam's initiative. Laos has been the
most vocal opponent of ZOPFAN; it introduced a counter-
resolution at the 1976 Colombo meeting, which, however,
supported a zone of peace in principle. Laos finds the
SSOD formulation and Vietnam's proposal acceptable. The
major stumbling block to both proposals or to a compro-
mise will be Cambodia. Cambodia has not accepted ZOPFAN
and thus far has not specifically reacted to Vietnam's
ZOIPN. Given its suspicion of ASEAN and its open antag-
onism toward Vietnam, it is not likely to endorse
either in the near future.
within such zones and to international peace and security as a
whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals
for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in: (A)
Southeast Asia where states in the region have expressed interest
in the establishment of such a zone in conformity with their
views."
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PRODUCER DECISIONMAKING AND INTERNATIONAL OIL SUPPLY
The problems and uncertainties facing oil import-
ing countries regarding the cost and availability of
oil include two widely recognized aspects: the geo-
logical and technical difficulties of producing a
smooth and adequate supply of oil and the threat of
politically motivated restrictions on exports. There
is still another important aspect: notional short-
ages in oil supply arising from the institutional
slowness of producing governments and operating com-
panies in recognizing future production problems and
implementing programs to alleviate them.
The issue of institutional responsiveness helps
to illuminate the complex nature of the problem of
adequate oil supplies; in particular, it helps explain
some of the differences in estimates of the timing,
intensity, and duration of future notional shortages.
The judgments of this paper support the more pessimis-
tic estimates.
The inadequate institutional responsiveness of
national oil companies, multinational companies, and
producer state bureaucracies not only makes the future
emergence of an international oil shortage more
likely, but will tend to make that shortage more
stringent and prolonged. To the extent that these in-
stitutions focus on short-run difficulties and simple
solutions rather than addressing more fundamental
problems, they can create conditions in which the im-
porting countries will face not one but two oil supply
shortages--the second of which is likely to be much
more serious and long-lasting than the first.
The paper is necessarily general and
speculative. It is intended primarily to stimulate
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discussion and focus greater attention on the deci-
sionmaking process of oil producers as a factor af-
fecting the future well-being of the industrial democ-
racies. While the problem of institutional inadequac-
ies is the focus of the article, the author recognizes
that this factor must be viewed in the context of even
more critical political and economic factors.
If trends in consuming country oil demand fall with-
in the range of most recent projections,* and if soft
market conditions and production limits in the countries
with excess capacity continue to deter expansion of pro-
ductive capacity in the short run, the world will reach
a point (perhaps in 1981 or 1982) when demand for OPEC
oil approaches OPEC productive capacity. At that time,
expansion of productive capacities would be limited by
several different sets of problems that would be seen in
layers, with the least difficult recognized first.
Because of their decisionmaking methods, the first
set of problems that is likely to be recognized and ad-
dressed within the institutional framework of interna-
tional and national oil companies and producer govern-
ments is that which most immediately impinges on their
ability to modestly expand productive capacity (and
production) as demand for OPEC oil approaches, or reaches,
OPEC productive capacity.**
*Most projections show fairly flat OECD demand for OPEC oil in
the 1978-80 period because of North Sea and Alaska additions.
OECD demand for OPEC oil would grow at an annual rate of 2.5 per-
cent to 3.5 percent in the early 1980s. LDC demand for OPEC oil
would grow at an annual rate of 4 percent to 6 percent during the
entire period.
**The logic, as developed in this' article, can be best applied in
Saudi Arabia. But, although the participants, problems, and po-
litical-economic settings are quite different, the same general-
izations can be usefully applied in Kuwait, UAE, Iran, Iraq, and
non-OPEC Mexico.
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aDUMM
Often,'in both multinational and nationally controlled
oil companies the planning cycle best isolates short-
range and easily identifiable difficulties. Assessments
tend to be both narrow and shallow, not because of incom-
petence, but because basic data and initial analysis are
generated by small operating units with narrowly focused
substantive interests at the base of the organizational
pyramid. The data and analysis are fed upward to the top
of the organization while remaining segregated from the
analysis of other operating elements. At fairly senior
levels, officers with responsibilities in planning and
finance evaluate these low-level assessments in the light
of broader economic and political factors. They.often
appear constrained in their efforts, however, by the
tradition of strong reliance on operating division assess-
ment* and executive conservatism with regard to presenting
"hypothetical" or "speculative" (that is, nonoperationally
derived) planning to finance committees and directors.
Finally, as analytic efforts near the most senior execu-
tive levels, they are packaged by small policy planning
staffs without the resources or authority to evaluate the
individual parts or integrate them in a satisfactory
manner.
An example of this incremental process can be found
in the basic assessment of future demand, which is usually
made by marketing groups without much attention to criteria
such as aggregate levels of economic performance, govern-
ment policy, or energy diversification efforts. At the
same time, supply tends to be viewed by many operational
personnel as a function of demand (namely, the supply
required to meet projected demand) rather than as a
separate analytic topic. The separate supply analysis
that is generated is handled by operating personnel in
the same decentralized manner. Their tendency is to
address the question of "how" to reach desired levels
of production in a narrowly defined production area..
That analysis is colored by an optimistic pragmatism
based on past successes in overcoming production diffi-
culties and by an isolation from the consideration of
*This reliance stems from the fact that these assessments have
been quite successful in meeting past. problems. The companies now
face production problems, however, that are different both in
magnitude and type.
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such related problems as the availability of equipment
and trained labor, investment difficulties, and govern-
ment policy.* For example, the difficulties now faced
by Aramco result in part from their failure to accurately
predict the more restrictive long-term petroleum develop-
ment policy that the Saudi Government has adopted within
the past year.
Senior levels do attempt to coordinate the opera-
tional level inputs and address the difficulties stemming
from decentralized planning (such as the impact of com-
peting requirements for scarce resources), but these
attempts tend to be only partly successful because of a
"splitting the difference" philosophy in those areas
where high-level analysis suggests that operationally
derived assessments are in error.
Thus, while one often sees both sound technical
competence and good planning capacities within the
major companies, one also finds tendencies that are
likely to result in very cautious and rather slow identi-
fication of potential problems.
This model, however, should not be overdrawn. Like
most generalizations it is subject to considerable dis-
agreement among analysts, and there are both exceptions
to the generalization among the companies and qualifica-
tions to the generalization within specific companies.
For example, there are companies in which there is a
relatively high degree of sophisticated political and
economic understanding at working levels within the
organization that is not effectively passed to the top.
company interests, if not maximized, are at least advanced and
protected and that companies cannot adequately consider broader
*The argument has been made that this is rational behavior; that
economic and political concerns.
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In general, until very recently, national oil com-
pany officials have tended either to adopt the decision-
making techniques of the multinational firms, create
different but equally simplistic projective models, or
focus on political and strategic questions rather than
operating questions. As a result national oil company
officials have tended'to accept cautiously (often parti-
ally) the operating assessments of the multinational
companies, and the resulting policies are patchwork com-
binations of conservative compromises. The role of
national companies (and related bureaucracies) is chang-
ing as they assume control of policy, but their methods
of decisionmaking are likely to change only slowly be-
cause of the character of their training and experience.
Perhaps the most important single problem in the
decisionmaking process stems from the relationships be-
tween producer governments and multinational companies.
Senior executives within a company are usually quite
sensitive to the operating constraints (whether for po-
litical, economic, or technical reasons) placed on them
by the host government and attempt to develop policies
and projections with them in mind. There is often little
understanding of these constraints, however, at lower
operating levels where basic assessments of production
possibilities begin, and there is a less than adequate
ability to integrate the impact of these imposed con-
straints with basic assessments at senior staff levels.
In some companies the reverse seems true: there are
generally accurate perceptions of the political con-
straints of direct concern to an operating element within
that company, but these are not fed up through the com-
pany for aggregation and analysis. In a sense there are
usually two sets of plans--one developed by the marketing
elements with little regard for governmental operating
decisions and constraints on the supply side, and one
formed by the production elements with an awareness of
these constraints. Senior planners attempt to reconcile
these differences. The results are less than satisfac-
tory. One finds "public," optimistically stated sets
of projections and policies that ignore these constraints
and actually serve as guidelines to many within the com-
pany. One also finds "private" and less optimistic
opinions that are not fully understood within the com-
pany's diffuse policymaking process or by people outside
the company when assessing the companies' statements.
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As a result of these planning tendencies, as produc-
tion nears or reaches capacity, companies recognize cer-
tain technical problems similar to those encountered by
Aramco during the expansion of the last few years and
particularly acute in 1977 (cumbersome administrative
procedures; inefficient well maintenance; expansion-
caused difficulties in treatment, pipelines, storage,
and loading) that would limit production but could be
partially alleviated in short periods of time. The com-
panies would then begin fairly modest programs for the
accelerated development of relatively new production
that could be exploited within a short period.
Corporate planners assume that all necessary avail-
able measures will be undertaken to raise productive
capacity (and production) at a rate sufficient to stabi-
lize the relationship between supply and demand to avoid
serious supply disruptions. This could result in in-
creased, and misplaced, optimism in both the companies.
and importing countries that reduces immediate pressure
for expansion of productive capacity. The "optimistic
projections" of the world oil outlook seem to focus on
this set of assumptions, with less attention devoted to
the more serious political and technical problems. More
pessimistic projections tend to focus on the more seri-
ous, long-range constraints.
If attitudes within the producing governments and
companies remain optimistic and oriented to short-range
solutions, hence complacent, the world could reach a
point at which the "shortage" became more severe than
it otherwise need be. While it is quite true that ca-
pacity could be further expanded (by attacking water
and salt problems, and by increasing reservoir pressure
to allow more extensive production), these efforts may
require long periods of time to implement. If little
expansionary work had been done before the supply diffi-
culty actually started, there would be a long period of
time in which the notional gap constrained demand. The
companies would be in the unfortunate position of having
used their most effective (in terms of impact time) ex-
pansionary tools because they were simple and cheap.
The results would be twofold: an initial false sense of
security and only difficult, time-consuming expansionary
tools left at their disposal.
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The difficulties of dealing with serious technical
problems would be made more severe by the length of time
necessary to design and implement investment policies
that would increase the productivity of old fields and
increase or open production in the newer, smaller fields.
Investment and program design could also be a serious
problem in the application of secondary and tertiary
recovery techniques necessary to expand production in
many existing fields.
At first glance it might seem that this investment
problem could be easily dealt with in the Persian Gulf
states, but even there one would find problems: govern-
ment conservatism and slowness in expanding capacity
and approving expenditures, personal and bureaucratic
frictions over investment programs, the "normal" insti-
tutional time lags in developing programs, the compli-
cated institutional arrangements present in several
countries. Those problems would be further complicated,
and the expansionary programs further slowed, if capital
markets were involved (as they well might be in some
countries), if administrative and labor constraints de-
veloped (as they often do), and if equipment production
and purchase bottlenecks developed (as they have in
every period of expansion).
This analysis should not be taken as a general in-
dictment of the effectiveness of oil company decision.-
making processes. Nonetheless, the challenges that lie
ahead in terms of meeting oil demand are likely to be:
more formidable than in the past, and the consequence's
of inefficiencies in planning and implementing produc-
tion increases more damaging to the interest of import-
ing countries. In some cases, if this thesis is correct,
company "underestimation" of potential future oil short-
ages may be less the issue; production decisions may be
constrained primarily by the different perceptions of
self-interest on the part of multinational companies and
producing governments (as in the Saudi-Aramco disagree-
ment on the funding of expansion and improvements). The
consequences for the industrial democracies would, how-
ever, be the same.
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JI?, 1.L L 1
Figure 1
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-77
N Wounded Total: 4,654
Killed Total: 1,652
1. Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents, e.g., exclusion
of the Malaysian hijacking of 1977, which some reports credited to Asian terrorists, would subtract 100 deaths from that year's total.
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VL"l.1lL'11
25X1
Developments relating to international terrorism in
1977 showed several major patterns and trends.
For the year as a whole, there was a decline in the
number of international incidents and their attendant
casualties (see figures 1 and 2). This decline was prob-
ably in large part due to increased security measures
taken by previously victimized governments, coupled with
political developments fostering a wait-and-see attitude
on the part of terrorists. During the second half of
the year, however, the frequency of terrorist incidents
jumped to nearly the previous year's record levels.
Several spectacular acts--such as the Japanese Red Army
(JRA) and Lufthansa hijackings--and bombings protesting
the Baader-Meinhof suicides and the Sadat peace initia-
tive occurred toward the end of the year.
In geographic terms, terrorists continued to prefer
operations in the industrialized democracies of Western
Europe and North America. More than half of all incidents
were recorded in these regions (see figure 3).
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5i;cxic1
Figure 2
International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-77
Figure 3
Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Incidents, 1968-77
Total: 2,690
Trnncroninn,l A
Asia
x,155
'North ,
America
274
25X1
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There were fewer attacks than the previous year,
both in relative and absolute terms, on US citizens and
property (see table 1). Increasingly effective preven-
tive measures taken by police and by US Government and
business officials were probably the main reasons for
the decrease. American human rights advocacy may also
have played a part by making US citizens and installa-
tions a more ambiguous and less inviting target than in
previous years..
Terrorism in the Middle East stayed at relatively
high levels and again transcended the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. As in 1976, attacks on fellow Arabs constituted
the bulk of fedayeen-related international terrorism.
Bombings of Egyptian overseas facilities contributed to
an overall increase from 1976 in the number of fedayeen-
related attacks.
While terrorist organizations at times carefully
planned and coordinated complex operations, the vast
majority of reported attacks continued to be low-risk
endeavors, such as bombings, arson, and murder (see
table 2). This was accompanied by a shift away from
well-protected targets to more remote ones not hereto-
fore subjected to attacks. For example, US facilities
in isolated rural villages were attacked, while hijack-
ers used smaller airports as their embarkation points.
Terrorists continued to display a lack of inclina-
tion, or perhaps ability, to master and use sophisticated
weapons and technology. Terrorist acquisition of such
devices and training in their use is frequently reported,
but this has not led to their operational deployment..
While the West German Red Army Faction threatened to
shoot down Lufthansa planes with SA-7 heat-seeking mis-
siles, so far it has not followed up its threat.
The behavior of hostage-takers suggested a height-
ened sensitivity to the tendency for sympathetic psycho-
logical bonds to form between captors and hostages over
time. For example, South Moluccans refused to talk to
their hostages; Japanese Red Army hijackers wore masks,
used numbers to refer to themselves, and initially in-
structed passengers not to look at them; the Lufthansa
hijackers deliberately mistreated passengers and killed
the pilot.
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International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property,
1968-77, by Category of Target (U)
Target 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total'
US diplomatic officials
or property .................................... 12 17 52 51 22 19 12 12 12 21 230 (20.0)
US military officials
or property .................................... 4 2 38 36 11 12 12 9 33 10 167 (14.5)
Other US Government
officials or property ...................... 26 32 57 21 20 10 16 14 2 7 205 (17.9)
US business facilities
or executives .................................. 6 35 24 40 44 51 86 42 52 33 413 (36.0)
US private citizens ........................... 3 7 17 5 12 10 13 27 26 13 133 (11.6)
Total .............................................. 51 93 188 153 109 102 139 104 125 84 1,148
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-77, by Category of Attack (U)
Kidnaping ..........................................
1
3
32
17
11
37
25
38
30
22
216
(8.0)
Barricade-hostage ..............................
0
0
5
1
3
8
9
14
4
5
49
(1.8)
Letter bombing ..................................
3
4
3
1
92
22
16
3
11
2
157
(5.8)
Incendiary bombing ..........................
12
22
53
30
15
31
37
20
91
57
368
(13.7)
Explosive bombing ............................
67
97
104
115
106
136
239
169
176
131
1,340
(49.8)
Armed attack ....................................
11
13
8
8
9
10
21
11
21
14
126
(4.7)
Hijacking 2 ..........................................
3
11
21
9
14
6
8
4
6
8
90
(3.3)
Assassination ......................................
7
4
16
12
10
18
12
20
48
23
170
(6.3)
Theft, break-in ..................................
3
7
22
10
1
0
8
8
5
0
64
(2.4)
Sniping ................................................
3
2
7
3
4
3
3
9
14
6
54
(2.0)
Other actions' ..................................
1
3
11
10
4
4
4
1
7
11
56
(2.1)
' Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.
2 Includes hijackings of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.
' Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.
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Implications for 1978
The 1977 experience with international terrorism,
compared with historical events, suggests two basic ob-
servations. First, relatively wide fluctuations in the
nature and intensity of violence remain evident. Second,
the number and character of the groups engaged in inter-
national terrorist activity have been constantly chang-
ing. Although terrorism has risen from the levels of
the 1960s, the 1970s seem to have produced a cyclical
pattern in terms of overall numbers of incidents. Most
terrorist campaigns do not appear to be sustainable for
more than a few months, as governments adapt to terror-
ist tactics, group leaders are arrested, and logistic
problems arise. In time, however, new terrorist recruits
appear and develop new methods--thus the cycle continues.
These oscillations and uncertainties in the pattern
and level of terrorist activity render predictions
hazardous, although it is clear that the threat will
persist. While the precise level and nature of inter-
national terrorist activity over the next six months or
so cannot be forecast, past experience suggests that:
-- Regional patterns of victimization and location
of operations will remain unchanged. Repre-
sentatives of affluent countries, particularly
government officials and business executives,
will continue to be attractive targets. Eur-
ope, Latin America, and the Middle East will
be the primary arenas of attack. While US
official and corporate security will continue
to deter potential attackers overseas, Ameri-
can persons and property will continue to be
attractive targets.
Terrorists will shift to alternative targets
rather than retreat from the scene, if their
primary goals are unattainable.
-- Acts of terrorism related to the Palestinian
issue will almost certainly continue. Extrem-
ists will seek to demonstrate their rejection
of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli
dispute, even if this is accepted by the main-
stream of the Palestinian movement, the PLO.
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Recent terrorist activities in the Middle East
have focused on President Sadat's overtures to
Israel, with Egyptian facilities becoming
prime targets. Developments seen by the Pales-
tinians as contrary to their interests could
induce even more moderate groups, such as
Fatah, to resume terrorist activity outside
of Israel.
-- Developments in other areas, such as separatist
sentiments in Europe or apartheid in South
Africa, could motivate terrorist organizations
indigenous to the arena of conflict to carry
their battles abroad to gain increased inter-
national publicity for their cause.
-- The vast majority of incidents will continue to
involve bombings and incendiary attacks, which
will be of little immediate risk to the terror-
ists.
-- Commemoration of radical martyrs--such as
Andreas Baader, Mayir Cayan,. and Che Guevara--
through the use of violence will continue.
There are also likely to be incidents designed
to protest specific national or international
political developments.
-- The development and implementation of more
effective international countermeasures will
continue to be impeded by differing moral
perspectives among states, a broad resistance
to the perceived infringement of sovereignty
in any curtailment of the right to grant po-
litical asylum, and a natural reluctance on
the part of many states to commit themselves
to any course of action that might invite
retribution--either by terrorist groups or by
states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
The next six months or so are likely to be charac-
terized by some discontinuities and new developments as
well, including:
-- The potential use of standoff weapons, such
as heat-seeking missiles, to avoid direct
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confrontations with authorities. One or more
groups may overcome their present tactical
limitations and moral qualms to master and
employ such technologies.
A further upsurge in West European radical
activity. Although the original West German
anarchist leaders are dead, their organiza-
tions remain a major threat. Difficulties ex-
perienced by police in locating suspects in-
volved in major kidnapings and assassinations
have demonstrated the existence of well-orga-
nized support networks willing to aid such
individuals. The suicides of the Baader-
Meinhof leaders, as well as the deaths of the
Mogadiscio hijackers, have provided the radi-
cal left with a new group of martyrs whose
deaths may be avenged by future operations.
These may be primarily directed against the
governments that aided Bonn in arresting
radicals who had fled West Germany.
causes will arise. Although added security precautions
at sensitive facilities and the use of paramilitary
rescue squads may deter spectacular confrontational at-
tacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all pot.en-
In sum, the decline in the frequency of interna-
tional terrorist attacks is expected to level off and
may even be reversed. The many issues that have moti-
vated individual terrorists remain unresolved, and new
tial targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
26 July 1978
33
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