INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
26 April 1978
DOJ review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP INBR 78-009
26 April 1978
Copy
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
26 April 1978
CONTENTS
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Increased Opium
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PERU: Prospects for the New
Narcotics Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS:
1. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Nepal-India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
PRESS EXCERPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. 25X1
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Iq
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PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: Increased Opium Production
Opium production is increasing on both sides of the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Moreover, at least in Pak-
istan, we appear to have seriously underestimated the
amount of opium produced in the past. Total production
for the two countries had been thought to be in the neigh-
borhood of 500 tons a year; it may be closer to 1,000
tons this year.
From December to March, the US Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) systematically surveyed the opium-growing
areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. It
concluded that almost 100,000 acres of poppies here
under cultivation and would produce between 404 and 610
tons of opium this year. Our previous estimates, based
largely on Pakistani figures, had put illicit opium pro-
duction in the neighborhood of 200 tons a year. The DEA
survey, which involved cross checking both official and
unofficial government figures and on-site surveys, re-
vealed that official statistics are sometimes based on
nonexistent records and that deliberate underreporting
is common. According to some local officials the pro-
vincial government wants the figures kept low to avoid
embarrassment.
The increase, however, is not due solely to past
underreporting. Illicit opium prices have risen dramat-
ically in the past three years from about $35 a kilogram
to over $200. DEA believes prices will continue upwards,
possibly to $250 in the next few months. One reason for
the greater demand reflected in the higher prices is the
establishment of illicit laboratories producing heroin,
morphine base and morphine sulphate for both domestic
consumption and export.
As a result of higher prices
acreage has qUadrupied in one district
in the past two years. Opium, moreover, is now profit-
able enough to justify the use of commercial fertilizer,
increasing the yield from each acre.
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The government has argued that enforcement in this
area is almost impossible, and there is considerable
validity to their claim as it applies to the more remote
parts. Recently, however, poppies have been seen grow-
ing within 600 meters of the provincial police head-
quarters. The government has also claimed that opium
is produced largely by marginal farmers who need the
additional income to survive. The claim may well have
been valid in the past, but the relatively high tech-
nology being used in extensive, irrigated fields can
hardly be called subsistence farming.
Any statistics on Afghanistan have be be viewed
with some skepticism, but the UN estimated the production
last year at 293.5 tons; according to DEA it was between
200 and 400 tons. Opium is grown throughout the country,
but the border area may account for around two-thirds of
the country's total. Should production be doubling there,
the country's total would jump, despite strong evidence
of a decline in other areas.
Neither Kabul nor Islamabad has ever had much con-
trol over the tribes along the border, and tribal hos-
tility to any outside interference led to periodic
clashes with police and military of both countries and
on occasion to fairly serious tribal uprisings. Under-
standably, neither government wants to stir up the tribes
unnecessarily, and many officials in both countries see
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narcotics as a problem for the industrial nations to solve
through elimination of the causes of addiction. They see
no reason for the developing countries to risk domestic
violence or undergo economic hardship in the effort.
Despite the situation along the border, there are
some bright spots in both countries. In Afghanistan's
Helmand Valley, where the UN estimated production last
year at 51 tons, the government is attempting to plow
under this years crop. Kabul has much greater control
there and more incentive to act. It risks losing US
financing for local development projects if the poppies
remain.
Early this month, the recently created Pakistani
Customs Drug Enforcement Unit seized 84 kilograms of
opium in Karachi and may have broken up a ring that was
sending about 80 kilograms a month to Hong Kong. Although
increased Pakistani capabilities and interest in com-
batting smuggling will obviously contibute to narcotics
control, most opium leaves the country across the Afghan
border, not through Karachi.
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PERU: Prospects for the New Narcotics Law
Peru's military government, which in the past has
been indifferent to the problem of narcotics control,
has shown increasing concern about the nation's drug
situation. A controversial and long-delayed narcotics
law*--intended to strengthen existing controls on the
cultivation of coca and gradually eliminate its produc-
tion altogether--was finally passed last month.
We continue to agree with the US Embassy's belief
that the highest levels of the Peruvian Government realize
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that narcotics trafficking is not solely a problem for
the US to solve. The amount of time devoted to preparing
the narcotics reform law indicates that Peruvian officials
are aware of the domestic implications drug trafficking
could have if left unchecked. These same officials appear
to be sincere in their concern over the increasingly wide-
spread drug abuse among Peruvian youth and the corrupting
influence of narcotics trafficking on security forces
and other national institutions.
in spite of both the high level recognition the drug
problem has received and the passage of the new narcotics
law, a number of constraints will continue to work against
effective drug control in Peru. The country's current
economic problems--a $5 billion foreign debt, an annual
inflation rate of 30 to 40 percent, and unemployment or
underemployment of 50 percent of the work force--will
limit resources available to control narcotics.
The government's economic dilemma, coupled with a
continuation of labor restiveness, comes amid heightened
expectations for a return to civilian rule in 1980. The
possibility of a failing political will on the part of
the current regime, as its time in power comes to an
end, could also jeopardize short-range drug control plans.
In the interim, the coca growers themselves may
exert pressure on the government. For example, two groups
of coca growers claiming to represent more than 32,000
families who cultivate the crop have already met with
President Morales in an attempt to get the government to
alter regulations for the production of coca. Members
of the delegation raised the possibility that, if the
law were not altered in favor of the farmers for whom
coca is a major source of income, they might call a strike
or attempt to get support from radical political groups.
obviously, passage of the narcotics law--while an
important step for drug control in Peru--is only a first
step. The real test lies in the military government's
willingness to overcome the obstacles and pay the social
and economic costs involved in actually eliminating a
crop which is deeply rooted in the history and culture
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of the large Indian segment of the country's population.
Unless the Peruvians significantly reduce coca produc-
tion, however, enforcement efforts in neighboring coun-
tries which figure as part of the overall cocaine traf-
ficking pipeline in South America will continue to be
little more than expensive stopgap measures.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another
CFA publication, do not deal specifically with the
international narcotics situation. They are in-
cluded here, however, because they concern develop-
i.ng political or economic situations that could im-
pact on the international narcotics control effort.)
IRAN: Government Reaction to Recent Violence
The policy of tolerating dissent that the Shah has
followed for many months may be coming to an end.
In response to foreign interest in the human rights
situation in Iran, the Shah has over a period of more
than a year instituted judicial and prison reforms and
tolerated a larger amount of publicly expressed dissent
than has been the case for 15 years. In the last three
months, however, violence has broken out in all the
large cities and many of the smaller ones throughout
Iran. The police, who have the main responsibility for
controlling demonstrations, have been indecisive, appar-
ently unsure how far they can go in view of the Shah's
policies.
The government appears to be starting to react. A
large public demonstration in Tabriz organized by the
government-sponsored Rastakhiz Party pledged support for
the Shah-People Revolution and condemned "every plot,
every design instigated by colonialists and their hired
agents." Other progovernment demonstrations will prob-
ably be organized in the weeks to come.
The Civil Resistance Corps, a sort of paramilitary
home guard, has announced that it is ready to "stop the
violence and-sabotage perpetrated by groups of masked
hooligans," foreshadowing the possibility of a repeti-
tion of clashes between pro and antigovernment mobs
which have been so common throughout Iranian history.
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In addition, bombs have exploded at the homes of
three moderate opposition leaders, and a fourth man has
been beaten up. This ostensibly is the work of a pseu-
donymous "Underground Organization for Vengeance." The
US Embassy reports that there are two stories making the
rounds: that the bombings are the work of progovernment
elements and are intended as warnings that public vio-
lence has gone as far as is tolerable, and that the bomb-
ings are the work of more extreme dissidents opposed to
the line followed by the moderates. The Embassy gives
greater credence to the first explanation.
If the bombings are the work of government supporters,
they may be striking at the wrong target. The recent
violence appears to have been primarily protests by a
relatively conservative, unorganized group of religious
fundamentalists expressing their unhappiness with the
Westernization and modernization of Iran, which they be-
lieve threatens the very existence of Islam. Counter-
violence by street mobs might disperse these Islamicists,
but attempts to intimidate the moderate opposition lead-
ers would not.
In spite of the evident government concern, the
security situation is not out of control, and the moder-
ate opposition nationalist coalition does not at this
time appear to be seeking a showdown with the government.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
NEPAL-INDIA: Economic Relations
Nepal and India finally signed new agreements on
trade and transit in mid-March, after two and a half
years of occasionally bitter negotiations. The two
treaties and an agreement on smuggling reflect the Desai
government's willingness to make minor concessions to
its weak neighbors, but they also underline Nepal's
obvious vulnerability. The specific provisions offer
slightly increased scope for Nepalese exports, but mostly
serve to limit the ways in which the two countries can
hurt each other. The economic package is an important
symbol of improved relations. Its practical significance
will depend on how it is implemented, and that in turn
will depend on economic conditions in each country and
the state of their political relations.
Transit Issues
rrhe main Indian concession--agreement to a separate
treaty for transit issues--was partly the result of In-
dian administrative confusion. Prime Minister Desai
personally agreed to separate treaties shortly after he
came into office, apparently thinking this request was
of major symbolic importance to Nepal but of negligible
practical importance. In fact, the Nepalese had earlier
withdrawn this request in order to press their greater
interest in language establishing a "right" to transit
through India rather than just a "freedom" subject to
negotiation. The final language does not concede this
"right," although it does refer to Nepal's landlocked
status and its "need" for access to the sea. The format
of separate treaties is intended to give the illusion
of more concessions than were granted.
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In the past, Nepal has accused India of using its
control of transit goods to punish Nepal for its politi-
cal statements, to force it to buy more from India, and
in general to ensure its dependent status. There is
some truth to these accusations, but most impediments to
transit have been the result of Indian inefficiency. On
the other hand, Nepal has sometimes claimed that a transit
"right" would entitle it, for example, to the use of
scarce freight cars in preference to the requirements of
Indian users. Whatever the niceties of language, transit
will inevitably remain subject to negotiations.
Nepal obtained some concessions on specific transit
issues--simplification of paper work, additional routes,
the right to lease more warehouse space in Calcutta, and
additional free days there before demurrage is levied.
As soon as details can be worked out, Nepalese goods
will be allowed to transit India to and beyond Bangladesh.
Special arrangements were made in the past for Nepalese
rice shipments to Bangladesh, but the Indians did not
want to bother establishing permanent facilities. The
present economic value of this route seems minimal, but
Nepal feels more comfortable having access to a port
other than Calcutta.
Illegal Trade
Throughout the negotiations, India was primarily
interested in control of smuggling. The new agreement
commits each country to "take all necessary measures"
to prevent unauthorized trade from hurting the other.
India tightened its border control several months ago
and now cites this provision as justification. In
addition, the new treaties give the Indians greater con-
trol of smuggling of goods in transit. As before, un-
authorized trade is defined to include not only conven-
tional smuggling, but also the export of Nepalese goods
made largely from Indian products.
Two weeks after the agreements with India were
signed, Nepal announced substantial changes in its trade
and currency regulations. An export incentive scheme,
which India viewed as an incentive to smuggling of third
country goods into India, was abolished. Many Nepalese
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now resentfully view the policy reforms as part of the
bargain with India. This is only partly true; the changes
were also recommended by the Internation-al Monetary Fund.
In economic terms, smuggling is scarcely worth all
the trouble. Neither country is short of convertible
currency at the moment, and it is Nepal that loses when
its imports are diverted. Illegal trade patterns that
could harm India more--such as export of Indian jute or
routing of Indian internal trade through Nepal--were once
important but are now minor as a result of changed eco-
nomic conditions. The long border between the two coun-
tries makes tight contorl of smuggling almost impossible.
Legal Trade
India will now permit duty-free entry of Nepalese-
manufactured goods with a 20-percent foreign content in
place of the previous 10 percent. This Indian concession
does affect some products and therefore has real, if
limited, value. As before, a 50-percent duty will be
levied on goods with a higher (but less than 50 percent)
foreign component. This gives Nepal preference over
other countries, but probably does not make many of its
products competitive in Indian markets.
Nepal did not receive guaranteed access to all the
Indian products it may want to buy. New Delhi did pledge
improved administrative arrangements and "best efforts"
to supply goods such as cement, coal, steel, aluminum,
and hardware. India often restricts exports of these
goods and rations supplies among its own consumers.
Nepal needs special permission in order to buy. The
permitted annual "quota" of purchases has been held
down when India has been particularly short, when the
request was judged in excess of Nepalese needs, or when--
in the Nepalese view--political relations were sour.
Nepal's development could be handicapped when it has to
turn to third country suppliers, since such imports are
more expensive, require convertible currency, and must
in any case transit India.
i'referential treatment of trade in primary products
will be provided on a reciprocal basis. The new provi-
sion covering Indian goods will probably not guarantee
Nepal access to scarce commodities, such as pulses.
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Nepalese products were covered under the old agreement,
but Indian central government intervention was frequently
necessary to force the Indian states to allow the promised
movement of Nepalese rice and oilseeds. Implementation
will probably continue to be a problem.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
BRAZIL: The Views of President-Designate Figueiredo
President-designate Figueiredo has expressed strik-
ingly contrasting views on a number of issues closely
related to the eventual liberalization of the political
system. Because of his ambivalence, many Brazilians must
now be wondering what Figueiredo's true opinions on this
all-important subject really are and how deep, in fact,
is his expressed commitment to a political "opening."
Figueiredo's first formal political speech, de-
livered on 9 April on the occasion of his "nomination"
as the government's presidential choice, was a notably
conciliatory statement. In his remarks, Figueiredo dis-
cussed fundamental questions indicating an intention to
follow President Geisel's lead in working toward a grad-
ual opening of the tightly controlled political system.
In his speech, Figueiredo waxed considerably more liberal,
however, than he did during the preceding week when, in
a series of lengthy media interviews, he hewed to a fun-
damentally authoritarian line with only a sprinkling of
democratic notions.
In his remarks to the progovernment ARENA politi-
cians who had just "nominated" him for the presidency,
Figueiredo stressed political and social issues, rather
than the strickly economic and security themes that have
generally preoccupied the military over the years. Very
early in the statement, Figueiredo alluded to the long-
standing domination of the government by the executive
branch and suggested that some change in tone could be
expected. He said that the "structure" he envisions as
appropriate for the achievement of national aspirations
is based on an "active congress representing the many
currents of thought among the electorate" and a "dynamic
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judiciary respected in all instances." The reference to
"various currents of thought" is widely taken to mean
that Figueiredo is giving serious consideration to the
creation of more political parties.
The president-designate also spoke of the need to
manage the economy to meet the needs of the people.
Specifically, he stressed the importance of holding down
inflation, which "erodes the purchasing power of salaries"
while still maintaining a growth rate that allows for
some expansion of the job market. He also said he rec-
ognizes a need to carry out "with ever greater determi-
nation" the task of reducing social disparities. To this
end, Figueiredo promised a major effort to promote job
training, eradicate malnutrition, and, in general, better
meet the health needs of Brazilians.
Figueiredo formally associated himself with the
concept of a gradual opening of the political. system
that the military has put in place. He declared that as
president, he will "have to ensure the continuity of a
program of political, economic, and social consolidation
that is being unfolded in stages without being afraid to
revise some established concepts in the process." The
statement was almost universally taken to mean that
Figueiredo intends to retain and add to whatever liberal-
izing measures Geisel puts in place by the end of his
term next March. Figueiredo cautioned, however, that
"tolerance must not be confused with permissiveness" and
added that politicians must act "responsibly." He capped
the substantive portion of his speech by saying that "the
times call for reconciliation and understanding, but with
neither patronizing accommodation nor intransigence."
While Figueiredo in his formal speech was concilia-
tory, he was contentious in wide-ranging, impromptu re-
marks to the press during the preceding week, greatly
unsettling public opinion. Indeed, a number of opposi-
tion congressmen and the nation's leading newspapers
expressed serious concern over the views he proffered
in several extensive interviews.
Figueiredo gave vent to opinions that echo the
familiar rhetoric that has long been used to justify the
military's dismantling of the civilian political system
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and its retention of sweeping controls over national
life. Figueiredo stressed, for example, the need for
the state to continue to have the "instruments to protect
society," an obvious reference to the all-encompassing
national security laws the officers decreed and still
enforce. The General frequently fell back on the well-
worn argument that Brazil "is in the midst of a revolu-
tion" (by the military), as when he defended President
Geisel's temporary closure of congress last year when it
balked at certain authoritarian laws the regime wanted
enacted.
On the subject of selecting presidents, Figueiredo
said he favors indirect elections which, he said, are as
"legal and democratic" as direct elections. Indeed, he
indicated his conviction that Brazilian voters are simply
not yet capable of voting "intelligently" enough to
justify direct balloting.
Still, Figueiredo insisted he does favor a political
opening that involves some greater degree of civilian
participation in the government and the easing of some
political controls. He defended, for example, the right
of students to demonstrate so long as they restrict them-
selves to campuses. He hinted that he might favor re-
scinding a recent measure that established indirect
election of one-third of the national senators. Figueiredo
added that he favors direct election of state governors,
currently chosen by state assemblies.
During the week of the media "blitz" a noteworthy
clash occurred between the president-designate and a
leading senator of the nominal opposition party.
Figueiredo, in an interview, called the senator, an
advocate of greatly liberalized rule, a "false democrat"
who had arrogantly abused his authority years ago as a
state official. The senator categorically rejected the
charges and went on to say that if Figueiredo, as the
nation's top intelligence official, believed such unsub-
stantiated information, the nation's intelligence appara-
tus must be woefully inept.
Other opposition legislators reacted strongly to
Figueiredo's views. The president of the party, for
example, said he was more convinced than ever that
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Brazil's problems could not be solved merely by rotating
the presidency among the officers. "The system is wrong,"
he declared, and its "arbitrariness must be discarded
without delay." An opposition congressman said that
Figueiredo's remarks proved the General was "not prepared"
for the presidency, while another regarded as "offensive"
the candidate's negative comments on the capacity of
Brazilians to vote intelligently.
Two of Brazil's leading dailies, 0 Estado de Sao
Paulo and JornaZ do Brazil, were no less disturbed.
0 Estado termed some of his ideas "incoherent" and others
"inconsistent," noting the "crudeness of his attitude
toward reality." The paper said that, judging by
Figueiredo's remarks, one must conclude that his idea of
consensus consists of "bowing to the will of the prince."
This, said 0 Estado, hardly seems like a way to approach
liberalization. JornaZ do Brazil acknowledged Figueiredo's
frankness and his courage in undertaking the dialogue but
said his opinions raised "worrisome questions." The same
paper went on to say that the General's statements reveal
"questionable understanding" of what democracy should be
and equally questionable understanding of Brazil's cur-
rent situation.
At this point, Brazilians are uncertain whether the
views expressed to ARENA or those splashed in the media
represent the true intentions of the president-designate.
Figueiredo, himself, appears uncomfortable with the after-
math of his free-swinging encounters with the media. He
clearly intended the sessions as a means of making him-
self better known nationally and of enhancing his--and
the military's--image by being readily accessible to the
reporters and forthcoming on pertinent issues. Figueiredo
has since, in effect, acknowledged that his "shoot from
the hip" style was, if anything, counterproductive. He
has now let it be known that at least for a while he
will limit his press exposure and may even resort to
insisting that questions be submitted in advance.
Indeed, since the nomination acceptance speech,
Figueiredo has been publicly silent. But his withdrawal
from the limelight may not have been his decision alone.
President Geisel
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may have prevailed on his successor t
keep a much lower profile.
Figueiredo's inconclusive but disquieting perform-
ance has undoubtedly left some Brazilians more skeptical
than before as to the sincerity of Geisel's promise to
institutionalize an "opening" by the end of his tenure.
At the same time the populace is more anxious than ever
to see what, if anything, the administration will do or
say to prove the "opening" is still in the works. Geisel
and Figueiredo both know they have a difficult task be-
fore them if they are to win greater popular acceptance,
as each has said he hopes to do. If the administration
perceives that popular dissatisfaction has grown apppre-
ciably as a result of Figueiredo''s foray, it may feel
obliged to try to regain lost ground by advancing the
timetable of its proposed reforms.
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IRAN-AFGHANISTAN: SHAH TO VISIT KABUL NEXT MONTH; MAY
MOVE TO REDUCE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ACROSS BORDER.
Although the subject of narcotics may not be on the
agenda for the bilateral talks, decisions that are
made there may improve border control thus making
narcotics smuggling more difficult, at least over
established routes. The visit, to begin on 26 May,
is expected to involve among other things a discus-
sion of Iranian development assistance to Afghanistan
and control of the migration of Afghan workers to
Iran. Iran regards Afghan migratory workers as
potential "security risks" and is trying to bring
the migratory worker traffic under better control.
The Afghans have not as yet responded to Iranian
overtures on this matter; the Shah may take the
opportunity of his visit to press the issue. Iran
has already begun strengthening its own security
forces along the border with Afghanistan. The Em-
bassy in Tehran notes that it has long recommended
such tightening of controls along the border with
Afghanistan for the purpose of interdicting opium
trafficking. Any measures that may be agreed upon
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to mutually strengthen border controls could dis-
courage narcotics traffickers, although any likely
controls would fall far short of actually stopping
the substantial cross-border narcotics trafficking
TURKEY: DOMESTIC POPPY PRODUCTION CONTROLS POSSIBLE;
ANOTHER BUMPER CROP EXPECTED THIS YEAR. According
to the American Embassy in Ankara, some high level
Turkish officials are currently reviewing the world
opium supply and demand data and may be seriously
considering the imposition of production controls
by the next crop year. Such controls are possible
either by limiting authorized hectarage or by re-
quiring crop rotation, either of which apparently
would be possible without further legislation of
government decree. The Embassy notes further that
there has not been a single case of illicit collec-
tion of raw opium, as opposed to authorized poppy
straw, in the licensed areas since the government
authorized limited and controlled cultivation of
opium poppies for the production of poppy straw.
it has noted further that, during the years since
the opium ban was rescinded in 1974, the Turkish
Government has never refused to purchase the entire
poppy straw crop from authorized producers. Illegal
crops are destroyed and those involved prosecuted.
All factors considered, the poppy straw crop
in Turkey this year probably will be approximately
the same as last year's crop of approximately 37,000
tons rather than the 50,000 to 80,000 tons that
would theoretically be possible under ideal growing
and harvesting conditions. Although a larger total
area has been authorized for opium poppy cultiva-
tion, weather and other factors indicate that the
actual producing area may be even slightly less
than last year. Total production will depend on
the weather conditions between now and the harvest
period in late summer and early fall. There have
been no indications that government controls in the
poppy-growing areas will be any less rigidly en-
forced than in previous years or that there will be
any greater possibility of illicit harvesting of
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gum opium or of any practical diversion of author-
ized production into illicit channels. A nonindus-
trial process to convert poppy straw into illicit
opium or morphine apparently has yet to be developed,
rendering such diversion improbable.
INDONESIA: HEROIN TRANSITING INDONESIA GOING PRIMARILY
TO AUSTRALIA AND EUROPE. According to the latest
semiannual assessment from the Embassy in Jakarta,
domestic drug use still appears to be increasing
within Indonesia, and larger amounts of both raw
opium and heroin are being channeled through the
country. Reports received by the Embassy :indicate
that heroin transiting Indonesia is being routed
primarily to Australia and Western Europe. Accord-
ing to current intelligence estimates, Indonesia
probably will play an increasing role both as an
opium producing country and as a transit country
for opium and heroin. Although the Indonesian gov-
ernment has plans to strengthen its law enforcement
capabilities, the lack of expertise, funds, and
equipment limit Indonesia's potential for mounting
an effective narcotics control effort.
BURMA: MORE ILLICIT BURMESE OPIUM MAY BE SHIPPED BY SEA.
Burmese authorities recently seized over 100 kilo-
grams of illicit opium on board a schooner about to
sail from Rangoon Harbor to a port on the southern
coast of Burma, according to an item in the Rangoon
press. The Embassy notes that narcotics smuggling
from Burmese ports represents one alternative to
the traditional land routes which carry the bulk of
Burmese narcotics entering world markets. The Em-
bassy notes further that, although the seized opium
may have been intended for domestic markets, the
shipment could have :been destined for delivery to
Malaysia or Thailand.
THE NETHERLANDS: DUTCH OFFICIALS TO VISIT SOUTHEAST
ASIA TO REVIEW NARCOTICS SITUATION. Justice Minis-
ter de Ruiter, the secretary general-designate of
the Justice Ministry, and Jan van Straten, head of
the Dutch National Narcotics Unit plan to visit
Southeast Asia in early May to discuss narcotics
matters. Van Straten is slated to become chief of
the Central Criminal Information Service of the
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Justice Ministry.
THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES: NARCOTICS PROBLEM BECOMING
MORE SERIOUS. Drugs are a major and growing prob-
lem in the Netherlands Antilles, according to a re-
cent report from the Embassy in Curacao. The leg-
islature, by unanimous vote, recently increased the
penalties for trafficking in drugs, including mari-
juana, from four to 10 years. The Embassy regards
the government there as sincere in its effort to
move against the domestic drug problem, and believes
that cooperation in any bilateral narcotics control
effort will be according to the government's own
perceptions of the nature and seriousness of the
drug problem.
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INDIA--Drug Abuse Increasing Among Upper Class--TNDD,
No. L/7735, pp. 8-9. A survey by the All-India In-
stitute of Medical Sciences has estimated that 3
percent of Delhi University students are hard-core
drug addicts, and nearly one-third of the students
are drug abusers. Another survey by the Indian
Medical Council of Medical Research covering Calcutta
University students suggests that 11.4 percent abuse
amphetamines. A study conducted in Bombay Univer-
sity claims that 19.7 percent of the students are
drug addicts. Concerned over the rising trend in
drug abuse among young people, the Indian Government
has announced its decision to push through a law to
fight the use of drugs, including psychotropic drugs.
There is also a proposal to treat and rehabilitate
addicts. Contrary to popular belief in India,
alcohol appears to be the most common drug being
abused in India. According to one survey, alcohol
abuse involves 74 percent of all adults over the
age of 15. Many Indian experts feel that the inter-
national agreements on drug control are too Western-
oriented and take little account of the peculiarities
of Asian countries.
US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Transla-
tions on Narcotics and Dnagerous Drugs. Published
by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.
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THAILAND--Foreigners HeZd on Drug Charges in Asian Jails--
TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 17-18. The life term for an
Australian in Malaysia and the sentencing of a
British nurse to a 20-year jail sentence in Thailand
have highlighted the dilemma of foreigners falling
afoul of Asia's tough antidrug laws. Many Asian
governments in recent years have made the death
penalty or long prison terms mandatory for traffick-
ing in drugs. About 50 foreigners are currently
serving jail terms in Thai prisons on drugs charges
or are awaiting trial according to the local press.
Traffickers face possible summary execution in Thai-
land though no Westerners have yet received this
sentence. In the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, where
there is fairly strong antidrug enforcement, 34 for-
eigners have been serving jail terms for drug of-
fenses. Malaysia has become increasingly concerned
about the drugs coming into the country and has
amended its laws to provide tougher penalties.
Antidrug laws are also tough in Singapore, where
nine people have so far been sentenced to death for
drug trafficking. Drug pushers in Indonesia can be
sentenced to death. over 200 foreigners were ar-
rested in Japan last year on drug charges.
THAILAND--Pattern of Constant Change in Illicit Drug
Trade--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 19-20. Despite more
vigilant police action and tougher sentencing, drug
addiction reportedly is increasing in Southeast Asia
where the pattern of the narcotics business is con-
stantly changing. Several years ago trawlers used
to run illicit opium from the Golden Triangle to
Hong Kong to be refined into heroin. Then the traf-
fickers decided it was more efficient to take the
chemists to the growing areas and refine the opium
there. Two or three years ago, most of the couriers
carrying illicit narcotics were Asians; now the
smugglers are using mostly non-Asians. Trafficking
routes have also changed. Alternate routes are
being used, including Malaysia, with the resort is-
land of Penang as a principal transshipment port.
Malaysia, facing a growing influx of drugs from
Thailand, has become a pipeline and distribution
center for opiates from the Golden Triangle.
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RHODESIA--More HeZp Needed to Fight Drug Abuse--TNDD,
No. L/7735, p. 146. The medical officer of the
Drug Dependence Council of Rhodesia has appealed
for more of his medical colleagues to help in the
treatment of drug abuse. Doctors working in the
system are also hampered by limited facilities.
Those appealing for government funds to carry on
the drug abuse treatment program in Rhodesia have
met the reaction that there is no drug problem in
Rhodesia as it is not the Rhodesian way of life.
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Those who have surveyed the situation, however,
claim that there is indeed a problem with many
tragic situations.
DENMARK--Parliament Denies Police Request for Central
Utegistering of Drug Violators--TNDD, No. L/7735,
pp. 149-150. A large majority in Parliament rejects
the proposal for central registration of narcotics
addicts because of fear that many would refuse treat-
ment because of possible association with narcotics
crimes. A radical proposal about setting up a per-
manent committee on alcohol problems has also had
a mixed reception in Parliament.
DENMARK--Police Break Up International Smuggling Ring--
TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 151-153. Three criminal ex-
perts from the national police travel department,
after several months' investigation, have broken up
an international narcotics smuggling organization
having strong Danish connections. Several hundred
narcotics traffickers are said to be involved in
the operation. The case reportedly involves large
sums of money, coded telephone conversations, and
considerable amounts of cocaine being smuggled from
South America. Money transfers have also been used
involving large sums being circulated between Swiss
bank accounts.
PORTUGAL--Journalist Tries Updating 1976 Official Report
on Drug Problem--TNDD, No. L/7735, pp. 155-160.
The report in question, the first official report
on the drug problem in Portugal, begins by estimat-
ing the number of drug addicts in Portugal at
300,000. The drug problem in Portugal was taken up
on an international scale for the first time in
1976 when, during a UN session, an extensive report
was presented on the subject. This report was the
first attempt at a systematic official coverage of
the subject. The author of the press article claims
that the situation in Portugal has grown worse, and
that there has been a major increase in the use of
injected drugs.
TURKEY-EGYPT--Turkey and Egypt Sign Protocol on Narcotics
Lmuggling--TNDD, No. L/7735, p. 168. A protocol on
counteracting narcotics smuggling has been signed
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in Cairo between Turkey and the Arab Republic of
Egypt. According to the protocol, the two countries
will cooperate on the prevention of smuggling, and
a joint committee composed of experts will be estab-
lished to make proposals to government members on
measures to be adopted on the subject.
YUGOSLAVIA--More Strict Drug Laws To Be Introduced--
TNDD, No. L/7716, 18 April 78, p. 56. The first
discussions held in connection with the adoption of
a new law on drugs indicate clearly that more strict
measures regarding the production and trafficking in
drugs will be taken. It is proposed that the grow-
ing of the coca plant, the production of opium by
cutting poppy capsules, and the production of prep-
arations having a psychoactive effect should be
banned. The opium poppy will still be grown in
Yugoslavia, in specified areas, to meet the needs
of domestic consumption--for pharmaceuticals--and
for export. The draft bill provides for maintain-
ing extensive records and for the imposing of heavy
fines for violations of the new law.
SRI LANKA--Smugglers Shift Base to Sri Lanka--TNDD,
No. L/7710, 11 April 1978, pp. 38-39. In the shadow
of the Golden Triangle there is a similar triangle
comprising Sri Lanka, India, and the Maldives which
is fast growing to notoriety as a center of inter-
national smuggling and traffic in opium. Sri Lanka
official circles estimate that 5 tons of opium flow
into the country from India each year and that the
bulk of this supply is eventually siphoned off to
Europe, England, Australia, and the US. According
to the article, opium was brought in from India
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concealed in fast boats or towed underwater in
polythene bags by innocent-looking fishing craft.
The deploying of the Sri Lanka Navy to support the
police has led to frequent arrests and seizures.
Although seizures have decreased in number and
quantities, the article claims that smuggling of
contraband and traffic in drugs have by no means
ceased but that big operators have merely scaled
down the size of their individual operations. The
article describes some of the new methods of opera-
tion being used by the Sri Lanka traffickers.
SOUTH AFRICA--South African Connection to International
i)rug Ring Suspected--TNDD, No. L/7710, pp. 50-51.
Profits from the greatest LSD racket in history may
be hidden in South Africa, which may have been the
gang's international banking house. This article
refers to the major LSD operation that was disrupted
in Britain last month. After 14 months of surveil-
lance, 122 people were arrested by a "phantom"
British police team of 800 policemen throughout
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