INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BI WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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r \ Foreign
Assessment
Center
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
15 February 1978
State Dept. review
completed
DOJ review(s) completed.
Secret
RP INBR 78-004
1.5 February 1978
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
15 February 1978
CONTENTS
INDONESIA: Narcotics Trafficking Increasing ........ 1
LAOS: Proposed Site for UNFDAC Crop Substitution
Project ............................................
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Transit Point for Narcotics.... 15
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
1. TURKEY ...................................... 18
2. TURKEY ....................................... 21
3. IRAN-INDIA-PAKISTAN ......................... 24
4. COLOMBIA ..25
BRIEFS .............................................. 30
INTERESTING READING ................................. 33
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.
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, ' Vietnam
Thai and
Seto
Medan., *KUALA LUMPUR
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r ^a APQRE
BANDAR
SERI BEGAWAN
Brunei
(UK) S
Riau _ t 1
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INDONESIA: Narcotics Traffic Increasing
The use of Indonesia as a transit route for Golden
Triangle - produced narcotics appears to be expanding.
traf-
fi~cers are currently smuggling narcotics through the
Langkawi and Penang Island groups across the Strait of
Malacca to the northeast coast of Sumatra. It is be-
lieved that the Thai town of Setoi near the Malaysian
border is a staging area in the routing of the Sumatra-
bound narcotics.
Boats transporting narcotics cross the Strait of
Malacca in 24 hours or less to Sumatra with landings
taking place at Langsa in Atjeh Province and other points
in North Sumatra Province, including Belawan and Riau
Province. The hundreds of Malaysian fishing boats nor-
mally operating in the area make it difficult to detect
those carrying narcotics.
Penang is considered to be the main operating cen-
ter and is a primary receiving point for the Golden Tri-
angle narcotics smuggled into Malaysia by land and sea.
The quantity of narcotics smuggled annually into Sumatra
is unknown, and no significant seizures have taken place
during the past three years. This is attributed to a
lax narcotics control effort by the Indonesians. Most
of the narcotics moving into Sumatra are believed to be
destined for Jakarta for transshipment to other areas
of the world and for local consumption. Narcotics are
normally transported to Jakarta by air, although small
quantities may move by bus and private vehicles.
Narcotics addiction appears to be growing in
Sumatra. There are at least 1,000 opium and heroin ad-
dicts in North Sumatra of which some 300 are located in
the city of Medan. Whereas in the past this addiction
was limited to the children of high-level officials,
more middle-class children are now being affected.
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Although the extent of narcotics trafficking through
Indonesia cannot be ascertained from these reports, there
appears to be little doubt that Sumatra has become a
transit point for Golden Triangle narcotics. Sumatra
has historically been a pirate's paradise for the smug-
gling of all types of goods and the many islands along
the coast with their remote beaches provide excellent
cover for such operations.
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LAOS: Proposed Site for UNFDAC Crop Substitution
Project
The Lao Government has proposed a site for the
UNFDAC crop substitution project designed to reduce
opium poppy cultivation by hill tribes. Although the
location of the site does not meet requirements agreed
upon earlier, UNFDAC officials seem inclined to accept
it.
A joint UNFDAC/Lao Agreement signed in November
1977 linked UNFDAC funds for a model crop substitution
project and for a drug rehabilitation center. Although
Lao officials are enthusiastic about the drug rehabilita-
tion center, they have shown little interest in crop
substitution and have dragged their feet in planning
for it. When a UN team visited Laos to survey sites
and draw up work plans in December 1977, the Lao did
not respond to their requests to see the crop substitu-
tion site. UNFDAC officials seemed willing to provide
funds for addict rehabilitation alone, dropping the
requirement that both phases of the program proceed
simultaneously, and it was assumed that the Lao intended
to renege completely on the crop substitution project.
The original agreement specified that the crop
substitution project would be located in a "mountainous
region where opium poppy previously has been cultivated."
The proposed site, named Oudomsai Mai, is a government-
established settlement for hill people located on a low-
land plain where opium cannot be grown. Lao authorities
plan to eventually relocate as many as 18,000 Hmong and
other tribal peoples from their traditional homelands to
this village to grow rice. The independent hill tribes
have resisted Lao authority and, in some areas, have
supported or participated in insurgent activities; Lao
officials apparently feel that they can be more easily
controlled if they are moved to lowland rice-growing
areas.
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The UNFDAC director in Laos and a UNFDAC representa-
tive from Geneva seem inclined to accept the proposed
site. They argue that since it provides assistance for
former opium producers who have stopped cultivating it,
the project still falls within the UNFDAC mandate.
They also fear that any pressure on the Lao to propose
a new site which meets the specific terms of the agree-
ment might cause them to close down the UNFDAC office
there.
As pointed out by the American Embassy in Vientiane,
however, the site chosen by the Lao authorities could not
serve as a laboratory for testing and developing crop
substitutes for opium or as a demonstration project.
More importantly, UNFDAC support for Lao programs to re-
settle hill tribes could have negative human rights
implications.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Transit Point for Narcotics Smuggling
There are indications that the Dominican Republic is
playing an increasing role as a transit point for South
American cocaine being sumggled into the US. In the past
year, for example, there have been major increases in the
amount of cocaine seized and the number of foreign traf-
fickers arrested.
The statistics could merely reflect increased effi-
ciency and stricter enforcement of the country"s narcotics
laws by the National Police and the Department of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. It is more likely, however, that
the figures represent a jump in drug smuggling through
the island.
As enforcement and interdiction programs in some
Latin American mainland countries become more effective,
it is inevitable that the resilient drug networks will
alter their routes and change their methodologies. The
Dominican Republic is an attractive site for such a shift.
Located astride important shipping lanes that connect the
Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Panama Canal, the
island also has numerous hidden inlets which enhance the
opportunities for smuggling.
Colombia is the main source of the drugs, the majority
of which enter the Dominican Republic on cargo ships.
Tourist boats and commercial pleasure yachts that call at
northern ports of the island may also be transporting
drugs between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
Even though national attention is focused on the May
presidential elections, drug arrests continue to be widely
publicized in the local media. Although the Dominican
Republic does not suffer from a major drug abuse problem.
officials seem aware of the potential consequences which
could result for their island society as a result of in-
creasingly available drugs.
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The National Police readily cooperate with INTERPO
and the US Drug Enforcement Admini
the Dominican
Republic will remain at least one of the stops in the
"island hopping" path South American cocaine takes en
route to the US.
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NOTEWORTHY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
ditor's Note: These items, produced for another
CIA publication, do not deal speci=ieaZZy with the
international narcotics situation. They are in-
-~Zudea here, however, because they concern develop-
ino economic or political situations that could
impact on the international narcotics control
e',-'o r t . )
TURKEY: The Balance-of-Payments Crisis
Prime Minister Ecevit's month-old government prob-
ably will impose controversial austerity measures within
the next few weeks in an attempt to remedy a critical
balance-of-payments situation. Foreign exchange reserves
are at their lowest level in six years, and short-term
debt has reached an alarming $4 billion.
Former Prime Minister Demirel's coalition, which
fell in late December, foundered in part because it could
not agree on policies that would satisfy the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and private foreign bankers, poten-
tial sources of much-needed loans. Ecevit must convince
politicians and the public alike that stiff austerity
measures are essential and do not represent knuckling
under to outside pressure.
Turkey has been involved in a foreign exchange
juggling act for at least a year as officials try des-
perately to maintain essential imports. Central Bank
overdrafts and arrears carried over from last year amount
to between $1.5 billion and $2 billion. Shortages of
imported goods have caused industrial production to be
cut and development projects to be delayed.
Iraq and Libya, Turkey's main sources of oil, have
stopped supplies for short periods in recent months when
their bills were not paid. Foreign exchange reserves now
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are below $500 million, the equivalent of about five
weeks' worth of imports. Expectations of a substantial
devaluation of the Turkish lira are slowing both payment
for the country's exports and remittances from Turks
working abroad.
The deepening foreign exchange crisis stems from
several years of rapid economic growth and high military
expenditures at a time of skyrocketing oil prices, world
recession, and a shutoff of US military grant aid. In
addition, the government has been supporting agricultural
prices well above world levels, making key exports salable
only on a subsidized basis. The result of these and
other policies has been a ballooning of the current ac-
count deficit from $720 million in 1974 to $3.2 billion
in 1977.
To finance the deficit, Turkey has borrowed abroad
and encouraged foreign banks--mainly US--to maintain
deposits of foreign currency in Turkish banks. These
so-called "convertible lira" deposits plus Central Bank
arrears and overdrafts make up Turkey's short-term debt
of $4 billion. Long-term debt, primarily owed to the
US and international organizations, amounts to $5 billion.
Earlier Remedies
The Demirel government began taking steps to reduce
the current account deficit following initial discussions
with the IMF last September. Ankara devalued the lira
by 9 percent against the dollar and trimmed the annual
increase in agricultural support prices. It raised do-
mestic petroleum prices for the first time since 1973
and announced substantial increases in the prices of
some state enterprises' products to reduce the budget
deficit. The Demirel government balked, however, at
further measures needed to meet IMF loan conditions and
restore the confidence of foreign bankers.
International bankers, after considering loans to
tide Turkey over until a settlement could be reached
with the IMF, decided in December to stake new assistance
conditional on an IMF standby credit. The $65 million
to $110 million potentially available from the IMF for
1978 is small change compared with total financing needs,
but Turkish acceptance of IMF policy conditions would
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open the door to medium-term private credits that could
total $1 billion or more. Under the circumstances, Tur-
key has little choice other than to accept the IMF policy
recommendations.
The new Ecevit government is believed to recognize
the need for austerity and is likely to seek an early
agreement with the IMF. Ankara may delay the next round
of IMF talks at least until next month, however, to allow
time for approval of the 1978 budget and enactment of
other economic measures. The government proposals will
be difficult enough to defend without their appearing to
be imposed from outside.
IMF proposals discussed with the Demirel government
included a further 20-percent devaluation of the lira, a
cut in 1978 government spending in real terms, limits on
money supply expansion, and a sharp cut in imports. The
Turks apparently calculated that these conditions would
result in real GNP growth of 4.5 percent in 1978, well
below the average 7- to 8-percent rate of the past few
years. The projected slowdown in growth proved to be
a key stumbling block for members of the Demirel govern-
ment, particularly Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan.
With Erbakan out of the government and preliminary
figures showing GNP growth down to 5 percent or less in
1977, the IMF proposals appear to be gaining greater
acceptance among Turkish officials. The new government
already has accepted the $4.85 billion IMF limit on im-
ports, and Ecevit probably will agree to the proposed
devaluation. He may try to raise slightly the government
budget ceiling agreed to last fall by Demirel, and he is
likely to postpone restrictions on domestic credit as
long as possible.
In the absence of a standby agreement with the IMF,
external financing constraints would almost certainly
result in a severe decline in real GNP this year, with
shortages of oil and other imports causing widespread
plant closings and power outages. Road transportation
would be crippled, and the cities--where over 40 percent
of the population lives--would be hit hardest.
With IMF support, much of Turkey's short-term debt
could be rescheduled, and exports and worker remittances
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would probably recover. Some real growth might be
realized, although probably less than the Demirel govern-
ment expected. High inflation and unemployment will per-
sist, however, and real incomes may fall even if Ankara
enacts the measures demanded by the IMF.
Tight control over imports and government spending
probably will have to be maintained through 1980. US
ratification of the long-pending four-year Defense Co-
operation Agreement, which calls for $250 million a year
in loans and grants to Turkey in return for the use of
military bases, would make available foreign exchange
that could be used to support domestic investment proj-
ects.
Once the immediate foreign exchange situation is
brought under control, Turkish leaders probably will
have to address structural economic problems. For the
past decade, Ankara has channeled a large portion of in-
vestment into high-cost showpiece plants or into con-
sumer-oriented industries that depend heavily on imported
materials and are not competitive in export markets. A
reevaluation of development policy would be politically
difficult, but creditors may force the government's hand.
TURKEY: Prospects for the Ecevit Government
Influential Turkish political and military circles
are cautiously optimistic that Prime Minister Ecevit is
prepared to move forward on a broad range of domestic
and foreign policy issues. He has an image of decisive-
ness and independence and is courting groups outside
the government, particularly labor.
The components of the governing coalition headed
by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit--his own left-
of-center Republican People's Party plus two tiny rightist
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parties and at least 11 independents--have displayed
in their first weeks in office a considerable degree of
cooperation, and the new government is enjoying a politi-
cal honeymoon of sorts. The Prime Minister is working
hard--within his own party, the coalition, the parlia-
mentary opposition, and important groups outside the
government--to gain support for an activist program that
will improve Turkey's economy and international standing.
Opposition to Ecevit, led by former Prime Minister
Demirel, has been strident and even vicious. Demirel
reportedly is trying to win back some of the 11 defec-
tors who resigned from his Justice Party and are now
aligned as independents with Ecevit. However, it is hard
to see what Demirel could offer them; Ecevit has put
nine of them in the cabinet.
Ecevit's award of 13 ministerial posts to his coali-
tion partners comes close to guaranteeing his government
a 226-vote majority in the National Assembly. Perhaps
more important is the realization within the coalition
that there is no clear alternative to the present govern-
ment:
Within his own party, Ecevit has tried with some
success to placate his critics, particularly those on
the left. He has reshuffled the party executive commit-
tee and given the Energy Ministry to Deniz Baykal, the
party's principal leftist dissident. Baykal does not
appear completely satisfied, and may continue his crusade
for greater social and economic activism, but he is not
anxious to split the party or to jeopardize his new job.
Ecevit has attempted to minimize parliamentary op-
position by neutralizing Necmettin Erbakan, leader of
the Islamic-fundamentalist National Salvation Party.
Shortly after Demirel's government fell, Turkey's chief
prosecutor accused Erbakan of having violated Turkey's
secularist laws by pursuing an aggressively Islamic
line in his speeches. Erbakan faces expulsion from his
party if convicted.
Military Approval
Turkish military officers, particularly those in the
middle grades, seem pleased with Ecevit's government.
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Although some senior officers may be chary of Ecevit's
occasional socialistic statements, they still remember
him as the man who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in
1974. They believe that Demirel's coalition was inef-
fective and that Ecevit is probably the only leader who
can achieve a Cyprus settlement.
Solving that problem, the officers believe, would
reopen the path to cooperation with the US, which to
many of them is of primary importance. A $1 billion
Defense Cooperation Agreement has long been stalled in
the US Congress. The military is also concerned by the
present magnitude of domestic violence and hopes that
the Ecevit admi,iistration can do something about it.
Labor and Business Views
Ecevit's meeting last week with Turkey's two major
labor leaders signaled that he is attuned to the problems
of labor, particularly important during the period of
economic austerity that lies ahead.
The head of the leftist labor federation has ex-
pressed reservations about increased austerity measures.
The more conservative union is prepared to make sacri-
fices, but only if collective bargaining arrangements
are preserved. Neither organization is particularly well
disciplined, and a large number of Turkish workers are
not union members. Nonetheless, organized labor seems
likely to give Ecevit the benefit of the doubt, at least
for the present, if only because it considers him prefer-
able to Demirel.
Businessmen have been cautious in discussing the new
government, but they seem relieved that Demirel is no
longer in power. In August and September, various em-
ployers' associations offered proposals for more real-
istic economic policies, but received little response
from Demirel.
Ecevit has not yet announced the details of his
economic program, but it is generally understood to call
for belt-tightening, a move most businessmen would wel-
come. Rather than call back the International Monetary
Fund negotiating team to finish talks on a $130 million
loan, Ecevit may decide to implement austerity measures
independently and attempt to negotiate new bilateral
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loans. This move would be politically popular over the
short term because it would enhance Turkey's image of
independence; there is virtually no chance, however, that
Ecevit could obtain adequate outside support if no IMF
loan is negotiated.
As his foreign and domestic policies become clear--
and memory of Demirel's ineffective government fades--
Ecevit will surely be subject to more criticism. The
strength of such pressure, probably more topical than
general, will be dampened for a time by the general be-
lief that a Turkish government is, at long last, address-
ing major problems. But Ecevit must soon produce results
in order to sustain his current popularity.
By continuing to project himself as a highly inde-
pendent yet realistic leader, Ecevit can probably gen-
erate the popular confidence that will enable him to make
difficult decisions, particularly in foreign policy. Un-
like his predecessor, Ecevit will be able to operate
without the encumbrance of parliamentary allies who are
often opposed to his policies or preoccupied with their
own ambitions.
IRAN-INDIA-PAKISTAN: Shah's Visits
The Shah of Iran was impressed by Indian Prime Minis-
ter Desai during their meeting in New Delhi last week-
end. From all indications, the relationship of the lead-
ers of the two major powers in the region got off to a
good start. The Shah told the US Ambassador to Iran
that he had found the political situation in India much
improved, reflecting his generally favorable reaction to
the performance of the Desai government during its first
year in power.
With respect to specific issues, the Shah found
ready Indian acceptance of the concept of an Asian Com-
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mon Market. The scheme is intended to strengthen re-
gional economic cooperation, a familiar theme in Iranian
foreign policy but one on which little headway has been
made. The Indians favor greater regional economic co-
operation in principle, but they view the Shah's pro-
posal as ill-defined and premature.
The Shah was less satisfied with his brief stopover
in Pakistan, where he was unable to dispel what he sees
as Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia's obsession with
possible Indian-Iranian collusion against Pakistani in-
terests. Pakistanis are not fully aware of the Shah's
reaction and appear pleased by what they regard as avoid-
ing a confrontation as well as by the Shah's agreement
to defer repayments on a $580 million loan.
COLOMBIA: Congressional Elections Set
President Lopez' measures to counter kidnapings and
lawlessness have assuaged the Colombian military's con-
cern over a serious crime problem, and national attention
has now shifted to election year political activities.
Congressional elections, which will also serve as a pri-
mary for the ruling Liberal Party, are scheduled for
26 February, and will be followed by presidential elec-
tions in June.
This month's "primary" is significant because it
takes the place of a nominating convention for the badly
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splintered Liberal Party. Presidential and congressional
elections were originally planned to be held together
in the spring. Liberal Party officials have been con-
cerned, however, that the numerous factions would not be
able to unite behind one of the two leading Liberal pre-
candidates--Julio Cesar Turbay and former President (1966-
70) Carlos Lleras Restrepo.
A divided Liberal Party at election time, or even
one led by a compromise candidate, would enhance the
prospects of victory for Belisario Betancur, the Conser-
vative Party standardbearer. To head off that possibil-
ity, a Liberal caucus last December succeeded in pass-
ing controversial legislation which separates the up-
coming elections. This maneuver bought the Liberals
additional time to patch up political differences.
In a further attempt to strengthen the Liberal Party
against the attractive Betancur, Lopez engineered the
San Carlos consensus--an agreement calling for the Liberal
Party nomination to go to the contender whose supporters
win the most votes in the congressional elections.
This approach favors Turbay, a facile politician who
controls much of his party's political machinery. Lleras,
however, is an experienced statesman noted for economic
reforms and strong fiscal policies--persuasive credentials
in the eyes of a populace economically fatigued by infla-
tion. Over the past several months Lleras has narrowed
Turbay's lead.
Turbay's loss of momentum is due in part to his
indecisive campaign platform, ponderous oratorical style,
and public concern over rumors of corruption and narcot-
ics trafficking surrounding him and his supporters.
Nevertheless, he is projected to win.
A poor turnout at the polls, which is expected due
to low voter registration, probably will not hurt Turbay's
grass-roots machine, but it will be a serious blow to
Lleras, who is banking on a last minute upsurge of sup-
port from undecided voters.
There is still a question, however, whether Lleras
will honor the San Carlos accord and support Turbay, a
long-time bitter enemy. Lleras probably will not run
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for the presidency on a maverick ticket because he re-
alizes that would virtually ensure the election of Betan-
cur. For the Conservatives, the February election will
be a struggle between the Gomez and Pastrana-Ospina fac-
tions to determine which group will be the party's major-
ity bloc in Congress.
After this month's election the political pace will
accelerate even more. The candidates also will have to
abandon their political platitudes and begin seriously
to address campaign issues such as government corrup-
tion, kidnapings, rampant crime, and guerrilla activity.
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CUBA: In conjunction with the war against common crime
which President Fidel Castro declared late last year,
Cuba just imposed stiffer penalties for drug traf-
ficking and other criminal activities. The tougher
penalties are the result of growing concern in Cuba
over increasing crime and delinquency. According to
the new decree, production, cultivation, or trans-
portation of illicit drugs will be punishable by
three to eight years imprisonment, with increases
up to 15 or 20 years for major violators. The new
laws may have a direct effect on foreigners and
American citizens periodically detained by the Cubans
while smuggling marijuana north by air and sea from
Colombia and Central America.
YUGOSLAVIA: Poppy Crop Damage--The low temperatures in
the area around Kochani have damaged the opium poppy
crop. According to the director of the Mosha Pijade
cooperative farm in the area, the opium poppies planted
on 40 hectares were "completely destroyed." In addi-
tion, about 150 hectares of poppies planted on farms
in neighboring communities have also been destroyed
In another section, 80 percent of the crop was de-
stroyed in a 1000 hectare area. The greatest damage
was caused by the drought accompanied by dry winds
and frost.
SWEDEN: The resources for the care and rehabilitation of
drug addicts in Sweden will be doubled if a govern-
ment proposal--to be submitted to the Swedish parlia-
ment within the next few weeks--is adopted. The
proposed government-supported program will cost the
equivalent of about $7 million. According to the
draft legislation, the country will be divided into
regions, and each community will have access to a
special treatment center. The proposal calls for
an interlocking program which will include intensive
medical care, institutional treatment, and postre-
lease assistance. The proposed legislation partic-
ularly emphasizes the importance of providing jobs
for rehabilitated drug addicts. A special project
group will also be created to study the use of
"foster families" in the rehabilitation program.
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The bill also provides for research on treatment
methods and calls for greater cooperation both
among the Nordic countries and with the US in research
on drug addict rehabilitation. The bill provides
further that over $500,000 in Swedish foreign aid
funds will be spent to support crop substitution
efforts in certain developing countries especially
those in Southeast Asia.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: The 2 February issue of Rude Pravo carried
a brief roundup of recent smuggling attempts includ-
ing an item on a "West Berlin Citizen" who recently
tried to smuggle a small amount of hashish into the
country in his car. The newspaper speculated that
it was perhaps an attempt to find a suitable smuggling
route for drugs. An initial attempt by the Embassy's
narcotics coordinator in Prague to get more informa-
tion on the case from Czech customs authorities was
unproductive, but he is pursuing the matter further.
AFGHANISTAN: The Afghan Ministry of Commerce is offering
25 tons of confiscated opium for sale, and interested
pharmaceutical firms have been invited to submit bids.
The Embassy in Kabul notes that this is the same con-
fiscated opium that had been offered for sale last
December. The Afghan Government chose not to accept
the bids received at that time and has reopened the
bidding. Because of the general oversupply of opiates
on the world market, the bidding this time probably
will be even more unsatisfactory to the Afghan Govern-
ment.
BURMA: The nationwide antidrug abuse campaign, which was
launched late last year, is continuing unabated,
according to the American Embassy in Rangoon. The
campaign is aimed primarily at school-age children
and features large exhibitions of student-made posters
depicting some of the perils of drug abuse. The
continuing campaign also includes mass rallies and
song, poem, and essay contests. Recently in Mandalay,
Burma's second largest city and a center of drug
addiction, some 32,000 students marched through the
city carrying posters and chanting antidrug slogans.
Student attendance at such rallies is said to be com-
pulsory. The embassy in Rangoon points out, however,
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that the "intensity and duration" of the overall
drug abuse campaign is further evidence of the
seriousness with which the Burmese Government views
the local addiction problem.
BURMA: The UNFDAC Burma Project, a $6.6 million, five-
year program launched in mid-1976, got off to a slow
start, but the problems which marked its beginning
have now been largely overcome, and rapid progress
is likely in 1978, according to the Embassy in Rangoon.
The project provides equipment and supplies to
support Burmese Government programs in crop substitu-
tion, antidrug education, addict treatment and re-
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Singapore: Ferret Digs In (SINGAPORE)--TNDD*, No. L/7584,
31 January 1978, pp. 17-18. "Nine months after its
inception, there are signs that the Singapore Gov-
ernment's antidrug Operation Ferret is putting the
heat on the island republic's burgeoning narcotics
underworld. Since Ferret began, some 7,000 heroin
takers--the most numerous among the abuser group--
have been rounded up out of an estimated addict pop-
ulation of 200,000." (Phase two of "Operation Ferret"
officially began on 1 January 1978.)
Experts Discuss Drug Addiction, Prevention (ARGENTINA)--
TNDD, No. L/7584, pp. 24-26. "A recent police cam-
paign made it possible to uncover some secrets of
the Argentine drug-smuggling route. Meanwhile,
authorities responsible for the area have succeeded
in checkmating traffickers, closing off the routes
that they travel."
Drug Agents To Be Assigned to overseas Embassies
(BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7584, pp. 30-34. "Brazilian
embassies will have police attaches for drug-related
matters beginning in 1978, starting with Peru,
Bolivia, and Venezuela. This is one of the new
measures announced by the interministerial commis-
sion that is formulating a new strategy for the
Justice Ministry for suppressing drug trafficking
and restricting drug use."
Five Thousand Kilos of Narcotics Confiscated Last Year
(IRAN)--TNDD, No. L/7584, p. 80. "According to the
Iranian National Gendarmerie, in all probability,
the smugglers had prepared 50 percent of these items
for export to the West. (Items listed included both
opium and heroin)."
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Transla-
tions on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by
JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.
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Customs Officials' Crackdown Fails To Stem Drug Traffic
(DENMARK)TNDD, No. L/7584, 92-94. "Drug-related crimes
increased explosively in Denmark in 1977. Narcotics
valued at about $10,000,000 were found on Danish soil,
while other drugs worth about $6,540,000 were in tran-
sit in the country. These figures provide only a
partial picture of the real drug crimes."
Minister Seeks Isolation From World Drug Scene (NEW
ZEALAND)--TNDD, No. L/7598, pp. 38-39. "The Minister
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of customs has embarked on a campaign to seal New
Zealand off from the world's drug traffickers . . .
the amount heroin seized by New Zealand Customs
officers alone has jumped from nil in 1972 to 1,448
grammes in March 1977."
Intensive Anti-Drugs Campaign Announced (COLOMBIA)--TNDD,
No. L/7598, pp. 80-81. "Within the radical changes
to take place in the methods of preliminary penal
investigation, under the absolute responsibility
of the national attorney general's office, there
will be a new operative front which will take a
unified stand against drug traffickers. Prelimin-
ary investigation (methods) during the last six
years have contributed to the wave of insecurity."
Police Official: 90 Percent of Juvenile Theft Tied to
Drug Abuse (NORWAY)--TNDD, No. L/7598, pp. 136-140.
"There are between 6,000 and 7,000 narcotic addicts
in and around Oslo. The money to support their
addiction is gotten by thefts. In 1977, eight
youths died in Norway from overdoses."
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