WESTERN EUROPE WEEKLY REVEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001500010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 11, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Nation 1
pMftg For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79T00912A0015000',t
Assessment
Center
Western Europe
Weekly Review
Secret
.RR W 78-002
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Copy :a
11 January 1978
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WESTERN EUROPE WEEKLY REVIEW
11 January 1978
CONTENTS
France: Communists Spurn Electoral Accord
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France: Communists Spurn Electoral Accord
The French Communist Party's decision, announced at
the party's convention last weekend, not to conclude an
electoral accord with the Socialists further reduces the
Left's chances for a victory in the legislative election
in March. Communist leader Georges Marchais left open
the possibility that his party might sign an agreement
for the second round of the two-round election to be held
on 12 and 19 March if his party showed sufficient strength
in the first round.
The Communist Party is clearly more concerned about
rebalancing the forces of the Left and consolidating and
expanding its own electorate than it is about winning the
election. An electoral accord signed now, followed by
two months of a show of unity, might have reassured voters
disenchanted by the Left's squabbling and could even have
attracted some of the large number of undecided voters,
for there is still a strong desire for change in France.
"Twenty years of center-right government is enough" is
still the Left's most persuasive slogan.
The Communists, however, are willing to risk elec-
toral defeat and a reduced parliamentary representation
in order to cut the Socialists down to a more manageable
size and possibly cause the removal of the popular Social-
ist leader, Francois Mitterrand.
The Communists are aware that their behavior since
the breakdown of the Left alliance last September has
stirred up latent anti-Communism among the Socialist elec-
torate and that more than half of the Socialist voters
now say they will not shift their votes to the better
placed Communist candidates in the second round. This
percentage can be expected to increase as the Communists
continue their polemics against their former Socialist
allies in the time that remains before the election.
11 January 1978
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The Communists have repeatedly said that they do not
want to participate in a Left government that will just
"manage" the economic crisis and that they want rapid
profound reforms. They fear being a junior partner in a
government that might be forced to continue an austerity
policy that is anathema to the party's working class
electorate.
A national poll of voting intentions in mid-December
continued to show the same phenomenon: leftist losses
are not being translated into rightist gains. The poll
showed the Left at 50 percent (Communists 21, Extreme
left 2, Socialist and Left Radicals 27), the Ecologists
at 3 percent, and the Center-Right at 47 percent (Gaullists
22, Giscardians 18, Centrists 7). Because of the vagaries
of the electoral system and uncertainty about voter dis-
cipline on the Left, these percentages, if actually trans-
lated into votes, would probably give the governing coali-
tion a victory, but that is by no means assured.
The question of what the balance of forces will be
on each side of the political spectrum is becoming almost
as important as who wins the crucial election in March.
It looks as if the Socialists will continue to dominate
the left by a significant margin, and the Gaullists will
probably do the same on the right. There may be further
shifting on the right, for President Giscard is as deter-
mined to rebalance the center-right to the disadvantage
of the Gaullists as Marchais is to redistribute strength
among the leftist parties.
The election is likely to be close. A slim victory
for the center-right, involving a reduced majority and
Gaullist dominance, would not give France the strong uni-
fied government it needs to tackle its economic troubles
and institute social and structural reforms. A slim
victory for a divided Left would probably roduce an even
more weak and impotent government.
11 January 1978
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