INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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International Issues
TIAL ANALYSIS
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D
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
16 March 1977
Trends in Terrorist Skyjacking. . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authoritarianism and Militarism: The
Roots of the Human Rights Problem . . . . . . . . 25
This publication is prepared by the International Issues Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. The views presented are the best judgments of individual
analysts who are aware that many of the issues they discuss are subject to alternative
interpretation. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
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Trends in Terrorist Skyjacking
The wave of air piracy by politically motivated
terrorists during the late 1960s crested in 1970
(47 recorded incidents), and then subsided almost as
rapidly as it had developed. The figure for such
activity in 1975 (three terrorist hijackings world-
wide) was the lowest in nine years. By way of com-
parison, nonterrorist skyjackings peaked in 1969
(62 attempts) and then fell off even more sharply to
a low of seven attempts in 1973. (See Table 1)
The dramatic decline in terrorist skyjackings
during the 1971-75 period stood in marked contrast
to a sharp increase in international terrorist inci-
dents in general. This shift of tactics was in
large part attributable to:
--A gradual decline in the number of states
willing to grant hijackers unconditional safe
haven.
--The conclusion of a number of international
agreements (including the US-Cuba accord of
1973) that reduced the chances that skyjackers
would go unpunished.
--Tighter airport security measures introduced
in the US and a number of other countries in
the early 1970s.*
In December 1972, the FAA Administrator ordered
screening of passengers boarding US commercial flights.
This order was implemented 30 days later on January
5, 1973.
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TABLE 1: SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL AERIAL HIJACKING ATTEMPTS
CUBA AND OTHER LOCATIONS, 1931-1976
OF US AND
NON-US REGISTERED AIRCRAFT TO
Total
Attempts
Year
US to
US to
non-US
non-US
non-US to
non-US to
US to US to on US
Cuba
Success
Cuba
Failure
to Cuba
Success
to Cuba
Failure
elsewhere
Success
elsewhere
Failure
elsewhere elsewhere Total General
Success Failure Attempts Aviation
1931
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
1947
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
1948
-
-
-
-
6
1
-
-
7
-
1949
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
-
6
-
1950
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
-
4
-
1951
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
1952
-
-
-
-
1
1
-
-
2
-
1953
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
1
-
1956
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
-
1958
-
-
2
1
4
1
-
-
8
-
1959
-
-
1
-
5
-
-
-
6
- m
1960
-
-
-
-
6
3
-
-
9
- 0
1961
3
2
-
-
4
2
-
-
11
- 7J
1963
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
1
- -4
1964
-
-
1
-
-
1
-
-
2
1
1965
-
2
-
-
-
1
1
1
5
-
1966
-
-
-
-
2
2
-
-
4
-
1967
1
-
2
-
3
-
-
-
6
1
1968
18
1
7
1
3
1
-
2
33
5
1969
31
6
27
9
9
3
1
1
87
-
1970
13
2
17
5
22
14
2
6
81
2
H ;d
1971
10
4
3
7
7
15
2
10
58
2
M b
1972
6
2
4
2
9
17
6
16
62
4
1973
-
-
2
2
8
8
1
1
22
1
1974
1
-
1
1
4
13
3
3
26
4
1975
-
1
-
1
3
9
4
7
25
6
H
1976
-
-
-
-
6
7
1
3
17
2
Totals
84
20
67
29
118
101
21
50
490
27
F-' I
lD O
-3O
~1W
Note: The tally includes all aircraft, including private charter flights. "Elsewhere" includes unknown destinations
as well as extortionate "parajackings." "Success" refers to the hijacker diverting the plane to a location of his
choice other than that noted in the flight plan. The last successful US-to-Cuba event was the December 14, 1974 di-
version of a Tampa Flying Service charter plane. The last hijacking to Cuba of a regularly-scheduled flight was of a
Colombian Aeropesca on January 21, 1974. The last successful hijacking of a regularly-scheduled US flight to Cuba was
of a Southern Airways jet on November 10, 1972.
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A sense among terrorists that skyjacking had
been overexploited may also have played a role, par-
ticularly in view of the massive reverses suffered
by the fedayeen as a result (at least in part) of a
multiple skyjacking operation staged by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine in September
1970.* In any event, the seizure of aircraft had
become more difficult, more risky, and a potentially
less rewarding proposition. As a result, its place
in the arsenal of terrorist "spectaculars" was
taken by other forms of hostage operations.
Developments in 1976
Despite these disincentives, however, terrorist
skyjackings registered a modest revival in 1976,
reaching a level (nine incidents) that slightly
surpassed the corresponding figures for 1974 and 1975
combined. Although the increase was not large, it
ran counter to a further decline in nonterrorist
skyjackings as well as to a general shift in terrorist
tactics away from other forms of hostage operations
toward safer and simpler endeavors (for example,
bombing, assassination, incendiary attack, and armed
assault.)**
The following factors contributed to the increase
in skyjacking in 1976 and may be indicators of the
possible future dimensions of the skyjacking problem:
That operation, which ended with three of the
hijacked planes being blown up at Dawson's Field,
was the catalyst which sparked King Husayn to engage
the fedayeen in a bitter conflict that resulted in
their explusion from his country.
' Tighter security practices adopted by US diplo-
matic and military installations, as well as by
overseas facilities of US-based firms, and the
effectiveness of local counterterrorist campaigns in
Latin America have contributed to the decline in
terrorist operations.
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--Disuse of skyjacking had renewed its shock
and publicity value.
--Changes in the operational environment in
various parts of the world had made other
forms of hostage operations more risky and
more difficult.
--At least two African nations, Uganda and the
Somali Republic, came to be considered by the
Palestinians as potential safe haven states.
--Libya continued its active and direct involve-
ment in the Muslim insurgency in the Philip-
pines.
--Terrorist groups exhibited considerable inge-
nuity in circumventing airport security ar-
rangements. The off-site "supplementary bomb"
technique employed by the Croatian extremists
who hijacked a TWA plane to Paris last
September may inspire other similar cases.
The Uncertain Future of the US-Cuban Hijacking Accord
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro announced last
October that he would terminate the 1973 US-Cuban
memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of
aircraft and vessels. It is unlikely, however, that
Castro's statements will lead to a new wave of
hijacking.* Castro implied that hijackers would
still be treated harshly by the Cuban government.
Moreover, the US-Cuban agreement was less of a
deterrent than other inhibiting factors--tighter
airport security in particular--that have been cited
above. Finally, similar Cuban agreements with Canada,
Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela will remain intact,
and there is a good chance that the lapse in the
US-Cuban agreement will at worst be of relatively
short duration.
Castro's decision was occasioned by the bombing
of a Cubana Airlines passenger plane Last October by
a Cuban exile group. All 73 people on board the air-
craft were killed.
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The Deterrent Effect of the US-Cuban Agreement
Skyjacking continued to fall off in the wake of
the US-Cuban accord of 1973. A look at Table 1
reveals that, as with skyjackings, the diversion of
US planes to Cuba peaked in 1969 and then began to
decline rather rapidly. Skyjacking of non-US planes
to Cuba also declined. This was probably due to the
fact that it had become common knowledge that Cuba
was treating most hijackers as common criminals.
Moreover, the most precipitous drop in terrorist sky-
jackings, and in skyjackings in general, occurred in
1971, over a year before the US-Cuban accord was
signed. In short, the agreement appears to have done
little more than reinforce trends that were already
under way.
The effects of the US--Cuban accord are difficult
to ascertain. As indicated earlier, the signing of
the agreement was preceded and accompanied by the
implementation of strict search procedures at US
airports. Similar procedures have subsequently been
established in a number of other countries that are
relatively near to Cuba (e.g., in Colombia, Barbados,
and Trinidad and Tobago). Passengers are now subject
to body searches at Caracas Airport, and tighter
security procedures in Jamaica have delayed flights
up to two hours.
The US-Cuba agreement had no effect on many
potential hijackers. The statistics on weapons seized
at American airports (see Table 2) document the con-
tinued willingness of individuals to attempt to seize
aircraft. The conclusion that security precautions
have been more effective than the accord in thwarting
potential hijackings is further bolstered by the
rise in attacks on general aviation (which is subject
to fewer safeguards) in 1974 and 1975. Would-be
hijackers--at least those who were unconcerned about
publicity--simply shifted to an easier target.
The Prospect for Renewal
Castro has stated on several occasions that
renewal of the US-Cuban hijacking agreement can occur
only within the context of general discussions on the
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TABLE 2: RESULTS OF AIRPORT SECURITY
MEASURES AT 500 AMERICAN AIRPORTS*
Year Firearms Arrests Potential Hijackings Aborted
Seized Due to Security Procedures (FAA
estimates begun in 1974)
1973
2162
3156
1974
2450
3501**
1975
4783
2464
1976
3936
1040
*Comparable figures for other nations are scarce. West
Germany reported that in the first 6 months of 1976, 455
firearms and 5000 other weapons were seized.
**2663 other passengers were denied boarding, but were
not arrested.
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normalization of relations between the two countries.
The Cuban leader views the accord as one of many bargain-
ing chips he can use in negotiating an improved relation-
ship with Washington. The outlook for the agreement is
not bleak, although its renewal may be delayed by other
issues such as the termination of the economic blockade.
The Outlook for 1977
While the ultimate fate of the US-Cuban accord may
have little impact on the level of skyjacking in .1977,
there are other, more immediate grounds for concern.
Although too many variables exist to permit precise
forecasts about any type of terrorist activity, most of
the factors responsible for the resurgence of aircraft
hijackings in 1975 seem likely to retain their force.
Moreover, some new incentives may be growing in prom-
inence.
The frustration felt by Palestinian "rejectionist"
groups over recent developments in the Middle East
provides a case in point. The leader of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habbash,
recently told a reporter that while his organization
planned no such action, he expected other embittered
Palestinians to launch a new wave of hijackings. He
repeated this prediction in an interview reported by
the Washington Post on March 7.
Further setbacks at the hands of local security
forces may prompt a number of Latin American groups to
attempt hijackings. Argentine terrorists may feel the
need to stage an aerial spectacular as a means of
bolstering morale and re-establishing themselves as a
serious threat to the government.
Terrorists may be inspired by the opportunities for
action associated with the expanding number of cities
served by the controversial Concorde supersonic airliner,
as well as "inspiration" derived from heavy media coverage
of such developments as the recent wave of hostage
episodes in the US and Idi Amin's alleged plan to allow
Palestinian terrorists to hijack a planeload of Americans
who were to be expelled from Uganda.
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The revival of skyjacking by terrorist groups will
probably continue. While it is impossible to predict
whether these will be offset by a greater degree of in-
ternational cooperation, the factors discussed above il-
lustrate the potential for a further increase in such
activity.
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Authoritarianism and Militarism: The Roots of the Human
Rights Problem
On March 11, Brazil canceled its 25-year-old mili-
tary assistance treaty with the US in reaction to a re-
cently released State Department report on the human
rights situation in that country, charging that the doc-
ument represented "intolerable interference" in Brazil's
internal affairs. The following day, the Pinochet re-
gime dissolved all Chilean political parties and groups.
The regime claimed that its action was necessary because
of the "confrontational" and sometimes "subversive" ac-
tivities of thoseparties (primarily the Christian Demo-
crats and the Social Democrats) that were supposed to be
in officially imposed "rece?ss. " In fact, however, Pino-
chet's move clearly reflected mounting concern over the
potentially destabilizing effect of the increased atten-
tion being paid Locally and internationally to human
rights violations in Latin America's Southern Cone.
These are but the Latest and most dramatic of a
series of developments that have underscored US policy
dilemmas that arise when promotion of respect for human
rights conflicts with this country's relations with non-
democratic regimes. The problem has been made more dif-
ficuZt by resurgent nationalism--a phenomenon which would
seem to be in Large part attributable to a combination
of widespread dissatisfaction with the postwar interna-
tional order and defensive reaction to the de facto limi-
tations on national sovereignty that have resulted from
the growing political and economic interdependence of
nations. But the heart of the problem lies in the eeu-
Liar dynamics and imperatives of authoritarian rule.
The following article is drawn from a much Longer
study, Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Eu-
that was published by CIA's Office of Political
Research in March 1975. It thus breaks no new ground.
Rather, parts of the key judgments and of the text of
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the study are reprinted here in the belief that they of-
fer a useful analytical framework for assessing the char-
acter, limitations, and prospects of a wide variety of
nondemocratic regimes--many of which are the focus of US
concern about human rights.
Key Judgments
--Authoritarianism generally places far less
arduous demands on a society than either
totalitarianism or representative democ-
racy. For many nations it is, in effect,
the only feasible system of rule. For
many more, particularly for those with
long-standing authoritarian traditions, it
offers an easy way out when an attempt at
democratic (or, in the case of Yugoslavia,
totalitarian) practice runs into trouble.
--The societal characteristics and problems
that give rise to military intervention
and to prolonged or recurrent authoritarian
rule are similar, and these conditions tend
to be especially prevalent and pronounced
in "developing" countries beset by the dis-
ruptive impact of belated modernization.
--Even when civilians are at the helm, the
internal dynamics of authoritarian rule
tend to keep the military involved in pol-
itics in a significant way--whether as an
active participant in policy-making coun-
cils, an intermittent veto group, or simply
the ultimate arbiter of political strife.
--Thus, for most of the world today, authori-
tarianism and militarism are norms, not ab-
errations. And if world-wide economic
strains continue to exacerbate the problems
associated with modernizing change, the
chances are that both phenomena will become
even more common in the decade ahead.
--Under certain circumstances, authoritarian-
ism can be a fairly stable and effective
form of rule over comparatively long periods
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of time--even in countries which have passed
well beyond the initial stages of social and
economic development.
--Nevertheless, the key internal balances and
tradeoffs upon which the successful opera-
tion and stability of authoritarian rule
depend are easily upset. Hence, most au-
thoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent
crisis and political violence. And while
such domestic turbulence may trigger move-
ment toward more efficient and possibly
more democratic government, it is more
likely to result in paralysis and the
emergence of still another ineffective
authoritarian regime.
--As a long term proposition (i.e., anything
over five years), direct military rule has
a propensity to suffer from a number of
distinct and potentially serious weaknesses.
But in the short to medium term, it would
seem to make little difference per se
whether soldiers or civilians head up an
authoritarian regime.
--To be stable and effective, any non-totali-
tarian regime--whether authoritarian or
democratic--must be in basic consonance
with prevailing customs and circumstances.
Moreover, a nation's political culture
cannot be changed by fiat; although far
from immutable, its evolution is a func-
tion of overall societal development.
Over the past several decades, authoritarian govern-
ment and direct military intervention in politics have
been either constant or recurrent phenomena in most coun-
tries of the world. Some observers, particularly those
who perceive the widely disparate manifestations of au-
thoritarian rule as mutant or nascent forms of totali-
tarianism or democracy, consider this to be an unnatural
and therefore transitory state of affairs.
In contrast, this study is based on the premise that,
for all its variants, modern-day authoritarianism is it-
self a distinctive system of rule--one in essence neither
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totalitarian nor democratic, and one in which the mili-
tary establishment generally plays a significant role.
The principal objectives of the discussion that follows
are thus (1) to examine the causes, nature, and conse-
quences of authoritarian rule and of the separate but
overlapping phenomenon of direct military intervention
in political affairs, and (2) to assess the local and
international implications of both.
Authoritarianism
It is perhaps more difficult today than ever before
to group governments into neat categories. Not only are
there nearly twice as many independent countries than
just a decade or so ago, but in most cases there is
little correlation between constitutional pretension and
political practice. Although nearly all contemporary
regimes claim to be democratic, relatively few can be
classified as representative democracies by any meaning-
ful definition of the term. An even smaller number can
usefully be considered totalitarian dictatorships. The
remainder can be divided up in many ways. As suggested
above, however, it is argued here that the governments
of the great majority of contemporary societies are
most usefully viewed as falling within the bounds of a
third and less demanding system of rule: authoritari-
anism.
The Nature of the Beast
In an authoritarian system, predominant power is
exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite
neither responsible to the general public nor fully sub-
ject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a
limited number of relatively autonomous special interest
groups can and do influence the political process. This
last-mentioned trait--hereafter subsumed under the ru-
bric of limited political pluralism--requires special
emphasis; of all characteristic features of authoritari-
anism, it is perhaps the most critical to understanding
the dynamics and limitations of the system.
Although the leadership of an authoritarian regime
effectively stands above the law, its freedom of action
is restricted in often predictable ways by the constant
need to manage and manipulate interest group pressures
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and conflict. Control is maintained through a combina-
tion of repression of clearly inimical individuals or
groups and conscious efforts to play the remaining polit-
ical actors off against each other in such a way that
none becomes strong enough to challenge the existing
order or even to appear to offer a viable alternative.
This is hardly an easy task at best; and, as perhaps
best illustrated by Yugoslav experience, its difficulty
increases with the number and variety of groups whose
interests must be taken into account.
Directly or indirectly, the armed forces play a
key role in the establishment of any authoritarian re-
gime. Thereafter, even if power passes to (or remains
in) civilian hands, latent instability and the conflict-
oriented dynamics of authoritarian rule usually insure
that the military establishment continues to play a sig-
nificant political role--whether as an active partici-
pant in policy-making councils, an intermittent veto
group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political,
strife.
The internal dynamics of authoritarian rule also
impose certain practical constraints on ideological ri-
gidity, electoral practices, and even levels of popular
political mobilization. Within these bounds, however,
authoritarianism can take many forms--not only with re-
spect to general ideological orientation, but (as illus-
trated by variations in the number and type of political
parties found under authoritarian rule) in terms of or-
ganizational structure as well. For example, all politi-
cal parties are now banned in Chile--as they were in
Greece during that country's most recent interlude of
military rule. Both Zaire and Yugoslavia presently have
one-party systems, but Mobutu's Popular Movement of the
Revolution and Tito's League of Communists are poles
apart in terms of functional role and institutional
strength. There are multi-party authoritarian systems
as well: what might be termed the "predominant party"
type has long been exemplified by Mexican political
practice, while an officially imposed two-party variant
is currently employed in Brazil.
Although it is generally relatively easy to distin-
guish a multi-party authoritarian regime from a repre-
sentative democracy, the dividing line between authori-
tarianism and totalitarian dictatorship at the other end
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of the political spectrum is less evident. Indeed, many
non-democratic governments seem to exhibit some or all
of the traits generally attributed to totalitarianism.
But on close examination, only the more rigid Communist
regimes seem to fill the bill. For example, in all
other possible candidates for this distinction, the
monopoly parties lack the cohesion and political clout
of their counterparts in the classic Fascist, Nazi, and
Soviet models. Political repression is commonplace,
but vigorous efforts to employ the full range of totali-
tarian thought and behavior controls are notably lack-
ing. And while lip service may be paid to the goal of
a monolithic society, conflicting interests are both
recognized and--within limits--tolerated as essential
to the operation of the authoritarian system.*
The Why and Wherefore
Under most circumstances, authoritarianism places
far less arduous demands on a society than either to-
talitarianism or representative democracy. In addition,
it is adaptable to a wide range of local conditions.
For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible
system of rule. For many more--particularly for those
with long-standing authoritarian traditions--it offers
an easy way out when an attempt at democratic practice
runs into trouble.
There are many factors which bear on the establish-
ment and persistence of authoritarian rule--a fact un-
derscored by that phenomenon's seemingly capricious
* Since no totalitarian system has been able to re-
press all pluralistic tendencies, the difference here
is one of degree. Indeed, it can be argued from the
slow but steady rise in the influence of professionally
based sub-elites in the USSR that the Soviet system is
itself inching toward authoritarianism.
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record.* Among these, cultural and historical heritage
(e.g., the constellation of hierarchical, patronal, and
corporatist customs that make up the so-called "Iberian
tradition"), deep-seated societal cleavages and con-
flicts, external inspiration and pressures, and the ac-
cident of charismatic leadership frequently play partic-
ularly prominent roles. But in recent years at least,
the key catalytic factor has most often seemed to be
the disruptive impact of social and economic changes as-
sociated with modernization.
Not only does the modernization process itself favor
efforts to centralize and expand political authority,
but by fostering political Lag or political decay, it
can result in a breakdown of domestic order and a con-
sequent imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian
rule. Political lag may be defined simply as the fail-
ure of political development (particularly institution-
building) to keep pace with socio-economic development.
Political decay refers to the actual breakdown of estab-
lished political institutions which, for one reason or
another, are no longer suited to the times.
Although felt everywhere, the destabilizing effects
of modernizing change are quite naturally most pronounced
--and most widespread--among states that are still in
an early or middle stage of social and economic develop-
ment.** The problems faced by such nations are enormous.
.4 Authoritarian regimes have emerged as the result
of breakdowns of colonial rule, of traditional socie-
ties, and of existing democracies. At least one (.Yugo-
slavia's) grew out of an infant and ill-starred totali-
tarian dicatorship. Some have persisted, changing in
nature and leadership over time. Others have given way
to more demoncratic forms of government, often only to
reemerge in new guise just a few years Later.
As a group, these countries might best be character-
ized as victims of delayed development. Whether be-
cause of foreign domination, geographic or self-imposed
isolation, the strength of traditional customs and in-
stitutions, or a combination of these and other factors,
all of them were rather Late entrants in the moderniza-
tion game. And to add to the other problems they face
in trying to catch up, the destabilizing impace of so-
cial and economic change increases with its pace.
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Rapid increases in literacy, exposure to mass media, in-
dustrialization, urbanization, and per capita income ex-
pand the politically relevant segment of the population
and generate a sharp rise in expectations. Whether or
not such factors as poverty of natural resources or tra-
ditional ethnic animosities pose additional complications,
the general proliferation of new social forces and re-
quirements places great strains on existing political
institutions. And if these prove resistant to or inca-
pable of necessary adaptation, either political lag or
political decay ensues.
A society thus afflicted generally enters (or lapses
back into) what political scientists now commonly refer
to as a praetorian phase, i.e., one characterized by the
politicization of all significant social groupings and
the lack of political institutions strong enough to me-
diate, refine, and moderate their interaction. Under
these conditions, contending groups increasingly resort
to various forms of direct action (e.g., bribery, coer-
cion, terrorism, work stoppages, and demonstrations), and
the military establishment is inevitably drawn toward the
center of the political stage. The overall situation
strongly favors the imposition of a law-and-order author-
itarian solution, even if only on an interim basis. In-
deed, in those countries which by dint of local circum-
stance habitually seem to suffer from a lack of strong
political institutions, military coups and revolving-door
authoritarian governments have become characteristic fea-
tures of the political scene.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Obviously, authoritarianism is far from a sure-fire
cure for socio-economic growing pains. Its repeated and
sometimes dramatic failures are evidence enough of this.
But most of these failures have occurred under circum-
stances which would have made it very difficult to estab-
lish and maintain any sort of effective government. Ef-
fectual rule is, in fact, an elusive quality for most of
the world; whatever the form of government, the require-
ments are stringent.
At the minimum, effective political authority--the
power to promote and, when necessary, to guide basic so-
cietal change--requires (1) the consent (or at least
passive acceptance) of most of the governed and (2) the
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support of those institutions which, individually or col-
lectively, have been entrusted with a virtual monopoly
over the means of coercive force. The first is in large
part a function of political organization and legitimacy.
The second is basically a question of subordinating the
armed forces and paramilitary police to government di-
rection. Both are characteristic features of stable de-
mocracies and totalitarian dictatorships. By extension,
they are critical to the performance and prospects of an
authoritarian regime as well.
In practice, the form, general orientation, effec-
tiveness, and stability of any given authoritarian re-
gime are conditioned by the interplay of a host of in-
ternal and external variables. But even though the mix
of operative factors is different in every case, there
are certain general problem areas bearing on the ques-
tion of effective political authority that are common to
all. Hence it is possible to gauge the outlook for a
particular authoritarian government on the basis of its
performance with respect to a few basic tasks. Briefly
stated, they are:
--Centralize and expand political power.
Stable authoritarian rule rests on clear-
cut hierarchical relationships. Yugoslav
experience illustrates how elusive this..
goal can be in a country where culturally
and economically based aspirations for
greater regional autonomy are strong.
--Develop an aura of legitimacy through
some combination of traditonal, charis-
matic, and legal-rational considerations.
The shortlived Ioannidis regime in
Greece was particularly deficient in
this regard.
--Establish stable political institutions
(i.e., organizations and procedures
which are both effective and valued
in their own right). The importance of
this task is sometimes obscured by the
personal skill and stature of leaders
like Tito and Peron. Nevertheless, in
the absence of political institutions
capable of accommodating conflicting
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societal interests and of mediating
inter-elite disputes, a society will re-
tain strong praetorian tendencies. And
this, in turn, will increase the chances
of popular alienation, more frequent re-
sort to repression and violence, and bit-
terly contested succession.
--Rationale-ze and increase the competency
of the governmental bureaucracy. This
is essential because the administrative
apparatus not only plays a major role in
determining economic performance, itself
a key factor affecting domestic harmony,
but also substitutes for political action
as the primary means for assuring social
order and justice. In Franco's Spain,
for example, bureaucratic shortcomings
undercut efforts to use a combination of
social welfare programs, paternalistic
labor laws, and elaborate grievance pro-
cedures to mute demands for politically
independent trade unions.
--Co-opt or neutralize potential challengers
at an early stage--particularly those who
are members of, or allied with, dissident
factions within the military establish-
ment. As amply illustrated by the ex-
perience of a number of ill-fated author-
itarian regimes in Africa, Southern Eu-
rope, and Latin America during the last
decade alone, authoritarian regimes in
southern Europe during the conflict-
oriented dynamics of limited pluralism
generate a special need in this regard.
They also require development of a paral-
lel capacity to defuse potentially con-
tentious domestic and foreign policy is-
sues through a flexible mix of repression,
compromise, and diversion--lest these is-
sues polarize the society and thus deprive
the regime of much of its room for maneu-
ver and base of support.
Although this list of chores seems formidable, weak
performance in one or another field is often at least
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temporarily offset by such things as rising living stan-
dards or charismatic leadership. Indeed, the record
shows that under certain circumstances, authoritarianism
can be a fairly stable and effective form of rule over
comparatively long periods of time--even in states that
have reached a complex and demanding middle stage of so-
cial and economic development.*
Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-
offs upon which the successful operation and stability
of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence,
most authoritarian regimes are prone to recurrent crisis
and resort to political violence (both government-spon-
sored and oppositionist). Sometimes such turbulence
serves as a catalyst for evolutionary change toward
more efficient and possibly more democratic goverment.
More often it results in paralysis and the emergence of
still another ineffective authoritarian regime.
Another clear systemic weakness stems from the fact
that, unlike representative democracy, authoritarianism
has no built-in mechanism for orderly political succes-
sion. Thus each authoritarian regime must devise its
own, a requirement which adds urgency to the need to le-
gitimize and institutionalize its rule. Personal dicta-
torships are particularly vulnerable to succession dif-
ficulties. Even if the supreme ruler makes elaborate
arrangements for succession, including constitutional
provisions for the division of his offices and powers,
the basic components of this new system are likely to lie
dormant and untested until after he has actually departed
the scene. Then, in the absence of his stabilizing in-
fluence, they may prove incapable of functioning as in-
tended.
Militarism
Although the fact that both the conditions which fa-
vor authoritarian rule and the dynamics of the system it-
self tend to draw the military into politics in a major
way has been established in previous discussion, some
For all but the world's major oil producers, the
concept of a middle stage of development can be crudely
defined as signifying a per capita GNP in current
prices of between $300 and $2,000.
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further observations about the causes and consequences
of military intervention are clearly in order. Specifi-
cally, what seems to be the reason for the increasing
incidence of direct military rule? Why are there such
marked variations in the form and direction of the polit-
ical role played by the military in different countries?
Are military regimes inherently any better or worse than
civilian authoritarian regimes?
The motives which move military men to direct ac-
tion in the political arena are usually complex. The
mix varies according to time and place, but almost al-
ways includes three distinct areas of concern--personal,
institutional, and societal. Sometimes ambitions, griev-
ances over pay and promotion, or uneasiness over policies
or trends which appear to threaten the perquisites and
power of the military establishment clearly predominate.
But in a growing number of cases, these considerations
seem to have been strongly reinforced, if not overshad-
owed, by fear that economic or political mismanagement
was threatening to lead the nation to the brink of dis-
aster.
The process of modernization has, in fact, increas-
ingly affected both military motives and capabilities
with respect to direct intervention in political affairs.
Proliferation of domestic missions (e.g., counterinsur-
gency, riot control, and civic action), corresponding
changes in the curricula of advanced military schools,
and the influence of foreign ideas and developments have
combined to increase the level of social awareness with-
in the military establishments of many countries--and to
generate a consensus that preservation of national secu-
rity demands prompt and energetic efforts to resolve
pressing economic, social, and political problems. Par-
allel development, however gradual, of new managerial
skills and bureaucratic resources has tended to increase
the confidence of military leaders in their "unique"
ability to analyze and cope with their country's ills.
Not surprisingly, the emergence of this new breed of
soldier-technocrat has been accompanied by a distinct
trend toward: (1) military interventions which are in-
stitutional rather than personalistic in nature, and (2)
both longer and more frequent interludes of direct mili-
tary rule.
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Nevertheless, no national military establishment--
no matter what its size or degree of professionaliza-
tion--is a monolithic :institution. In fact, with few
exceptions, each tends to reflect the currents and divi-
sions affecting the country at large. Thus, while it is
possible to catalog the conditions which invite military
intervention, the form and direction that such interven-
tion takes, in any given case, will depend on which mili-
tary faction seizes the initiative and which domestic
allies it chooses to court or support.
Although the effectiveness of each military regime
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, aggregate data
analysis suggests that, in the short to medium term at
least, it makes little difference per se whether soldiers
or civilians hold the reins of power. It seems that mili-
tary regimes tend to impose more restrictions on politi-
cal activity, achieve greater success in promoting eco-
nomic growth in very poor countries, and do less to de-
velop primary education than their authoritarian civilian
counterparts. (Contrary to popular belief, non-military
authoritarian regimes tend to spend more on defense.)
Apart from these findings, the differences in overall
economic and political performance appear to be negligible.
As a long-term proposition (i.e., anything over five
years), however, direct military rule has a propensity
to suffer from a number of potentially serious weaknesses,
including: (1) inadequate political institutionaliza-
tion;(2) a lack of compensating charismatic leadership;
and (3) increasing factionalism within the military es-
tablishment itself. The ill-fated Gowon regime in Nigeria
provides a case in point.
But even though these profession-related shortcom-
ings are in time likely to afflict any predominantly mil-
itary regime, there is an offsetting tendency for civil-
military distinctions to become blurred under authori-
tarian rule. Most military regimes co-opt a large num-
ber of civilians into key posts. Moreover, soldier poli-
ticians are soon confronted with a number of problems--
including, ironically enough, the need to ensure con-
tinued subordination of the armed forces to political
authority--which both limit their options and tend to
have an erosive effect on their old institutional loyal-
ties and ties. The Brazilian government, for one, has
clearly benefited from this process. 25X1
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