INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 8, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

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International Narcotics
DOJ, DOS Reviews
Completed.
Secret
Secret 202
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USSR: Poppy Cultivation in the Lake Issyk-Kul
Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Narcotics Prices Remain Depressed
in Most Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
PAKISTAN: Government Faces Problem in Collecting
opium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PAKISTAN: Current Embassy Assessment. . . . . . . 7
COLOMBIA: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields . . 9
IRAN: New Narcotics Control Organization. . . . . 13
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS:
1. Cocaine Countries: Peru and Bolivia
17
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
INTERESTING READING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for
specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international nar-
cotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the
authors of the individual articles.
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USSR: Popp Cultivation in the Lake Issyk-Kul Region
The Soviet Union probably ranks third, behind India
and Turkey, in legal opium poppy cultivation, but rela-
tively little information is available on the precise
location and extent of its poppy fields or the agricul-
tural techniques employed in their development. The
Kirgiz Republic, in Soviet Central Asia, accounted for
about 35 percent of the total Soviet opium production
in 1973.
Opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in the east-
ern part of Kirgizia in the Lake Issyk-Kul region, high
in the Central Tien Shan Mountains. A growing season
of 140-150 days and the light chestnut soils character-
istic of the region are especially favorable to the opium
poppy, a traditional crop of the area. Under the direc-
tion of the Ministry of Medical Industry (Lekrasprom)
Harvesting opium near Lake lssyk-Kul.The last year that opium was extracted from poppy
capsules in the Soviet Union was 1974. Since then the poppy straw method has been used.
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and its All-Union Office for the Production, Preparation,
and Processing of Medicinal Plants, specialized farms
are tasked with the development and cultivation of su-
perior varieties of poppies.
Przheval'sk, a city of 50,000 at the eastern end of
the lake, is the center of the Issyk-Kul poppy-growing
region. Lekrasprom's All-Union Medicinal Plant Research
Institute maintains a large experimental station on the
outskirts of the town. This facility and others like
it are responsible for research in biochemistry, seed
selection, and methods of opium processing. The three
principal varieties of opium poppies grown in the Soviet
Union in 1970 were developed at this station--Przheval'-
sk-222 (early-ripening), Przheval'sk-D250 (middle-ripen-
ing), Przheval'sk-133 (late-ripening). Almost 1,000
varieties are grown and studied. In addition, research
is conducted on the application of organic and chemical
fertilizers and on improved harvesting techniques. Pri-
mary seed from the plants propagated at the station is
distributed to farms in the area. The Przheval'sk sta-
tion also conducts research on oil poppies, which are
grown in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian republics.
A description of the Przheval'sk experimental sta-
tion is included in a 1970 Soviet tourist guidebook
Most of the Kirgiz opium poppies are grown on irri-
gated farm land on the northeast and southeast shores
of the lake. These areas are characterized by small
villages strung out along the main highway at 3- to 5-
kilometer intervals, with poppy fields flanking both
sides of the road.
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GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Narcotics Prices Remain Depressed
in Most Areas
Wholesale prices for narcotics in the Golden Triangle
remained depressed through the end of April 1977. The
average price for most narcotics was running signifi-
cantly below the level of the same period in 1976. The
most drastic reductions have taken place in the northern
Shan State of Burma where the price of raw opium was
some 60 percent below the 1976 level. Similar price re-
ductions have also been reported in the Burma/Thailand
border area for all types of narcotics.
An exception to the price reductions has been noted
on sales in Bangkok and in the southern Thailand border
area with Malaysia. In Bangkok, for example, pitzu
(impure morphine base), morphine base, pai lung chu, and
No. 4 heroin were selling at prices ranging from 4 to
21 percent above the same period of 1976. Number 4
heroin was also selling at 16 percent above the 1976
level in the southern Thailand border area.
Depressed prices in the producing and trading areas
of the Golden Triangle continue to reflect a lack of
market activity which has failed to draw down the large
stocks of narcotics reported to be stored in the area.
These stocks have recently been augmented by the 1977
harvest. On the other hand the higher prices that have
been cited in Bangkok and southern Thailand probably re-
sult from increased activities of international traf-
fickers in these markets.
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PAKISTAN: Government Faces Problems in Collecting
Opium
The Pakistani government is having difficulty buying
opium in one district in the North-West Frontier Province
because of the great difference between the prices paid
by the government and illicit purchasers. In theory--but
hardly in practice--all licit opium in Pakistan is pro-
duced under license and then sold to the government for
processing and resale to registered addicts or pharma-
ceutical manufacturers.
According to the poppy growers in this district,
they are not selling because they fear violence will
break out at government purchasing centers in the un-
settled political situation. Government officials be-
lieve the reason for their refusal to sell is the low
government price--about :;20 per kilogram; the illicit
price is about $130 per kilogram.
If it wishes, the government could take action
against the growers by not renewing their licenses. In
such cases the growers usually obtain new licenses under
assumed names or the names of relatives or become unli-
censed growers. Almost half of those currently growing
poppies in this district have no licenses. A more dras-
tic step would be to ban all opium production in the dis-
trict. This tactic has been used in the past, resulting
in high level political intervention to remove the ban.
Even if the growers were willing to sell to the
government, a significant amount of opium would still
enter illicit channels. The government normally buys
about four tons of opium in this district where total
production is between 16 and 24 tons. In the province
as a whole, poppy acreage this year is about 80 percent
higher than the government ceiling.
The government expects to be able to buy opium in
other parts of the province, and the government alkaloid
factory is using previously confiscated opium obtained
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from the police. This approach will enable the govern-
ment to meet its own needs, but will do nothing about
the diversion of the opium produced in this one district.
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PAKISTAN: Current Embassy Assessment
The US embassy, in its most recent assessment of the
narcotics situation in Pakistan, asserts that opium grown
in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area could become a
very serious problem for the US within three to five years,
if the Mexican supply line is cut and international traf-
fickers have to look for alternate sources of supply.
If efforts to eradicate production in Mexico are
successful, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area and the
Golden Triangle would be the main potential sources of
supply. The embassy believes the eradication of produc-
tion is likely in neither area, but that it would be far
easier to control shipments along the limited number of
routes from the Golden Triangle than along the almost
limitless routes open to the Pakistanis and Afghans.
The embassy notes that there is little factual basis
for any estimate of Pakistani opium production but, em-
phasizing that its "guesstimate" is uncertain, puts pro-
duction at 200 to 250 tons a year. The embassy estimates,
again from limited information, that 55 to 65 percent of
this opium is consumed in Pakistan, 35 to 40 percent in
Iran, and possibly 5 percent in other countries.
Currently, most illicit opium in Pakistan is taken
into the tribal areas and then shipped to other parts of
Pakistan or through Afghanistan to Iran. Neither Afghan-
istan nor Pakistan has any effective control along the
border, and the Afghans are able to do little to impede
shipments within Afghanistan.
Within Pakistan, most opium is transported by truck
along the main supply route where the large number of
trucks engaged in legitimate commerce provides excellent
cover for narcotics shipments. Some of this opium is
then exported through Karachi to Iran and the United
Arab Emirates. Opium also moves through Baluchistan Pro-
vince to Iran, and from small ports in Baluchistan to
Iran and the Persian Gulf.
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About a third of Pakistan's opium is produced in the
tribal areas, and the embassy doubts that any Pakistani
government is likely to make the effort required to es-
tablish enough central control there to deal with pro-
duction. The embassy would be very surprised if the
government is able to enforce a ban on production in the
more settled areas within the next five years. If the
Pakistanis go forward with present programs, poppy-grow-
ing might be eliminated in irrigated areas and main val-
leys in that period. About half the crop, however, is
grown in mountainous areas where production might well
increase as it declines in more accessible places.
Senior Pakistani officials are committed to a nar-
cotics control program, and no one in the government
openly opposes such a program, but implementation is
slow. The Prime Minister--who recently managed to get
a politically important constitutional amendment ratified
in a single day--has allowed a comprehensive narcotics
control bill to languish for more than two years. Some
high officials resent narcotics control efforts, which
they view as forcing Pakistan to use its scarce resources
to help solve the problems of much wealthier countries.
The embassy reports a distinct lack of enthusiasm for
narcotics control in the government and a vast number
of officials who are completely uninterested in the prob-
lem.
Moreover, there are strong indications of high
level protection for the hashish traffic, and the em-
bassy has little doubt that there would be similar high
level attempts to protect opium production if necessary.
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COLOMBIA: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields
Reports of the "world's largest" marijuana field in
the Guajira region of northeast Colombia have focused
official and public attention on the extent and sophisti-
cation of cannabis production in the country. Originally
reported as 1,500 hectares, the marijuana fields, which
are interspersed among other agricultural crops, are now
estimated at 200-250 hectares.
Even with this lower estimate, the sector under
cultivation is still extensive. Moreover, the report
that some 300 farm workers were recruited from neighbor-
ing areas to tend the fields, coupled with the discovery
of irrigation facilities and modern agricultural imple-
ments, is an indication of the commercial and highly pro-
fessional aspect of the marijuana business in Colombia.
Colombia has long been a principal source of mari-
juana supply for the US market. Most of it is grown
in the rugged Sierra Nevada Mountains in the departments
of Magdalena and Cesar. The Guajira, perhaps more in-
famous as a center for contraband smuggling, also has a
reputation for marijuana cultivation.
There are no estimates on the amount of marijuana
grown in Colombia, but US Drug Enforcement Administration
officials believe that 50 to 80-ton shipments of the drug
are routine and that smaller 1 to 2-ton shipments may
leave the country several times a day. Most of the mari-
juana is stored clandestinely on commercial or private
vessels which depart from Riohacha, Santa Marta, Barran-
quilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean seaport cities.
In addition, innumerable secret runways facilitate air
smuggling. Virtually all of the Colombian marijuana is
destined for the US market, entering through the east
coast, Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico.
The latest discovery in the Guajira generated a
spate of news articles in Colombia calling for tighter
narcotics controls. According to the executive secretary
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VENEZUELA
M ETA
QMBIA
B R A Z I L
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of the National Council on Dangerous Drugs (NCDD), herbi-
cides which had been considered for eradication of the
marijuana field will not be used because of legal and
political constraints and because the marijuana is inter-
spersed with legitimate crops. Reportedly, some Colombian
government agencies are looking into the possibilities
of crop substitution and the development of industry in
the Guajira as approaches to future marijuana control.
In the interim, the military is apparently becoming
involved in anti-marijuana operations in the area. Sim-
ilar in design to the Mexican military's "Operation Con-
dor," the Colombian armed forces now are reportedly con-
ducting patrols to locate additional marijuana fields and
manning road blocks and patrolling the coast to prevent
the shipment of harvested plants.
Considering the state of near anarchy in the volatile
Guajira region, the military's participation will be es-
sential for even a modestly successful operation
against the marijuana growers and traffickers. Colombia's
military establishment, however, dislikes police roles
and may not be a willing participant in any government
effort directed against marijuana producers. Further-
more, given the feeling of futility in Colombia regarding
the overall narcotics trafficking problem, it is unlikely
that enforcement officials will be inclined to do much
about the innocuously regarded marijuana issue.
The narcotics situation in Colombia could become
a minor campaign issue in next year's presidential elec-
tions, but the state of the economy and unemployment will
predominate. Even if government and enforcement officials
were to respond positively to US initiatives regarding
marijuana control in Colombia, problems and misunder-
standings no doubt would develop over what Bogota doubt-
lessly sees as an inconsistency between the US domestic
policy of decriminalization for marijuana, and US efforts
to convince foreign producers that marijuana is a dangerous
drug.
Regardless of its political ramifications, marijuana
production remains a profitable endeavor for Colombians.
Faced with increasing economic hardships, more and more
campesinos are likely to sow the lucrative marijuana seed.
There have already been reports that small-scale Sierra
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Nevada coffee growers, who claim the National Federation
of Colombian Coffee Growers (FNC) is not passing on the
unprecedented profits from the current high prices, are
switching to marijuana cultivation.
According to a news interview with a Colombian
farmer, the cultivation of marijuana does not require
the costly chemical agents needed to prevent coffee
plant diseases. Furthermore, marijuana matures in six
months while coffee takes three years to reach maturity.
In the Sierra Nevada, marijuana brings 30,000 pesos
($820) per quintal or 100 kilograms. On the other hand,
125 kilograms of coffee, which constitutes a "load," is
worth only 7,300 pesos ($200) in the Sierra, and there
are innumerable difficulties involved in transporting
it to the regional centers where the FNC is located.
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IRAN: New Narcotics Control Organization*
Tehran has recently taken steps to strengthen its
drug control program, the most significant action being
the establishment in early May of a government agency
whose sole mission is to monitor Iran's enforcement pro-
cedures. The Iranians, moreover, are showing greater
interest in regional cooperative efforts to control
drugs. These positive Iranian initiatives are, in part,
in response to advice and encouragement from local US
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representatives.
While the national police have had an active anti-
narcotics program for the past 20 years, intergovern-
mental cooperation with other law enforcement agencies
has been virtually nonexistent. The establishment of
the new agency should help to strengthen coordination
among the government agencies--police, gendarmerie, and
customs--that are responsible for the enforcement of
Iran's drug control laws. The head of the new organiza-
tion, Behruz Shahandeh, is regarded by DEA field repre-
sentatives as a qualified professional.
Initially, at least, the new agency's charter calls
for a cooperative--not a control--relationship with the
other enforcement agencies. The drug agency will have
its own inspectors, however, giving agency chief
Shahandeh the capability to assess the results of sei-
zures independently of police reports.
.The police and the gendarmerie are giving narcotics
enforcement a higher priority as demonstrated by the
allocation of greater manpower resources to drug control
assignments. Both agencies have established additional
special narcotics units, and the police have expanded
their number of drug control personnel by 35 percent in
Tehran and the provinces.
*See Brief, p. 17
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Iranian authorities appear to be increasingly aware
of the merits of pooling regional assets in coming to
grips with the nation's inordinately large drug addic-
tion problem. Nearly all of the illegal opium smuggled
out of neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan is destined
for Iran where it is consumed by addicts who are not
registered and serviced by the government.
Shahandeh told the local DEA representative that
Iran is becoming concerned about the increased poppy
production in Afghanistan and has mentioned the problem
to the Afghans. He said that Tehran is considering
linking its economic aid to Afghanistan to Kabul's will-
ingness to limit poppy production. He stressed that
Tehran is willing to help Afghanistan strengthen its
narcotics control program by providing training in Iran
for drug enforcement specialists assigned to the Afghan
police and gendarmerie.
The new Iranian drug chief did not indicate how
the Afghans responded to Tehran's inquiries on their
shared narcotics problems. Even if Kabul is willing to
cooperate with Tehran's proposal for regional coopera-
tion, however, it will be hampered by its limited capa-
bility to police remote areas where some of the poppies
are grown.
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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
(Editor's Note: This item, with the exception
of the introduction, was produced for another
CIA publication and does not deal specifically
with the international narcotics situation.
It is included here because it concerns a
developing political situation that could
impact adversely on the international narcotics
control effort.)
TURKEY: Election Results
Opium poppy controls and related matters were not
in great evidence during Turkey's recently completed
parliamentary election campaign. There seems to be a
tacit consensus among politicians, technicians, and
farmers that the control program works better than the
old system and that, while it may need some tinkering,
it should not be abandoned.
National Salvation Party leader Necmettin Erbakan--
who has held the balance of power in two recent coalition
governments--tried to woo rural voters at one point in
the campaign with promises of expanding poppy cultivation
to two eastern provinces where the crop is now banned,
but he presumably meant under the current controls. If
Erbakan ends up with a role in the government again, he
may be expected to push this line.
There were no decisive winners in Sunday's parlia-
mentary election in Turkey, and the country seems to be
in for another period of relatively weak caretaker and
coalition governments. Complete unofficial returns give
opposition leader Ecevit's center-left Republican Peoples
Party a comfortable parliamentary plurality. His party
gained 28 seats and will apparently fall 13 seats short
of the 226 needed for a parliamentary majority.
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Ecevit will spare no effort to attract enough in-
dependents, defectors from other parties, and splinter-
party deputies to form a working majority. The realities
of parliamentary arithmetic, however, will probably re-
quire him to turn once again to the right-wing, Islamic-
revivalist National Salvation Party.
As they proved in their eight-month coalition in
1974, Ecevit and Salvationist leader Erbakan are unlikely
partners in both temperament and ideology. Each, how-
ever, seems capable of making the necessary adjustments
and concessions for the sake of gaining power.
Negotiations between the two will be difficult and
may be protracted as well. Ecevit--having come so close
to winning outright--will jealously protect his preroga-
tives, while Erbakan, although his party's parliamentary
strength is down, will still be in a position to sell his
votes to the highest bidder. Erbakan could switch to
Justice Party leader Demirel if Ecevit's terms appear
unsatisfactory.
Another Ecevit-Erbakan coalition would have no as-
surance of longevity. Both men would strive to make any
coalition protocol as specific as possible in order to
minimize the bickering that was a major factor in the
demise of their earlier partnership. Erbakan might be
slightly less feisty than before, but dissension and
indecision would probably prevail.
If Ecevit is unsuccessful in forming a government,
Demirel will try. Demirel's Justice Party scored dra-
matic gains over 1973; as an aggregate, the four center-
right parties of his current government now hold an
absolute majority. There would be considerable reluctance
in all parties--particularly Erbakan's--to recreate the
stresses of the former coalition, but the lure of power
would probably win out.
There may be talk in the coming days of alternatives
to government by coalition---a minority government or a
"grand coalition" of Ecevit's and Demirel's parties. The
principal party leaders will probably give serious con-
sideration to them, however, only if other options prove
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Overview: Virtually all of the cocaine that enters the
US originates in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia--
the countries that compose the coca leaf-growing and
processing region of South America. Each of these
countries shares similar characteristics which facili-
tate the growth of cocaine trafficking and impede in-
digenous narcotics control efforts. For example, long
and socially accepted traditions of smuggling, corrup-
tion among government officials and law enforcement
agencies, and extensive, unpatrolled borders provide an
ideal setting for cocaine trafficking. Lack of resources,
equipment, and trained personnel, plus unsophisticated
and frequently uncoordinated enforcement efforts, weak
judicial systems, and poor cooperation amonq govern-
ments in the region further impede efforts to combat
the problem.
Significance: Peru is a major producer of coca and the
main source of illicit cocaine. Statistics on both licit
coca and illegal cocaine production, however, are impre-
cise. The US embassy estimates that 70 percent or more
of the world's coca leaf supply comes from Peru. Annual
crop production, which is "regulated" by the National
Coca Company, is thought to be somewhere between 14 and
22 million kilograms. Of this amount, perhaps one half
to two thirds is diverted to the illicit drug market.
Campesinos, who usually know nothing of the drug trade,
readily sell their crops to traffickers whose prices
exceed what can be earned on the legal, commercial mar-
ket. Since it is primarily a growing or production area,
the majority of Peruvian traffickers serve as wholesalers
who provide either raw leaves or partially refined coca
paste to a variety of local and "international customers."
By employing an endless variety of imaginative smuggling
routes and techniques, traffickers are able to transport
the paste to its final refinement site either in Peru
or to one of several other intermediate countries where
it is converted to finished cocaine, packaged, and trans-
shipped to distributors in the US and Europe.
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Principal Areas of Coca Cultivation
AREQUIPA
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Problem: Although Peru ratified the United Nations Con-
vention on Drugs in 1964, which in Peru's case stipu-
lated a cutback in coca production within a 25-year pe-
riod, there has been a general lack of interest in the
coca issue within the military government. Indeed, in
the past ten years coca production instead of tapering
off has increased more than two-fold and continues to
expand at a rate of more than 10 percent annually. Many
officials believe that crop reduction would precipitate
increased migrations to the country's already over-
crowded capital city. As a result, they favor continued
and even increased production because it permits the
Indians to support themselves without subsidy from the
financially troubled central government. Moreover, most
government officials believe that it is futile to attempt
to reduce or eliminate the crop because use of the plant
is ingrained in the cultural and economic life of Peru's
6 million Quechua Indians. Furthermore, many government
officials maintain that cocaine trafficking is a problem
of police control and that it is essentially an issue
for the US to resolve since the drug is used almost ex-
clusively by North Americans. In the midst of this in-
decisiveness, cocaine trafficking organizations have
proliferated to a point where there are now thousands
of efficient systematic trafficking networks.
Prospects: The continuing efforts of moderate and radi-
ca military officers to solidify their political posi-
tions and to influence the revolution's future direction,
coupled with pressing demands to solve the country's
social and economic problems, more than likely will deter
the development of a clear policy on Peru's coca situa-
tion. Certain factors, however, have forced the govern-
ment to take a more serious, and perhaps sustained, look
at the narcotics issue. The discovery last year that an
urban terrorist gang was financing its operations from
the proceeds of cocaine trafficking prompted the attorney
general, with the apparent backing of President Morales
Bermudez, to call for crop substitution, public education
programs on drugs, and increased enforcement measures
against traffickers. Geographic factors, however, will
continue to make control of the illicit activity diffi-
cult.
I ~ AI=
so, based on past experience, the Peruvians may well
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Major Cocaine Producing Areas
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have called for anti-narcotics measures enthusiastically
only to allow their interest and efforts to be diverted
at some future point. There has even been speculation
that the junta welcomed the terrorist/trafficker con-
nection, and perhaps even magnified it, to justify a
prolongation of the state of siege and an intensifica-
tion of certain repressive tactics. Peru may_now be
experiencing a national sense of responsibility for
being the world's principal source of illicit cocaine,
but the military government has still not become suffi-
ciently involved to confront effectively a problem that
only it can solve. Despite the fact that US-Peruvian
relations are improving and that US influence on drug
control is increasing, the military government will con-
tinue to make policy decisions on the basis of what it
perceives to be domestic imperatives. More than likely,
narcotics control will continue to be of secondary in-
terest.
Significance: As a producer of both coca and cocaine,
Bolivia isof major importance to the US narcotics con-
trol effort. Second only to Peru in volume of produc-
tion, Bolivia is pumping increasing amounts of cocaine
into the multi-country pipeline, which extends north
through Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and south to Brazil,
Argentina, and Paraguay. Figures on the amount of co-
caine produced in Bolivia each year vary significantly.
The head of the Departrlento de Narcoticos y Substancias
Peligrosas (DNSP), the principal agency charged with
narcotics control in Bolivia, estimated in 1976 that 17
tons annually were illegally exported.
Problem: Like Peru, the production and consumption of
coca have been in integral part of the cultural life of
highland Bolivia since pre-Inca times. In recent years,
Bolivian coca production has increased but indigenous
consumption (mastication) of the coca leaf itself has
declined. Apart from the thousands of small farmers and
Indians who are culturally and financially dependent on
the plant, large-scale production and cultivation are
being undertaken by groups who cater exclusively to the
extensive and rapidly expanding illicit cocaine market.
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As new roadways are constructed in Bolivia, more areas
for coca cultivation are opened and the potential for
expansion of illicit trafficking increases. The Yungas
and Chapare regions already are leading areas of produc-
tion. The province of Santa Cruz, referred to by many
as the "cocaine capital of the world," deserves special
mention
Prospects: In deciding last year to implement an inten-
sive narcotics control program in Bolivia, Banzer demon-
strated a willingness to take a firmer stance. With
large-scale financial assistance from the US, pilot study
programs have been undertaken to determine a feasible
crop substitute for the coca plant, and indigenous en-
forcement programs are being improved. A host of serious
problems, however, will continue to impede effective nar-
cotics control in Bolivia. Historically, Bolivia has
lacked a strong central government, a factor which im-
mediately limits the effectiveness of crop substitution
Neither the number of acres 25X1
of coca cu tivation nor their location is known, and
aerial surveillance methods have not yet been developed.
Unlike Mexico and Turkey, helicopters cannot be used
effectively in Bolivia for eradication ro rams because
of the extreme altitudes involved.
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ECUADOR: The price of one kilogram of cocaine paste in
Guayaquil last month was between $1,600-$1,800,
while the price of one kilogram of cocaine sulfate
or base was approximately $7,200. Refined cocaine
hydrochloride was valued at $10,000.
paste and sulfate represent t e wholesale price
for sales to Ecuadorean chemists. Sales to Colom-
bians who carry the raw materials across the border
to their own laboratories are considered retail
business and prices are higher. Based on statis-
tics available in the Guayaquil DEA office, over
the past seven months the prices of paste and sul-
fate have increased $400 and $2,000 respectively.
The price rise, however, has not resulted from a
shortage of raw materials coming from Peru but from
an increased demand for both paste and sulfate. As
a result of the demand, Ecuadorean laboratory oper-
ators are able to sell cocaine sulfate rather than
fully refined cocaine hydrochloride and still earn
sizable profits.
WEST GERMANY: Dr. Huebner, assistant head of the South
and Southeast Asian Office in the West German
Foreign Office, agreed on June 2 to propose a
West German demarche to Kabul aimed at promoting
tighter government control over opium poppy culti-
vation in Afghanistan. (C)
THAILAND: Prime Minister Thanin Kraiwichian in a recent
press interview claimed that heroin traffickers are
now using floating laboratories in the Andaman Sea,
part of the Indian Ocean west of the Malay Peninsula,
to process opium into morphine and heroin. The
source of the Prime minister's information is not
known,
THAILAND: The Thai government has announced that a
"huge operation" will be launched this year to
encourage hill tribesmen to switch from opium
poppy cultivation to the growing of coffee beans.
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Coffee is being promoted as a viable crop substitute
for opium, and initial testing of the product in
Geneva has found the coffee to be "very good to
outstanding." UN officials believe it will be at
least three more years before Thai coffee production
will reach levels that will permit foreign export.
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Illicit Drugs Transported by Mail (AUSTRALIA)--TNDD*,
No. 302, June 1, 1977, pp.8-9.
Addicts Dying of Poisoned Heroin. (AUSTRALIA)--TNDD, No.
302, pp. 15-16.
Rangoon Radio on Narcotics Suppression from 1975 to 1977
(BURMA)--TNDD, No. 302, pp. 18-19.
Malaysia Faces Serious Threat from Drugs (MALAYSIA) --
TNDD, No. 302, pp. 30-34.
Progress on Antidrug Campaign Reported (SINGAPORE)--TNDD,
No. 302, p. 54.
Drug Flow Down; France to Send Drug Aide (THAILAND)--
TNDD, No. 302, pp. 59-60.
Thai Doctor on Treating Drug Addicts, Addiction Figures
(THAILAND)--TNDD, No. 302, P. 71. ("...statistics
compiled by several institutions indicated that the
number of narcotics in the country is about 500,000,
about 300,000 of whom are youths.")
Seizure of "Mexican Brown" Heroin (THAILAND)--TNDD, No.
302, pp. 72-73. ("...the first 'Mexican Brown' type
of heroin ever seized in Thailand.")
Cabildo Discusses Spread of Addiction (MEXICO)--TNDD,
No. 302, pp. 91-92. (Dr. Hector Cabildo is president
of the Mexican Mental Health Society. He notes that
the drug addiction problem in Mexico is "growing
alarmingly" and that the percentage of those who
take drugs occasionally and then become addicted
has increased from 12 to 25.)
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Charges Government Ignoring Plight of Addicts (GREECE)--
TNDD, No. 302. pp. 104-107.
Newsweek, "The Cocaine Scene," May 30, 1977; pp. 20-25.
A concise account of the history and extent of the
cocaine problem in the US.
Washington Post Potomac Magazine, "Cocaine of Washington,"
June 5, 1977; pp. 18-21. Describes the cocaine
atmosphere in Washington, D.C.
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