INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
12 April 1978
DOJ review(s) completed.
DOJ review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP INBR 78-008
12 April 1978
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
12 April 1978
CONTENTS
USSR: Efforts To Combat
Drug Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR: Reluctant To Pressure Afghans on
Drug Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 4
AFGHANISTAN: Poppy Growing in US-Supported
Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2- Tr n 15
4. Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PRESS EXCERPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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LEfforts To Combat Drug Abuse
Soviet o icia s are concerne about a rapid increase in
drug abuse and drug related deaths, although alcohol re-
mains the most widely abused drug in the USSR. Currently,
there are an estimated 8,000 hard-drug addicts nation-
wide, with some 900 in Moscow and 400 in Odessa alone.
These figures seem insignificant compared to US statis-
tics (hard-drug addicts number around 450,000, with New
York City alone accounting for some 70,000), but Soviet
officials perceive their problem as serious and have
begun a national program to combat drug abuse.
The most common street drug is a powdered product
of the cannabis plant, produced in the Uzbek, Tadzhik,
and Turkmen Republics. Cultivation and use of cannabis
is an ancient tradition in Soviet Central Asia, but pro-
duction "for export" is increasing rapidly to meet new
demands in other parts of the USSR. Large urban centers
in European Russia, especially Moscow and Leningrad, are
major markets. (In Moscow, the subway is a common site
for drug trafficking.)
In 1975 the Ministry of the Interior established a
department concerned with alcohol and drug abuse. This
department is responsible for devising preventive meas-
ures and punishments, collecting information on Western
experience and programs, and compiling a national data
base (registries, files of case histories). Also in
1975, a narcotics research center was established within
the Serbskiy Institute. A separate institute was
planned originally, but its formation was vetoed because
Soviet officials wished to conceal the extent of the
Soviet drug problem. The 80 to 100 scientists at the
center study the actual nature and extent of the prob-
lem--the number of addicts, the type and use of drugs
in circulation, any connection between drug abuse and
mental illness, addiction by medical patients to pre-
scribed drugs, and demographic factors such as the age
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distribution of addicts. In cooperation with the Minis-
try of Health and the Ministry of the Interior, the cen-
ter is to develop measures to combat and prevent drug
abuse.
Since 1973, stringent antidrug abuse laws have been
in effect. Drug addiction is a criminal offense, since
it is considered "antisocial." Possession of any
amount of an illegal drug is punishable by a minimum of
two years in prison or labor camp; habitual users re-
ceive sentences of up to 10 years. Drug addicts had
been integrated with alcoholics in special "labor clinics"
(a type of labor camp designed as a treatment and re-
habilitation facility), but a problem of "cross-contami-
nation" (alcoholics turning on to drugs and vice versa)
caused the Ministry of the Interior to establish sepa-
rate drug clinics. By 1976, three of the four planned
clinics had been established, in the Ukraine and Moldavia.
In contrast, there are some 35 labor clinics for alco-
holics, each accommodating 500 to 1,000 inmates.
In 1976 the Ministry of the Interior ordered police
investigation of all known or suspected drug addicts.
All known addicts were to undergo medical examination,
and private citizens were encouraged to help in the
identification of new addicts by reporting anyone sus-
pected of drug abuse. A special case officer for alco-
holism and drug addiction was appointed in each police
precinct. These officers are assisted by "helper squads"
established in each city district and staffed by depend-
able persons who receive three days paid vacation for vol-
unteering. The names of suspected drug addicts are
entered into police files; if subsequent investigation
confirms the allegation of abuse, the case is turned
over to the courts. An examination by a court psychia-
trist is required before an addict can be sent to a
labor clinic.
In 1976, the Leningrad police established a compu-
terized central registry of drug addicts, a similar na-
tional registry for alcoholics having been established
there in 1975. After compilation is completed, data from
this registry will be made available to republic and
oblast capitals.
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USSR: Reluctant To Pressure Afghans on Drug Issue
In a recent conversation with US officials in Wash-
ington, a Soviet diplomat provided some insights on So-
viet attitudes toward combating the international drug
problem and on the drug situation in the USSR. If his
comments were at all indicative of the Soviet position,
there seems to be little prospect that the USSR will
risk its relations with the Third World to cooperate in
joint US-USSR programs to stem the flow of illicit drugs.
On 28 March, Soviet Charge Vladillen Vasev and So-
viet Embassy First Secretary Y. Ivanov met with US of-
ficials to discuss the international narcotics problem.
Discussion centered on the increasing flow of drugs out
of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and neighboring parts of Pakistan con-
stitute one of the three major areas of illicit opium
production in the world. In the past, most of this
opium has been consumed in the two countries or in Iran,
but recently increased amounts of Afghan opium--or
Pakistani opium presumably shipped through Afghanistan--
has been finding its way to Western Europe. The flow
will probably increase as international efforts to cut
production in the other two major areas--the Golden
Triangle of Southeast Asia and Mexico--succeed.
Some of the Afghan opium crop is reportedly being
produced on land associated with Soviet aid projects in
Nangarhar Province
It is not known whether Moscow had previously been aware
of this or not. In any case, the Soviets theoretically
are in a good position to influence the Afghans. Since
1956, the Soviets have supplied 95 percent of Afghanis-
tan's military imports, and Moscow is Kabul's largest
source of foreign economic aid.
Not surprisingly, Vasev's remarks indicated that
the USSR would be reluctant to pressure the Afghans on
the drug issue. Moscow has long pointed to Afghanistan
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as an example of how a small, backward nation could exist
on the borders of the USSR without fear of being domin-
ated by its northern and more powerful neighbor. During
the 28 March discussion Vasev insisted that narcotics
had never been a problem in Soviet-Afghan relations, a
statement that could be read as implying that they would
not become one in the future either.
Although Vasev admitted that the US and USSR should
be able to cooperate on an issue like drug trafficking,
he gave little indication that Moscow was ready to take
any concrete steps in that direction. While he conceded
that the USSR had not entirely avoided the narcotics
problem, he argued that it was primarily a social problem
indigenous to the more affluent West.
Throughout his discussion with the US officials,
Vasev accused the Chinese of being behind much of the
world drug problem. Indeed, Vasev exhibited real rancor
that the US was even raising the drug issue when it did
not criticize the Chinese for their role in the interna-
tional drug problem. For some time the USSR has echoed
unsubstantiated rumors of Chinese backing for the inter-
national drug scene. During the trial of three Americans
accused of drug trafficking last year in Moscow, Soviet
propaganda did its best to implicate the PRC.
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AFGHANISTAN: Poppy Growing in US-Supported Project
On 29 March, US officials found opium poppies, al-
most ready for harvest, growing within the boundaries of
a US-assisted irrigation project in Konar Province.
Afghan officials were informed last August that US financ-
ing would be withheld from any projects in which opium
poppies were grown.
The Afghans had been informed that the inspection
would take place, that US officials had seen opium poppies
in the area, and that if they were still there, funds would
be withheld. There are several likely reasons for the
Afghans' failure to do anything about the poppies.
The Afghans may have believed the US would not
go through with the threat. They tried to
avoid the withholding of funds by promising
that they would not grow poppies in the project
next year, while arguing that it was too late
in the season for the farmers to shift to
another crop this year.
Officials both in the province and in Kabul
may have felt that the amount of funding at
stake, about $44,000, was not enough to
justify the problems--ranging from more
hardship for the farmers to possible vio-
lent resistance to the police--that
eradication could cause.
Mohammed Maroofi, the official in charge
of the Afghan narcotics program, may have
had neither the influence nor the time to
deal effectively with the problem. When
officially informed that the US was with-
holding funds he implied that he would. use
the decision to show the Agriculture and
Interior Ministers that their failure to
cooperate has cost Afghanistan money.
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Maroofi, however, is a second level Foreign
Ministry official and his ability to influ-
ence cabinet members, especially the Interior
Minister, one of President Daoud's confidants,
is very limited. Moreover, Maroofi is also
in charge of arrangements for the meeting
in Kabul next month of the Nonaligned Coordi-
nating Bureau and has presumably been giving
this project priority over narcotics.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
AFGHANISTAN: Daoud's Revolution
In a recent series of speeches, Afghan President
Daoud has given the clearest picture so far of his ulti-
mate goals. Little that he said was new, but he has not
previously explained his plans so fully nor come so close
to drawing his policies together into a comprehensive pro-
gram.
Daoud's goal is the transformation of Afghan society,
prefeudal in many ways and with an underdeveloped econ-
omy, into a modern, prosperous nation state. Daoud is
under no illusion that he will transform Afghanistan over-
night--he said it would take a generation to complete the
next stage of the revolution. Moreover, Daoud's emphasis
on the institutions he is creating rather than his own
leadership seems to indicate that he does not expect the
revolution to be completed in his lifetime. He told his
audiences that the presidency is not a personal position
and that the Party of National Revolution would be the
"most important institution for nurturing a revolutionary
generation." He envisions the fledgling party as an organi-
zation of the people, apparently more for directing their
efforts than for expressing their will.
According to Daoud, the first phase of the revolution--
the "consolidation" phase--is over, and the more difficult
economic development phase has begun. Daoud's speeches
were given in three provinces along the Pakistani border,
and he apologized for spending almost all his time in
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Kabul. Daoud has, in fact, been consolidating his posi-
tion in Kabul and working to establish institutions for
governing the country, and it was not especially important
for the people--particularly in the provinces--either to
understand or approve his decisions. Daoud, however,
apparently believes that popular support and participation
is necessary for the success of the next stage and so
has taken the highly unusual step--for an Afghan ruler--
of taking his case to the people.
Daoud repeatedly stressed that the revolution is for
all the people, and all must think of themselves as Afghans.
Few now see themselves as Afghans--except when using the
term as a synonym for the Pathans, the country's dominant
ethnic group--and most of the people do not think of them-
selves even in terms of tribe, ethnic group, or region.
Loyalties tend to go no further than the extended family
or village or valley.
The fragmentation of Afghan society has hindered the
development of national political institutions and limited
Kabul's ability to plan and execute social and economic
reforms. In some parts of the country, Kabul has little
control. For Daoud, who believes that progress is likely
only at the prodding of the small, modern sector of the
society concentrated largely in Kabul, fragmentation and
a lack of central control may seem an especially impor-
tant problem. Moreover, Daoud, unlike most of his country-
men, is a strong nationalist and sees a united population
with a common loyalty to the nation as a desirable end'in
itself. Daoud's concern was emphasized by his taking his
case first to what may be his least receptive audience,
the Pathans themselves. As the dominant group, they stand
to lose the most by any rule not based on ethnic groups
and show some resentment when Tajiks, Hazaras, or Uzbeks
have the temerity to call themselves Afghans.
Daoud highlighted the provisions of his government's
economic plans and pointed out that "temporary" foreign
help can be useful, but economic progress depends on the
Afghans themselves. Currently Afghanistan is dependent
on foreigners for almost all development projects, and it
will be years before the country will be in a position,
either financially or technologically, to forgo outside
assistance. Daoud's insistence on the Afghans progressing
through their own efforts reflects his deep dedication
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to Afghan independence, not only political but economic,
but this seems more of a distant goal than a near-term
achievement. Daoud obviously realizes that his country
needs foreign help, and it is unlikely that he intends
to dispense with it.
The goals Daoud has set for his revolution may be
unattainable even with his strong and skillful leader-
ship. Much of the task will fall to his successors, and
it seems unlikely that they will have the ability, even
if they have the inclination, to carry on.
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JCI.KC I
Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
IRAN: The Natives Are Restless
The riots, demonstrations, and sabotage in many
cities and towns in recent weeks are no threat to gov-
ernment stability. The incidents reflect, however,
widespread dissatisfaction with the government on the
part of conservative religious groups and add a new ele-
ment of religious fanaticism aimed at non-Muslims. The
new line of tolerance of dissent adopted by the Shah
presents the security forces with the problem of how to
control public disorder without resort to the harsh meas-
ures of suppression that have been common--and effec-
tive--for the last 15 years.
As many as 43 towns and villages have experienced
disturbances of some kind in recent weeks. These have
ranged from acts by a single person--such as the fire-
bombing of a car or building--to demonstrations of 50
or more persons. These do not appear to be part of a
unified and coordinated attack on the government. They
are separate incidents growing out of a common unhappi-
ness on the part of conservative religious elements
with government actions and with the modernization of
Iranian society, which is equated with Westernization
and anti-Islamism. Some of the incidents have taken on
a tone of religious bigotry. A chain of banks owned by
a Bahai* businessman has been a particular target of
*Bahaism is a 19th century offshoot of one of the more
esoteric sects of Shiah Islam. Its doctrines, however,
put it beyond the pale, and it is considered by the
orthodox Shiah to be a heresy, and--at least in the more
old-fashioned view--its adherents can be killed on sight.
The last murderous attacks on the Bahai were in 1954--aZ-
though there were some incidents in the 1960s.
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attack. He has now put his banks up for sale. In addi-
tion, threats have been made against the Community Church,
which is attended by Americans, and against the native
Assy--ian and Armenian Christian communities.
Although the bulk of the incidents reflect religious
dissatisfaction, a few may have been carried out by one
of the two identified terrorist groups. There is no in-
dication, however, that the terrorists have actually con-
trolled or directed the demonstrations.
The government has charged publicly that "foreign
elements"--the USSR is not mentioned by name--are re-
sponsible, and some officials may actually believe this,
but there is no evidence that this is the case. Two
well-publicized cases of Soviet espionage in recent
months help, however, to strengthen the impression the
government is trying to give.
The government's major problem is how to handle
these demonstrations. In response to foreign criticism
of Iran's treatment of dissidence, the Shah seems to
have instituted an unprecedented soft line, leaving the
security forces uncertain as to how far they can go in
containing the demonstrations. He may expect that pub-
lic opinion will eventually harden against such disrup-
tions and demand that the government take strong action.
Until this can be done, the chances are good that vio-
lence will continue--perhaps with lulls--and that for-
eigners of all kinds, especially Americans, will become
a more specific target.
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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments
BRAZIL: Economic Prospects
Last year, austerity measures and expanded exports
sharply reduced Brazil's current account deficit for the
first time since the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1974,
and trimmed inflation without unduly cutting output and
jobs. Politicking for the congressional election this
fall is likely to induce the military regime to allow
some slippage in monetary and fiscal targets this year.
Even so, economic growth may reach 5 to 6 percent with-
out jeopardizing recent gains on the current account
and inflation fronts.
Because of Brazil's heavy dependence on foreign
energy, its balance-of-payments position was hard hit
by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 1974. The
government began to implement serious austerity measures
in 1976 to slow inflation and reduce the current account
deficit, but they.did not begin to take hold until 1977.
Inflation in 1977 was held to 39 percent, compared
with 46 percent in 1976. The reduction would have been
greater if Brazil had been able to stick to its monetary
goals. This was not possible because of the need to
finance rising coffee stocks after the cessation of cof-
fee exports in July; the stronger than expected perform-
ance of agriculture, which required additional. credit
to finance stockpiling under the price support. program;
and the large sale of bonds by state-owned enterprises
in September. The government tightened monetary re-
strictions in September.
Although austerity caused a marked slowing of eco-
nomic activity, real gross domestic product still grew
by 4.7 percent in 1977. This was not enough, however,
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to absorb fully the increase in the labor force. Agri-
culture was the star performer; farm production grew
9.6 percent because of a good growing season and the
recovery of coffee production. Industrial output rose
3.9 percent, but manufacturing registered only 2.3
percent.
Increased exports were largely responsible for the
substantial improvement in Brazil's current account in
1977. Coffee and soybean exports were up 10 percent
and 23 percent for the year. Manufactures--benefiting
from devaluations totaling 30 percent, export incentives,
weak domestic demand, and market diversification--regis-
tered the largest gain, increasing by almost 40 percent.
weakened demand and direct controls continued to
limit imports. The trade balance was turned around, from
a $2.1 billion deficit in 1976 to a surplus of $123
million. The strong trade performance cut the current
account deficit from $6.1 billion in 1976 to $3.8 billion
in 1977. Capital inflows more than offset the deficit,
and official reserves increased by $700 million, to
$7.2 billion. Total foreign debt increased from $26
billion at the end of 1976 to $31 billion in December
1977. Servicing the foreign debt equaled 46 percent of
merchandise exports in 1977.
Despite progress in 1977 in curbing inflation and
improving the balance of payments, major problems re-
main. The continuing need to control the current account
deficit and preserve Brazil's international credit rating
conflicts with the political pressure to maintain real
wages and ensure sufficient growth to keep unemployment
from rising.
President Geisel and Minister of Finance Simonsen
have indicated that they intend to continue to emphasize
reducing inflation and cutting the current account def-
icit. Even so, election year politics and the adminis-
tration's desire to complete major import substitution
projects before leaving office next March will probably
force it to let monetary and fiscal targets slip a bit.
Geisel knows that his efforts to liberalize the Brazilian
political scene gradually could backfire if the domestic
economy becomes a focal point for opposition criticism.
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The conflict between austerity and the politics of
transition will almost certainly preclude attainment
of the target of less than 30-percent inflation this
year. Real spending in the public sector is budgeted
at almost last year's level but probably will be con-
siderably higher as a result. of overspending by govern-
ment-owned companies. The government will have to control
monetary expansion much more effectively than it has in
the past if it is to hold inflation under 35 percent.
Prospects for 1978
Brazil should be able to obtain a politically accept-
able real economic growth of 5 to 6 percent. A severe
drought and weakening prices for cocoa and coffee have
hurt agricultural prospects for 1978, but manufacturing
is likely to grow faster than it did last year as govern-
ment and private investment programs are stepped up and
as major projects come into operation. Steel and petro-
chemical production should continue to post good gains
on the basis of expanded capacity. Consumer industries,
especially automotive firms, probably will rebound in
1978.
Because of slower growth of exports and increasing
imports, Brazil's trade balance probably will show no
improvement this year. Exports are likely to increase
between 6 and 7 percent in value. Exports of manufactured
and semimanufactured goods will again lead the way, in-
creasing by around 25 percent if--as expected--the
currency continues to be devalued in line with inflation.
Agricultural exports probably will decline from the record
level last year because of falling prices and drought
damage to soybeans, corn, and rice.
Import volume will have to increase this year to
support economic expansion and to help dampen inflationary
pressures. Several large steel, chemical, and fertilizer
projects, whose output is to substitute for imports,
are not yet completed. Even allowing for substantial
substitution, imports probably will reach $13 billion,
compared with $12 billion last year.
Brazil's current account is likely to deteriorate
slightly this year. Rough equilibrium in the trade
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balance will not offset a deterioriation in the services
account, as interest payments on foreign debt increase
by approximately $500 million.
Brazil should have little trouble handling its
anticipated $4 billion current account deficit, barring
further major deterioration in agriculture. Direct
foreign investment inflows should continue to cover $1
billion of the deficit, and a $3 billion increase in
Brazil's foreign debt to cover the remainder should be
readily arranged. The international banking community
might balk at providing funds much in excess of this
figure, given its already large exposure in Brazil.
Brazilian borrowing rates are now averaging 2 percentage
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LAOS: UN NARCOTICS OFFICIAL MAY BE EXPELLED FROM LAOS.
The Laotian Government has indicated that it is
considering the expulsion of Alexander Arnaud, di-
rector of the UN-sponsored antinarcotics program
in Laos. The specific reason for the pending ex-
pulsion has not been divulged
Laotian officials may have concluded that
Arnaud has not been effective enough in promoting
the proposed UN-sponsored crop substitution program
in Laos. Any delays regarding this project, however,
have resulted primarily from the failure of the
Laotian Government to come up with an acceptable
site proposal for the project. Vientiane wants
the project to be located in the plains area of
Vientiane Province; the UN agreement calls for it
to be located in the mountainous opium-producing
area of Laos. Nonetheless, Laotian officials may
view the expulsion of Arnaud as a signal to the UN
that patience is running thin and that the project
will be located in the plains or not at all. If
a warning is intended, it has not been lost on the
UN officials who favor accepting the government's
proposal rather than endanger the tenuous relation-
ship between UNFDAC and the Laos Government. Al-
though Arnaud himself has been somewhat controver-
sial in his approach to the Laotian problem and
his statements have, at times been unreliable,
he has been firm in his belief that Vientiane, at
the policymaking level remains committed to both
the Single Convention and to the UNFDAC program in
Laos. He has acknowledged, however, that some
"middle level types" might still look upon opium
sales as a means of generating badly needed revenue.
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BURMA-THAILAND: THAT PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT RANGOON
SOON. The Burmese Government has proposed that
Prime Minister Kriangsak of Thailand pay an official
visit to Burma during the period 5-9 May. This is
in response to an overture made by Kriangsak last
month that he would like to visit Rangoon. Unfortu-
nately the Thais had not allowed sufficient time to
coordinate the proposed visit which came at a time
when Burmese attention was taken up with a new
upsurge of fighting against Burmese Communist forces.
Thai officials continue to stress the sincerity of
the Thai Government's desire to improve relations
with Burma. The Thai Ambassador in Rangoon, appar-
ently expecting the visit to take place soon, has
affirmed his belief that Kriangsak's visit to Burma
will mark an important step toward improved relations
between the two countries. The Burmese, although
still waiting for some concrete move on Bangkok's
part that would demonstrate a willingness to cut
off aid to insurgent organizations in Burma, appear
to be in a mood to be receptive for any sincere
Thai overture for improved relations, according to
the Embassy in Rangoon.
SYRIA: NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER ARRESTED WITH OPIUM FROM
TURKEY. Syrian authorities in Aleppo on 4 April
arrested a Syrian national with 12 kilograms of raw
opium in his possession.
L Syrian authorities claim the raw opium is
of recent origin but did not specify how recent
or that it was of Turkish origin. They accept the
trafficker's claim that the opium came "from Turkey."
This is not the harvest season for opium poppies in
Turkey, but use of the term "recent origin" does
not necessarily mean "fresh" or just harvested opium.
Use of the term here probably merely means that it
was not from a stock that had been cached several
years ago and just brought out for sale. When it
was legal to harvest raw opium, even though under
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strict government controls, it was a common practice
for a poppy grower to package raw opium and hide it
away as an eventual dowry. Many Turkish nationals
currently living and working in West Germany have
been apprehended in recent months for smuggling
illicit opiates into Western Europe. There is
still no evidence, however, that the raw opium in-
volved actually came from poppies grown in Turkey
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Press Excerpts
LEBANON--hashish Production, Some Principal Growers and
:'eaters--TNDD,* No. L/7682, 2B March 1978, pp. 85-92.
"Growing and smuggling hashish means big business
for rich clans in Lebanon who own the hemp fields
in the Bekaa Valley: foreigners who deal with the
hashish suppliers pay sums which run into millions.
This year the hashish harvest is expected to be a
record one. The top men of the biggest drug syndi-
cates in North America and Europe come to Baalbek,
the center of the hemp area, to buy large quantities
of hashish. Operations are being planned in Lebanon
which would make the French Connection look like a
five finger exercise. Baalbek is the very center
of activity. Hash is sold openly on the street
corners. It is an open city ruled by the sharpest
shooters and the richest planters who always remain
invisible to outsiders. Baalbek, a small free and
easy town deep in the mountains about 90 kilometers
east of Beirut and once a friendly little mountain
town, was overrun by mountain dwellers who had hemp
fields in the Bekaa Valley between l9-50 and 1970.
Before then, thousands of tourists had come there
to see plays and operas performed in the setting of
the centuries-old Roman temple ruins. But now that
is all over. Guests who do come take flight
after one night, sometimes shaking with fright. The
hash dealers do not give them a moment's peace. The
whole area is in the hands of 20 families. The most
powerful is undoubtedly the Jaafar clan, which is
more than 3,000 strong. This family possesses
dozens of fields and its own factories and boats
to ship the drug to Europe and North America. The
clan has its own tanks, M-16 machineguns, and anti-
aircraft guns to protect its fields. The police
are no problem. They have them in their pocket in
Baalbek. They belong to the hemp field owning
tions on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published b
JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.
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families of the Bekaa Valley." This detailed account
of the hashish trade from field to market was written
by a team of reporters who spent a week in the Middle
East, disguised as dealers, on the trail of hashish.
The account goes into considerable detail concerning
the routes that the illicit drug take on its way
from Lebanon to Europe either by sea to Rotterdam
or by land through Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugo-
slavia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Accord-
ing to the reporters, "nothing has changed despite
international intervention. While the demand for
hashish continues to grow, greedy dealers will go
to desperate lengths to satisfy the demand. The
cycle remains unbroken."
COSTA RICA--Country's RoZe as Drug Channel Denounced--
TNDD, No. L/7682, pp. 64-68. The continental drug
traffic uses Costa Rica as an intermediate stopover
from which drugs are reshipped to the large markets
in North America. For geographic and other reasons
Costa Rica seems to have become a good place to
bring in appreciable quantities of drugs, particu-
larly cocaine, and ship them to their final desti-
nations. Costa Rica is an involuntary instrument
exploited by international traffickers without local
contacts involved in most cases, although the in-
volvement of Costa Ricans cannot be entirely dis-
counted. Foreign drug traffickers find out how to
enlist them as liaisons and intermediaries. Our
people are well aware of this problem and are ready
to cooperate to eradicate it.
The Mafia that controls international drug
traffic has made this small Central American nation
one of the principal links in its chain of illegal
trade. In this involuntary position, Costa Rica
channels the major percentage of the drug that
reaches the United States and Canada from productive
sources in South America. Major political changes
that occurred in Panama in recent years favored the
slow but continual transfer of the headquarters of
Latin American drug traffic to Costa Rica.
MAURITIUS--Increase in Use of Drugs Reported--TNDD, No.
L/7682, pp. 93-97. Drugs have already devastated
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our society. Young people are turning away from
marijuana, whose price has increased considerably,
and have adapted themselves to cocaine, until now
unknown in Mauritius, and introduced to our country
by foreigners in November 1977. Or else they dis-
cover the hallucinogenic properties of certain varie-
ties of local mushrooms. About 40,000 marijuana
plants were uprooted last year. Because of the
scarcity of this product, people are "shooting"
opium. It is foremost on the drug scene in Mauritius
today. Another important development is the intro-
duction of cocaine. Some people sip their "mushroom
soup" a soup spiced with several varieties of poi-
sionous mushrooms which cause severe hullucinations.
There is no doubt that there has always been a drug
problem in Mauritius. What is new is the fact that
all levels of the population, particularly idle
youth, are touched by it, and drug use has had a
great deal to do with the crime wave which is spread-
ing throughout the country.
CYPRUS--Cyprus Examined as Transit Point for Drugs--TNDD,
No. L/7682, p. 98. The proximity of Cyprus to
several Middle East countries and Turkey has gener-
ated concern over the possible use of the island
as a transit point for illicit drug trafficking.
Domestic use of drugs in Cyprus is said to be neg-
ligible. Many smugglers attempt to use the coast-
line as a means of transporting drugs. If people
are in transit or on board a ship, it is not normal
routine to check unless there is special information,
according to a police official. The author of the
article appearing in the Cyprus Mail also commented
that "local authorities" have evidence that some
trafficking is going on in the areas of Cyprus con-
trolled by the Turkish Cypriots, but this allegation
has never been substantiated.
MALAYSIA--Drug Abuse Increasing Daily--TNDD, No. L/7682,
p. 15. This can be seen from the figures on arrests
and seizures recorded by the various bodies con-
nected with eradicating drug abuse in the country.
Arrests in 1975 were 3,202. Last year it was 5,000.
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BRAZIL--Psychiatrist Cites Need For Awareness of Drug
Danger--TNDD, No. L/7698, pp. 96-97. Psychiatrist
Oswald Moraes Andrade, who headed the commission
to draft the new anti-drug law, believes that one
of the causes of drug consumption among young
people is big-city idleness. The article goes on
to draw a comparison of the new law regarding drugs
and the previous law.
COLOMBIA--An Overflight of the 'Drug Province' of
Guajira--TNDD, No. L/7698, pp. 109-114. "The light
plane, which had been following the coast in a
northerly direction, finished its turn to the east
and began flying parallel to the five enchanting
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coves of Praque Tayrona, one of them a colony of hip-
pies and drugs . . . . Where is the airport around
here? . . . . Everywhere! There are 50 or 100 . . .
The maritime, air, and port organization of the
region is excellent. Its 'statesmen' have succeeded
in designing a system of commerce which is extremely
simple, efficient, and extra quick. There are no
delays, congestion, or disputes. Or better said,
there are, but they are on a small scale, and they
are settled in minutes by the codes of Madsen, Mag-
num, or Smith and Weston, without further ado. The
essential thing is that the merchandise move and
arrive quickly and promptly at its destination. But
what would happen if suddenly the marijuana culti-
vation and traffic and smuggling in general were
stopped in La Guajira? Who then would solve the
social problem of a poor people who suddenly dis-
covered a way to quadruple their incomes without
more effort?"
INDIA--Seminar in Delhi on Narcotics--TNDD, No. L/7698,
p. 65. Production of opium in India which is con-
fined to Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh
amounted to 1,164 tons in 1976-1977 and the area
under opium cultivation is 57,018 hectares. The
major portion of the raw opium is exported for medic-
inal and scientific purposes while a part of it was
used within the country for the manufacture of alka-
loids and medicinal opium.
New Delhi was selected as the venue for the
seminar on narcotics for law enforcement officers
from the area because of the experience India gained
over a long period of time as the largest producer
and exporter of licit opium.
MALAYSIA--Malaysian Paper Concerned Over Worsening Drug
Situation--TNDD, No. L/7698, p. 69. Malaysia's
anti-drug laws are already harsh: The move to in-
troduce mandatory death sentences for trafficking
will make them even more punitive. But punitive
laws have not in themselves been able to control
drug abuse. In 1977 the number of traffickers
arrested more than doubled over 1965, as did the
amount of drugs confiscated. Customs and police
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officials cannot cope with the multiple demands on
their understaffed departments. It is no wonder
that, despite the law, enough traffickers get away
to earn Malaysia an international reputation as the
transshipment center for hard drugs from the "Golden
Triangle."
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