WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 6, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Nato al
ro~s~;~.or Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001615-6
Center ~ ~~
Western Europe
Review
Secret
RP WER 78-019
6 December 1978
Approved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
251
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Approved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
 Approved For Release 2004/1 ~ ~ A-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW
6 December 1978
CONTENTS
0
West German - USSR: The Economic
Cooperation Agreement
The West German Bundestag will give general
approval to the West German - Soviet agree-
ment on economic, industrial, and technical
cooperation signed last May by CY~t~lor
Schmidt and President BrezYinev. u
Italy: Berlinguer's Troubles ~. .
Italian Communist Chief Berli.nguer is cur-
rently facing a broader array of political
problems than at any time si~he became
party leader six years ago. u
_The S anish Constitution: An End to
Consensus? -
margin in today's referendum.
.
5
13
The Spanish electorate is almost certain to
approve the country's constitution by a wide
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/ rC,1-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
West Germany - USSR: The Economic Cooperation
Agreement
The West German Bundestag will give general approval
to the West German - Soviet agreement on economic, in-
dustrial, and technical cooperation signed by Chancellor
Schmidt and President Brezhnev during the tatter's visit
to Bonn last May. Parliamentary discussions made clear
that all parties accept the agreement's economic objec-
tives. There is a dispute--still unresolved--over how
to endorse the accord in the Bundestag, but this is es-
sentially a conflict aver the presumed intentions of
Ost~olitik. Although only a framework for economic re-
lations, the accord has been portrayed as politically
significant because Bonn and Moscow want to accentuate
evidence of understanding at a time when progress is
stalled on bilateral problems. ~~
The agreement, while similar to previous cooperation
pacts between the two countries except for its expected
duration, has been regarded as the centerpiece of the
Brezhnev visit. His visit produced no notable under-
standing on other issues, such as the contentious one of
Berlin. ~~
The agreement represents a ;promise of stability in
relations and of economic cooperation that both West
Germany and the USSR desire. The element of hope per-
haps is more significant than the agreement itself. In
fact, the pattern of goods exchanged between the USSR
and West Germany will develop according to the decisions
of West German businessmen rather than by the terms of
the agreement. The pact is balanced and general. It
includes, for example, credits on conditions "as favor-
able as ossible" or cam ensation deals--much favored by
P ~~ .
the Soviets--if they are in the interest of both sides."
The term of 25 years is unusual: the initial validity
of the economic cooperation agreement is 10 years with
renewal for five-year periods.
6 December 1978
1
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
Recent Trade Pattern
Despite a rapid rise in the 1970s, trade with the
USSR has not been extensive and remains a small share of
West German trade. The surge of 1973-75, when West German
exports more than doubled., is not likely to be repeated.
After 1975, Soviet concern about its rapidly rising trade
deficit with the industrial West led the USSR to slow
down imports from hard currency countries and push ex-
ports. As a result, West, German - Soviet trade leveled
off. Despite recent indications of a rise in exports
from West Germany, available 1978 trade data suggests
that the goal cited in the joint communique--a do, ling
of trade between 1976 and 1980--is unrealistic. u
More detailed plans for carrying out the May eco-
nomic agreement are still being prepared far presentation
to the next Soviet - West. German Joint Commission meeting
next fall in Bonn. Problems of payment were reportedly
explored last September a.t a Joint Economic Commission
meeting. Yet Moscow continues to be unwilling to deplete
hard currency reserves or increase indebtedness to West
Germany, and the West Germans still refuse to go along
with Soviet insistence on. compensation deals. The West
German Government does not support such arrangements,
nor does it provide guarantees for such transactions.
Bundestag Endorsement
The desire of key Ostpolitik advocates to make the
most of this economic agreement has led to partisan dif-
ferences over what sort of Bundestag endorsement it
deserves. Chancellor Schmidt apparently agreed for a
time that Bundestag ratification of the agreement--an
unusual procedure firmly resisted by the opposition--
would impress Moscow with. Bonn's seriousness of purpose.
He also relished, to some degree, the idea of perhaps
forcing the opposition to vote in effect against good
relations with the USSR. The idea of ratification was
dropped however, reportedly after Foreign Minister
Genscher raised the question of what such an exception
would mean for foreign policy agreements with other
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
The government asked the Bundestag to approve the
agreement by resolution. In the debate, Schmidt declared,
"This agreement is something special and it should be."
His remarks stressed that "continuity of policy" would
be underscored by the long-term nature of the agreement.
The Chancellor also took the occasion to express his
government's interest in expanding trade with China, but
added that this could only happen if it does not disrupt
"our relations with the Soviet Union." This potential
problem is much on the minds of West German policymakers
because of Soviet concern about possible West European
Christian Democratic economics expert Karl-Heinz
Narjes, as the leading spokesman for the opposition,
mixed factual analysis of the agreement's abstract
character with suspicion of the government's Ostpolitik.
He commented that he considered it unusual to turn an
economic cooperation agreement into a political demon-
stration. Accusing the government of "see-saw politics,"
Narjes said the policy seeks to attach exaggerated polit-
ical significance to an economic agreement with the East
i:n order to impress the West.
Schmidt's rejoinder to Narjes deplored especially
the term "see-saw politics" on grounds it poses the
question of West Germany's loyalty to alliances. As
usual, the Chancellor portrayed doubters of Ostpolitik
as unregenerate cold warriors. The opposition refused
to support even the resolution of approval for the agree-
ment, claiming it was drafted so that it would make
Bundestag endorsement appear to be ratification. The
Bundestag, however, did agree to refer the pact and the
approval resolution for Bundestag committee review.
The dispute over haw--or whether--to endorse the
accord in the Bundestag is essentially a conflict over
the presumed intentions of Ostpolit k. However it is
resolved, the government has not gained the partisan
advantage it initially saw in the issue. But all parties
accept the economic objectives of the agreement because
they want increasing economic exchange with the USSR and
stability in the bilateral relationship. In this respect,
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
however, the economic cooperation agreement is no more
than a statement of principle: the resolution of ques-
tions of payment will have more influence on the actual
development of economic relations.
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
25X1
Italy Berlinguer's Troubles
0
Italian Communist chief Berlinguer is currently
facing a broader array of political problems than at
any time since he became party leader six years ago.
Berlinguer's dilemma stems from increasing internal
party pressure to show that his cooperative stance
toward the government can produce tangible benefits--
pressure that appears to be growing at precisely the
moment when Berlinguer's margins for maneuver are
shrinking. Berlinguer's stewardship of the party has
advanced its influence in ways that will be difficult
to reverse, and he still appears in control of the
party--but it is clear that his fellow Communists are
watching him more closely and debating his policies
more seriously than in the past. Should various cur-
rent maneuvers--principally by the Socialists and
Christian Democrats--succeed in toppling the Andreotti
government, Berlinguer would almost certainly be unable
to maintain Communist support for a new government un-
less the agreement moved the party a step closer to a
cabinet role or guaranteed other concrete rewards to
Communist supporters.
Flagging Momentum
Many Communists--who have been trained for years
to regard the Christian Democrats as the major enemy
have always been uneasy with Berlinguer's call for an
"historic compromise." Since announcing that strategy
in 1973, however, Berlinguer has managed to hold criti-
cism in check through his close association with a
string of impressive leftist victories: the collapse of
the last center-right government in 1973; the endorse-
ment of legalized divorce in a 1974 national referendum;
unprecedented Communist gains in the 1975 nationwide
regional, provincial, and municipal elections; and even
greater gains in the 1976 parliamentary contest. By
mid-1976, any Communist who wanted to challenge Berlin-
guer had to contend with his indisputable status as the
most successful leader--at least electorally--in the
party's history.
6 December 1978
5
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12~4R>~IA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer
6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
But it has been more than two years since Berlinguer
scored a clearcut victory. Since the 1976 election, he
has been involved mainly in complex interparty maneuver-
ing that has enhanced Communist influence significantly,
but in ways too subtle for many average party supporters
to appreciate. The Communists, for example, have pro-
vided the last two Andreotti governments with crucial
,parliamentary support and have used this leverage to
gain a formal consultative role in most government pol-
icymaking. Along the way, they have gained important
parliamentary posts previously denied the party and made
modest inroads in the patronage area. While all of this
:has improved the party's bargaining position, the bene-
fits have n et trickled down to the average Commu-
nist.
Moreover, voters who switched to the Communists in
1976 probably have a more general kind of complaint. It
can be argued that Italy would be in much worse shape
today had the Communists remained in opposition, but the
results of their cooperation with the government have not
matched expectations raised by the party's ringing elec-
toral slogan: "Change Italy with the PCI." The country's
overall economic position has improved only marginally,
terrorism has grown, and other long-neglected problems--
the backward south is the classic case--still await so-
lutions. (The south is a particularly nagging problem
for Berlinguer, because the party's electoral surge in
1976 stemmed in large part from :its strong gains there--
gains that probably reflected hope that the Communists
could spur the government to action.)
Moreover, many Communists asking themselves what
has really changed in the last two years can probably see
as much on the minus as on the p:1us side. The most tan-
gible example, comes from local elections last May, which
involved 10 percent of the voters and produced the sharp-
est Communist losses of the post war period. The party
was apparently deserted mainly by moderate voters who
had crossed over to the Communists in 1976. Berlinguer
apparently believes this result reflects an impression
among same voters that the Communists are, in effect,
acquiescing in the immobilism many Italians have come to
associate with the government.
7
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
:iECRET
Hostile Landscape
In trying to remedy this situation, Berlinguer must
deal with a political environment much less favorable
than the one he faced while preparing a year ago to top-
ple Andreotti and to push for formal membership in a new
government's parliamentary majority. Then, a variety of
factors--the disarray in i~he Socialist Party, growing
political violence, the desire of leading Christian Demo-
crats for Communist support in the coming presidential
election--had combined to ease the way for Berlinguer.
All except one of the Christian Democrats' major faction
chiefs were on record in favor of closer cooperation with
Berlinguer, and both the ;>ocialist and Republican parties
were pushing, at times seE:mingly harder than Berlinguer,
for Communist entry into i:.he goverrur~ent. The "historic
compromise" had begun to ~icquire an air of inevitability.
But the Communist election losses and Socialist
chief Craxi's aggressive f~spousal of policies designed
to distinguish his party from the Communists have done
much to erode the inevitability thesis. Today, in fact,
the most frequently heard Christian Democratic refrain
is: we have the Communists right where we want them--
saddled with responsibilii:y far government decisions but
denied direct governmental. power--and we must now wait
for Berlinguer's problems to ripen.
Berlinguer's dilemma is sharpened, moreover, by the
absence of a skilled Christian Democratic interlocutor.
When the Red Brigades murdered Aldo Moro last May, they
removed the Christian Democrat who was probably most
inclined and most able to make the current governing ar-
rangement more rewarding i:or Berlinguer. No Christian
Democratic leader comes close to filling Moro's role.
Andreotti seems more responsive to some of Berlinguer's
problems than other Christian Democratic leaders, but he
does not have the moral authority and political clout
that enabled Moro to mold Christian Democratic policy.
Divided Communists
So the essential problem the Communists face in pre-
paring for their triennia]. congress in March is how to
regain at least a measure of the momentum the party had
6 December 1978
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/15i~~$~A--RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
ome
seem to a arguing t at t e congress should move the
party further away from the Soviets and closer to a so-
cial democratic stance on domestic policies--in short,
a further but presumably marked evolution in the direc-
t;nn the Harty has been moving far nears.
Other Communist leaders apparently think such evo-
lution has gone far enough and that the party's recent
troubles counsel a hardening of the Communist line and
renewed emphasis on tradition--even if that ultimately
means a shift back to the opposition. They doubtless
assert the party should worry more about its identity
and its traditional working class base and less about
holding recent converts from the :middle class. Moreover,
it is not hard to imagine exponents of this view urging
the party seriously to threaten a return to the opposi-
tion, on the theory that it would sober Christian Demo-
crats who are flirting with the idea of a new center-
left alliance; even the Christian Democrats who are push-
ing hardest for a new partnership with the Socialists
harbor serious doubts about their reliability, particu-
larly in the face of strong Communist opposition.
Berlinguer is apparently holding the middle ground
in this debate. Although his last major speech was widely
interpreted in Italy as a hardening of the party line, it
looks mare like a balancing act when viewed in the context
of the present party debate. Berlinguer did say the party
would never break with Moscow, but he also rejected the
Soviet model of socialism and reserved the right to criti-
cize the CPSU. He said the party would never become
social democratic but should aim for a "third way" be-
tween social democracy and East European socialism. And
while he ripped into the Christian Democrats for obstruc-
ting efforts to solve Italy's problems, he also admitted
the Communists could not solve these problems without
them.
9
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
 Approved For Release 2004/12/9'b4-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
25X1
13
SECRET
The Spanish Constitution: An End to Consensus?
0
The Spanish electorate is almost certain to approve
the country's constitution by a wide margin in today's
referendum. Approval will cap a process that is unique
:in Spanish history and rare anywhere else: a peaceful
transition from authoritarianism to democracy by a proc-
ess involving a consensus across the political spectrum.
As one Spanish politician noted, this is the first Spanish
constitution that has not been rammed down the throat of
half of Spain by the other half.
Until recently it had seemed a goad bet that pro-
mulgation of the constitution would signal the end of
the consensus era, that the pressures of partisan politics
would assert themselves, and that Spain's four major
parties would feel constrained to differentiate themselves
in anticipation of the national election that must be
held by 1981. This prospect was never a certainty, how-
ever, both because each of the major actors had reason
to fear he might not do well in elections and because
unresolved major problems, particularly Spain's troubled
economy and Basque demands for greater autonomy, still
demanded a consensus approach.
In the last several months, the Basque problem has
become more acute. Terrorist depredations have increased
bath in the Basque region and in Madrid, and even rela-
tively moderate Basques have become more intransigent.
ron a wi a.s range o c a enges an ace wi e
prospect of tough legislative battles over enabling leg-
islation for the constitution, Spain's politicians may
decide to prolong their consensus approach. If tension
persists, the. two largest parties--Prime Minister Suarez'
Union of the Democratic Center and Felipe Gonzalez'
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
Socialists--may even join in a coalition government.
Even so, the government will have trouble coping with the
challenges looming beyond the referendum.
The Writing of the Constitution
The plan for the constitution grew from the -idea
that given Spain's tendency toward polarization--of
which the Civil War was on:1y one vivid manifestation--
the country needs a democratic constitution acceptable
to the broad majority of Spaniards. The bitter legacy
of Spain's seven previous constitutions, all of them im-
posed on the others by one dominant group, led to the
decision to write a constitution under which any party
could govern. The evolution of the drafting process it-
self reflected this urge toward consensus. Initially,
Prime Minister Suarez suggested that the government
should submit a draft constitution for approval by the
Cortes. But other political parties insisted on partic-
ipating from the beginning. The fact that Suarez'
party did not have a majority in the Cortes may have
influenced his decision to let the parliament write the
.document, but subsequent events made it clear that he
was consistently willing to compromise in order to im-
prove the prospects for broad acceptance.
The task began in August of last year in a subcom-
mittee made up of seven representatives* of the major
parties in the lower house. The representatives of the
four largest parties were guided by unpublished drafts
prepared by their respective parties. The drafters agreed
on the general outlines of the post-Franco structure:
in addition to being civilian and parliamentary, it should
be arranged to discourage polarization. It should also
have a fairly strong executive with safeguards against
authoritarianism.
During this period, ~:ing Juan Carlos played an
important role. His success in projecting himself as a
*Subcommittee members were: Perez Llorca, Herrero, and Cisneros
of Union of the Democratic Center; Peces Barba of the Socialists;
Sole Tura of the Communists; Fraga of the Popular Alliance; and
Roca of the Catalan Democratic Pact for Catalonia for the Basque/
Catalan group.
14
>ECRET
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14E~RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
moderating influence and symbol of unity, as well as the
popularity he developed among the people, helped confirm
the notion of consensus. Perhaps even more important was
the part he played in reconciling rightists, particularly
in the military, to the need for democratic change. Mili-
tary loyalty to the crown has been an important element in
keeping the Army out of politics; even now, when Army of-
ficers make little secret of their disdai~~r Suarez,
they are reluctant to oppose the Ring.
Portions of the draft constitution produced by the
subcommittee of the Congress last December triggered con-
siderable controversy, and over 1,000 amendments had been
dealt with by the time the full committee began its con-
sideration in early May. The committee's progress was
slow at first, in large part because Suarez was relying
on the votes of the rightist Popular Alliance, and nearly
every issue triggered a confrontation with the parties
of the left. A private dinner meeting between government
party leaders and their Socialist counterparts, however,
dramatically changed this lineup: from that point on, the
Socialists and the Democratic Union worked toward com-
promise language on controversial points such as regional
autonomy, the role of the Church, labor relations, divorce,
abortion, and education. With a few important exceptions,
the pact held firm for the remainder of the committee's
deliberations and during the subsequent sessions of the
Cortes.
The reasons behind the pact. are complex. In addition
to a shared belief that consensus was essential if democ-
racy were to take root, Suarez and Socialist leader
Gonzalez had a common interest in getting the constitution
out as soon as possible. Moreover, as leaders of Spain's
two largest parties, they also shared an interest in
making it clear that their two parties were calling the
shots--no matter how much noise the Communists, rightists,
and regionalists made. Suarez saw advantage in enhancing
his left-of-center credentials by moving away from the
Popular Alliance, and Gonzalez was looking for a way to
break in on the cozy tactical arrangement that had de-
veloped between Suarez and Communist leader Santiago
Carrillo.
6 December 1978
15
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
Given the combined strength of the Union of the
Democratic Center and the Socialists, there was no way
the other parties could oppose what Suarez and Gonzalez
agreed on and only a limited possibility of modifying it.
Most of them acquiesced in the arrangement--although
Carrillo loudly and frequently proclaimed his fear that
the arrangement portended an undesirable evolution into
a two-party state. Only the Popular Alliance and the
moderate Basque Nationalist Party withdrew from the com-
mittee in protest against the "smoke-filled room" approach.
At any rate, the pact made it possible to achieve wide-
spread acceptance of the final draft. When the leaders
could not agree on a particular matter, they compromised
by a general statement that left the details to future
enabling legislation or judicial interpretation.
The Constitutional Provisions: Distribution of Power
Like other democratic parliamentary systems, the
government is responsible to the legislature--or more
precisely in the case of Spain, to the lower house Con-
gress of Deputies. The legislature in turn is respon-
sible to the people through direct universal suffrage;
the Congress is chosen under a modified proportional
representation system, and most of the Senate by direct
election.* The Congress has the power to override a
Senate veto of a bill or amendments to it.
The legislature's ability to remove a government is
sharply circumscribed. A censure vote must be passed
by an absolute majority of the Congress and must contain
the name of the proposed candidate for the office of prime
minister. A five-day delay before voting is required,
and a censure motion that fails cannot be reintroduced
in the same legislative session. The prime minister, on
the other hand, can call for a vote of confidence which
needs only a simple majority. Thus, once a prime minis-
ter has received his initial vote of investiture (which
after the first vote requires only a simple majority),
it will be difficult to remove him.
*In addition to four directly elected senators from each province,
the assemblies of each autonomous community will designate one sen-
ator and one additional senatar for each one million inhabitants.
16
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
v
 Approved For Release 2004/12/~~~~IIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
The people may be consulted on important matters
through a referendum called by the King with the approval
of the prime minister and the authorization of the Con-
gress. The people in turn may request a law by a peti-
tion that has at least 500,000 signatures, provided it
does not concern constitutional matters, taxes, pardons,
or international affairs.
Constitutional reform is relatively easy. The gov-
ernment or either legislative chamber may propose a change
that must be approved by a three-fifths majority of each
hawse. If no approval is possible by this vote, several
alternatives are allowed, the ultimate one giving more
weight to the Congress than the Senate. In any case, the
reform roposal must be ratified by a popular referendum.
The Executive
In recognition of the significant role King Juan
Carlos has played during the transition and the popular
sentiment he has evoked, the monarchy was retained for
him and his heirs. As chief of state his main functions
will be consultative and ceremonial, with all of his
important acts being subject to countersignature. He
dominates the prime minister, but only after consultation
with the parliamentary groups; his nomination is made
"through" the president of the Congress. Juan Carlos'
influence is likely to be more important than that of his
British counterpart--and with the military it could be
critical--but it is likely to remain informal and unob-
trusive.
Executive power is centered in the prime minister
{el presidente del gobierno in Spanish terminology). He
proposes his ministers, and they are responsible to him;
he in turn is responsible to the Congress. Nominated by
the King and approved by the lower house after each gen-
eral election, the prime minister serves the full four-
year legislative term unless he loses a vote of confi-
dence or censure, or decides for tactical reasons to dis-
solve the legislature early. He and his cabinet may
initiate bills, a power also available to the Cortes.
The cabinet may also issue decree laws in times of emer-
gency, subject t~proval within 30 days by the Congress
of Deputies.
6 December 1978
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14~~-ZRDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Provisions for Autonomy
Regional loyalties persist in Spain, despite the
efforts of successive ru:Lers (including Franco) to empha-
size the country's unity.. Pressure far autonomy is most
intense in Catalonia and the Basque country; indeed, the
Basque issue is the most urgent one presently facing the
government. But other regions also want greater self-
government, and the drafters of the constitution had
little choice but to heed the demands of the "nation-
alities." They had to walk a fine line, however, since
much of the military sti:11 regards the preservation of
Spain's unity as one of :its primary missions; the mili-
tary even objected to the inclusion of the word "nation-
alities" in the constitution.
As passed by the Coates, the constitution provides
that those of the 50 provinces which so desire may form
autonomous "communities.'" These will have their own leg-
islatures, cabinets, and prime ministers. The constitu-
tion assigns certain powers to the "communities"; all
major powers, however, a:re initially reserved for the
central government. Provision is made for the Cortes
to delegate its reserved powers to any or all of the
"communities," but the Cortes can, for reasons of national
interest, substitute its own initiative for theirs.
The drafters took particular note of Basque demands
with a provision protecting and respecting the historic
rights of the Basque provinces.* Because the definition
of these rights must be carried out within the framework
of the constitution, however, and because its autonomy
provisions do not conform to Basque demands for unre-
stricted recognition of their historic rights, most
Basques remain unreconciled to the constitution.
*The three provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava are generally
considered the Basque .heartland. The neighboring province of
Navarra, which is sometimes included with the other three, is prob-
ably less than half Basque and the constitution includes special
provisions for determining the preferences of its inhabitants.
25X1
25X1
25X1
18
SECRET
p~prov^ed For a ease - -
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14~ERDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Protection of Rights
In addition to providing for the rule of law and an
independent system of courts and trial by jury, the
constitutian established an independent constitutional
court. The court will rule an unconstitutionality of
laws and serve as a court of last resort in protecting
liberties and rights granted in 'the constitution.
Balancing Other Demands
The constitution contains an exhaustive enumeration
of rights and duties, reflecting interests of the parties
and the compromises necessary to get a consensus document.
In many cases, the solution was to refer the problem to
future enabling legislation. Divorce, for example, was
handled in this way. A compromise was achieved on reli-
gion by ruling out any "state1? religion but providing
for government cooperation with the Catholic Church and
other confessions. On education, private and state
schools are allowed, and vague wording leaves open the
possibility of aid to church schools. Labor unions and
the right to strike are recognized, and provision for
social security and taxation is made. Free enterprise
is guaranteed, but so is public intervention. Leftists
were glad to get reduction of the votin~~ to 18 and
the abolition of the death penalty.
Unhap mess Remains
The overwhelming parliamentary vote for the consti-
tution on 31 October obscures a good deal of discontent
in some of the parties over the outcome. Many Socialists,
for example, feel that Gonzalez gave away too much in
his compromises on the monarchy, religion, education,
and the nature of the economy. Gonzalez has acknowledged
publicly that elements within the party are restive over
'the leadership's moderation; privately he is said to have
commented that the rank-and-file has no comprehension of
the process that produced the agreed draft. Noting that
party members would be uncomfortable with the pragmatic
measures that would be forced on any Socialist government,
Gonzalez has even wondered in public whether the party is
ready to govern.
6 Dgcember 1978
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
aECRET
On the right, the Popular Alliance abstained in the
first vote in the lower house. Party leader Fraga charged
that the grant of autonomy to the "nationalities" threat-
ened the unity of the nation and that Suarez had given
up too much to the left o:n social and economic provisions.
To some extent, Fraga was playing politics: he knew this
line would strike a sympathetic chord in the military.
But he was also reflecting the concerns of many of his
followers. In the end, although Fraga and most other
members of the Popular Alliance came around in the final
parliamentary vote to accept the constitution, two of
its most conservative factions suspended their member-
ship in the party.
A few conservative Catholic bishops have condemned
the constitution. The Cardinal Primate in a pastoral
letter issued last week branded the document godless and
permissive; eight bishops supported his stand. Earlier,
however, the Spanish Episcopal Conference, the Spanish
Church's governing body, decided against taking a stand
an the constitution., recommending that Roman Catholics
decide their vote freely and according to their con-
science.
A controversy over a seemingly innocuous passage
last July shows the sort of interparty tension that lies
not far beneath the surface consensus. In the constitu-
tion's long first section on basic rights and principles,
there is an article that, among other things, guarantees
the right to life. The text originally introduced in
the lower house stated that "an individual" was guaranteed
this right, but Fraga's Popular Alliance introduced an
amendment that guaranteed the right to "all." Fraga's
purpose was to make it harder to decriminalize abortions,
and the amendment aroused a storm of protest from the
left. In the end, the support of Suarez' party permitted
the amendment to pass, but by only 11 votes. This was the
only article in the entire draft that drew a significant
negative vote in the lower house; on other issues, oppo-
nents by and large contented themselves with abstentions.
That it was a unique occurrence attests to the strength
of the urge for consensus, but that it occurred at all
attests to the potential for future trouble.
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/~~C~~,~j4-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
The Basque Problem
vote "no . "
One issue--the demand of the Basques for special
status--escaped the consensus process entirely, and its
ramifications could yet undo the structure that has been
carefully put together in the last year and a half. On
this issue there were five principal actors: Suarez and
his party, the Socialists, the Basque Nationalist Party,
the ETA terrorists, and the Spanish military. The Basque
Nationalists, who speak for the overwhelming majority of
Basques, were torn. Like nearly all Basques, they wanted
constitutional language that in essence put their region's
"historic rights" outside the constitution, yet they
recognized that Madrid would never make such a concession
willingly, if only because the military would not allow
it. Moreover, they were repelled by the stepped-up cam-
paign already being waged by the ETA. In this situation
the Socialists tried to play a mediating role. As the
Congress approached the final stages of its considera-
tion of the constitution in July, representatives of the
Socialists, Basques, and the government met and succeeded
in working out wording on Basque :rights that the Basque
representatives accepted. Then the government withdrew
its commitment, probably as a result of military pressure.
Meanwhile, ETA actions triggered the sort of overreaction
by the Spanish security forces that the terrorists were
hoping for, giving a boost to the populace's inherent
hatred of Madrid and making further compromise on Basque
rights difficult. Still, the Basque representatives did
not close the door on compromise, for they absented them-
selves from the Congress' vote on the constitution, saying
they could not vote "yes" and did not want to abstain or
To the surprise of everyone, far reasons that are
not clear, when the constitutional committee of the
Senate considered the draft in September, it approved by
one vote an amendment that gave the Basques essentially
what they wanted in the first place. The original lan-
guage was quickly restored by the full senate, however,
and incorporated into the final document. But the genie
was out of the bottle; having been so close to success,
the Basque Nationalist representatives could no longer
settle for anything less. They abstained on the final
vote in both houses and are urging abstention in the
referendum. The initiative in the Basque country has
6 December 1978
21
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/1251,,4C~~A-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
clearly shifted to the ETA, whose apparent ability to
strike with impunity has seriously undermined the morale
of the security forces and has fueled military criticism
of Suarez. ~~
Military Discontent
Military unhappiness stems primarily from the growing
threats the generals see in three areas of traditional
army concern: the unity of Spain, the containment of
Communism, and the maintenance of public order. In ad-
dition, the unhappiness reflects the fundamental dis-
agreement of inherently conservative officers with the
democratization process and their frustration over the
radical restrictions Suarez has placed on their ability
to play the role of "ultimate arbiter" in olitical de-
cisions.
0
So far, unrest has been less evident in the armed
forces than in the Civil Guard and its sister service,
the Armed Police.* But if the government cannot gain
control of the situation in the Basque country--and
there is little prospect that it can do so anytime soon--
military pressure on Suarez is bound to increase. An
outright coup seems unlikely, since the military remains
reluctant to challenge the constitutional order as per-
sonified by the King. Nor does the Army seem any more
eager than the government to impose martial law in the
Basque region, since it is generally recognized that to
do so would play into the ETA's hands. It is far more
likely that the military will press the government to
use the security force more aggressively against the ter-
rorists; if the situation continues to deteriorate, the
military might urge the King to replace Suarez and other
ministers.
25X1
*The national police are divided into two separate forces: the
Armed Police, who are responsible for order in urban centers, and
the paramilitary Civil Guard, who patrol rural areas, small towns,
and the borders.
22
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2004/12/1~ECR~-'~RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
undesirable.
Once the referendum is over, Suarez will probably
be in no position to resist military pressure for tougher
action against the Basques, even though such a move would
greatly restrict his own political options. His party
is 11 votes short of a majority in the lower house, and
he has been counting on the Basque Nationalists--along
with the Communists and the largest Catalan party--to
make up the difference. Without the Basque votes, he
would essentially be dependent on the Communists and for
a variety of reasons such an alignment would be highly
Suarez' Options
Suarez must decide within 30 days of the referendum
whether to seek investiture, which would require only a
simple majority on the second vote, or call a general
election. So far he has kept everyone guessing, and he
will probably try to leave his options open for as long
as possible. Although most polls show the Socialists
slightly ahead of the Prime Minister's party, Suarez re-
portedly is confident that he will pick up enough support
from the large bloc of undecided voters to win at least
a plurality. A groundswell of popular acclaim for Suarez
in the wake of the anticipated overwhelming endorsement
of the constitution could encourage him to try his luck.
0
creasingly restive.
There are, however, strong arguments against Suarez
calling an election. His chances of winning a majority
seem slim, and he could well lose, rather than gain,
seats. An election campaign would disrupt the country
at a time when it is imperative that the government take
strong action on economic problems and terrorism. It
seems likely that terrorist attacks will persist while
the Basque problem festers and the military becomes in-
The odds, therefore, seem to favor a decision to
seek a vote of investiture. Suarez will have little
trouble securing enough votes to stay in office, but in
order to get through the tough legislative battles that
lie ahead, he will need a stable majority. The Basque
Nationalists, Catalans, and Communists have all reportedly
pledged him their support. Relying on either a Basque-
Catalan combination or on the Communists would give Suarez
23
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
 Approved For Release 2004/12/1~~~RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
25X1
25X1
enough votes, but probably at too steep a price: the
regional parties would demand concessions on autonomy
that would be unacceptable to the Army, and the Communist
demands for recognition of their role could cause inter-
national repercussions as well as rejection by the mili-
tary and Suarez' own centrist constituency. Suarez'
final option would be to form a working arrangement with
the Socialists, either for a continuation of consensus
politics duri~n "emergency interim" or for a formal
coalition.
The Socialists' Choices
The Socialists, too, are faced with a dilemma. The
party rank-and-file, buoyed by the opinion polls, is
spoiling for an election and party leaders loudly insist
that the government must seek a new mandate once the con-
stitution is ratified. Privately, however, Gonzalez re-
portedly has serious doubts about the wisdom of early
elections. For one thing, his ever-present concern about
the military's willingness to accept a Socialist govern-
ment has been heightened by the recent coup rumors and
obvious unhappiness in military ranks. And he is also
aware that the current public tension over unrest in the
security forces and the military could drive many voters
into Suarez' camp. Suarez, a past master at political
maneuvering, is capable of using the military threat to
his own advantage--to scare the Socialists out of press-
ing for an election or to secure Socialist support for
his policies.
to a coalition would be relatively small.
Another factor pushing the Socialists toward a
coalition solution is the urgent need to reach agreement
on a new plan to cope with Spain's pressing economic
problems. Last year's all-party agreement--the Moncloa
Pact--expires at the end of this month as several hundred
collective negotiating contracts come up far renewal.
Although the Socialists have sought to preserve an oppo-
sition role by insisting that political parties should
play no role in the current negotiations among govern-
ment, labor, and management, persisting political and
security tensions may leave Gonzalez with no option but
to endorse a new economic: program. That done, the step
24
SECRET
'25X1
pprove or a ease - -
 Approved For Release 2004/12/'~~-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
to be his, however; Suarez as usual, has the initiative.
Gonzalez has reiterated publicly and privately the
Socialists' willingness to enter into a coalition with
Suarez in the event of a "national emergency." Suarez
has pointedly ignored the offer, probably on the assump-
tion that it is open-ended and that he can pick it up
later if necessary. Suarez might prefer an extension of
the informal consensus agreement. Gonzalez, however, is
under pressure from his restive left wing to play a
stronger opposition role. He would probably prefer coa-
lition status that would at least give the Socialists a
direct part in the government. The choice is not likely
0
A Look Ahead
On balance, it seems likely that various forces
will continue to drive Centrists and Socialists together
in the near term. The need for consensus on the economy
aYid on enabling legislation for the constitution are
important considerations, but the Basque problem may be
the determining factor. ETA terrorists are highly un-
likely to allow the government any breathing space after
the referendum; they must continue and even step up their
efforts to prevent Madrid from reaching a modus vivendi
with the mainstream Basques--represented by the Basque
Nationalist Party--on autonomy statutes for the region.
Such an agreement would isolate the terrorists from the
populace and destroy their carefully cultivated myth
that the Suarez government is simply continuing Madrid's
centuries-old effort to subjugate the Basques. The ETA
must make the entire region so unstable that Madrid can-
not grant any kind of autonomy. Moreover, as the ter-
rorists grow more desperate, they are likely to try to
draw the military into the fray. To placate the mili-
tary, Suarez will have to reinforce security units in
the Basque region even more than he has already done,
and he will also have to give them more license to crack
down. Lacking enough information about the ETA to make
selective strikes, the police will probably again lash
out at any provocation and inevitably more innocent by-
standers will be killed or injured. This will set in
train a dismally familiar cycle: mass demonstrations,
police overreaction, and confrontations between the Basque
Nationalists and Madrid.
Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/12/14: CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
SECRET
In this kind of high:Ly charged political atmosphere,
Suarez will need at least a stable majority in parlia-
ment; he would doubtless prefer a consensus. If he should
form a pact or a coalition with the Socialists, it would
probably be for a strictly limited duration--perhaps until
the new economic program is on track and some light is
seen at the end of the Basque tunnel--but could easily
drag on for at least a year.
Should the government prove unable to cope with
persistent terrorism while indiscipline in the security
forces reaches serious proportions, military leaders
would likely pressure the King and the Congress to replace
Suarez with a more authoritarian leader. Such a pos-
sibility cannot be ruled out, but the new constitution
will make it difficult fo:r the Army to prevail without
an open show of force--an option it has hitherto been
most reluctant to conside:r. Thus, Suarez will have the
support of the constitution to give him time to choose
his options in a democratic manner.
25X1
25X1
 Secret Approved For Release 2004/12/14 :CIA-RDP79T00912A001600010015-6
Secret
v -