INTERNATINAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
International
Narcotics Review
DOJ review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP INR 78-002
16 August 1978
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW
16 August 1978
CONTENTS
COLOMBIA: Increased Attention on Marijuana
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Colombia has long been a principal source
of marijuana for the US market. It now
appears that the Guajira region, renowned
as a center of contraband smuggling, has
emerged as the prime source.
PAKISTAN: The Opium Export Business. . . . . . . . . 9
Recent information presents a clearer
picture of what has become a well-
established business.
PAKISTAN: Experimental Abolition of Opium Vending
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
As a narcotics control measure Pakistan
has abolished, temporarily at least,
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This publication is prepared by analysts in the National. Foreign
Assessment Center for specialists in the Washington community who
are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and
queries are welcome.
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licensed vending in two districts. The
system has long been exploited for illicit
trafficking.
TURKEY: Attempted Illegal Harvest Draws Quick
Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Ankara continues to demonstrate its de-
termination to maintain firm control
over opium poppy cultivation. It also
appears to be trying to adjust its
production to world demand.
YUGOSLAVIA: Tightening Narcotics Controls . . . . . 15
New legislation and a new control
center being established in the
border area with Bulgaria should
help reduce narcotics smuggling
from the East.
2. Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
FOREIGN MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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COLOMBIA: Increased Attention on Marijuana Production
According to a report from the Attorney General's
office in Bogota, as many as 70,000 hectares (approxi-
mately 150,000 acres) of marijuana are under cultivation
in the Guajira region of northeast Colombia. This
estimate, perhaps the most precise one made thus far,
represents a drastic increase over the amount of canna-
bis previously believed grown in Colombia. The findings
also present an increased challenge for drug control by
the new Turbay administration.
Colombia has long been a principal source of mari-
juana for the US market. In the past, most of it has
been grown in the rugged Sierra Nevada Mountains in the
Departments of Magdalena and Cesar. It now appears that
the Guajira region, renowned as a center of contraband
smuggling, has emerged as the prime source. US officials
believe that 50 to 80 ton shipments of the drug are
routine. These marijuana shipments account for perhaps
one-half or more of Colombia's estimated $500 million
to $1 billion annual drug trade.
The majority of the cultivation is done by squatters
who encroach on public land. Their average yield is
about one ton of marijuana per acre of land. The crop
is harvested, bailed, and then stored clandestinely on
commercial or private vessels that depart from Riohacha,
Santa Marta, Barranquilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean
seaport cities. In addition, literally hundreds of secret
airports facilitate air smuggling.
In spite of a recent 572-ton marijuana seizure by
Colombian authorities, prospects for drug control in the
Guajira are not good. The area itself is geographically
remote, politically autonomous, and highly volatile.
Legislation is presently under consideration that will
permit confiscation of land used for growing marijuana,
but that is likely to be of little deterrence to the
itinerant farmers who grow their illicit crop on govern-
ment land to begin with. Moreover, the technical prob-
lems caused by terrain and weather will make an aerial
eradication campaign expensive and difficult to mount.
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Colombia: Major Marijuana Growing Area
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At the outset of the Lopez administration, narcotics
control in Colombia was divided among several uncoordi-
nated and often competing enforcement agencies--an ineffi-
cient system that Lopez attempted to improve by assigning
primary responsibility for drug control to the Attorney
General's office. The Attorney General's drug unit is
finally starting to pay dividends.
President Turbay, in his inaugural address last week,
pledged that his new government would continue the war on
drugs initiated by Lopez. Turbay also implied that the
military would play an increased, and perhaps even the
lead, role in the antinarcotics program. More than
likely Turbay will not lessen the Attorney General's
current drug control responsibilities; to do so would
be counterproductive at this point. Moreover, it would
increase misgivings among many Colombians and others who
believe Turbay is associated with traffickers and will
afford them official protection.
If Turbay does make changes in the drug control pro-
gram, it probably will be with regard to increasing mili-
tary involvement. By ordering the armed forces to step
up its participation, the new president can put. a personal
stamp on his administration's commitment to drug control.
Additionally, such a decision would be a sound one in view
of the fact that the Attorney General lacks the resources
and manpower to operate effectively in the Guajira.
Turbay has to wage his drug war on two very different
fronts--cocaine processing and smuggling in the urban cen-
ters and marijuana cultivation in remote rural provinces.
Attention is currently being focused in Colombia on the
latter. It would be a mistake, however, for Turbay to
focus enforcement and interdiction efforts solely on the
marijuana issue, and to permit the cocaine problem to
escalate further.
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PAKISTAN: The Opium Export Business
We have known for some time that a significant
amount of Pakistani opium is shipped to Iran through
Afghanistan, but information recently reported by DEA
sources gives a clearer picture of what apparently is
a well-established business. The sources have identified
two major opium brokers and five smaller ones, all of
whom normally deal in lots of more than a ton. They
conduct their business in Landi Kotal, at the entrance
to the Khyber Pass, long notorious as a smuggling center.
The brokers usually maintain a stock of about four
tons of opium. When supplies run low, they order more
opium from middlemen in the growing areas. On 5 August,
the two major brokers received shipments of four and six
tons. The brokers are responsible for the delivery of
the opium to their customers. One minor broker recently
sold two tons of opium to Afghans in Jallalabad, but
most shipments are made to the Herat area, where the
buyers reship the opium to Iran.
Some opium is also sold directly to Iranians. Early
this month, the second most important broker sold 1.4
tons to two Iranians and a European for delivery in Iran.
Nomads are transporting the opium by mule to a trans-
shipment point in Afghanistan where others will take
over for the rest of the journey. The nomads receive
60 cents a kilo, but must pay 20 cents a kilo to the
border guards. Because a system has been developed for
paying border authorities, shipments usually go by truck
not by animal caravan.
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PAKISTAN: Experimental Abolition of opium Vending System
Pakistan, as an experiment, has abolished the opium
vending system in two districts in Punjab Province. In
these districts, addicts will be registered, issued spe-
cial identification cards, and will buy opium directly
from the government. If the program is run at all hon-
estly, it should be an improvement over the present
system, whereby licenses to sell opium to addicts are
sold by the government to the highest bidder. The ven-
dors buy their opium from the government and resell it
to addicts at set prices.
The supposed profit and loss of the vendors in this
system can only indicate that they are diverting much
of the opium to illicit channels. The opium vendors--
by the official bookkeeping--lose about $2.25 million
annually.
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TURKEY: Attempted Illegal Harvest Draws Quick Penalty
For their attempt to gather opium latex, or gum,
by lancing the poppy capsules, twenty-seven farmers in
southwestern Turkey were arrested recently, and their
opium poppy fields destroyed. This method of harvest-
ing for raw opium, which can be easily converted into
heroin for illicit trafficking, has been banned in
Turkey since 1972. This is the first report since the
opium poppy control program went into effect in 1974 of
an attempt to harvest raw opium with the probable intent
of illegal conversion into heroin. There is no informa-
tion on how large an area was involved.
The Turkish Public Prosecutor has called for
10-year sentences for those implicated. If imposed,
as appears likely, it will further underscore Ankara's
continuing commitment to a tough policy against illicit
opium production and its firm determination to maintain
its strict, and thus far effective, opium control system.
There has been no evidence of any breakdown in the con-
trol system since it first went into effect; and the
Turks show every intention of expanding their control
procedures.
In an attempt to come to grips with persistent
overproduction and storage problems created by the grow-
ing surplus of poppy straw, the Ministry of Agriculture
is seeking a government decree that would reduce the
size of the planting area authorized to each farmer who
is licensed to grow opium poppies. The Turkish Soils
Products Office (TMO) has recommended a reduction from
five decares--about 1.25 acres--to two decares or about
one-half an acre. Under this restriction, the total
area authorized should produce about 20,000 tons of
poppy capsules per year, an amount that would meet
the requirements of the alkaloid factory currently
being constructed at Bolvadin in southwestern Turkey.
The new plant is expected to be operational sometime
next year, probably in time for the 1979 harvest. The
proposed decree probably will be promulgated within the
next few months.
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Turkey: Legally Grown Opium Poppies
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LInUxni
In a further step intended to reduce poppy straw
production and, at the same time, to promote higher
quality, the TMO has announced its intention to dis-
continue the practice of buying all poppies, regard-
less of quality, at prices near the top of the pricing
scale. On 10 August, the official Turkish Gazette
published the prices to be paid for the 1978 crop.
Poppies that were planted last fall will be purchased
at $1.00 per kilogram; those that were planted in the
spring to replace crops that were damaged by the winter
weather will be bought at the rate of $.72 per kilogram.
Despite an inflation factor exceeding 40 percent, the
two-level pricing system will enable the government to
pay approximately the same total amount for poppy
capsules this year as it paid in 1977. Although the
purchase price this year represents a net decline for
the farmers and there probably will be some protest
from those provinces where poppies are grown, the prices
are still not unattractive, and the byproducts of seed,
oil, and fodder are of considerable value to the
farmers.
The steps being taken by the Turkish Government
reflect Ankara's concern over its poppy straw surpluses
in recent years, largely as the result of growing sur-
pluses on world markets. They also reflect Ankara's
determination to keep Turkey's annual yield of poppy
straw in balance with the capacity of the new poppy
straw processing plant. The reduction being contem-
plated could result in as much as a 50 to 60 percent
reduction in the total area actually under poppy culti-
vation.
The poppy straw harvest, which got under way in
early July and will continue for another few weeks,
probably will yield between 30,000 and 35,000 tons of
capsules, or about the same as last year. This is a
preliminary estimate, however, and is subject to change.
Because most of the available storage areas are already
filled with the carryover from previous crops, most of
the new crop will have to be kept in open storage, al-
though it will be partially protected by canvas and
polyethylene covering. Some weather damage could result
from this type of storage; the previous year's experence
suggests that any loss should not be serious.
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YUGOSLAVIA: Tightening Narcotics Controls
Belgrade is planning to introduce tougher legal
restrictions on the production and use of narcotics
later this year. It will also strengthen its enforce-
ment ability along a major smuggling route.
The new law--to be passed at the end of the year--
requires greater care in the storage of narcotics, moni-
toring of narcotic substances in production, and official
permits for personal possession of such drugs. Stiff
fines--in the Yugoslav context at least--of $3,000 to
$6,000 and light imprisonment, only up to 60 days, are
the teeth in the new legislation.
In a related move, Yugoslav narcotic control. ex-
perts recently told US officials that a modern drug
investigation unit will be opened in southern Serbia in
January of next year. The investigation center in Nis
will concentrate on checking the flow of smuggled nar-
cotics from the Grading crossing point from Bulgaria.
Already this year, the authorities confiscated 870 kilos
of illegal drugs at Gradina, and existing enforcement
facilities are hard put to keep up with the problem.
The Gradina border crossing is probably the most
significant control point for the interdiction of nar-
cotics couriers in Europe, according to American ob-
servers in the area. Last year about 2,500 kilograms
of illicit drugs were seized at this point from 115
smugglers, including Turks, Iranians, and Germans. Forty-
four of the 46 smugglers arrested at the Grading crossing
so far this year have been Turkish nationals. The new
Narcotics Investigation Center at Nis will have a capa-
bility of eliciting information from narcotics couriers
concerning the point of origin and the destination of
drug shipments and will be able to forward that informa-
tion quickly to police enforcement units in the countries
concerned.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
ECUADOR: Presidential Election Quandary
Ecuador's armed forces still appear divided over
what to do about Jaime Roldos--winner of the first round
of the presidential election on 16 July and protege of
the military's archfoe, Assad Bucaram. Opposition to
Roldos is said to be growing among general officers, but
there is also mounting international and domestic pres-
sure on the government to proceed with the second round--
which Roldos should win handily. Battle lines are now
the
populist leader is threatening to take his cause to the
streets.
Roldos unofficially polled a surprising 31-percent
plurality in the first round
an inordinate
delay in the tribunal's tabulation of the returns, have
prompted an outcry from civilian political leaders and
the press. They have also caused foreign observers to
discount the Ecuadoran leaders' commitment to return to
constitutional rule. President Poveda, however, has as-
sured US emissaries that the election will proceed with-
out hindrance.
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Although the Ecuadoran public has remained rela-
tively quiet during the past six years of military rule,
an obvious attempt to steal the election from Roldos
could trigger widespread popular unrest.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
HONDURAS: A New Leadership Takes over
The bloodless ouster of Honduran Chief of State
Melgar by the Superior Defense Council--the group of
lieutenant colonels who help set national policy--re-
sulted from a mix of motives centering on the struggle
over the delineation of authority between the Council
and the Chief of State. The new three-man junta--led
by armed forces chief General Policarpo Paz--is probably
sincere at the moment in its commitment to hold elections
in 1980 as scheduled. No civilian opposition to the
change in leadership is likely.
The division of responsibility between Melgar and
the Council was never resolved after they assumed power
in 1975. While the lieutenant colonels at first tried
to run everything, they soon discovered that affairs of
state detracted from military duties. As a result, Mel-
gar and his cabinet were delegated more authority to im-
plement government policy while the Council provided only
overall guidance. Differences also arose between progressive
and conservative members of the Council over the pace of
reform. These were eventually resolved in favor of the
conservatives, and by last year, most of the more liberal
members of the Council had been retired or sent abroad.
New disagreements cropped up among the leadership
early this year, however, when the government decided
to schedule elections for 1980 and open up the political
system. Moreover, the relatively free Honduran media
embarked on a continuing campaign of allegations of mil-
itary involvement in narcotics trafficking, which prompted
hard-line officers to institute a coverup.
Melgar--the odds-on favorite to win the 1980 presi-
dential election--opposed retaliatory measures against
the press. This, together with his increased reliance
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on civilian advisers, raised questions about his insti-
tutional loyalty to the military and appears to have
exacerbated personality differences between himself and
General Paz.
The Council began bidding to regain a larger role
in setting and carrying out policy, ostensibly to halt
alleged inefficiency and graft in Honduras' autonomous
institutions. The actual motivations among the nearly
three dozen members of the Council, however, probably
ranged from a real desire for reform to a simple effort
to siphon off more funds for themselves. The Council
and General Paz, increasingly determined to expand their
authority, demanded late last month that Melgar remove
several officials and institute other changes in his ad-
ministration. Although the Council had initially been
disposed to reach a compromise, Melgar's effort to garner
civilian support for his position evidently triggered his
ouster.
Any resistance on the Council to Melgar's removal--
apparently only a small minority of members--seems to
have dissipated quietly. Several of the officers whose
support for the ouster was once considered questionable
played leading roles in the move--most notably Air Force
Chief Alvarez, who is now part of the three-man govern-
ing junta.
The two leading civilian political parties are prob-
ably not displeased with the shift. Although Melgar
would probably have been the National Party's candidate,
the Nationals may now be able to run a civilian. The
Liberals, for their part, believe that they have a better
chance of winning with Melgar out of the race.
Melgar's most prominent civilian
advisers and those military officers in his cabinet who
are viewed--like Melgar--as having become too politicized
will be removed. This is not likely to result in any
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basic shifts of policy. The new leadership is clearly
less inclined to suffer public attacks on the military,
but its considerable sensitivity to US concerns--evidenced
by the decision to inform the US Embassy of Melgar's re-
moval before making any public announcement--seems likely
to keep its human rights record a relatively good one.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
MALAYSIA: What the Election Means
The results of the recent parliamentary and state
elections suggest that:
-- The position of Prime Minister Hussein has
been strengthened both within the ruling
10-party National Front coalition and within
his own party, the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO).
-- The gains made by UMNO, although aided by the
ban on rallies during the campaign, reflect
the majority Malay community's continued
support of a secular Malay party as the
country's dominant governing body.
-- The modest gains made by the opposition
Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party
(DAP) reflect increasing disenchantment on
the part of the minority Chinese population
with the National Front's two Chinese
parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA) and Gerakan.
-- The losses absorbed by the opposition conserv-
ative Malay Islamic Party (PAS) stem from
its inability to shake off its corrupt image
and to articulate credible policy alterna-
tives.
Hussein, who came to power in January 1976 upon
the death of his predecessor, has emerged with a man-
date to continue pursuing the New Economic Policy--
aimed at increasing wealth among Malays through sus-
tained economic growth--while minimizing communal
tension. The National Front, which he leads, won 131
of 154 parliamentary seats, gaining once again the
strength to make constitutional changes; his own party
took 70 of those seats, an overall increase of nine.
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The victory will probably set the stage for a
harmonious UMNO General Assembly, which Hussein had
canceled to hold the election. The convention, at
which party officers are elected, is now scheduled for
14-16 September. In the wake of UMNO's strong electoral
showing, it is unlikely that Hussein and Deputy Prime
Minister Mahathir--who was returned to Parliament with
a surprisingly large majority--will face even token
challenges for the UMNG presidency and vice-presidency.
The Front's victories in all state assemblies have
also led to the appointment of several new Chief
Ministers. Their reputations for honesty and adminis-
trative competence combined with their close ties to
Hussein may work in favor of settling some federal-state
conflicts over land use--a constitutional prerogative of
the states that has impeded national planning and has
been a traditional source of corruption at the state level.
Discrimination in land matters--for example, the
difficulty encountered by the Chinese in obtaining
licenses to run their tin operations--is one of several
reasons why more Chinese Malaysians voted for the DAP;
favoritism of Malays in economic and educational issues
are two others. The DAP's increase in Parliament from
nine to 16 seats and the MCA and Gerakan's combined
decrease from 26 to 21 may also reflect an increasing
perception among ethnic Chinese that their Front par-
ties are too subservient to UMNO. The fact that two of
the DAP victors are detainees who could not campaign
illustrates the level of frustration harbored by the
Chinese community.
Although it is unlikely that the government will
change its educational policy--favoring the admittance
of Malays to universities and the use of Malay in the
classroom--Hussein will probably be more flexible in
economic matters. He may seek to lessen restrictions
on the amount of Malay equity needed for approval of
new investment, which might assuage at least some seg-
ments of the Chinese business community and lead to an
increase in what has been lagging domestic investment.
The Prime Minister's creation and assumption of a new
Ministry of Federal Territory--with control over land
matters in an area including Kuala Lumpur, where the
majority of the population is Chinese--may be another
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way to win Chinese support. The Front won only two of
five seats in Kuala Lumpur, and one of those was gained
on a plurality; the DAP took the other three.
Hussein and other UMNO leaders have worked hard at
winning over the rural Malay constituency of PAS with
timely allocations of federal funds and promises of
future economic development. This strategy, combined
with land profiteering scandals involving PAS leaders,
has led to the party's lowest point since its birth over
20 years ago. As a result of recent elections, its par-
liamentary representation fell from 13 to 4; and its
state strength declined to 11, including considerable
setbacks in Kedah and, earlier this year, in Kelantan.
Nevertheless, the margin of some UMNO victories over
PAS, especially in traditional PAS strongholds in the
north, were slim. A faltering economy combined with
heightened racial tension could lead to a PAS resurgence,
particularly under a new party leadership.
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BRIEFS
EAST/WEST GERMANY: WEST GERMAN OVERTURE TO GDR COULD
HELP PAVE THE WAY FOR COOPERATION IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT. The West Berlin
police recently received information that a Turkish
narcotics courier from Istanbul would soon be at-
tempting to smuggle an undisclosed amount of heroin
into West Germany after first landing at East Ger-
many's Schoenefeld Airfield. The report named the
alleged Turkish courier, gave his date of birth,
and cited a long record of dealing in illicit drugs.
After gaining permission, the West Berlin police
promptly passed the information via Telex to the
East German authorities and suggested that, since
they had given the GDR information which could lead
to a major narcotics arrest, probably the East Ger-
mans "would want to inform" the West Berlin police
of any results. Although there, as yet, has been
no response from the East German authorities, this
direct contact between representatives of the two
German elements in Berlin is viewed by some Ameri-
can observers as a positive development. The US
Mission in Berlin notes that it is unaware of any
previous instance where narcotics intelligence has
been passed directly between the West German police
and the GDR. The Mission feels the incident may
encourage cooperation on the narcotics issue and at
least will help to keep pressure on the GDR to try
to stop narcotics smuggling through the East German
airport. The GDR, like other East European coun-
tries, admits to no domestic narcotics abuse prob-
lem. They have, however, recently indicated more
awareness of the international narcotics problem by
press references to West Berlin as the "drug capi-
tal" of Europe and by commenting on the drug abuse
problem in Portugal. Schoenefeld Airfield has been
widely viewed as a favored transit point used by
Turkish "guest workers" who have been smuggling nar-
cotics into Germany. Recent intelligence from the
US Mission in Berlin notes, however, that heroin
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appears to be reaching Berlin via a "great variety"
of ways and that there is no major point of entry.
It noted that motor vehicles may well be the pre-
ferred way for transporting illicit drugs into Ber-
lin.
EAST GERMANY: DRUGS COULD.FOLLOW THE ALCOHOL ROUTE.
Large amounts of alcoholic beverages are being
smuggled into West Germany from the east, and the
same modus operandi may also be used by narcotics
traffickers. According to an item appearing re-
'cently in Der Spiegel, truckers traveling between
the two German sectors frequently carry contraband
alcohol hidden in their cargo. The press item fur-
ther claims that East German officials are involved
in the smuggling operation. According to the item,
West German Customs officials have recently learned,
allegedly from one of those involved in the smuggling
operation, that East Germany has, for years, been
building its foreign exchange reserves by serving
as an accomplice to the illegal trade if not actu-
ally the managing agency in the activity. The con-
traband cargo is loaded on "sealed" trucks that are
detoured briefly while en route to the control point;
shipping documents are also altered to cover any
delay made necessary by the unscheduled stop. The
source claimed that the system only works smoothly
because GDR officials are personally involved. West
German officials are also partially at fault, how-
ever, because they apparently often pass trucks
through the control points with little or no in-
spection, other than a brief look at the shipping
.documents. Often there is little more than a wave
of the hand. The Der Spiegel article refers only
to alcohol and cigarettes as contraband items, but
the same smuggling routes and methods of operation
apparently are well established and could just as
easily be used for smuggling narcotics into West
Germany from the east for further distribution
throughout Western Europe and even to the Western
Hemisphere. The routes and the vehicles apparently
are virtually uncontrolled, except for a check of
the bill-of-lading and a wave of the hand. The
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volume of traffic passing through the control points
rules out any thorough search of the large trucks
traveling from east to west unless there is intel-
ligence indicating that contraband cargo may be on
board. only freight from non-EC countries is sub-
ject to strict control.
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FOREIGN MEDIA
BELIZE--Drugs-By-Air Smuggling Hottest Racket in Town--
TNDD,* No. L/7947, 9 August 1978, p. 46. The police
in Belize City, acting on a tip-off, seized a Cessna
Air Commander aircraft carrying more than 1,000
pounds of marijuana. According to the press item,
there is little question that the marijuana, packed
in 30 large plastic bags, was grown in Belize.
From time to time, the police in Belize reportedly
have come-across large caches of marijuana, but
this is the first time that the marijuana traffick-
ing has been definitely linked to air transporta-
tion. According to the press, the lack of previous
arrests and prosecution of carriers tends to con-
firm the suspicion that the drug trade in Belize
has the protection of persons of power and influence.
COLOMBIA--French View of Aborted Bombing Plan--TNDD, No.
L/7933, 2 August 1978, pp. 75-77. (Based on an arti-
cle appearing in the French magazine Le Point.) As
in the James Bond movies, an electronically con-
trolled garden camouflaged the airfield which was
equipped with the latest innovations in navigational
gear, radio beams, and landing lights for night
flights. This clandestine airfield was used by drug
traffickers. The Colombian police, after receiving
an anonymous tip, put an end to the most modern co-
caine laboratory yet found. Colombia has become
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road
Arlington, Va. 22201.
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the base of drug traffickers in Latin America; small
airplanes reportedly land daily on the northern and
southern coasts of the country to pick up or drop
off drugs. "What is to be done against organiza-
tions which have resources greater than those of
the state?" a Colombian official sighs. The Colom-
bian Air Force continues to investigate every pos-
sible clandestine landing strip which will be bombed,
according to the Colombian official. More than 300
such strips in Colombia reportedly have already
been destroyed according to the press report.
FRANCE--Authorities Seize 40 Kilos of Cocaine--TNDD, No.
L/7947, p. 94. Forty kilograms of cocaine, worth
about $7 million, were seized recently at a French
airport by the French Customs Service, according to
an item in Le Figaro. The seizure was one of the
largest ever made in France. The drug was found
in four suitcases in the possession of four members
of a Chilean family who had just arrived from La Paz
and were passing through Paris on their way to Rome.
This single seizure equaled the total amount of
cocaine seized in France during six months of the
year.
FRANCE--How Marseilles Seagoing Customs Officers Fight
Drugs--TNDD, No. L/7947, pp. 91-93. The supervision
of territorial waters and of the coastline is an
age-old concern of maritime countries. Its novelty
today lies in the acceleration of technical progress
in every area, but this works both ways, for the
big traffickers very quickly adapt to the new cir-
cumstances. By degrees, international cooperation
has been broadly achieved; in the Mediterranean, for
example, there are constant exchanges with the
Italian and Spanish customs officers. International
agreements even make it possible to intervene on the
high seas under certain circumstances. Supervision
of territorial waters and sea reconnaissance of sus-
pected vessels, is possible only with fast boats
and effective fire-power. French scout-type coast
guard vessels, armed with 12.7-mm machineguns, pa-
trol the high seas and carry out considerable mari-
time checking and, where necessary, escort suspected
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ships to port. Aircraft and helicopters are also
used to maintain this surveillance. Detection mis-
sions are becoming more difficult, according to
those involved, shipments are split up into smaller
lots and get through on some of the countless small
pleasure sailboats. The French Customs officials
admit that large amounts of drugs escape seizure.
The problem is that the trafficker always has the
initiative both as to time and method, and he is
quick to exploit gaps and weaknesses. The majority
of the long weekends apparently are the peak periods
for narcotics smuggling.
INDONESIA--Malaysia Agrees To Join Effort Against Drug
Trafficking--TNDD, No. L/7947, p. 10. Indonesia
and Malaysia have agreed to cooperate more closely
in combating drug trafficking between the two coun-
tries.
INDONESIA--Review of Drug Scene in Indonesia--TNDD, No.
L/7933, pp. 27-29. An International Narcotics Bu-
reau and European Interpol intelligence report re-
ceived by the Indonesian police last spring claimed
that a large Thai narcotics syndicate planned to
establish a clandestine narcotics laboratory on the
mainland area of Indonesia. Another intelligence
report, according to the Indonesian press, stated
that Indonesia was to become a major transit area
for illicit drugs destined for the US and Europe.
A narcotics police official in Jakarta has stressed
that the illicit narcotics problem constitutes a
"strategic threat" which must be faced. According
to the press item, 27 domestic syndicates and five
international syndicates operating in Indonesia have
been smashed, but much remains to be done. Accord-
ing to the police, narcotics abuse in Indonesia
reached alarming proportions as early as 1968 when
some 10,000 youths were known to be drug addicts.
LIBERIA--Marijuana Seizure at Liberian. Airport--TNDD,
No. L/7933, p. 90. More than half a million dollars
worth of marijuana reportedly was seized recently
by Customs and Security officials at the interna-
tional airport. Three large suitcases, believed to
have come from a West African country, were said to
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contain large quantities of marijuana. According
to a Liberian Customs official, the government is
mobilizing its forces to prevent the importation
of dangerous drugs into the country.
NORWAY--Prison Director Announces Steps To Keep Drug
Out--TNDD, No. L/7933, pp. 91-92. Because of the
serious increase in the use of drugs in Norway's
prisons, the government has authorized prison of-
ficials to carry out body searches on prisoners in-
cluding where necessary the use of laxatives such as
oil and enemas. According to a Cabinet minister,
the abuse of narcotics in Norwegian prisons has
become a big problem, and the harsh search measures
are required as security measures for the employees
at the prisons. The examination must be carried
out by health personnel and only after the decision
of a physician, and will only be considered where
there is definite suspicion that drugs are involved.
THAILAND--Why Does Heroin Spread With Every Passing Day--
TNDD, No. L/7947, pp. 20-22. According to figures
cited by the clandestine "Voice of the People of
Thailand" there are 600,000 drug addicts in Thailand,
including over 300,000 in Bangkok and 4,000 Buddhist
monks. Some 60 to 70 percent are said to be children.
The clandestine radio station goes into considerable
detail as to what it alleges to be the drug traffick-
ing networks in Thailand.
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