INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Assessment
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
19 January 1978
DOJ review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed 7 l (-7? 7 Secret
RP INBR 78-002
19 January 1978
Copy
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
19 January 1978
LATIN AMERICA: A Brief Discussion of Drug-Related 2
Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . "
THAILAND: Government Professes Commitment to 5
Vigorous Narcotics Control Program. . . . . . . .
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: 8
1. Guatemala. . 18
2. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . 11
3. Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 13
4. Turkey
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
INTERESTING READING . ? 21
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and ueries are welcome.
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LATIN AMERICA: A Brief Discussion of Drug-Related
violence
violence has long been associated with narcotics
trafficking in Latin America. The potentially huge
financial profits have caused many drug smugglers to
have virtually no compunction against taking human lives,
particularly those of enforcement officers. As enforce-
ment operations in Latin America become more sophisti-
cated and efficient, trafficking groups and other organ-
ized crime syndicates involved in the illegal drug in-
dustry are increasingly resorting to violent counter-
measures in order to protect their interests.
Earlier this month a Bolivian drug agent from the
Department of Narcotics and Dangerous Substances (DNSP)
was lynched in a cemetery in downtown La Paz. A note
attached to the murdered official's body stated this
was the beginning of the "elimination of narcotics agents"
in Bolivia. The murder is undoubtedly a scare tactic
by one or more cocaine smuggling groups and is intended
as a response to Bolivia's current priority program to
end the lucrative cocaine trade through registration of
coca growers and increased emphasis on enforcement and
interdiction.
Although the DNSP has competent and professional
leadership, the organization has traditionally been
staffed with underpaid and poorly trained personnel. If
more DNSP agents are murdered, the reluctance that many
enforcement officials already feel about going into
parts of Bolivia's drug oriented hinterland will be in-
creased--perhaps to a point where there will be no con-
trol at all in certain areas.
In Colombia, the gangs that operate cocaine labora-
tories and smuggle marijuana are reportedly well armed
with automatic weapons. Competition for supplies and
disputes over prices and operational territory have
resulted in frequent gang warfare. This situation has
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exacerbated Colombia's already serious crime problem
and added pressure on the government to solve the country's
social disorders. Efforts over the past year to con-
trol the problem, however, have resulted in an increasing
number of ambushes and assassinations of National Police
(F-2) and Department of Administrative Security (DAS)
agents assigned to narcotics control. Even judges have
been murdered in an attempt by the traffickers to
intimidate the judiciary.
Perhaps the most graphic example of violent reprisals
by drug traffickers has occurred in Mexico. Apparently
pinched by the continuing eradication program, poppy
growers in northwestern Mexico have begun firing on the
government helicopters that are spraying herbicides.
A number of helicopters have been struck, several have
been brought down, and at least one pilot has been
killed. In addition, steel cables have been strung
across mountain valleys, but the aircraft, so far, have
successfully avoided entangling their rotor blades.
Although it has not been attempted thus far, there is
always a possibility that some of the prominent drug
groups might employ "commandos" to sabotage the heli-
copters while they are still on the ground.
Acts of brutality and sabotage may prove embarrassing
for the affected countries, but violent retaliations by
drug smugglers will not ultimately prevent governments
from either continuing or escalating their drug enforce-
ment programs. Indeed, the very extent to which traf-
fickers can retaliate against enforcement agencies is
limited at the outset.
For example, regardless how well armed they are, no
trafficking groups can match military firepower. Heroin
traffickers in Culican, the drug smuggling capital of
Sinaloa, Mexico, operated with virtual impunity until
the armed forces swept out the city late last year.
Rampant lawlessness, which the ill-equipped local police
had been powerless to stop, terminated practically over-
night after the aggressive and tough-minded Mexican
Army moved in.
Similarly, Colombian drug traffickers---through their
corrupting influence on government officials and their
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indiscriminate shootouts among themselves and police
officers--have exceeded the military's 'level of tolera-
tion. As a result, the drug industry in Colombia has
become part of the focus of an intensified campaign to
clean up violence and crime in the country, a campaign
which the military command enjoined President Lopez to
undertake.
In the long run, however, a type of symbiotic
stalemate will persist. The violent reprisals of the
drug smugglers will not dissuade enforcement, nor will
the efforts of enforcement eliminate the traffickers--
they both will endure. In the interim, violence will
be prevalent, and the loss of life on both sides will
be simply one more aspect of the complex and pervasive
narcotics problem in Latin America
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THAILAND: Government Professes Commitment to Vigorous
Narcotics Control Program
Prime Minister Kriangsak has offered strong affirma-
tion of his personal commitment to a vigorous government
program against narcotics production and trafficking in
Thailand and along the Thai-Burmese border. His professed
plans, however, have thus far shown few signs of immediate
implementation.
In official
talks wi US o icials in Bangkok, Kriangsak has
strongly reaffirmed his determination to eradicate
narcotics trafficking from Thailand, and he has recently
emphasized that antinarcotics enforcement elements in
Thailand have complete authority to carry out their
narcotics suppression responsibilities. Unlike his
predecessor, the Prime Minister claims that he seeks
complete international cooperation and assistance in
such areas as crop substitution and addict rehabilitation.
Kriangsak has stated his belief that the international
narcotics problem can only be solved by attacking the
source of the problem--by eradicating the opium poppies
in the growing areas. He affirms his strong support of
crop substitution as a control program, and claims to
have pursued such a program in Thailand for years. He
insists, however, that the farmers who have become de-
pendent on the cultivation of opium poppies for their
livelihood must be given some alternative source of
income and be convinced that they can earn more from
other crops than from opium.
Kriangsak has admitted that
irregu ar arme a ements from Burma that are involved in
narcotics trafficking, have clandestine bases in Thailand
and have been getting some logistic support from Thai
sources of supply. He has stated quite candidly that his
government and the Thai armed forces have "some equity"
in these "irregular armies in northern Thailand." He
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regards this equity as affecting the security of Thailand,
presumably by insulating his country from armed Burmese
Communist forces operating in the Thai-Burma border area.
Kriangsak adamantly denies, however, that he authorized
either the Thai Army or the Internal Security Operations
Command to supply any of the irregular forces from Burma
with military equipment including weapons and communica-
tions equipment or that he had advance knowledge of such
assistance.
Kriangsak applauds the accomplishments of the Thai
Police Narcotics Suppression Center, but he has plans
to make the narcotics suppression more effective. He
claims that he is considering a move that would improve
the capabilities of the Thai Border Patrol. Basically
this would be accomplished by organizing at least four
special strike "platoons." In past operations against
opium refineries in the Thai-Burma border area the
Thai forces have been able to seize and destroy the
clandestine refineries but have been unable to prevent
the escape of the operators, guards, and workers who
then reopen new facilities in other areas.
In other moves designed to tighten narcotics con-
trols, the Prime Minister plans to ban chemicals that
are essential to opium refining process--primarily
acetic anhydride--from parts of Thailand north of a line
yet to be fixed in northern Thailand. He also has
affirmed his intention to foster closer cooperation
between Thailand and Burma in the narcotics control
effort, especially in the common border area. He re-
portedly will soon invite top Burmese political and mili-
tary leaders to come to Bangkok for talks on the narcotics
issue. Furthermore, as a domestic control measure, he
plans to impose heavier penalties on convicted traffickers.
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Despite all of General Kriangsak's professions of
commitment and intent, however, the Thai narcotics con-
trol effort has not changed much since he became Prime
Minister last November. Thai police and customs forces
continue to make significant seizures and arrests,
but opium refineries are still operating in the border
area and trafficking southward through Thailand apparently
is still continuing. Although Kriangsak professes great
personal interest in crop substitution as an opium con-
trol measure, he obviously expects foreign assistance in
developing viable alternative crops. Developments in
Thailand during the next few months should indicate
whether Kriangsak is sincere in his professions, both
private and public, of his determination to launch a
more vigorous program, both unilaterally and in coopera-
tion with neighboring Burma, aimed at stopping the flow
of narcotics through Thailand to world markets.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
GUATEMALA: The Pressures of Burgeoning Political Violence
Guatemala is experiencing an upsurge in political
violence that is symptomatic of, if not directly attrib-
utable to, the coming presidential election. Typically,
radical groups believe that forcing the administration
to declare a state of siege and suspend the election
will foster public dissatisfaction and political chaos,
enabling them to build popular support. President
Laugerud, despite mounting public and personal pressures,
seems determined to keep security forces in line and hold
the election as scheduled on 5 March.
Aside from the abduction of several wealthy business-
men last fall, the two spectacular kidnapings last month
by Guatemala's largest terrorist group, the Guerrilla
Army of the Poor (EGP), are the first major incidents of
political violence in the election campaign. They once
again impressively demonstrate the daring as well as the
substantial capabilities of the EGP to act throughout
most of the country.
On 13 December, the EGP kidnaped and killed Luis
Canella, a prominent businessman and member of the Presi-
dent's Council of State. On 31 December, it kidnaped
Roberto Herrera Ibarguen who was Minister of Government
and Minister of Foreign Relations under former President
Arana, Laugerud's predecessor. Herrera is currently vice
president of Laugerud's Council of State, a member of
Guatemala's Belize negotiating team, a wealthy business-
man, and a close personal friend of the President.
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The EGP, which claims that Herrera organized and
directed government "death squads" in the early 1970s, de-
manded wide media dissemination of its propaganda and $2.5
million in ransom in exchange for Herrera's release. The
government and the Herrera family apparently complied with
the demands. According to one press report from Guatemala,
Herrera has been released.
President Laugerud would like to leave office with
his comparatively good human rights record intact, but
he is under considerable pressure from rightists and
businessmen to crack down on the terrorists. Although
he has called for stronger measures to combat violence,
including the death penalty for kidnaping, he has pub-
licly asserted that he will not impose a state of siege.
Last week, Laugerud called on the three presidential
candidates to confer with him on ways to discourage cam-
paign violence. Former President Enrique Peralta Azurdia,
candidate of the conservative National Liberation Move-
ment, showed up, but the other two candidates did not.
Fernando Lucas, the semiofficial candidate, was late
returning from a trip to Venezuela, while the Christian
Democratic candidate, Ricardo Peralta Mendez, refused to.
attend unless the press was permitted to participate. Co-
operation by the political parties would help ease cam-
paign violence, but in the absence of a government crack-
down, terrorist incidents are likely to continue.
Even so, the election will probably come off as
scheduled, and the cycle will play itself out with the
level of violence declining after the new president as-
sumes office in July. A tangential but major implication
of the latest kidnaping is that it. distracted Laugerud
from the Belize issue. His attention is critical now if
a settlement is to be achieved this year, since he will
become a lame duck President in just seven weeks. F -
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INDIA: Gandhi Splits Opposition
The aggressive tactics former Prime Minister Gandhi
evidently intends to employ are likely to disrupt Indian
politics. Her decision to split the Congress Party di-
minishes, if not destroys, the party's potential for es-
tablishing itself as India's first major opposition party
since independence. The split in opposition ranks also
increases the difficulty the ruling Janata Party will
have in staying together over the long term.
Gandhi and about a third of her followers on the
All-India Congress Committee, the Congress Party's gen-
eral working body, called their own convention in Delhi
earlier this month that was attended by 1,500 to 2,000
supporters. They declared their independence of the
present Congress leadership--after having failed in ear-
lier attempts to take over the party's organization--and
issued a program condemning the government's domestic
and foreign policies. The rebels were promptly expelled
from the party by Congress President Brahmananda Reddy
and Parliamentary Leader Y. B. Chavan.
These actions parallel events in 1969 when Morarji
Desai and others broke away from the then governing Con-
gress Party and expelled Gandhi. At that time, however,
by exercising the powers of government and patronage
Gandhi was able to retain the loyalty of a large major-
ity of Congress Party members and to solidify her con-
trol over the party. Neither wing of Congress has that
power now.
The future outline of Indian politics is once again
fluid. We are not yet sure of the extent of Gandhi's
support in the Congress, or of where the bulk of her
strength lies in India. Both wings of the party are
sure to begin wooing potential supporters. If Gandhi
can muster sufficient popularity in three southern states
where elections are to be held in the spring, she could
emerge as a leader with at least regional strength.
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If the Reddy-Chavan Congress appears to be losing
popular support, many of its members might give in to
the temptation to join the Janata Party--especially in
the north where the governing party is strongest.
On the other hand, the old Congress Party might ap-
pear more attractive now that it is dissociated from the
stigma of Gandhi and emergency rule, and disgruntled
Janata factions in some states may be tempted to join
with it in new political coalitions.
IRAN: The Opposition, Plus Ca Change
Terrorist organizations of recent years and nonter-
rorist, nationalist opposition groups that have become
prominent in recent months are not new on the Iranian
scene. All have spiritual, if not organizational, ties
to similar groups of the 1940s and 1950s.
Since 1970, two terrorist organizations have been
prominent--the Peoples Sacrifice Guerrillas and the Peo-
ples Warriors. The first is a Marxist anarchist group
that draws its inspiration and some training, funding,
and weaponry from such sources as Libya, South Yemen,
Cuba, and the Palestine Liberation. Organization. The
latter is a religiously oriented, conservative group that
believes the present Iranian regime is anti-Islamic and
dominated by the secularism of the West. Although they
are poles apart in philosophy, the two groups have coop-
erated with one another because they have a common enemy,
the Shah and the style of government he represents. Both
groups have indulged in assassinations of Iranian offi-
cials, but only the religiously oriented group has been
implicated in attacks on Americans.
The same tendencies existed in the 1940s. The Tudeh
Party, a traditional communist party dominated by Moscow,
was involved in agitation, propaganda, mob violence, and
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espionage. It restricted its murders to party members
who were deemed unreliable. Most of the six or eight po-
litical assassinations of the period were the work of a
religious group, the Fedayan-e-Islam. An unsuccessful
attempt on the Shah's life in 1949 was made by a man who
carried credentials in both groups. The Tudeh Party also
provided training in weapons to some of the religious
group..
In the last few months a nonterrorist, nationalist
opposition group--at present trying to organize as the
National Liberation Front--has emerged. It is composed
primarily of middle class intelligentsia, teachers,
writers, lawyers, and engineers who represent an impor-
tant part of the modern sector of Iranian society. Their
aims are usually framed in glittering generalities and
reflect the politically liberal ideas that many have
acquired in the course of a European or American education.
Their most concrete demand is the abolishment of the mon-
archy or its reduction to a figurehead status, and the
dismantling of the machinery which the Shah has constructed
to carry out his White Revolution. The White Revolution
itself is seen as a fraud. The National Liberation Front
is a direct descendant of the National Front which former
Prime Minister Mossadeq organized in 1949 and which domi-
nated the government until 1953. Some of the present
activists were prominent under Mossadeq, although most
are probably too young to have been active at that time.
For them Mossadeq represents a "Golden Age"; the stagnant
economy, paralysis of parliament, rioting mobs, and back-
stabbing among Mossadeq's supporters and opponents are
all forgotten in the rosy glow of that mythological past
when, so they imagine, Iranians controlled their own
destiny. The major weakness of this group is that it has
been unable to adjust its thinking and plans to the com-
pletely new situation the Shah has created in the last
25 years.
The commitment of the United States to human rights
gave the nationalists new hope. A near article of faith
for the nationalists is that the Shah is so completely
controlled by the United States that he must do what
Washington wants. For them, a simple order to the Shah
would put the nationalists in power and solve all of Iran's
problems. Similarly, the nationalists thought in 1961
that the Kennedy administration would assist them in over-
throwing the Shah. The monarch himself suspected the same
thing.
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The attitudes represented by all these groups are
rooted in Iranian history and society and will not go
away easily. Religious terrorism is at least 500 years
old, the Westernized nationalist impulse goes back to the
early part of the 20th century and Marxism-Communism to
at least 1918. These oppositionists cannot operate within
the limits that the Shah has set for political activity.
To do.so would be to sell out to the system, but some of
the nationalists and not a few communists have sold out
and have found a place in the system.
The Shah is trying to develop in his Rastakhiz Party
an organization that will mobilize mass support for him
and his programs. If this is done, he reasons, the de-
structive opposition will be isolated and will wither
away. Meanwhile, overt acts of opposition are met with
force, not, the Shah would say, because they are committed
by the opposition, but because they are destructive.
TURKEY: Government Approved
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit won a vote of confi-
dence yesterday in the National Assembly. His first
priority appears to be resuming negotiations on the
Cyprus problem by offering new proposals. He also hopes
to meet with Greek Prime Minister,Caramanlis, both to
discuss bilateral issues and to press for more direct
Greek involvement in the Cyprus negotiations.
Ecevit's informal coalition held firm yesterday,
polling 229 votes, three more than a majority. The
opposition, led by former Prime Minister Demirel, mustered
218 ballots against the new government's program.
Ecevit has already communicated to Caramanlis his
wish to meet personally with him. He views a meeting
with Caramanlis as the best way to begin meaningful
negotiations between the two countries.
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Ecevit recently told US officials and UN Secretary
General Waldheim that the proposals he intends to make on
a new constitution for Cyprus will go further than those
of his predecessor toward meeting Greek Cypriot demands
for a strong central government, while also safeguarding
Turkish Cypriot rights. He also noted that his govern-
ment, unlike Demirel's, would offer concrete territorial
proposals, but that Greek Cypriots should not expect to
get back too much. Progress on the Cyprus issue, Ecevit
believes, would in turn pave the way toward solving the
Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean.
Ecevit plans to be his own foreign minister and has
apparently won support from his coalition for his foreign
policy. His program calls for maintaining good relations
with all countries and makes a point of the need for
cooperation with Turkey's neighbors, particularly Greece
and Cyprus. His initiatives on the Cyprus problem are
likely to strike a responsive chord at home; Turkish
politicians believe that some kind of movement on this
issue is essential if Turkey is to solve other interna-
tional problems.
The new Prime Minister may have somewhat less flex-
ibility in dealing with domestic policy. Although there
is recognition within his coalition of the need to imple-
ment austerity measures and eliminate political violence,
the methods for meeting these needs remain vague, and
Ecevit is certain to hear many different opinions from
his colleagues.
TURKEY: Political Violence
The high rate of political violence that plagued
Turkey last year shows no sign of declining since the
installation of Prime Minister Ecevit earlier this
month. Ecevit has declared that an end to domestic
strife is a critical goal of his government. The prin-
cipal causes of the violence, particularly among students,
are deep-seated, however, and defy immediate solution.
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During 1977, between 200 and 300 individuals were
killed in political incidents--twice the tally for 1976
and at least seven times the total for 1975. Over
3,000 people were injured and more than 700 bombings
were reported.
Ecevit and his coalition partners have announced
that they intend to eliminate domestic turmoil and im-
prove security. Ecevit named retired General Ozaydinli
to the Interior Ministry, which supervises the national
police. A highly respected officer and staunch supporter
of Ecevit, Ozaydinli is nevertheless regarded as energetic
and impartial in his treatment of extremists.
~Ozaydinli will use
every means a is disposal to curb anarchy. Should this
prove ineffective within two or three months, he may also
impose martial law.
Allegiance to either leftist or rightist ideologies
does not appear to be the primary motivation for much of
Turkey's violence. On the left, the Turkish People's
Liberation Army is the principal advocate of terrorism,
but effective police action has decimated its ranks, which
were not very large to begin with. Extreme rightists
are concentrated in the Idealist Hearths, a nationalist
organization under the ideological tutelage of National
Action Party leader Alpaslan Turkes. Turkes drew many
of its zealous members into commando groups called "grey
wolves" and gave them paramilitary training. In the
last year, however, Turkes has sought to improve his
political standing and has restrained his youthful war-
riors from large-scale retaliation against "leftists."
This might cost him the allegiance of some rightist
zealots, however, who may strike out on their own.
The primary cause of violence among Turkey's youth
is rooted in economic and educational problems. A
university education is essential for those aspiring
to become members of Turkey's elite. University students
are frequently confronted with miserable dormitory and
library conditions. Furthermore, underpaid professors
often must teach classes of several hundred students,
and frequently feel compelled to employ rote educational
techniques. The ability of students and their parents
to finance educational expenses is undercut by an in-
flation rate of over 30 percent. In addition, students
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often face uncertain futures, because of Turkey's high
unemployment rate.
Student activism in Turkey began nearly two decades
ago when students became involved in the events that
contributed to the 1960 ouster of Prime Minister Menderes
by the military. Subsequently, political groups became
embroiled in factional struggles in which fists and
knives began to replace words.
The situation was exacerbated by the importance of
personal honor in Turkish society and the traditional
acceptance of vengeance as a legitimate course of action.
Ideological motivations have since been largely replaced
by the need to avenge insults and injuries suffered by
friends or relatives. Because much of this violence is
spontaneous, it is difficult to control. Only if Ecevit
is able to improve the country's economic and educational
situations, will he be able to provide long-term domestic
security.
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PERU: According to the President of the Peruvian Supreme
Court, the judicial system, on the recommendation of
President Morales Bermudez, will begin imposing more
drastic sanctions on convicted narcotics traffickers.
The President reportedly views the fight against
narcotics as his number two priority problem for the
current year. The Embassy notes that the nation's
severe economic crisis presumably has top priority.
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VIETNAM: UN and Vietnamese officials have been discuss-
ing the prospects for an early antinarcotics program
in Vietnam. According to a report from Vientiane,
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Laos, where talks recently occurred, UN and Vietnam-
ese representatives have been discussing a UN draft
response to an earlier appeal for assistance from
the Vietnamese Government. They reportedly have
agreed that any program sponsored by the UN program
for drug abuse control should be managed from
Vientiane, at least for the first few years. The
UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) director in
Laos told US officials on 10 January that he had
recommended that UNFDAC provide $1,000,000 annually
for opium eradication and addict rehabilitation proj-
ects for the Montagnard tribes in Vietnam and another
million dollars for medical care for Vietnamese drug
addicts. Vietnamese officials informed another UN
representative late last year that there are an
estimated 500,000 drug addicts in southern Vietnam
and that there may be some opium poppy production in
the central highlands. The allegation that the
Montagnards may be cultivating opium poppy is highly
suspect, however. An American specialist with long
experience in this area claims that he has never en-
countered poppy cultivation in the Montagnard tribal
area of the central highlands. American representa-
tives in Vientiane speculate that the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment may be seeking crop substitution aid for
this area more to pacify rebellious tribal elements
in the south than to help solve any bona fide opium
production problem. They also question the Vietnam-
ese Health Minister's claim that no opium poppies are
being grown in northern Vietnam. They point out that
traditionally tribal groups in the north have grown
19 January 1978
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LAOS: According to a UN official in Vientiane, the Gov-
ernment of Laos signed an agreement with the Bul-
garian Government some time ago for the purchase of
four tons of raw opium from Laos at approximately
$6,000 per ton. The opium reportedly had a morphine
content of about 7 percent. The opium was to have
been shipped to Bulgaria via "a special plane" due
to arrive bringing supplies for the Bulgarian
Embassy.
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SECRET
PCP: A Terror of a Drug, TIME, 19 December 1977, " . . .
phencyclidine (PCP) is the most dangerous drug
to hit the streets since LSD . . . it has been linked
to hundreds of murders, suicides, and accidental
deaths."
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Transla-
tions on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by
JRPS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.
19 January 1978
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SECRET
Seized Cocaine Disappears from Bank Safe (BOLIVIA)--TNDD,
No. L/7548, p. 48. "Officials of the Bolivian
Central Bank and the State Bank are investigating
the mysterious disappearance of . . . 3.5 kilograms of
cocaine which was being kept in a safe in the Central
Bank." The discrepancy was discovered when govern-
ment officials came to get 30 kilograms of illicit
cocaine for incineration.
New Study on Drug Dependency and Trafficking (COLOMBIA)--
TNDD, No. L/7548, pp. 52-55. Extracts from a report
by a law student at the University of the Andes.
Interpol Discovers Two Million Dollar Drug Laboratory
(ECUADOR)--TNDD, No. L/7548, pp. 63-64. The drug
laboratory, which was camouflaged on a private
estate, reportedly had been in operation for some
time and had turned out large amounts of cocaine
and "other drugs."
Doctors and Nurses Involved in Drug Smuggling (URUGUAY)--
TNDD, No. L/7548, pp. 83-87. Two doctors and a
nurse were implicated in one illicit prescription
operation. In another "drug traffickers forged
dozens of prescriptions with signatures of pro-
fessionals who were completely innocent of the
undertakings."
19 January 1978
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Special Narcotics Squad Tracks Pakistanis in Morphine
Traffic (DENMARK)--TNDD, No. L/7548, pp. 97-98.
Last November, a 34-year-old Pakistani, who had
previously been acquitted of a narcotics trafficking
charge, was arrested in Copenhagen and accused of
being the head of a gang trafficking in morphine
pills in both Denmark and Norway.
Morphine Smugglers Arrested (DENMARK)--TNDD, No. L/7548,
pp. 99-100. "Seven young people aged from 20 to
24 years were imprisoned (last November) . . . for
trade with morphine base--an extremely scarce sub-
stance among Danish narcotics addicts, who prefer . .
heroin and Pakistani morphine pills."
19 January 1978
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Secret
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