INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002300010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 28, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

National
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Assessment
Center
International Issues
Monthly Review
State Dept. review completed
Secret
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW
28 October 1977
CONTENTS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE JAPANESE RED ARMY
HIJACKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The domestic outcry following the Japanese
Government's concessions to terrorist demands
in the recent JAL hijacking, combined with
the difficulty in finding a safe haven for
the terrorists, means that most democratic
governments will feet greater pressure to
use force in any similar future incident.
The threat of terrorist attacks against US
citizens and Iranian officials remains high
in spite of the ZuZZ in terrorist activity
in Iran this year. Indeed, it is possible
that terrorists might mount some operation
during the President's forthcoming visit to
Tehran.
GLOBAL ISSUES
Contradictory pressures for conflict and
cooperation seem to be particularly
central to the explanation of world politics
during the present period. This means that
the US faces increased uncertainty and
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challenge to freedom of action, but has
the opportunity to influence events signi-
ficantly.
NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
The six LDCs that President Carter is to
visit next month have played important
roles in the North-South dialogue. Their
leaders may be eager to present the President
with their views on how the North-South
negotiations may best be kept on track.
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AS AN AID POLICY . . . . . . . . . 24
LDC RECEPTIVITY TO A FOREIGN AID EMPHASIS ON
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Although some poorer countries have Long
advocated a BHN aid strategy, other LDCs--
especially among the rapidly growing
countries--have reacted to the idea with
skepticism and even resistance.
DEVELOPED COUNTRY ATTITUDES TOWARD BASIC
HUMAN NEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Many developed countries question whether
a BHN strategy will serve their best
interests in relations with LDCs. The
diversity of industrial country attitudes
on this issue indicates that they will
probably not be able to agree on a con-
certed BHN strategy in the near future.
Nuclear power is neither the solution to the
energy crisis nor the cause of the prolifera-
tion crisis. Preoccupation with the energy-
proliferation trade-off makes policy choices
appear both harder and easier than they really
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are. A separate opinion offers another
assessment of the economic impact of
limiting nuclear power generation.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DESERTIFICATION. . . . . 41
In an atmosphere free of extraneous political
arguments, the recent UN Conference on Deserti-
fication was able to reach broad agreement
on how to stop the spread of deserts, but
could not resolve the aZZ-important funding
issue.
Note: As a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977, intelligence
publications formerly issued by the Directorate of Intelligence and by the National
Intelligence Officers are now being issued by the National Foreign Assessment
Center. Publication covers and titles have been adjusted to reflect this change. This
publication was formerly titled International Issues Regional and Political Analysis.
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
National Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the best judgments of
individual analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to
alternative interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be
directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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The Political Implications of the Japanese Red Army
Hijacking
In recent weeks the governments of Japan and the
Federal Republic of Germany have been faced by incidents
in which hostages have been seized by terrorists to force
the release of jailed comrades and to secure the payment
of a substantial ransom. This study discusses the under-
lying factors that influenced Japanese decisionmaking in
responding to the recent JAL hijacking, as well as some
of the domestic consequences and international implica-
tions of the incident. A future edition of international
Issues will discuss the contrasting West German approach
to the SchZeyer kidnaping and Lufthansa hijacking.
The Bargaining
On 28 September, Japanese Airlines flight 472 from
Paris to Tokyo was hijacked after its stop in Bombay by
members of the Japanese Red Army (JRA). After diverting
the plane to Dacca, the group threatened to kill the
passengers if the Japanese Government did not free nine
prisoners and pay a ransom of $6 million, as well as
locate a nation willing to grant safe haven to the hi-
jackers. After five days of tense negotiations, punctu-
ated by an abortive coup in Dacca, the Japanese Govern-
ment paid the ransom and flew to Dacca the six prisoners
who were willing to join the terrorists. The hijackers
ended the episode in Algiers on 3 October after releas-
ing hostages in Dacca, Kuwait, and Damascus along the
way.
The initial Japanese Government reaction to the hi-
jacking was to stall negotiations with the terrorists on
board the aircraft until an analysis of the situation
could be completed. The next day, the Japanese Cabinet
decided, after much heated debate, to accede to the de-
mands of the terrorists to ensure the safety of the 151
hostages.
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This decision was apparently influenced by the fol-
lowing considerations:
-- It was reasonable to conclude from available in-
formation that the terrorist group was able and
willing to kill any number of the hostages to
achieve its ends.
-- A number of countries had expressed official con-
cern for the safety of their citizens on board
the aircraft.
-- After serious consideration of the option, it
was concluded that the Japanese Government did
not possess the capability to mount an effective
rescue operation.
-- A similar incident two years earlier, which had
been resolved by complying with the terrorist
demands, had resulted in the release of all
hostages and little if any domestic outcry in
Japan.*
Once the decision was made to comply with the de-
mands, the hijackers were assured, through a Bangladesh
intermediary, that further delays were necessary to col-
lect the money and assemble the prisoners willing to be
released. At the same time diplomatic efforts were in-
itiated to determine which countries would grant the air-
craft authority for overflight and refueling and a safe
haven for terrorists.
In August 1975, five members of the JRA seized the
US Consulate in Kuala Lumpur, holding more than 50 hos-
tages and demanding the release of seven prisoners in Japan.
The Japanese Government complied with the group's demands
and flew the five prisoners who were willing to join the
terrorists to Kuala Lumpur. The group was granted safe
haven in Libya, where they have since received training.
Some of the individuals in the Kuala Lumpur case report-
edly participated in the recent hijacking.
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Although a number of countries were willing to al-
low overflight, and some even landing rights for refuel-
ing, the Japanese Government found it difficult to find
a nation willing to be the final destination. This prob-
lem probably can be ascribed to a combination of circum-
stances not present in the Kuala Lumpur incident and not
anticipated by Japanese officials:
-- The more moderate Arab countries have attempted
to persuade many of the more radical nations
that chances for favorable resolution of the
Palestinian issue could be hindered by the ad-
verse publicity associated with assistance of
terrorist groups.
-- Most radical Arab countries recognize that they
may have more to lose than gain by providing
assistance to terrorist groups whose political
interests are geographically remote from. the
Arab world.
-- Radical governments with any level of commercial
ties to the West find that such ties are used
as leverage to discourage active support of
terrorist groups.
After the Japanese contacted several countries who
were considered likely to grant safe haven, only Algeria
indicated any interest, subject to five conditions:
-- The hijackers must express a desire to make Al-
geria a final destination.
-- Japan must endorse this request.
-- Japan must forgo any subsequent demands for the
prosecution, deportation, or extradition of the
hijackers and the released prisoners.
-- Japan must give up any claim to the $6 million
ransom.
-- Algeria must be made to appear as a reluctant
recipient whose intercession in the matter was
motivated by humanitarian considerations.
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The Japanese Foreign Ministry agreed to these con-
ditions and informed Algerian officials that it would
issue a statement expressing its gratitude to Algeria
for its humanitarian actions and revealing the fact that
Japan would not seek return of the offenders or the ran-
som. Such a statement was issued at the conclusion of
the incident, and for a brief period the matter appeared
to be at an end.
Domestic Reaction
Shortly thereafter, however, Japan's handling of
the incident sparked wide domestic criticism that ap-
parently caught the government by surprise. The Japanese
leaders were presumably expecting little more than a
brief flurry of reaction tempered greatly by a sense of
relief that the incident ended without loss of life. It
seems as if too little attention was paid to the influence
of the following circumstances:
-- This was the second such incident to occur, and
it was thought that the precedent established
by the government's concession to terrorist de-
mands in both cases would encourage further
such attacks.
-- During the past year and a half, Israel and the
Netherlands had registered spectacular successes
by refusing terrorist demands and successfully
freeing hostages by force of arms.
-- The Japanese public was apparently embarrassed
by the relatively indecisive and weak-willed
performance of their leadership in this incident.
The storm of domestic criticism has sparked political
sniping at Prime Minister Fukuda even within the cabinet.
This dissension reflects an attempt by some cabinet min-
isters to dissociate themselves from the government's
handling of the incident. Responsibility for the deci-
sion was officially borne by the Minister of Justice,
who opposed capitulating to the terrorist demands and
dramatically resigned after the incident.
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Foreign Minister Hatoyama and other Foreign Ministry
officials have so far borne the brunt of criticism for
allegedly giving in to the Algerian demands without for-
mal cabinet approval. The cabinet endorsed the decision
after the fact, and Foreign Ministry officials maintain
that they had tacit cabinet approval before accepting
the Algerian conditions.
Despite the previous agreement with the Algerians,
Prime Minister Fukuda has sought to contain the contro-
versy by attempting to open negotiations for return of
the hijackers. For the moment, the Japanese have re-
quested that the Algerians prevent the hijackers from
leaving the country and ensure that the $6 mission ran-
som is not diverted to terrorist coffers.
Algeria has been quick to reject any consideration
of the Japanese request and has publicly condemned the
Japanese for attempting to exploit its humanitarian ef-
forts. The Algerian response and the recent success of
the West Germans in the Lufthansa hijacking add to the
arguments of those who question the ability of the govern-
ment to function effectively in crisis situations.
Implications
This backlash will probably serve to restrict the
government's freedom of action in dealing with future
incidents.* The unfavorable comparison to the West Ger-
man rescue mission will lead to pressures for creation
of a similar Japanese commando squad. Such pressures
could force the government to engage in a potentially
dangerous military operation even in cases where it
would prefer a negotiated settlement. Public concern
''Taketomo Takahashi, the reputed logistics chief for
JRA operations in Europe, remains in a Japanese prison.
The recent JRA success could spark a quick action to se-
cure his release, although the failure of the Lufthansa
hijackers might be interpreted as requiring more careful
planning for any attack.
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for security will in the meantime lead to increased vigi-
lance by the authorities. The Japanese police have al-
ready conducted several raids on the homes of leftists
believed associated with the hijacking, while JAL and air-
port officials are implementing plans for tightening
boarding gate search operations.
In the JAL (as well as the Lufthansa) case, most of
the nations that had previously served as terrorist ref-
uges shifted course and denied landing, refueling, and
safehaven privileges to hijackers. Western governments
have been buoyed by this turn of events and believe that
this may serve as an additional deterrent to future at-
tacks. The increased interest in establishing commando
squads may also be seen as a deterrent to terrorist at-
tacks. Nevertheless, the tactic of hostage-taking has
remained a major tool in the operational repertoire of
publicity-conscious terrorists who, over time, have sought
to devise new techniques for circumventing security mea-
sures. When the next such incident occurs, there is
likely to be increased pressure for the target government
to eschew negotiations and use force. Such a limitation
in freedom of action could lead to unnecessary casualties
among hostages.
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The Terrorist Threat Against Americans in Iran
Terrorist organizations do not at this time pose a
threat to the stability of the Shah's regime, but they
constitute a major security problem. The threat of
terrorist attacks against US citizens and Iranian offi-
cials remains high in spite of the lull in terrorist
activity in Iran this year. The attempt in France on
13 September on the life of the Shah's twin sister,
Princess Ashraf, probably the work of Iranian terrorists
operating in Europe, is a pointed reminder that the
terrorists are still active. Indeed, it is possible
that they may mount some operation during the President's
forthcoming visit to Tehran in order to embarrass the
Shah.
The US Target
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of attacks against residents in Iran in e past four
years leave no doubt that the US community is a prime
target of Iranian terrorists. Since 1973, terrorists
have killed six Americans in Iran; the latest victims
were three employees of Rockwell International who were
shot in August 1976. The other three were military ad-
visers assigned to the US military mission.
The sprawling US community--it numbers about 30,000,
the majority of whom are in Tehran--presents a highly
vulnerable target to the terrorists. Although the 1976
killings drove home to US residents the dangers they
faced, with the passage of time the US community has
imprudently relaxed its security practices.
There are at least four reasons why the terrorists
believe that attacks against US residents serve their
political objectives:
-- Spectacular acts of violence against US
citizens receive heavy news coverage
that focuses domestic and international
attention on opposition to the Shah.
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-- The assassination of US nationals by
terrorists is intended to discredit
and embarrass the Shah by demonstrating
that SAVAK (the National Intelligence
and Security Organization) is ineffec-
tual in protecting the citizens of Iran's
most important ally.
-- The terrorists apparently hope to stimu-
late enough fear to prompt many US civi-
lians to return home. As Iran depends
heavily on American personnel to help
carry out its economic and military
modernization programs, even a limited
exodus would probably impede that effort,
if only temporarily.
-- The terrorists probably calculate that
the killing of foreigners does not
trigger as harsh a retaliation from
the security services or arouse the
same popular revulsion as does the
slaying of Iranian nationals, particu-
larly members of the royal family and
other prominent figures.
Terrorists and Their Assets
Two major terrorist groups have been active in Iran
in the past five years.
The People's Strugglers, while led by Marxists,
appeal to ultraconservative religious groups that deplore
the growth of Western, non-Muslim influences and the
diminished power of traditional religious leaders that
resulted from the Shah's program of land and social reform.
The group's leaders, for the most part, have been success-
ful in masking their ideology from the rank and file
who are drawn from the Islamic-oriented lower and middle
classes.
The Strugglers' strategy is to destroy the present
government by attacking its main bases of support, which
in the eyes of the terrorists include the US. Assassination
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of Americans is an avowed goal of the People's Strugglers;
the organization is generally accepted as having been
responsible for the slaying of the six US nationals in
Iran.
The other important terrorist group is the People's
Sacrifice Guerrillas, a secular Marxist organization.
The Guerrillas have been much less active operationally
than the Strugglers, and it is not clear why the group
has not put its ample resources of equipment and manpower
to fuller use. There is no evidence the group has been
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the Guerrillas do not view
the community in Iran as a prime target. Ideological
differences between the two groups have precluded joint
operations, although there is limited cooperation in the
exchange of information, arms, and supplies.
Despite rather vigorous activity, Iran's counterter-
rorist task force--a joint security unit staffed with
SAVAK and national police officers--has so far been unable
to impair the capability or disrupt the organization of
these two groups to any significant degree. The deaths
of two key leaders last year in clashes with security
agents temporarily disrupted terrorist operations. But
the core leadership remains essentially intact, for the
majority of terrorists killed by the security forces in
the past two years have been low-level members of their
organizations.
Security officials have no reliable figures on the
strength of either terrorist group. The government's
best source of information comes from captured terrorists,
but there are few of these, most preferring suicide. The
number of terrorists the security forces have netted in
sweep operations suggests the two organizations have no
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The quantity and sophistication of the weapons avail-
able to the terrorists are impressive. Their arsenal in-
cludes assault rifles, armor-piercing rifle grenades, and
possibly mortars, which allow them considerable flexibility
in their tactics.
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Foreign Ties
Tehran's effort to come to grips with its terrorist
problem has been concentrated on apprehending dissidents
within the country. Such countermeasures probably will
not be effective until the security services devise means
to cut off the internal terrorist network from its exter-
nal base of support.
Links between terrorist organizations in Iran and
dissident Iranian groups in the United States and Western
"
urope have apparently been strenathened_
This foreign support of the terrorists is
a mayor factor in the Shah's refusal to restore diplo-
matic ties with Tripoli and Havana or to allow the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization to open an office in
Tehran.
Iranian terrorists received support from the Iraqi
Government before the Iran-Iraq accord in 1975. Active
Iraqi support probably ended with the accord, although
Baghdad probably does little to halt the flow of funds
to the terrorists through Iraq.
A number of terrorists arrested in recent months
received training in the People's Republic of China in
the late 1960s. There is no evidence that such training
has continued, and for the last five years China has
assiduously cultivated good relations with Iran
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The USSR has long been on record as opposing politi-
cal terrorism as an instrument of international revolu-
tionary activity. It is therefore not surprising that
there is no evidence of Soviet support for terrorist
activity in Iran. While the absence of documentary evi-
dence does not prove a lack of Soviet support for ter-
rorists in Iran, the growing importance of Iran in the
area, the complex economic relationship that exists be-
tween the two countries, as well as their proximity argue
against such support.
The Outlook
The lull in terrorist activity in Iran during 1977
should not be misconstrued as a sign that the threat is
receding. As indicated above, both of Iran's major
terrorist groups remain organizationally intact. They
are well armed. They continue to enjoy financial and
logistic support from sympathetic foreign governments.
They have been methodically strengthening their links
to Iranian dissident groups abroad. And they remain
committed to terrorist violence.
It would appear, therefore, that for the past year
Iranian terrorists have simply been biding their time,
building up their operational capabilities while waiting
for opportunities for dramatic attacks. The distinct
possibility exists that they may try to mount some opera-
tion--against either American or Iranian targets--in
connection with President Carter's scheduled visit to
Iran on 29 November in order to embarrass the Shah. Such
an operation would not be unprecedented. Although Vice
President Rockefeller's and Secretary of State Kissinger's
visits to Iran in 1976 passed without incident, bombings
occurred during President Nixon's visit in 1972 and on
the eve of Secretary Kissinger's arrival in Tehran in
1974.
In any event, it would appear that the efforts of
the People's Strugglers and the People's Sacrifice Guer-
rillas to rebuild and reorganize in the wake of losses suf-
fered in early 1976 are not now well advanced. It there-
fore seems likely that the coming year will witness a
resurgence of terrorist violence by Iranian dissidents.
To the extent that such violence continues to be manifested
in Iran, the danger to the American community there will
mount accordingly. In addition, the terrorists' apparent
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success in tapping dissident groups in the farflung
Iranian expatriate community suggests that the attack
on Princess Ashraf in France may be the harbinger of
further such activity outside Iran. If this turns out
to be the case, Iranian terrorists may target American
citizens or installations in third countries as well.
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Conflict and Cooperation in Current World Politics
On such global issues as energy shortages, trade
and development problems, food-population pressures and
threats of nuclear proliferation and increased arms
transfers, the current scene is characterized both by
increased verbal commitments to the necessity for inter-
national cooperation and increased domestic pressures to
pursue national advantage at the risk of conflict. The
following article attempts to illuminate the apparent
increased complexity of world politics by underscoring
the common origins of the pressures for cooperation and
conflict and thus the seeming inability of countries to
pursue one or the other course consistently.
Contradictory pressures for conflict and for co-
operation have almost always been at play in interna-
tional relations; even during the height of the Cold War,
superpower competition had to be tempered by implicit
agreements to avoid a nuclear holocaust. These contra-
dictory forces, however, seem to be particularly central
to the explanation of world politics during the present
period.
The factors contributing to the present premium on
international cooperation are many, although they them-
selves reflect competitive situations in which either
cooperation or conflict can dominate. First, there is
a new sensitivity to international economic dislocations
and a growing awareness of economic interdependence,
which stems from the recognized dependence of most coun-
tries on imported oil and raw materials, the periodic
reliance of the Soviet bloc on Western food imports, the
persistent threat of international monetary difficulties,
and the increased influence on events of multinational
firms. The increased awareness of economic interde-
pendence has led policymakers to place new emphasis on
a search for international solutions that are of mutual
or reciprocal benefit.
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Second, the industrial democracies face increased
domestic obstacles to controlling developments beyond
their peripheries, especially where the use of military
power overseas or large amounts of economic assistance
would be required. The abatement of domestic support
for an assertive foreign policy reflects (1) a decline
in the perception of immediate security threats asso-
ciated with the height of the Cold War; (2) disenchant-
ment with the costs and risks of extensive overseas in-
volvement; and (3) constraints caused by slower rates
of domestic economic growth amid intensifying demands
for social and economic benefits. There is also con-
siderable information to suggest that there are growing
domestic economic and social pressures within the USSR
that place similar, if considerably weaker, constraints
on the governing elite concerning the extent to which
defense expenditures can take precedence over the pro-
duction of consumer goods. These domestic pressures
work to prevent leaders from looking at the world in
terms of simple competition for national political,
military, or economic advantage and force them instead
to develop more complex and ambiguous national objec-
tives and policies that rely on cooperation as well as
competition.
Third, domestic inhibitions on assertive foreign
policies, together with the growing wealth and regional
influence of certain LDCs (for example, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Brazil, Venezuela) and the rise in assertiveness
on the part of LDCs generally, have contributed to a
diffusion of power in international relations. This is
manifested most clearly in the increased frequency and
effectiveness with which the nonindustrial countries,
individually and collectively, challenge the general
authority and specific policies of the industrial powers.
External constraints affect the usefulness of an
assertive foreign policy for the USSR and China as well
as for the industrial democracies. While the Communist
powers may at times attempt to take advantage of oppor-
tunities for foreign adventure, their cost-benefit cal-
culations are also conditioned by the diffusion of power,
especially in regard to the growth of nationalism among
LDCs and even within the Communist parties of many coun-
tries.
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On the other hand, there are both longstanding and
newly emerging forces for conflict in the world.
First, although mitigated by the diffusion of power
and domestic constraints discussed above, national
rivalries for political, military, and economic power
continue as a force for conflict whether in the form of
a naval presence in the Mediterranean, support of leftist
insurgents in Angola, or hard bargaining on economic
matters.
Second, there is a marked absence of institutional
arrangements--whether designed for mutual defense purposes
like NATO, global political stresses like the UN, or
economic problems like the OECD--that have a significant
capacity to deal effectively with global problems whether
by consensus or imposition. This lack of institutional
efficacy and the search for new mechanisms to provide
forums for decisionmaking have caused considerable con-
flict as national players strive for advantage in the
process (as, for example, at the recently concluded
Conference on International Economic Cooperation).
In a sense, the wide scope of global (especially
economic) problems, the lack of credible solutions, and
the constraints on national governments that underlie
the pressures for cooperation also feed the counter-
pressures for conflict. With little confidence in con-
senual "fixes" and with fear of the domestic political
consequences of intensified economic problems at home,
governments feel forced to play for short-term national
advantage. This is reflected in intensive high-level
bargaining on economic issues not only between industrial
and nonindustrial nations but also among the industrial
democracies and between them and the Communist powers.
Finally, the apparent growing interconnections be-
tween global issues (for example, between energy depen-
dence and nuclear proliferation or between LDC demands
and the economic problems of industrial nations) inhibit
cooperation on any single issue. The difficulties of
dealing with any of the global issues singly are, as a
rule, magnified by the reverberations among related is-
sues. The difficulties of attempting national solutions
to one or all of the issues are similarly increased. Al-
though the prospects for cooperation might be heightened
in the long run, there are serious immediate sources of
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Rtl
conflict as each particular problem confronts national
leaders with trade-off choices that are difficult to
deal with.
An illustration of the tension between the forces
operating for and against cooperation can be found in
the international energy arena.
First, there
are
opposing forces for conflict and
cooperation among
the
member states of OPEC. The po-
tential regional
power
conflict over Persian Gulf
hegemony between
Iran
and Saudi Arabia and the ideolog-
ical and ol'tical disagreements between the conserva-
tive members/ I and the radical
members represent serious ten-
sions. on e o er Hand, the desire for joint politi-
cal influence with regard to settlement of the Middle
East dispute and the desire for high national revenues,
which stem from the shared control of oil supplies and
prices, are strong forces for cooperation.
There are also forces for both conflict and coop-
eration between the OPEC countries, as a group and
singly, and the developed oil importing countries. On
the conflict side one finds opposing objectives on the
questions of oil supply and price, but on the cooperation
side one finds mutual desires for a stable, smoothly
functioning international economic system with regard to
technology transfer, trade, and investment.
A third set of forces operating for conflict and
cooperation exist within the developed oil importing
community. There are national rivalries for closer po-
litical and economic links with OPEC producers to gain
advantage over other consuming states or to avoid damage
being inflicted on them (as in the French attempts at
reaching bilateral agreements). One also sees, however,
a genuine desire for joint energy research projects, re-
source development cooperation, financial integration,
and protective emergency sharing programs.
The meaning for US policy in this mosaic of coopera-
tion and conflict is that we face increased uncertainty
and challenges to our freedom of action yet have the
opportunity significantly to influence events because
patterns of national behavior are not narrowly attuned to
the attainment of clear, zero-sum objectives.
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The outcomes of interplay between forces operating
for cooperation and conflict are difficult to predict,
just as the causal relationships among various global
issues and international trends are difficult to align
with confidence. What seems clear, however, is that
the need to manage these global issues effectively--
whether to reduce risks or maximize opportunities--will
remain a central challenge to US foreign policy at least
for the remainder of the 1970s and the early 1980s.
Despite the explicit and implied limitations to its
freedom of action, the US (especially in the context of
basically harmonious relations with the other industrial
democracies) remains the single most powerful and influ-
ential country in the international arena. Most LDCs
remain poor, weak, and problem stricken and thus poten-
tially susceptible to US influence and power when the
latter are clearly delineated and forcefully projected.
Countries with some attributes of wealth and power remain
highly dependent in key areas (for example, the oil-rich
countries seek technological development and military
security). Also, although the Soviet Union is a super-
power in strategic military terms, it generally cannot
match potential US influence and freedom of action in
global issues in terms of economic wealth and power,
technological prowess, and alliance and other diplomatic
networks. Therefore, although the US can now rarely ex-
pect to control the outcome of complex international
events to the extent it did from the late 1940s to the
early 1960s, its ability to affect the ways in which
global issues will be addressed and what kinds of bar-
gains may be struck is still impressive.
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25X1
Regional Powers and the North-South Dialogue
Next month President Carter is to visit six develop-
ing countries that have played important roles in the
North-South dialogue. These countries--Venezuela, Brazil,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Nigeria--are also infZuen-
tial in regional politics and desire enhanced status and
authority in global affairs as well. This article dis-
cusses the goals of these countries in the context of LDC
demands for a "New International Economic Order (NIEO)
and assesses the near-term implications for the North-
South dialogue.
The countries on the President's itinerary are not
typical developing countries. Five (India is the excep-
tion) are major beneficiaries of the present international
economic system and have experienced long-term GNP growth
that has stayed well ahead of population growth. Four
(Brazil, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran) have "gradu-
ated" from the ranks of the LDCs eligible for concessional
aid from the World Bank and the US Government. Nigeria
(whose per capita GNP is now only $50 below the conces-
sional aid cut-off point of $520) has a larger GNP than
the rest of black Africa combined and in a few years is
expected to surpass South Africa. Together, the four
OPEC states the President will visit supply roughly one-
half of US imported oil.
North-South Policy
There are substantial differences in approach to
the North-South economic dialogue among these six coun-
tries as compared with that of the "Group of 77" (the
LDC caucus). In fact, many LDCs do not consider Saudi
Arabia or Brazil as developing countries. Saudi and
Brazilian leaders have been extremely ambivalent about
participating in the North-South dialogue on the G-77's
side. Their views on key issues are very close to those
of the industrialized countries, and they believe that
in general the demands of the LDCs must be reduced to
more realistic levels.
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Most LDCs seek increased aid. The countries the
President will visit seek increased access to industrial
country resources largely through trade and private fi-
nance. Most LDCs support a Common Fund to raise substan-
tially the prices of the commodities they export. These
six countries are net importers of many commodities pro-
duced in the Third World. Thus, the launching of such
a fund would probably result in net foreign trade losses
for all six countries and is opposed behind the scenes
by their leaders.* Finally, most LDCs want to restrict
the activities of multinational corporations that they
believe undermine their sovereignty. A prime concern of
the leaders of the six countries is attracting increased
foreign investment.
Nevertheless, the six countries the President. will
visit attach considerable political importance to the
North-South dialogue. Each views the dialogue as a means
of enhancing its influence among the developing countries.
Notwithstanding the differences in specific goals and
tactics among them (summarized in the accompanying chart),
each shares with the LDCs as a bloc the desire both to
alter the distribution of power and authority in inter-
national affairs (by, for example, enhancing LDC control
over international financial institutions) and to narrow
the income gap between rich and poor countries.
Like many LDCs, these six countries see NIEO politi-
cal objectives as essential to insulate them from exter-
nal pressures for economic changes they are reluctant
to make for domestic political reasons (for example,
World Bank pressure for monetary and fiscal policy reforms,
or US emphasis on a Basic Human Needs approach to de-
velopment strategy). This is even more the case for
protection against the use of international financial in-
stitutions to put pressure on them in the areas of human
rights or nuclear proliferation. They see these pressures
as an infringement on their sovereignty and an effort to
constrain their ability to act effectively as a regional
power.
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 Venezuela
Leader in demands for
a NIEO
Believes that threats
of confrontation can
be an effective tactic
Describes CIEC exercise
as a failure
Major concerns
preservation of its
oil earnings
better terms on foreign
investments in LDCs and
technology transfer
increased role for LDCs
in managing the
international economy
Approv
emG-~gmtjjftsi r, ey00912A002300010008-6
Nigeria
Recently became more
moderate after a period
of advocating confronta-
tion
Major concerns
maintaining the value
of its oil exports
changes in global
commodity markets to
favor the LDCs
changes in the global
economy to help its
African neighbors
Brazil
Active participant in
all facets of the dialogue
Prefers moderate tactics
Pursues measures to
enhance Brazil's role
in the existing global
economy instead of
pushing for systemic
changes
Major concerns
access to developed
country import markets
access to developed
country financial markets
access to developed
country technology
Denmark.,{
~" . ted
Ireland
Kingdom Neth,f Poland
,> - e~, 1 Vt~a.O.R~y~Luz. F.RA
.zgch `+--
Ivory
oast
s Itr.i un
Italy ~v,Yugo.
Libya
Niger /'Chad
yria i
--[. Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Major concerns
national order
greater Saudi role in
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Iran
Supports NIEO demands,
emphasizes that developed
countries-particulary
the US-should do more
to help the LDCs
Describes CIEC exercise
as a failure
Major concerns
perserving the value of
petroleum exports
technology transfer
expanding LDC agricul
tural output through
institutions like IFAD
relief from official debts
loser through provision
of aid for development
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Current Political Dynamics
From the perspective of the leadership of the six
countries, considerable progress has been made over the
past eight months in injecting a new sense of momentum
into the North-South dialogue, and expectations of future
progress are high. From the US viewpoint as well, the
North-South economic dialogue is currently on track. The
bargaining with the LDCs is being driven by specifics and
is being carried on in such forums as the IMF, the indi-
vidual commodity talks, the regional development :banks,
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Most of the rapidly growing LDCs (especially Brazil,
Saudi Arabia, and Iran) approach LDC bloc politics cau-
tiously, and behind the scenes have expressed reservations
on major G-77 demands like the Common Fund and debt re-
lief. The OPEC states (with the exception of Venezuela
and Algeria) have not attempted to apply their oil lever-
age on politics in the North-South context and are un-
likely to do so.
Although the North-South dialogue is now marked by
an unusual degree of moderation on the LDCs' part, the
atmosphere still is fragile. Over the next three to six
months, tensions that could adversely affect North-South
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relations will probably stem from three main sources and
will involve the six developing countries the President
will visit.
First, the terms of the bargain that most indus-
trialized countries are prepared to offer in the North-
South dialogue will probably be disappointing to all but
the most advanced, rapidly growing LDCs. In particular,
the poorest LDCs stand to gain little from the issues
(for example, Common Fund, debt relief, trade liberali-
zation) currently on the agenda of the North-South dia-
logue.* Their disappointment could lead to pressures
for a new round of confrontation, and this would pose
distinct problems for Nigeria (who seeks to be a leader
among the Africans) in continuing to support a moderate
stance in the North-South dialogue.
Second, the linkages between the political and eco-
nomic aspects of North-South relations will complicate
the specific negotiations ahead. Tensions in the economic
talks could disrupt US relations with key LDCs. For ex-
ample, US overtures in the UN in recent months over
the southern African question have been generally well
received, tending to build US credibility among Africans
(especially the Nigerians). These benefits could be
reduced, or even nullified, by a new round of confronta-
tion on economic issues. Moreover, just as the success
or failure of talks in the economic sphere can influence
political issue areas, international reaction to US
policy initiatives in the political arena can also have
an effect on the economic talks. Brazil's negative
reaction to US?pressure on human rights and nuclear
proliferation could contribute to persuading the Bra-
zilians--who have long been a force for moderation--to
take a more radical stand in the North-South economic
dialogue.
Third, simultaneous deadlocks in separate negotiations
(for example, stalled multilateral trade talks and
perceived backsliding on the Common Fund) would create
opportunities for some LDCs (for example, Venezuela) to
exploit in pushing the G--77 toward a return to the use
of confrontational tactics. Such deadlocks could possibly
*For a preliminary analysis of how poorer LDCs might view
the addition of a "Basic Human Needs" strategy to this
agenda, see the article in this issue on "LDC Receptivity
to a Basic Human Needs Approach to Development Aid."
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cause some relatively recent advocates of nonconfronta-
tional tactics--especially Nigeria and Iran--to recon-
sider their positions, especially if other countries in
their regions begin to question the efficacy of a moder-
ate approach. This might also lead to greater pressure
by the G-77 to deal with North-South issues once again
in the framework of a polarized UN General Assembly.
The impact that events and developments such as
those outlined above could have on the key LDCs the
President will visit next month suggests that the
state of North-South relations will pose continuing prob-
lems for US foreign policy in the period ahead. North-
South relations will be particularly important during
the President's trip because a major international con-
ference on a key North-South issue--the Common Fund ne-
gotiating conference (7 November to 2 December)--wall
be going on at the same time. Since the leaders of the
six LDCs clearly wish to avoid a net loss of support from
the industrial countries for their modernization efforts,
they will be eager to present to President Carter their
views on how the North-South negotiations may best be
kept on track.
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Basic Human Needs As An Aid Policy
The US has proposed a development aid policy focused
on Basic Human Needs (BHN). The implementation of this
strategy in ways that are both effective and minimally
disruptive to other important US interests is likely to
be a particularly demanding task. Some LDC resistance,
or even rejection, is probable. Mobilization of an ap-
propriately funded and managed multilateral effort on
the part of aid donors will also be difficult.
The first of the following two articles explores the
reasons why some LDCs would resist and others accept the
BHN approach. The second analyzes attitudes of developed
countries to BHN. Future issues of this publication will
examine the outlook for BHN in selected individual recip-
ient countries.
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LDC Receptivity to a Foreign Aid Emphasis on Basic
Human Needs
This article assesses the likely reaction among
LDCs to a proposed foreign assistance strategy that em-
phasizes the promotion of Basic Human Needs (BHN). Some
poorer countries have themselves long advocated such an
approach. But many LDCs have reacted to BHN with skep-
ticism or, especially among the rapidly growing coun-
tries, resistance. Yet, as the companion article in-
dicates, support for BHN among aid donors will require
broad LDC acceptance.
The Meaning of Basic Human Needs
At the Conference on International Economic Coop-
eration (CIEC) in May, the US pledged a substantial in-
crease in its foreign assistance over the next five
years and proposed a Basic Human Needs approach to de-
velopment aid. The US Foreign Assistance Act since 1973
has mandated that US bilateral assistance programs con-
centrate on the needs of the poor, and BHN represents a
further evolution of this "growth with equity" approach.
BHN would be an employment-oriented rural develop-
ment strategy, aimed at the great masses of rural poor
and emphasizing increased food production and better
nutrition. It would stress land reform, improvement of
rural distribution systems, upgrading of marketing and
storage facilities, and the strengthening of economic
and social services to low income agricultural producers.
It would also promote training to enhance capacity for
productive employment.
A successful BHN program could help ameliorate LDC
food and population problems. The long range answer to
LDC food deficits lies in expanded domestic production
and in employment and income distribution policies that
allow the poor to buy food at world market (that is,
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unsubsidized) prices. Increased productive employment,
the corresponding rise in the standard of living, and
the development of a rural social infrastructure could
in turn help move the poor through the so-called demo-
graphic transition from high to low birth and death
rates.*
The Question of Development Strategy
The effectiveness of a BHN aid program will depend
upon the willingness of leaders of recipient countries
to design appropriate development strategies. In coun-
tries such as Jamaica, Burma, Laos, Tanzania, and Algeria,
where the development philosophy is based on the need
for social and economic equity, BHN would provide sup-
port for existing strategies. For those political lead-
ers committed to the classical pattern of development
that stresses urban industrial growth, BHN would in-
volve difficult political and economic decisions.
There is a deep-rooted reluctance among some LDC
elites to make the shifts in investment from urban to
rural development, from capital-intensive to labor-
intensive activities, from the production of nonessential
consumer goods to essential ones that are required by
BHN. Elites bent on rapid modernization prefer urban
industrialization to investing scarce capital in agri-
culture, and foreign aid policies have generally rein-
forced this pattern. Historically, a negligible pro-
portion of aid has actually benefited agriculture. In-
deed, food aid during the 20 years of the PL 480 program
encouraged some recipient governments to avoid either
making the domestic policy decisions necessary to grow
their own food or to earn enough money through exports
to pay for food.
*Lower death rates, of course, initially result in pop-
ulation increases. But as people realize that declining
infant mortality Lessens the need for numerous children,
fertility should decline sufficiently to cause a net
Lowering of the population growth rate.
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The chief objectives of rural development in most
developing countries are to supply industry with raw
materials and industrial workers with food and/or to
extract an exportable agricultural surplus to finance
industrialization. The need for foreign exchange earn-
ings to finance development and pay for imports has led
many developing countries to emphasize cash crops for
export. Local staples, grown largely by poorer farmers,
receive a small percent of government agricultural
credits and assistance. In cases such as Mexico, where
attempts are made at reconciling greater equity with
growth by changing agrarian institutions, the reforms
are often partial and concentrated in certain regions.
Domestic Political Problems
The political returns to government elites of at-
tacks on absolute poverty are usually perceived as neg-
ligible or negative. The very poor in the LDC are
mini-farmers, landless laborers, and recent immigrants
to the cities who may soon be forced back to the land
by unemployment. They are usually unorganized, un-
educated, and inarticulate, and they therefore can exert
little leverage on the government. Conversely, the
landowning and urban elites are vocal and usually have
powerful ties to the government. At least initially,
both industrial employers and industrial workers stand
to be adversely affected by increased attention to the
interests of the rural poor, who would like to earn more
in the village through higher food prices and to see
governmental resources diverted from industry to agri-
culture. Often, powerful urban interests that would
suffer from a diminution of urban emphasis in develop-
ment as well as landowners who would be hurt by land
reform either dominate the government or exercise con-
siderable leverage in such policy areas.
Sometimes the rural masses are perceived as a po-
tential threat to political stability. Cultural self-
awareness and literacy would promote new aspirations
and demands, which might overwhelm the government's capa-
bility for providing goods and services. The resulting
frustration and the demands for greater political par-
ticipation to assure rural needs might ultimately cause
severe political instability.
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Another domestic obstacle to BHN arises from the
fact that political leaders have sometimes misused for-
eign aid for their own personal financial or political
gain. A BHN program would presumably entail a stringent
bilateral or international monitoring program with as-
sured access to the countries involved to measure per-
formance. Although this would increase the chances of
a successful aid program, it would be resisted by those
elites who had previously misused aid funds.
International Political Problems
More broadly and more importantly, some countries
see such a monitoring program as intervention by the
industrialized countries. The group of rapidly develop-
ing LDCs that are demanding major change in the inter-
national order and want increased world power status
would be particularly sensitive to the implications of
the monitoring process.* For example, Brazilian offi-
cials have made clear with reference to BHN that it is
not the prerogative of the US to decide how Brazil's
economic and social institutions should be designed.
If political conditions (as, for instance, those per-
taining to human rights) were included as prerequisites
for access to the program, some developing countries
would resist applying on the basis that these demands
impinge on their national sovereignty.
Economic and political elites in some developing
countries--such as Nigeria--that enjoy the prestige of
extending aid to still poorer countries may be sensi-
tive to any suggestion-that they require foreign assist-
ance to provide for the basic needs of their own people.
Further, some of the more prosperous LDCs may argue
that BHN diverts attention from the obligation of their
principal economic trade partners to share in the reso-
lution of their development problems. Other developing
countries, such as India and Pakistan, who demand major
economic as well as political change in the interna-
tional order, might fear that concentration on BHN would
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divert attention from these reform goals. Argentinian
officials have expressed particular concern that with
the great emphasis on BHN at CIEC, little attention
was given the countries--such as Argentina--that need
access to markets and remain concerned about a tendency
in developed countries to deny this access.
Outlook
The poorest countries of the world--such as Bang-
ladesh, Haiti, Guyana, and Laos--seek substantial new
official development aid from the industrialized coun-
tries. They would probably accept a BHN program that
they perceived as supporting their own survival. ]3e-
cause of the limited absorptive capacity of these coun-
tries, foreign policy returns for donors would be re-
lated mainly to humanitarian rather than economic or
security objectives.
The obstacles to successfully implementing a ]3HN
program even in receptive low-income countries center
on the adequacy of their institutions and the need for
a committed international BHN effort. Massive injec-
tions of aid, technical assistance, and training would
be necessary to develop the institutional and adminis-
trative mechanisms for an effective BHN strategy, and
major international financing would be necessary.
Among the more prosperous, politically important
LDCs, rejection of the plan is more likely than it is
among the poorer. Some upper-tier LDCs with secure po-
litical leadership and stable, flexible political :in-
stitutions may be interested. Even politically stable
countries, however, may fear the public pressures re-
sulting from increased demand on inadequate delivery
systems and social infrastructure. Countries would
probably contemplate applying for BHN funds only if
they were confident of the adequacy of existing dis-
tribution systems and institutions for bringing social
services to rural areas or have a mechanism for quickly
establishing such capabilities. For example, Mexico
set up in 1973 an integrated rural development project
and has begun institutional reforms as well as develop-
ment of distribution systems and social infrastructure
designed to reach the rural poor.
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In addition, an LDC may place high priority on
equity and desire access to BHN funds, but lack an ade-
quate bureaucracy to manage such a program and be un-
willing to accept the level of foreign intervention en-
tailed in it.
An upper or mid-tier LDC desiring access to a BHN
program would, in all likelihood, be one with some
existing ideological commitment to improve the situa-
tion of the rural poor. In Mexico, for example, the
ideological basis for agrarian reform has been a vital
part of national doctrine for several decades.
It is in the rich or potentially rich LDCs where
US interests will be more clearly advanced because of
their real or projected status in world trade and eco-
nomic patterns, their greater importance in security
affairs, and their greater influence in regional and
Third World forums. On the technical level, implementa-
tion of BHN programs would be less costly and less prob-
lematical in these countries with their relatively ad-
vanced institutions and infrastructure than it would be
among the poorest states. It is among the upper-tier
LDCs, however, that resistance to BHN on the basis of
its implications for national sovereignty and pride, as
well as for development strategies, can be expected to
be strongest. Thus, it will be important to exercise
care in designing approaches to these countries to try
to engage their interest in securing access to the sig-
nificantly increased aid resources involved in BHN and
their enthusiasm for tailoring their own programs.
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Developed Country Attitudes Toward Basic Human Needs
Industrial countries have in general rhetorically
endorsed the concept of a development assistance strategy
based on basic human needs (BHN), as long as it wins LDC
acceptance. But many developed countries question whether
it will serve their best interests in relations with the
LDCs and appear reluctant to make it the focus of their
aid policies. The diversity of industrial country atti-
tudes on the issue indicates that they will probably not
be able to agree on a concerted BHN strategy in the near
future.
General Developed Country Attitudes
The June OECD ministerial meeting in Paris adopted
a declaration on relations with developing countries
that reflected points emphasized by the US Secretary of
State. The resolution stated that development assistance
should meet the basic needs of the poor in all developing
countries, as well as contribute to each recipient coun-
try's economic growth. In response to Secretary Vance's
proposal that the OECD design a program for basic human
needs, the DAC formed an experts group composed of rep-
resentatives from DAC member countries,* international
organizations, and LDCs to discuss development programs
and policies for meeting these needs. The DAC considered
the group's report on 26 and 27 October.
*The DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States, and West Germany.
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Official Development Assistance by Selected DAC Members
1973
Million $ Percent of GNP
1976
Million $ Percent of GNP
France
1,461
0.57
2,167
0.63
Japan
1,011
0.25
1,105
0.20
Netherlands
322
0.54
720
0.82
Norway
87
0.43
229
0.71
Sweden
275
0.56
608
0.82
United Kingdom
603
0.34
835
0.38
United States
2,968
0.23
4,334
0.26
West Germany
1,102
0.32
1,384
0.31
DAC Total
9,351
0.30
13,688
0.33
Allocation of DAC Bilateral Development Assistance
(Percent of Total Disbursements)
GNP Per Capita
Less than $265
45.2
44.0
$265-$520
13.7
18.3
$520-$1,075
21.4
13.2
Over $1,075
10.9
15.8
Unallocated
8.7
8.7
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The industrialized countries appear to be awaiting
the outcome of further discussions in the DAC before
formulating specific aid policies based on BHN. A few
have asked for more detailed US views on the subject.
Most contend that the concept is too vague. None appears
willing to alter its current aid practices or increase
total outlays significantly to conform with a BHN strategy.
Instead, many want to define that strategy so that. their
existing policies could be said to fit it. Thus, BHN
has been defined both narrowly to mean meeting the min-
imum conditions for human existence, and broadly to in-
clude such economic infrastructure projects as telecom-
munications and industrial works. Nevertheless, a con-
sensus is emerging that the strategy would concentrate
on social projects among the poorest LDC populations.*
At the present time, the aid policies of the DAC
members as a group do not conform very well to this con-
sensus. Only a few industrial countries devote more
than 0.5 percent of their GNP to development assistance
(see table I). The proportion of total DAC bilateral
aid channeled to the poorer countries (those with per
capita incomes below $520) has grown only slightly. The
relative importance of assistance to the wealthiest LDCs
(those with per capita incomes above $1,075) has in-
creased more rapidly (see table II).
All developed states insist that no BHN strategy
can be adopted unless it has LDC support--a condition
that may not be easily fulfilled. To placate LDC ob-
jections, the industrial countries agree that a workable
BHN strategy must vary from recipient to recipient and
that development of specific aid policies must be done
in consultation and cooperation with the LDCs. In addi-
tion, spokesmen have emphasized that a BHN strategy
should not compete with other economic development aid.
Several have expressed a desire to ensure that the
volume of overall OECD (and particularly US) aid does
not decline. Because many BHN projects may not require
large-scale funding, some states fear that advocacy of
the strategy may mask an intention to reduce total aid
levels.
*For a discussion of the meaning of BHN and of LDC atti-
tudes toward the concept, see "LDC Receptivity to a For-
eign Aid Emphasis on Basic Human Needs," in this issue.
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Individual Developed Country Attitudes
Beyond those points of general agreement, industrial
country positions on BHN diverge substantially. Even if
general LDC support for the idea is achieved, probably
only the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states could
fully embrace it as the focus for their aid programs.
Their development assistance policies are already largely
directed toward social projects in the poorest countries
and to a great extent are inspired by a humanitarianism
that is eminently compatible with the fundamental BHN
concept. Because political self-interest does not govern
their aid policy, they would probably be willing to shift
from their current bilateral aid programs to multilateral
ones as part of a common developed country BHN effort.
In contrast, the major developed states--the United
Kingdom, West Germany, France, and Japan--have serious
problems with the idea. They are reluctant to disavow
a policy that appears ethically unassailable and repre-
sents a major US effort to have the developed states
seize the initiative in North-South economic negotiations.
At the same time, they question whether an aid policy
centered on the satisfaction of basic human needs would
serve their major political and economic interests in
regard to the developing states. In addition, they
would probably be reluctant to sacrifice some of the
political and (in the case of tied aid) economic bene-
fits of bilateral assistance by a greater concentration
of resources on multilateral programs.
Although the United Kingdom in theory seeks to
channel most of its aid to social projects in the poor-
est LDCs, in fact it is still heavily involved in eco-
nomic infrastructure development, directs most of its
aid to the Commonwealth, and opposes a BHN strategy that
would heavily stress welfare.
Since France's development assistance is mainly
directed toward French-speaking former African colonies
with which it has close political and economic ties, it
is reluctant to accept a BHN strategy that would restrict
its freedom to choose aid targets. In addition, it has
been more supportive than the other major developed
countries of LDC demands for a New International Economic
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Order and is concerned that a focus on BHN would be badly
received by LDCs that fear it would reduce the chances 25X1
for the achievement of those demands.
Since the developed and developing states have
only just begun to consider the BHN concept, it may be
premature to estimate the chances for the OECD members
agreeing on the question. Nevertheless, the diversity
in their aid principles and practices suggests that
they will probably be unable to adopt a concerted BHN
strategy in the near future, even if the LDCs accept
the idea.
A continued rhetorical endorsement of the concept
as one among many laudable approaches to assistance is
to be expected. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries will adhere to their current policies, which
closely conform to the BHN ideal. The others are likely
to shift some resources to BHN aims, probably along with
promises to do more in the future (reminiscent of their
commitment to devote 0.7 percent of GNP to development
assistance), but a major change in policy cannot be ex-
pected.
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The Nuclear Energy-Proliferation Trade-Off
The following article examines the controversy sur-
rounding the trade-off between nuclear power development
and nuclear weapons proliferation. It is presented in
the hope of stimulating thought and debate on these ques-
tions and in accompanied by a comment expressing a dif-
ferent view. In both cases, the judgments are those of
the individual analysts and do not represent an official
ORPA or NFAC position.
In recent nuclear debates--both within this country
and between the US and its foreign critics--attention
has centered on the relationship between nuclear power
generation and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Sometimes a direct trade-off between energy and nonpro-
liferation goals is implied: there is said to be a
choice between expanding nuclear power at the risk of
increasing proliferation or curtailing nuclear power at
the risk of an energy crisis. Or, as in current Ameri-
can policy, a middle way is proposed that is said to
assure the benefits of nuclear power while minimizing
the risk of proliferation.
This definition of the issues distorts the terms
of debate on both energy and proliferation questions by
inflating the nuclear energy alternative out of propor-
tion to its true importance and encouraging the belief
that, in addressing these questions, the decisive choices
are technological ones. A narrow focus on the nuclear
energy - proliferation trade-off thus serves to mask more
basic policy problems and alternatives in both areas.
It is doubtful at this point that nuclear energy
can have more than a marginal impact in staving off the
kind of energy crisis widely predicted for the 1980s and
1990s. It is similarly doubtful that restrictions on
the spread of nuclear power plants and their associated
technologies can have more than a marginal impact on the
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spread of nuclear weapons during this time period. The
"solutions" in each case are a matter of too little, too
late. More importantly, they come at their respective
problems indirectly and at the wrong level; they fail
to address basic structural causes and issues.
The most optimistic projections now place the con-
tribution of nuclear power to OECD energy supplies at
about 7 percent in 1985. Over the rest of this century,
the contribution should continue to grow (perhaps to 20-
25 percent of consumption by the year 2000), although
political and economic uncertainties make such forecasts
exceedingly risky.
While these figures are much lower than earlier
estimates, they are clearly not insignificant, and the
intention here is not to suggest that nuclear power can
or should be dispensed with altogether. Preoccupation
with the nuclear alternative, however, should not ob-
scure two basic points.
First, nuclear potential in the near to medium term
falls considerably short of being sufficient to prevent
the projected energy supply-demand gap of the 1980s and
1990s. This gap will in all likelihood be closed by
large downward adjustments in demand, either through
prudently implemented programs of conservation and con-
sumption constraint or through a fairly brutal rationing
of supplies by steep price increases. Even with a fa-
vorable trend of nuclear development, the most pressing
energy program facing the OECD nations will be to manage
the economic and political strains associated with
steadily rising energy costs and (in most cases) continued
high oil imports.
Second, nuclear power is essentially a temporary
palliative, insofar as it does not address the critical
structural bases of the global energy problem viewed in
the long term: the pattern of energy consumption in
modern industrial economies, and--in the case of the
current generation of reactors--the finiteness of our
energy resources.*
*The breeder reactor does, of course, potentiaZZy rep-
resent a renewable source of energy.
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If nuclear energy technologies cannot in themselves
avert an energy crisis, neither are restrictions on these
technologies likely to do more than marginally slow the
spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Again, the remedy
fails to cut to the heart of the problem. Like the energy
crisis, the process of proliferation is closely linked to
basic forces in the contemporary global political economy--
especially the drives for national security, development,
and status--and cannot be easily dealt with apart from
these forces. The policies that might successfully re-
verse the process have yet to be formulated, but it seems
likely that they would have to involve much more far-
reaching changes in the international order than existing
approaches concede.
While the diffusion of nuclear fuel cycle technol-
ogies undeniably increases the availability of potentially
weapons-usable materials, there is little historical or
technological justification for viewing this as the crucial
threshold to weapons proliferation. On the contrary, the
illegal diversion of materials from safeguarded "peace-
ful" nuclear facilities would be a relatively risky and
inefficient path to a weapons capability. A policy of
restrictions on the spread of "sensitive" nuclear facili-
ties such as enrichment and reprocessing plants is at
best a second or third line of defense or a delaying
action. At worst it may aggravate relations with poten-
tial nuclear weapon states in a way that increases pro-
liferation risks, since technological double standards
raise questions of legitimacy and status that are basic
to the proliferation problem itself.
Nuclear power, to conclude, is neither the solution
to our energy crisis nor the cause of our proliferation
crisis. Exaggerated claims on both sides have produced an
unfortunate preoccupation with the energy-proliferation
trade-off that makes policy choices appear both harder
and easier than they really are.
Harder, because it sets up an unfortunate policy
confrontation on what should be a relatively peripheral
issue. This is not to argue that energy and proliferation
policies should be made in a vacuum, without considera-
tion of their very real interconnections. Nevertheless,
a partial uncoupling of these questions so that each can
be approached on its merits could help alleviate what has
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become a serious irritant in US relations with key allies
and LDCs.
Easier, because a belief in the centrality of this
trade-off perpetuates the illusion that the energy and
proliferation problems are amenable to solution by tech-
nological means. This, in turn, leads to an imprudent
understatement of the true political and social price of
serious attempts to confront these issues directly. II 25X1
25X1 '
A Separate Opinion
I agree with the author that the widely discussed
conflict between energy policy and nonproliferation policy
is not as direct and simple as often argued, that energy
development is not the principal cause of the prolifer-
ation crisis, that nuclear power is only one instrument
among others for reducing the impact of the energy re-
source shortage, and that nuclear development does not
address the central features of the global energy prob-
lem.
There are, however, several points in the article
that would lend support to something approaching a nu-
clear moratorium, that are questionable, and that deserve
closer attention.
First, the assertion that nuclear energy can have
only a marginal impact on the energy crisis of the 1980s
is correct but should be expanded to explain that the
marginal impact of a national nuclear program producing
5-6 percent of total primary energy would probably mean
a potentially vital 1-2 percent difference in GNP and in
the level of employment.
Second, the implicit assumption that the energy pro-
duction lost through elimination of the nuclear program
could be regained by increasing production from another
energy resource is based on double bookkeeping. Current
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projections show US, OECD, and world demand for energy
outstripping total productive capacity in all energy re-
sources combined (assuming current economic growth rates
and levels of price increase) by the early 1980s. Thus, if
nuclear energy is taken from total energy, it means re-
duced energy consumption; there are no other resources
for substitution.
Third, the implication that there is greater long-
range potential in conservation and in renewable energy
resources than in nuclear power may prove accurate, but
it should not be interpreted to mean that the nuclear
effort should be abandoned. Moreover, even trouble-free
development of long-range potential in both areas would
not alleviate the economic hardships and political dif-
ficulties of energy shortages for this generation.
One can decide for a number of political, economic,
or social reasons to limit or reduce nuclear power gener-
ation, but one must take into account the results of that
decision in terms of energy consumption and resulting
economic impact. We should reject false trade-offs but
not fail to recognize real ones because they are unpal-
atable.
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United Nations Conference on Desertification
The recent UN Conference on Desertification demon-
strated both the achievements and limitations of the
tentative spirit of accommodation that has recently
characterized relations between developed and develop-
ing countries in international negotiations. On the
positive side, the conference was able to reach broad
agreement on how to stop the spread of deserts and was
not marred by the insertion of extraneous political
issues into the debates. On the negative side, the
participants could not agree on funding arrangements
for the action planned to combat desertification. The
translation of the results of the conference into action
demands more than a willingness to talk. The resolution
of the funding issue will determine whether this con-
ference, Zike many others, remains a success only on
paper.
The Conference
The United Nations Conference on Desertification
that met last month in Nairobi was intended to give an
impetus to international action to halt the spread of
deserts. The Nairobi conference was part of a series
of UN-sponsored meetings to address critical resource
problems facing mankind. Conferences on the environ-
ment (Stockholm 1972), food (Rome 1974), population
(Bucharest 1974), human settlements (Vancouver 1976),
and water (Mar del Plata 1977) have also been held,. A
conference on science and technology for development is
scheduled for early 1979.
Unlike many previous UN conferences, the Nairobi
meeting was characterized by remarkable accord among
the participants. Political issues were highly visible,
but did not unduly detract from the major work of the
meeting. Arab-Israeli disputes, which nearly wrecked
the Vancouver Conference in 1976, were muted. The
atmosphere of cooperation and consensus that pervaded
most of the session was marred only by a failure to
agree on financial arrangements for anti-desertification
activities.
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There was broad agreement on the causes and effects
of desertification. It was generally recognized that
climate, although important as a long-term factor, was
subordinate to human activity as the principal cause of
desertification. Emphasis was placed on problems as-
sociated with overgrazing, poor agricultural practices,
mismanagement of water resources, and population growth
and movement in the world's drylands. Existing knowledge
and institutions were considered adequate to make sub-
stantial progress toward halting desertification.
The Plan of Action
The conference adopted a comprehensive plan of
action containing 26 principal recommendations plus a
series of immediate actions designed to halt desertifi-
cation by the year 2000. The plan focuses on a limited
number of priority objectives that can be achieved within
the present state of technical competence. The recom-
mendations call for governments at national, regional,
and international levels to take a variety of steps
such as improving livestock management, revegetating
destroyed surfaces, and improving programs for reset-
tling people displaced by deserts.
As a first priority, the plan of action calls for
six transnational feasibility studies involving 29
countries to be completed by 1984. These include two
projects to establish greenbelts to stop the desert ex-
pansion on the northern and southern fringes of the
Sahara; two satellite monitoring studies of desertifi-
cation processes in groups of southwestern Asian and
South American countries; a study of ground water man-
agement in northeast Africa and the Arabian Peninsula;
and a proposal for improved livestock and range manage-
ment in the Sahelian region south of the Sahara. Coop-
eration on these studies on the whole has been remark-
able; thus a substantial degree of transnational amity
has emerged between such traditionally hostile neighbors
as Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Egypt, and India and
Pakistan.
Financing
Financial arrangements for implementing the plan of
action proved to be the biggest stumbling block at the
conference, causing a sharp split between the developed
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and developing countries. Deliberations running late
into the night of the last day brought out doubts and
hesitations by many countries, forcing formal votes on
three contentious issues. The conference concluded by
calling for the immediate establishment of a permanent
consultative group of multilateral and bilateral as-
sistance agencies with developing country representa-
tives; creation by the UN General Assembly of a special
account for financing desertification programs; and a
study of other funding measures, such as international
taxation schemes and trust funds from donor countries.
The major sources of financing for anti-desertifi-
cation efforts will probably be through existing multi-
lateral and bilateral arrangements. The strong opposi-
tion of Western and East European countries to the
creation of a special account means that it will prob-
ably remain empty. The capital surplus Arab states do
not appear interested in funding it. In fact, these
countries abstained in key votes on financial arrange-
ments.
Despite the failure to agree on financial matters,
the conference may be considered a relative success.
For the first time the international community has com-
mitted itself to fighting the spread of deserts. But
the nonresolution of the funding issue makes it ques-
tionable whether the conference's rhetoric will ever
be translated into action.
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