INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
International Narcotics
Biweekly Review
4 January 1978
DOJ Review
Completed.
State Dept.
review
completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
RP INBR 78-001
4 January 1978
COPY 202
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW
4 January 1978
ECUADOR: Narcotics-Related Corruption .
1. Turkey. 5
3. Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2
INTERESTING READING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 5
This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international
narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
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ECUADOR: Narcotics-Related Corruption
Although Ecuador plays a prominent interim trans-
shipment role in the chain of cocaine trafficking coun-
tries in South America, it is not a major coca producer
such as Peru or Bolivia, nor is it a primary cocaine
"exporter" like Colombia. Nevertheless, US concern
over Ecuador's potential to fill any vacuum left by a
reduction of activity in the producer or exporter
countries has prompted US officials in Quito to continue
bilateral drug control talks with members of the mili-
tary junta's Supreme Council. Foremost in these dis-
cussions is the subject of narcotics-related corruption.
Last month, the US Ambassador in Quito told Supreme
Council member General Duran of President Carter's de-
termination to make international cooperation on combat-
ing narcotics a high level priority in relations between
Quito and Washington. General Duran, who is aware of
the extent of narcotics corruption in his country, stated
that he would "diagnose" the problem and implied that
some action would be forthcoming.
Although some US officials have expressed guarded
optimism that Duran will make an effort to do something
about corruption, he may have neither the time nor the
interest to address the problem seriously. Duran pres-
ently is enmeshed in political intrigues.
If Duran were to succeed in gaining power, he
probably would ignore the military's promise to reinstate
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a constitutional government in Ecuador. It is uncertain
whether or not Duran, as Chief of State, would take a
more active role in narcotics control. His rumored
shady business dealings and his close relationship with
the venal Commanding General of Police and other corrupt
enforcement officials suggests that Duran might take
a permissive attitude toward narcotics corruption
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(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another
.CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the
international narcotics situation. They are in-
cluded here, however, because they concern develop-
ing political and economic situations that could
impact on the international narcotics control
effort.)
25X1
TURKEY: Coalition Government
President Koruturk on Sunday named opposition leader
Bulent Ecevit to form a new coalition government. Prime
Minister Demirel, who resigned Saturday when his coalition
failed to win a vote of confidence, will remain as care-
taker until Ecevit wins acceptance for his cabinet and
program, possibly within two weeks.
Ecevit's efforts to bring down Demireland his three-
party coalition succeeded Saturday when he mustered 228
votes against the government in a no-confidence motion.
Weakened by the defection of 11 Justice Party deputies
last October, Demirel's government polled only 218 bal-
lots, eight short of a majority.
An informal coalition headed by Ecevit and his Re-
publican People's Party might be able to count upon 227
votes, one more than a majority. Aside from two small
splinter parties possessing three votes and. his own
party's 213, Ecevit has received support from 11 of par-
liament's 14 independents.
While questions. remain about Ecevit's ability to
hold his prospective allies together, his success in un-
seating Demirel will probably strengthen the commitment
to forming a stable government. Furthermore, Ecevit's
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allies might fear that a failure to put together a gov-
ernment could precipitate a political crisis in which the
military might intervene--despite the recent statement
by the chief of the General Staff that the military in-
tends to stay out of politics.
Ecevit's highly personal approach to politics makes
it difficult to predict his actions on foreign and domes-
tic issues. He believes austerity measures are essential
if Turkey's serious economic problems are to be solved
and will probably accept the International Monetary Fund's
conditions for granting a loan in order to reassure other
international lenders.
Domestic security may prove a more difficult problem
for Ecevit to solve. Turks have become accustomed to a
high level of political violence, much of which is the
work of individuals or small groups acting spontaneously
and with little allegiance either to larger organizations
or to ideologies. Ecevit, usually cast as a social dem-
ocrat, might placate leftist elements but incite right-
ists to more violence.
In order to solve Turkey's continuing problems with
Cyprus and the Aegean, Ecevit might opt for a dramatic
move, such as an immediate meeting with Greece's Prime
Minister Karamanlis. On Cyprus, Ecevit would probably
be in a better position to make concessions than his
predecessor.
Nevertheless, the Cyprus situation could well prove
less open to compromise than are Turkish claims in the
Aegean. The military might quietly press Ecevit to make
progress on Cyprus in order to improve chances for US
ratification of the $1 billion Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment, but they too are divided on how much Turke should
concede.
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COLOMBIA: Military Pressures Lopez To Control Crime Wave
Colombia's military leaders, concerned over. the in-
creasing number of kidnapings and other crimes in the
country, presented President Lopez with a declaration
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late last month calling for the government to take im-
mediate action to guarantee the rights of citizens. For
a time, the controversial and unprecedented declaration
threatened to sever completely the tenuous relations
between Lopez and the military. Tensions have now eased,
however, and the government has recently established new,
albeit probably ineffective, measures to be taken against
kidnapers and other criminal elements.
The declaration, which was signed by 33 top-ranking
generals and admirals, implied that if the government
proved unwilling or incapable of preserving peace, the
armed forces would. The forceful action by the military
was the result of several developments. Sixty people
were kidnaped during 1977; a total of seven persons
were taken in Bogota over one weekend during December.
Military leaders were chagrined over accusations in the
press about the armed forces' inability to stem the
rising tide of violence and crime in the country. In
addition, businessmen--who have been the primary targets
of the ransom-motivated kidnapings--and other concerned
civilian groups have been pressuring the armed forces
to restore order. Finally, military leaders have been
upset over the recent forced retirements of several
senior officers and distressed by public criticism of
Defense Minister Aaron Valencia and Armed Forces
Commander General Camacho for their roles in the presi-
dentially ordered dismissals.
Lopez believes the military has not done enough
on its own to deal with the rising crime problems.
Although he could have reacted impulsively and negatively
to the military's declaration, Lopez wisely chose to
conciliate by mapping out emergency measures to cope
with the problem.
In his end of the year message, the President praised
the military and simultaneously outlined the new secu-
rity program. According to the new decree, the Adminis-
trative Department of Security (DAS) will be responsible
for the "investigation and prevention" of kidnaping,
while the Judicial Police (JP) will concentrate ex-
clusively on narcotics trafficking. Furthermore, the
DAS, JP, National Police (F-2), and other state intel-
ligence services will form a unified command under the
coordination of the Attorney General.
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The consolidation will undoubtedly result in more
administrative efficiency and may, in fact, produce some
tangible results in the operational sphere--particularly
intelligence on kidnapings planned by the various in-
surgent groups. The government's plan, however, appears
to be more of a political gesture and less of a practical
solution to the problem. In actual practice it may
prove impossible to protect likely targets from extortion
or ransom by common criminal gangs. Two more kidnapings
have already occurred since the new measures went into
effect, and much of the citizenry remains skeptical that
a solution can be found quickly, if at all.
Efforts to enlist the population's support--a factor
on which much of the assumed eventual success of the
campaign apparently is based--may be the weakest link in
the security chain. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the insurgent group presently holding
a US Peace Corps member hostage, has already taken re-
prisals against several campesinos who were enlisted by
local authorities to report on the FARC's plans. The
murder of the campesinos will dissuade many from coop-
erating with security forces in the rural areas.
The situation is a little different in the urban
centers where the most recent spate of kidnapings has
occurred. Although townspeople would probably be more
inclined to cooperate with authorities, the sheer
number of prominent businessmen and other "lucrative"
targets would make it impossible for everyone to be
protected. Unless the plan develops into something
more effective and stringent, the rewards of easy
ransom money will more than likely continue to outweigh
the kidnapers' fear of capture. Should his plan fail
to produce quick results, Lopez will find himself again
at serious odds with the military.
NETHERLANDS: A Rough Time Ahead
Along with the Scandinavians, the Swiss, and the
West Germans, the Dutch have come to enjoy the highest
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standard of living in Europe. The Netherlands, in terms
of its protracted domestic tranquility, is also one of
a select few nations. Today, however, the crowded, civ-
ilized prosperous Dutch are uncomfortably aware of how
tenuous their well-being has become.
Racial Homogeneity to Social Diversity
The dissolution of empire and the steady expansion
of the Dutch economy in the 1950s and 1960s transformed
a racially homogeneous society into a multiracial one.
A land in which over 99 percent of the residents were
of northwest European origin successfully absorbed in
three decades some 500,000 foreigners, who with their
progeny are now estimated to compose about 6 percent of
the Netherlands' population. About 200,000 were Eurasians
from the former Netherlands East Indies; perhaps as many
as another 100,000 were East Indian loyalists who pre-
ferred Holland to the new Indonesian Government; and
35,000 formed the South Moluccan community. Except for
about 25,000 of the South Moluccans, all of the East
Indians were integrated into Dutch society with minimal
disruption.
Integration was facilitated by the unique structure
of Dutch society. Clearly defined institutional and
philosophical groupings, called locally zuilen (columns),
provided a congenial, supportive environment for each
social, political, economic, and religious persuasion
and made the question of race superfluous. Thus was
reaffirmed Holland's tolerance of those whose appearance
or behavior deviated from the norm.
But the Moluccan terrorist acts of the past three
years, notably the hijacking of a train and a school in
May 1977, are threatening this traditional outlook. The
bloody denouncement of the most recent action has stim-
ulated resentment against the South Moluccans, and, by
extension, to other dark-skinned residents. The Moluccans'
goal of persuading the Dutch to somehow liberate their
home islands from Indonesian control and to repatriate
them is clearly unattainable. Dutch commitments to the
Moluccans made in the late 1940s, when both were fighting
the Indonesian takeover, cannot be realized in the much
changed world of the 1970s. Until this goal is relin-
quished, however, approximately 25,000 Moluccans will
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maintain their self-imposed ghetto existence, which is
increasingly resented by the Dutch. Further terrorist
acts by a few extremists from among this group may yet
shatter the longstanding ethnic tolerance of the Dutch.
The other residents of non-Dutch origin include
dark-skinned migrants from Surinam and the Antilles and
about 100,000 south Europeans and Turks who migrated to
Holland during the Netherlands' rapid industrial expan-
sion. These migrants have become accustomed to the much
higher Dutch standard of living and are loath to go home
even though the Dutch job market is weakening. Thus far,
the native Dutch--the unions, employers, and the govern-
ment--have seemed equally reluctant to oblige them to
depart. But with the economic recovery forecast to be
sluggish at best, the competition for jobs must ulti-
mately put this tolerant attitude to a severe test. Un-
employment is now hovering at 5 to 6 percent nationally,
with some depressed sections averaging as high as 12
percent.
Labor Relations: Cooperation to Confrontation?
Until this year, the penchant for accommodation
that so characterized the Dutch extended to labor re-
lations. The Dutch may still boast the lowest percentage
of hours lost by strikes in Western Europe. If a society
almost equally divided between Protestants and Catholics,
with a large contingent of non-believers and featuring
as many as 11 political parties winning seats in the last
elections, could govern itself effectively, could not
organized labor and management similarly adjust their
differences?
Traditionally the "cooperation model" in Holland's
labor relations, as that in ModeZZ Deutschland, was a
paradigm that other countries sought to emulate. But
in both countries the "cooperation model" is giving way
to a "confrontation model," as the respective pies to be
shared have ceased to expand. The mechanism whereby
employers, unions, and government attempt to reconcile
their requirements is breaking down. Unions in Holland,
encouraged by the behavior of the large, radical Metal-
workers' Union, are withdrawing from the tripartite con-
sultations over such issues as their inability to gain
more say on questions of industrial investment or divest-
ment and the strengthening of the "works councils" so
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as to enhance the workers' role in codetermination. The
employers, understandably, are resisting on matters in-
volving their ultimate independence--their ability to
make decisions affecting their future. Also at issue
in a shaky economy are wage indexation, income leveling--
controversial even within the labor movement--a "profits
equals more jobs" formula to be imposed on employers,
the introduction of a corporate excess profits tax, and
an expansion of the state into such private preserves
as banking. The Netherlands suffered a dent in its
strike-free reputation last February, when workers in
several industries stayed away from their jobs for al-
most a month. They sought and got, with governmental
intervention, wage indexation for 1977. Unless progress
is made soon in resolving several of the contentious
issues clouding labor relations, a more serious sequence
of strikes may occur early in 1978.
Political Expression
The recent 26-week effort of the Dutch to form a
government is a reflection of the malaise afflicting
the nation. Notwithstanding the essential endorsement
by the electorate in May of a center-left government
such as had governed the nation for the previous four
years, the two principal components of that coalition,
the Socialist and major elements of the Christian Dem-
ocrats, were unable to again form a cabinet. The de-
cision of the Labor Party, now the largest political
grouping in the country, to go into opposition, while
the Christian Democrats form a minority government with
the Liberals, seems to forebode an end to the long period
of governmental stability.
Controversial noneconomic issues facing the govern-
ment concern abortion, outlays for defense, and nuclear
power. Efforts to resolve the many conflicts will in-
evitably widen the fissures separating the Labor Party
from the center and the right.
Economic Dimension
On balance, the health of the Dutch body politic
will rest on its future economic viability. As in
other advanced industrial nations, labor intensive
industries are the hardest hit by soaring wage and social
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welfare costs. Employers with declining profits are
reluctant to heed the government's pleas to expand in-
vestment. When they do invest, they are more interested
in introducing labor-saving equipment than in increasing
their work force with ever more expensive and hard-to-
discharge labor. Escalating wage costs, aggravated by
the persistent strength of the guilder, have squeezed
Dutch manufacturers to where they are ceasing to be
competitive on the world market. It has been the
Netherlands' abundant natural gas, whether exported or
used domestically, that has propped up the guilder.
Cheap energy--the vast natural gas deposits under
Holland--that provided the boost to the economic growth
of the late 1960s and early 1970s is beginning to run
out. A measure of the importance of natural gas to the
Dutch economy is the vast revenue accruing to the gov-
ernment from domestic and foreign sales of this source
of energy. The government's share of net earnings soared
from $166 million in 1970 to $3.6 billion in 1977. Much
of the cost of today's "super-welfare state" is financed
by these revenues. The gas bonanza is coming to an end
at a time when the cost of substitute petroleum is likely
to be soaring, increasing the danger of serious balance
of payments problems. The weakening of the guilder,
however, should provide some aid for nongas exports.
Hard hit because of reduced demand, high labor costs,
and the strong guilder are the large shipbuilding, steel,
and textile and clothing industries. The shipyards are
planning a 30 percent reduction in capacity, entailing
a 30 percent reduction in the industry's labor force.
Textiles and clothing will suffer more, the former having
experienced a 40 percent reduction in the labor force
since 1970, and the clothing sector a 58 percent drop
over the same period. Although in a deep depression,
steel has recently cut its labor force by a relatively
modest 10 percent. It anticipates, however, at least
another 10 percent cut in the next two years before re-
turning to profitability in 1980.
All three industries, plus the much smaller domestic
automobile industry, are experiencing increasingly stiff
challenges from outside the Common Market--notably the
Far East. The competitiveness of the West European steel
industry in relation to that of Japan has deteriorated
markedly. With Belgian and Dutch steel industry wages
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the highest in Europe, rationalization is mandatory.
In a country that is more dependent on exports than almost
any other in the industrialized world--over 40 percent
of its national income is so derived--restrictions on
international trade are not lightly undertaken. In 1977
the Netherlands` balance of trade moved from surplus to
deficit, while forecasts for a current account surplus
have been reduced markedly to $840 million.
Respected Dutch economists doubt whether the coun-
try would be able to exploit adequately a new upturn in
world trade unless there is progress in reducing wage
and social security costs and, to a lesser extent, the
strong position of the guilder that together are crippling
Dutch competitiveness. There is a tentative consensus
that recovery and growth may depend substantially on
zero growth in real wages in 1978. The unions have in
principle accepted no growth as a Spartan necessity--to
achieved by a wage increase that will match the inflation
rate plus an extra 1.5 percent from government measures.
The government contribution would compensate for antici-
pated increases in rents, gas prices, and national in-
surance premiums and would derive from tax and social
security rebates.
Dutch experience in construction and banking pre-
date the founding of the modern state. Reclamation of
arable land from the North Sea through the construction
of elaborate dikes and canals was well under way by the
16th century. The Dutch consider only mildly excessive
their claim that "God made the rest of the world, but
we made Holland." Banking skills transplanted from the
north Italian city states to Bruges during the Middle
Ages moved quickly to Antwerp and Amsterdam, which for
a while became the principal financial centers of the
north. This role was taken over by Amsterdam exclusively
following Dutch victory in the 17th century wars of in-
dependence. The Dutch soon came to be alluded to as the
"bankers of Europe." With but a few interruptions, they
have continued to fill this role to the present day.
Thriving commercial agriculture accounts for roughly
one quarter of Dutch exports. It continues to be helped
by a sophisticated division of labor, helpful EC agri-
cultural trading mechanisms, and the favorable geographic
location of the Netherlands.
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Conclusion
In sum, mounting tensions in the traditionally
stable Dutch society spring from the changing social and
economic environment. Sporadic terrorist acts and the
threat of more are awakening ethnic antipathies long
subdued, if not unknown among the Dutch. The most in-
tractable challenge, however, is the economic one. Not
only is public tranquillity in the crowded country largely
contingent on steady growth, but to a nation that must
"export or die," world economic conditions are a formida-
ble, largely uncontrollabel factor. With the anticipated
exhaustion of its large natural gas deposits, the specter
of rising petroleum prices is now nearly as real for Hol-
land as for most of its neighbors. The very well paid
and cared for Dutch will have to tighten their belts
to overcome increasingly stiff foreign competition, in
sluggish world markets. The prognosis for the Nether-
lands, as for the EC as a whole, is for a rough time
ahead, with a concomitant unsettling of social and po-
litical life.
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TURKEY: The latest estimate of Turkey's opium poppy
straw production for the 1976-77 crop year is
35,500 metric tons with a possibility that the
final total could reach 36,000 tons. Although the
harvest has been completed, Ankara has not yet re-
leased its official statistics. In any event, the
harvest has been much less than the 50,000 to 60,000
tons predicted last spring. The Embassy in Ankara
notes that the yield was much lower than anticipated
because of the higher-than-usual incidence of disease,
which resulted primarily from the unusual heat and
perhaps the lack of crop rotation in the growing
area.
Some opium poppy growers have been critical of the
government's failure to raise the authorized poppy
straw purchase price, which has not kept up with
inflationary pressures. American observers in
Ankara do not anticipate, however, that growers will
be discouraged to the point of reducing production
because they also profit from nonnarcotic by-products
such as poppy seed and oil.
Work is continuing on the poppy straw processing
plant in southern Turkey, and experimental process-
ing of the alkaloid reportedly will begin in the
summer of 1979. German technicians are expected to
arrive this month, and completion of the plant is
now projected for the end of February 1979. - 25X1
NEPAL: The Prime Minister of Nepal assured Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State Dubs, during his recent
courtesy call on the Prime Minister, that the gov-
ernment of Nepal has banned all trafficking in nar-
cotics and that his government has every intention
of enforcing the ban. The Prime Minister was de-
scribed as speaking with conviction. There were
reports last summer that Nepal planned to begin
state-controlled production of opium derivatives
and that the USSR and Yugoslavia were interested
in purchasing opiates from Nepal. In October, a
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pro-Soviet newspaper in Katmandu published an edi-
torial criticizing the ban on opium cultivation and
the production of opiates in Nepal claiming that the
ban deprived Nepal of a major source of foreign
exchange. In late October, Foreign Minister Aryal
admitted there had been some talk of going into
opium poppy cultivation but the subject apparently
had been dropped. The Prime Minister's assurances
have reaffirmed his earlier statement to US officials
that the Government of Nepal has no current intention
THAILAND: Drug addiction has rapidly become "a very
serious problem" for all Thai military services,
especially among new recruits, according to a high
level Thai military officer. He estimates the
annual increase in drug addiction to be about 5
percent. The US officer who submitted the report
noted that drug abuse is also becoming a serious
problem within the civilian sector; a recent National
Economic and Social Development Board report claimed
that there are currently about 600,000 drug addicts
to produce opium.
and users in Thailand.
confirmed.
THAILAND: According to the local press, Thai Customs
officers recently seized over a ton of raw opium
and at least 30 kilograms of morphine on an island
off the southwestern coast of Thailand. The alleged
seizure took place in a remote area and remains un-
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PERU: According to local press reports, the Peruvian
Investigative Police (PIP) have seized three illicit
cocaine-paste laboratories, one of which was located
only a few blocks from the US Embassy in Lima. The
17 suspects arrested included both Peruvians
and Argentinians; at least one was described as an
important trafficker. The Embassy report covering
the press story cites the arrests as evidence of
the increased antinarcotics activity of the Peruvian
security forces during recent months.
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Plea to Rethink Drug Treatment Program (NEW ZEALAND)--
TNDD,* No. L/7523, 19 December 1977, pp. 9-11. "A
plea for the government to overhaul its program of
treatment of the growing number of drug addicts was
made (recently) by a drug clinic case worker...who
said that not only had the government's methadone
programme failed but the police's attitude in deal-
ing with the drug problem was wrong and unhelpful."
Cooperation with New Zealand Police Cited (THAILAND)--
TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 27-28. "Thailand is doing
its best to prevent drugs leaving the country, but
so long as there is demand and users are prepared
to pay big money, people will find a way of getting
it out," according to the Chief of the Thai Police
Narcotics Suppression Center and deputy secretary
of the Narcotics Control Board. "A lot of drugs
were leaving Thailand by sea, but... the trend is now
to send more by air."
Increased Addiction Attributed to 'Dumping' Drugs
(BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 33-43. "The first
alert was sounded in mid-1976. Marijuana had dis-
appeared from the market. Some psychiatrists...
were afraid that a crisis was imminent on the here-
tofore stable drug market.... In other words, the
cocaine invasion was beginning, and the 'dumping'
prices were used for the market's reserves."
New Restrictions on Drugs Even for Medicinal Use
(BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 51-53. "...a ban
(has been) imposed throughout the country on the
manufacture, importing, exporting, reexporting, and
marketing of LSD and 12 other tranquilizing sub-
stances which cause physical or psychological de-
pendence-even for medicinal use."
*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Transla-
tions on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by
JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.
4 January 1978
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 Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01900010001-8
Drugs Prosecutor Sees 1977 as Record Year For Violations
(FINLAND)--TNDD, No. L/7523. "1977 was close to
the record year of 1975 in narcotics violations . . . .
The largest group of users are between 18 and 20
years of age. Younger users are under . . . age 10."
;rise in Crime Statistics Tied to Drug Abuse (GREECE)--
TNDD, No. L/7523, pp. 89-90.
Trafficker Arrested with a Kilo and a Half of Pure Heroin
(ITALY)--TNDD, No. 7523, p. 91. "In view of the
discovery and the dimensions of narcotics traffic,
it is believed that the two couriers might be part
of an international organization of drug traffickers."
Acupuncture Proves Promising (HONG KONG)--TNDD, No. L/7533,
27 December 1977, p. 11. " . . . . indications are
that the treatment of drug addiction by acupuncture
and electro-stimulation on an out-patient basis is
very promising and cost-effective . . . .""
Text or Brazilian-Venezuelan Agreement to Suppress Traf-
f'cking (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7533, pp. 47-49. "The
campaign against illegal drug traffic is the objective
of one of the agreements signed (recently) by the
Governments of Brazil and Venezuela." The text ex-
plains that "drugs will be understood to be the sub-
stances listed and described in the 1961 single Con-
vention on Narcotics and the 1971 Psychotropic Sub-
stances Convention . . . .'"
Rival Cocaine-Trafficking Gangs Clash on Moto Grosso
Border (BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. L/7533, pp. 50-55. "The
arrest in October of Joao Tolentino Pereira, the
biggest cocaine trafficker on the Brazil-Bolivia
border, stirred up a violent clash. . . the police
had hoped to use him to break up an international
drug network which involved more than 250 people
and operated 40 laboratories for processing cocaine."
Drug 'Mafias' Control Santa Marta (Magdalena) (COLOMBIA)--
TNDD, L/7533, pp. 60-70. According to an article
by Rene Perez in EL T.IEMPO, the Mafia has penetrated
all sectors. The measures that the government, the
police, and the DAS (Administrative Department of
Security) have taken to moralize local institutions
have been futile. There is always some agent or
high official implicated.
26
SECRIT
4 January 1978
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01900010001-8
 Secret
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01900010001-8
Approved For Release 2008/11/18: CIA-RDP79TOO912AO01900010001-8