WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 21, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
pro- Release 2004/12/21 :CIA-RDP79T00912A00170001 et
Assessment
Western Europe
Review
Secret
RP WER 79-012
21 March 1979
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO0170001001p2-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : % RR'DP79T00912A001700010012-8
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
21 March 1979
CONTENTS
D
25X1
France: The French Communist Party and Labor
Unrest . . . . . . . . . .
Prime Minister Barre on two recent occasions
has tried to link the violence that has ac-
companied labor demonstrations in northern
France and Lorraine with the French Co u-
nist Party.
Direct Election to the European Parliament
The campaign for the European Parliament
elections, although only just beginning,
gives weight into the interplay of European
and domestic political issues, the role of
European party confederations, the nature
of the new Parliament, and the role of the
EC Commission.
7 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
 Approved For Relea 001700010012-8
France: The French Communist Party and Labor Unrest
Prime Minister Barre on two recent occasions has
tried to link the violence that has accompanied labor
demonstrations in northern France and Lorraine with the
French Communist Party. He has openly accused "adver-
saries of the government's European policy" (read Com-
munists and Gaullists) of exploiting the unemployment
crisis for political reasons and whipping up violence.
Barre has also issued a stern warning to "those who
appear to be using the same tactics they used a little
more than 30 years ago"--a reference to insurrectional
strikes in 1947.* The Communists have retaliated by
accusing Barre of being caught up in an "anti-Communist
delirium."
Barre's tactics of placing the onus on the Commu-
nists conforms to French political tradition. It was
used by the government in allotting the blame for stu-
dent and worker riots and demonstrations in May 1968,
although the evidence clearly indicates that the Com-
munist-led CGT trade union and the French Communist
Party were both taken aback by the student demonstra-
tions and initially opposed them. Communist leader
Georges Marchais, in fact, called the students "bogus
revolutionaries," and trade union leaders tried unsuc-
cessfully in the initial stages to keep the student and
trade union elements apart. The socialist oriented
CFDT was, in fact, much more sympathetic to the sponta-
neous strikes than the CGT.
Confronted with the choice of trying to control
the workers or being undermined by the undisciplined
*In the current French political atmosphere, however, any action
of an insurrectional nature would only result in the party's fur-
ther isolation. For a more appropriate comparison, Barre might
have cited the Renault strike of 1947, carried out by the Commu-
nists and the CGT in order to put the brakes on an action that
had been initiated by Trotskyite elements. The Communists acted
in order not be outflanked on their left.
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/21ERDP79T00912A001700010012-8
rank and file, the CGT joined in the strikes and demon-
strations in 1968, but neither it nor the workers wanted
a genuine revolution. The CGT leadership was interested
in specific measures: wage increases, reduction of hours,
guaranteed employment. The "revolution" of 1968 col-
lapsed, in fact, when the trade union element that gave
the movement its strength became convinced they could
obtain their objectives by normal bargaining. Trade
union discipline was restored with remarkable rapidity,
the Fench public left for the Whitsun weekend, and the
"revolution" was over.
The violence accompanying the current labor unrest
probably represents more of an evolution in the French
worker movement than deliberate Communist strategy.
The branches of the steel industry most affected by the
government's current restructuring are those in which
the Communists are strongest. Steel is an old labor-
intensive industry where Communist organization and the
traditions of the class struggle have produced an au-
thentic political culture that identifies with the Com-
munist Party and the CGT. Communists are also strong
in metallurgy, mines, and shipbuilding--the latter also
scheduled for eventual restructuring. Newer industries,
such as data processing and chemistry, tend to be organ-
ized by the CFDT. An exception is Lorraine where the
CFDT is a strong rival of the CGT in steel and metallurgy.
Small wonder that the two labor federations approach
negotiations in a different fashion. The CFDT does not
question the need to restructure steel--its main concern
is to assure the maximum compensation for the workers.
The CGT wants the restructuring halted because it sees
its "reservoirs"--where it traditionally recruits party
militants--threatened. The situation is the same for
the Communist Party since many of its leaders have come
out of the trade union movement.
Since the March elections, the Communist Party has
been losing support among more politicized workers who
were drawn to the party because of the union of the left
strategy and now feel the party has discredited itself.
It has been trying to make up for this loss by recruiting
younger workers--those just entering the job market and
those at the lowest end of the wage scale--a change from
the "workers aristocracy" which has been characteristic
of the French Communists. These elements are more likely
21 March 1979
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/2S~G'1Tk-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
to resort to violence, and the CGT was openly disturbed
to see many 15- to 18-year-olds among the rock throwers
in some of the more recent violent demonstrations.
25X1
Observers on the scene in Denain, a small northern
town where steelworkers clashed with police, reported,
however, that even some of the older steelworkers lost
their heads. It required a skillful speech by CGT head
Georges Seguy--who informed the workers that they had
"won"--to restore order. But the CGT has, in fact,
been playing a double game--here negotiating and calming
*This photo taken from L'Express.
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/2tE(q#pRDP79T00912A001700010012-8
down the workers, there organizing occupations of fac-
tories and egging the workers on. Part of the CGT's
double game appears to stem from divisions within the
leadership over how best to exploit the situation.
The Communist Party, already politically isolated,
has to play its cards carefully. It cannot let the
workers get too far out in front of it, but neither can
it appear to condone violence. Thus the local Communist
Party in the Ardennes disassociated itself from violent
demonstrations there and blamed the CGT. L'Humanite,
on the other hand, announced its solidarity with t e
violent demonstrators in Denain. In general, however,
the Communist Party is careful to place a distance be-
tween itself and uncontrolled elements, particularly
those using firearms. The principle of a workers' march
on Paris, about which the CGT and CFDT are still arguing,
poses a real problem for the union and the Communist
Party because it is becoming more difficult to organize
a demonstration in the capital without some violence oc-
curring. What the French call the "autonomes"--unorgan-
ized anarchistic perpetrators of violence--would probably
seize the occasion of a Paris demonstration to stir up
trouble. And the workers, confused by the government's
contradictory statements and perhaps by the Communist
Party's double game, have shown they are vulnerable.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/f* ROA-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
25X1
Direct Election to the European Parliament
Direct elections to the European Parliament--which
will be held between 7 and 10 June--were foreseen in the
Treaty of Rome over 20 years ago but they are more the
result of the desire of member states to resume pro-
gress and revive interest in European integration. Al-
though the campaign has hardly begun in several countries,
it, is possible to make some suggestions about:
-- The interplay of "European" and domestic
political issues and factors.
-- The role and functions of European-level
party confederations in the campaign and
in the organization of the new Parliament.
-- The nature of the new Parliament.
-- The EC Commission's role.
European and Domestic Factors
At this stage of the campaign, the importance of
the EP election in domestic politics varies greatly from
country to country. The sharpest contrasts are found in
West Germany, where only the most politically active are
conscious of the election at all, and in France, where
the campaign is already actively contested. Interest-
ingly, while "battle weariness" from domestic elections
has been cited as the cause of West German voter apathy,
the current cantonal elections in France do not seem to
be having the same effect.
The importance assumed by the EP election is also
related to the degree of agreement in each country about
the nature and desirability of European integration.
The best example is France, where the campaign is in part
a referendum on the nature of "confederal" Europe. In
other countries the situation is :less clear. Substantial
anti-EC sentiment in Denmark and the United Kingdom has
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/21ECff,-RDP79TOO912AO01700010012-8
not yet led to very intense contests, even though an
electoral alliance of Danish anti-EC groups will put up
a joint list of candidates. In the United Kingdom, where
anti-EC sentiment is prominent in the left wing of the
ruling Labor Party, the slate of Labor candidates has
much less anti-EC coloration than many observers expected.
Several countries have had to consider the timing
of domestic elections in relation to the EP election.
Local elections in Ireland and in three of the West Ger-
man states and national elections in Luxembourg are al-
ready scheduled to coincide with EP elections. More
significantly, national elections in Italy and the United
Kingdom may be scheduled very near the 7-10 June EP elec-
tions.
The problem of timing is largely a choice between
having a more "European" election in terms of issues and
having a more participatory election, in terms of more
active party roles and larger voter turnout, that a na-
tional election would presumably elicit. There is also
the danger that a national election held shortly before
the EP election would preempt the latter in terms of both
issues and participation.
The situation is further complicated because coin-
cidence of a national or local election with the EP elec-
tion is thought to work an advantage for one or another
party. Thus, the West German regional elections may ham-
per the Social Democrats in the EP election by mobilizing
more voters in conservative areas. Conversely, Italian
Socialists have favored coincident elections in the hope
of capitalizing on the Europe-wide Socialist campaign and
the popularity of their northern comrades. Even without
a coincidence in timing, the EP election may become a
significant test of domestic political strength, partic-
ularly in France, but ossibl in Belgium and Ireland as
well.
Given the early state of the EP campaign in most
countries and the vagueness of the "platforms" adopted
by the European party confederations, little can be said
about the relative importance of "European" and "national"
issues. Nevertheless, France, the one country where the
campaign is well under way, demonstrates two possible
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/21EE8I -RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/1 2/2$ . IRDP79T00912A001700010012-8
trends. First, despite the rhetorical battle over the
nature of "confederal" Europe, it; is clear that specific
voter interests, particularly those of steelworkers and
farmers, are being addressed. this commingling is not
necessarily inimical to European integration, at least
to the extent that it stimulates voter interest in the
EC that is not overwhelmingly negative. Further, it is
probably inevitable as long as "European" issues lack
strong, immediate impact on voters.
25X1
Second, the French Government is carrying into the
electoral arena an existing tendency to make domestic
political capital out of its initiatives at the Community
level. This again is not negative if it fosters interest,
and it may create pressure for more decisive action at
the Community level. Nevertheless, in the short run it
can lead to frustration at all levels, and on occasion
may hoist a government by its own petard, as France was
in trying to extract concessions on agricultural policy
by delaying the European Monetary System. 25X1
Party Confederations
The three loose coalitions of like-minded national
political parties playing active roles in the election--
the EC Socialist Confederation, the European People's
Party (EPP, composed of Christian Democrats), and the EC
Liberal and Democratic Federation (ELD)--are related more
or less directly to the corresponding groups in the cur-
rent European Parliament. Notably absent from these
coalitions are the British Conservative Party, which has
a different historical experience from its ideological
counterparts, and the French Gaullists, who have proved
unable to create an electoral organization with their
Danish and Irish EP colleagues. French and Italian Com-
munists, who differ strongly on the future of the EP,
have repeatedly failed in their efforts to coordinate
their campaigns.
The three confederations are each coordinating elec-
toral activities such as major rallies, exchange in speak-
ers, and using common identification symbols and some
centrally prepared literature. This does not obscure
the fundamental differences between the national member
parties, that is, the West German. Social Democrats and
the British Labor Party. These differences appeared
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/Z. C- l -RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
earlier in attempts to draft common election programs,
but the fact that the attempts were made overshadows the
vagueness of the resulting documents and the differences
revealed. In other words, these confederations aspire
to a role in policy direction customary for a European
party, and not that of an electoral organization.
The differences between.national parties in each
group, however, and the national party control of elec-
tion lists, make it unlikely that the confederations will
have a major policy role in the new Parliament. Although
the groups will presumably continue to sit together, the
individual delegates will probably look to their national
parties for whatever policy direction the limited func-
tions of the Parliament require. The French Gaullists
have gone so far as to adopt a "relay" system under which
many elected Gaullists will serve only one year in the
EP, and then resign in favor of others lower on the party
list. This will inhibit the growth of delegate interest
both in expanding the powers of their assembly and in
developing more potent European-level party organizations.
On the former issue there is the possibility that oppo-
sition may coalesce among French Communists and Gaullists,
some British Laborites and French Socialists, and pre-
sumably the Danish anti-EC forces. Speculation about
more than de facto cooperation on this issue in the new
Parliament remains only that.
The New Parliament
In the absence of supranational parties and decisive
powers of its own, the European Parliament will be very
much what its members make of it. Whether the body as-
sumes a constructive role among EC institutions will be
greatly influenced by the vision and political skills of
the members. The issue is thus one of the quality of the
delegates.
Until now the Parliament has been assured of some
minimum quality and experience in its members by reason
of their participation in national assemblies. In fact,
a number of highly able figures gravitated to the EP.
With the decision for direct election arose the question
of the "dual mandate"--whether it would be better to al-
low delegates to serve in both national and European
Parliaments, at the risk of absenteeism, or force the
young and ambitious to serve in the more powerful national
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/9$C-RfF-RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
chambers. The issue also embraces the effectiveness of
delegates as lobbyists at home for the EP, a role they
would be better equipped for, but perhaps less eager to
play, as members of national parliaments. The decision
on dual mandates was left to the national parties, most
of which will allow it, but the incidence of national
parliamentarians standing for the EP has been low.
What has developed is, in a sense, the worst of both
worlds. The election lists include a smattering of prom-
inent parliamentarians (Brandt, Strauss, Mitterand, Mar-
chais, Chirac, Tindemans, Thorn) and experienced public
figures (West German labor chiefs Vetter and Loderer, can-
didates in several countries with experience on the EC
Commission staff), and a large number of parliamentary
novices. The danger is that the ranks of the experienced
are too thin, too heavily committed elsewhere, or poli-
tically too disinclined to provide much constructive
leadership. Some of these stars seem to have been chosen
in order to invigorate interest in the campaign, but may
in fulfilling that role raise expectations of the new
Parliament beyond what it can live up to. This is par
true of the German trade unionists.
A further danger, to the extent that the campaign
takes on real intensity outside France, is that the chief
campaigners may need to separate rhetorically their na-
tional slates from association with their partners at the
European level. This could be Brandt's position, for
instance, toward the French Socialists, rather than risk
being tainted with CDU/CSU insinuations of a "union of
the left" or "popular front." There are, however, indi-
cations that, whatever the new Parliament may be, the
national parties do not intend to be dominated or out-
flanked in it by their confederation partners. To that
end, parties are seriously attempting to field able can-
didates. There is clearly an opportunity for the party
confederations to augment their role by giving new dele-
gates procedural and technical guidance.
The Commission
The EC Commission, potential ally of the new Parlia-
ment in any effort to expand the latter's role, has had
a limited but controversial role in the campaign. The
25X1
25X1
25X1
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Approved For Release 2004/12/2' E FJ,RDP79T00912A001700010012-8
leak of a portion of a Commission-sponsored "Eurobaro-
meter" survey in January resulted in a decision to sus-
pend such polling for the duration of the campaign. The
controversial section, based on surveys conducted in No-
vember 1978, showed voting intentions for the EP elections
that strongly favored the Socialists, with 38.5 percent
of the Community vote. objections were loudest from an
ELD delegate from France, where the poll showed a Social-
ist plurality of 39.7 percent. 25X1
The Commission, in cooperation with the staff of the
Parliament, has also mounted a nonpartisan informational
campaign to stimulate voter interest in the understanding
of the EP. This effort drew fire when a brochure of the
London EP office inadvertently linked the human rights
situation in France to that in the USSR, Chile, and else-
where. The information campaign continues, however, and
it should contribute both to the atmosphere of the elec-
tion and to voter participation. Whether the new dele-
gates see themselves as defending national interests or
as working to enlarge the EP's role, a more successful
election process will enhance their position.
Outlook
25X1
Voter participation remains the most significant
imponderable in the EP election. A substantial turnout
will point toward the advances in political integration
ostensibly sought by the member states in holding the EP
election. The heavy participation in the recent French
cantonal elections may be a positive sign, but Italian
and British election schedules will play a major role.
It is also safe to say, however, that significant politi-
cal integration in the near term is considered unlike1 or perhaps even unwelcome--by many EC member states 25X1
As for the functioning of the new Parliament, a
learning period can be expected before its voice will be
influential. The Parliament's attitude on the expansion
of its role may not become clear very soon. Further de-
velopment of the European party confederations may depend
on the progress of the Parliament her than
vice versa. F__ f 25X1
21 March 1979
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
 Secret Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/12/21 : CIA-RDP79T00912AO01700010012-8