LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 12, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
12 April 1979
Secret
PA LAR 79-010
12 April 1979
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
12 April 1979
CONTENTS
Jamaica-USSR: Manley in Moscow
Prime Minister Manley's five-day visit to
the USSR this week will add fuel to the bit-
ter controversy in Jamaica over his growing
links with local and foreign Communists.
Brazil: Talking Tough, Talking Soft
The new Figueiredo administration's approach
to several major issues--a mixture of tough-
ness and conciliation--has left many Brazil-
ians uncertain of the President's intentions
toward political liberalization.
Cuba: 1979--Year of Austerity
Low world sugar prices, demographic pres-
sures, and an expanding military establish-
ment are having a measurable effect on the
size and shape of the budget.
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El Salvador: The Nationalist Democratic
Organization (ORDEN)
ORDEN--a progovernment, military-sanctioned
civilian force of perhaps as many as 60,000
campesinos--is one of the most intriguing
and enigmatic of El Salvador's numerous po-
litical, labor, insurgents, and government
groups.
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Jamaica-USSR: Manley in Moscow
Prime Minister Manley's five-day visit to the USSR
this week will add fuel to the bitter controversy in Ja-
maica over his growing links with local and foreign Com-
munists. Despite Manley's high hopes for his official
visit, which began on Monday, the trip will probably re-
sult at most in modest agreements for reciprocal trade
and economic cooperation. The trip may boost the Prime
Minister's stock among local radicals, but at the cost
of further strain in his relations with Jamaica's mod-
erates, especially in the crucial private sector.
LEG ITIM ISING THE UNION !
Kingston Press spoofs Manley's (the bride) trip and his ties
to local and international leftists
*From Jamaica Daily Gleaner, 27 March 1979.
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The Jamaican Government maintains that President
Brezhnev invited Manley to the Kremlin to exchange views
on international issues of mutual interest and to develop
specific proposals for bilateral economic cooperation
and trade. It is more probable, however, that local
leftists convinced Manley to request: the invitation from
the Kremlin--which has actually been slow to respond to
Manley's overtures. F__ I
The Prime Minister has publicly described the trip as
part of his longstanding goal to diversify Jamaica's eco-
nomic relations.
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assurances, however, have only inten.sitied he growing
opposition and hostility of moderate groups critical of
the government's improving relations with the USSR.
collaboration with the island's Communist Party.
Soviet-Jamaican Relations
Cuban brand" of Communism and have denounced his close
To the Prime Minister's critics, Manley's pro-Soviet
:line is evident in his speeches to leftist groups, in the
propaganda of government-owned media, and in Jamaica's
voting record in the United Nations. The increasingly
effective opposition party, the private sector, the in-
dependent press, and some church leaders have accused
Manley of consciously leading Jamaica toward the "Soviet-
The charges of Manley's critics are overdrawn. They
exaggerate the Prime minister's ability to influence
events in Jamaica, where democratic' institutions are still
strong. Local political and economic trends now point to
the Prime Minister's probable defeat in the election he
must call by 1981. The centrist opposition party led
successful antigovernment demonstrations in January, and
Manley apparently expects more popular protests in the
near future. The underlying concern of his opponents is
that Manley--with help from the Soviets, Cubans, and local
radicals--will try to rig the election or attempt an un-
constitutional seizure of power.
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recognizes that it will not be enough to buy the next elec-
tion for him.
Prospects
Manley apparently hopes that Soviet aid
can help prevent his political downfa . Although
Western aid to Jamaica has been about $25 million annually
cr
dit
d
t
i
t
h
i
i
i
e
s an
gran
s
n recen
years, t
e Pr
me M
n
ster
The bilateral talks in the Kremlin will have little
impact on the Jamaican electorate. The small amount of aid
the Soviets have offered to date--less than $50 million--
would if implemented help Manley's position only with
the Jamaican left, which is becoming his strop est do-
mestic constituency.
The Prime Minister's working-class power base seems
likely to continue to erode because of devaluations,
sharply rising food prices, chronic shortages, widening
labor unrest, and growing unemployment that now affects
more than 30 percent of the labor force. Overall, Manley
seems willing to risk a continued deterioration of his
relations with the private sector--which is now crucial
to economic recovery--for the political security he ap-
parently thinks he can get from local radicals
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Brazil: Talkie Tough, Talking Soft.
After less than a month in office, the Figueiredo
administration has approached several major issues with a
mixture of toughness and conciliation, leaving many Brazil-
ians uncertain as to the new President's true intentions
toward political liberalization.
Last week, for example, the Justice Minister announced
an "amnesty" and a return to the direct election of state
governors in 1982, when the terms of the appointed incum-
bents expire. He did not, however, promise direct elec-
tions for mayors of state capitals or for the so-called
"bionic" senators, and left undefined the nature of the
,proposed amnesty. The announcement may have been designed
to compensate for the regime's relatively tough handling of
the metalworkers' strike in Sao Paulo. To end that walkout,
which had halted auto production, the regime took over the
three unions involved, ousted their leaders, closed the
union halls, and made selective arrests. The government
seems to have rethought its actions against the unions,
however, and has allowed the labor chiefs to continue to
exercise de facto leadership and has even praised their
moderate behavior.
The regime is talking tough on other issues as well.
opposition politicians have been warned that pushing for a
congressional investigation of alleged torture during pre-
vious administrations would lead to serious, though un-
defined, consequences. A national newswriter is already
in trouble with the military courts for publishing a
series on this subject.
The administration probably sees no contradiction
between its behavior to date and the promised political
.liberalization. President Geisel, who began the process
of reform, had made progress toward this by the end of
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his term, even though, ironically, he resorted to authori-
tarian measures along the way. The early moves of the
Fi ueiredo administration seem to follow a similar pattern.
I
In some ways, however, Figueiredo's task will be
harder. Geisel's reforms left the regime without the
sweeping, dictatorial powers it could once count on,
though its authority is still great. Moreover, expecta-
tions in all sectors have risen dramatically, and the pace
of demands is accelerating. Figueiredo lacks the prestige
and ironclad control over the armed forces that Geisel
enjoyed and thus must tread more carefully than his pre-
decessor. Finally, the President must hold in reserve
a number of symbolic liberalizing moves for strategic
use later in his six-year term, when he may well need to
assuage a populace far more digruntled than it is already.
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Cuba: 1979--Year of Austerity
Continued low world sugar prices, growing demographic
pressures, and an expanding military establishment are
exerting a measurable influence on the size and shape of
the Cuban budget. The recently approved 1979 budget--
only the second to be published in .13 years--indicates
that:
Total
government expenditures will increase
only
2.7
percent
over last year, well below
the
10..5
percent
annual increase over the
past
13
years.
Outlays for "development of the economy" will
decline 3.6 percent in current terms and
even more in constant terms.
-- Expenditures on social welfare (including
public health, education, and housing)
are projected to jump 10.5 percent
-- Official. defense expenditures will rise
at least 7.3 percent and possibly more.
The admittedly tight budget and reduced outlays for
economic development can only dampen the already bleak
prospects for growth, while the increased emphasis on
social services will only moderately expand the quality
of health care and education and will not begin to
satisfy demand in the long-neglected housing sector.
Limited Budget Growth
The Cuban National Assembly has approved a 1979
budget of $12.4 billion--only 2.7 percent above last year
and well below the 10.5 percent average annual increase
of the past 13 years. The small increase suggests that
continued low world sugar prices are having an adverse
effect on economic growth despite significantly greater
Soviet aid over the past three years. The 1976-80 Cuban
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Five-Year Plan has been scaled down at least once, and
more recently Havana acknowledged that the planned 1979
growth rate will be somewhat below that of 1978.
Cuban Budget Expenditures
1966
1978
1979
Economic development
36.1
44.0
41.3
Social welfare
34.7
32.9
35.3
Social services, public health, and
education
(29.9)
(29.3)
(31.1)
Housing and community services
(4.8)
(3.6)
(4.2)
National defense and public order
7.8
8.6
8.9
Public administration
5.0
5.9
5.5
Other activities
0.0
4.3
4.8
Reserves
10.1
4.3
4.2
Debt service
6.3
0.0
0.0
TOTAL
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total budget revenues are also projected at $12.4
billion, resulting in a balanced budget. About four-
fifths of the revenues have their origins in the central
government, with the remainder coming from the operations
of the 14 provincial governments and the Isle of Youth.
Although details are not available, the sources of the
revenues will probably resemble last year's, with major
emphasis on profits of state enterprises--the difference
between an enterprise's gross earnings and expenditures.
State profits are being increasingly emphasized by the
cost-conscious Castro government and are consistent with
the "rationalization" measures undertaken by Havana over
the past several years. Other major sources of revenue
include a variety of excise taxes and unspecified nontax
income.
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Cuba: Budget Expenditures
Reserves
Other Activities
Social Services,
Public Health,
Education, and
Housing
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Shifting Priorities
Faced with limited means and monumental needs,
Havana is being forced to set priorities in its expendi-
tures, reducing outlays for economic development, public
administration, and reserves in order to expand those for
social services and defense.
Economic development expenditures, although still
the most important category in the centrally planned
Cuban economy, will decline both absolutely and rela-
tively. The 3.6 percent reduction in current dollars
and even more in constant dollars undoubtedly reflects
the forced lowering of capital goods imports from the
West and Havana's inability to offset these reductions
with increased imports from the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Expenditures on public administration and reserves
have also been cut as part of Havana's economic rational-
ization efforts. The reduction in administrative outlays
amounts to 4.3 percent and undoubtedly reflects efforts
to streamline the government bureaucracy and reallocate
these resources to more productive sectors. Allocations
for reserves, which grew rapidly in the 1960s, will fall
about 2.2 percent, probably in response to the adoption
of more orthodox and comprehensive planning procedures.
On the other hand, Havana will increase expenditures
on social welfare by 10.5 percent in keeping with the
Cuban Revolution's commitment to public health and educa-
tion and concomitant pressures from a significantly in-
creased school-aged population stemming from a 1960s
"baby boom."
Social services, public health, and education ex-
penditures will rise 9.1 percent. The disproportionately
large increase reflects:
-- A 5.4 percent rise in school enrollment in
the 1978-79 school year.
-- The emphasis on higher education, which keeps
students in the school system for a longer
period of time.
-- Plans to triple the number of medical
students by 1985.
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The emphasis on higher education is aimed primarily at
improving the labor force, but the bleak prospects for
the economy suggest that Havana may have difficulty
assimilating all of the new entrants. A growing propor-
tion of these may be sent overseas as part of Cuba's
growing technical aid program in 'the Third World.
The largest increase is slated for housing and com-
munity services--a sector that has been largely ignored
by the Castro government until recent years. The 23-per-
cent increase is grossly inadequate to meet Cuba's hous-
ing needs, which are far in excess of supply and will
continue to grow over the next decade as the relatively
young Cuban population--35 percent of the population is
under 15 years of age--reaches maturity. Cuba needs to
construct 100,000 homes annually over the next decade to
satisfy demand, but only 16,700 units were completed in
1978 and only 20,000 are planned for 1979.
Reflecting Cuba's large military presence in Africa
and the current. modernization of the armed forces, expend-
itures for defense--the third largest category--will jump
significantly. Outlays officially will ripe 7.3 percent
and perhaps as much as 9.2 percent if the amorphous cate-
gory of "other activities" contains defense items, as may
be the case. Even though the USSR underwrites all of the
Cuban Armed Forces' materiel needs, the commitment of some
35,000 Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia and the ex-
panding mechanization and mobilization of the Cuban mili-
tary apparatus have forced Havana to expand its regular
military by about one-third and to incur increased sup-
port costs.
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El Salvador: The Nationalist Democratic Organization
(ORDEN)
The current political, social, and economic turmoil
in El Salvador is in part a manifestation of the con-
flicting goals and interests pursued by the country's
numerous political, labor, insurgent, and government
/ groups. One of the most intriguing and enigmatic of
these is the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN),
a progovernment., military-sanctioned civilian force con-
sisting of perhaps as many as 60,000 campesinos.
Initially, ORDEN's primary purpose was to afford
the government a disciplined organization in the rural
areas that could teach campesinos the fundamentals of
democracy, indoctrinate them against the "dangers of
Communism," and provide limited social services and as-
sistance programs to the poor. Some members of the po-
litical opposition, however, claim that ORDEN increas-
ingly has become an instrument of control for the mili-
tary-dominated National Conciliation Party (PCN).
ORDEN patrols have been present at many polling
places in recent elections and seemingly have played a
part in the fraudulent practices employed by the PCN to
retain power. In addition, ORDEN members allegedly have
/ engaged in repressive, paramilitary tactics to harass the
Catholic Church and various other "antigovernment" groups.
There has also been periodic speculation that the military
could be grooming the organization as a political party to
re lace the increasingly controversial and unpopular PCN.
Historical Perspective
The history of ORDEN is reflected largely in the ca-
reer of its founder, Col. Jose Alberto Medrano, who was
director of the Salvadoran Intelligence Agency in the
mid-1960s. On orders from then President Rivera, Medrano
utilized his network of intelligence agents to set up a
national organization as a propaganda counterweight to
Communist groups operating throughout the country.
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Rivera soon realized, however, the key role that the
rapidly developing ORDEN could play in the electoral
process. Although ORDEN was structured like a paramili-
tary unit and initially recruited many of its members
from the ranks of former national guardsmen, it performed
more like a political organization at the outset and re-
portedly carried the burden of campaigning for the PCN
in the 1966 legislative/municipal and 1967 presidential
elections.
ingly powerful PCN.
By the time Gen. Sanchez Hernandez assumed the presi-
dency in 1967, ORDEN's membership had grown to around
10,000. Most of those who joined did so out of patriot-
ism, a desire to take advantage of the educational and
civil opportunities ORDEN seemed to offer, or because
they wished to ingratiate themselves with the increas-
try's 2,261 cantons.
Medrano's national prominence in the late 1960s and
his political contacts through ORDEN imbued him with
presidential aspirations. His premature efforts to se-
cure the PCN candidacy for the 1972 election enraged
President Sanchez, however, and caused Medrano's fall
from political grace. President Sanchez decided that
ORDEN's strength and political potential warranted
placing the organization under the direct command of the
casa presidencial. By the time he left office, Sanchez
had ousted Medrano, completed the institutionalization of
ORDEN, and established a chain of command that subse-
quently was inherited by Presidents Molina (1972-77) and
Romero (1977-82).
ORDEN's Structure and Membership
ORDEN's leaders are appointed by the President and
high-level military officials. These appointments extend
all the way down to unit commanders in each of the coun?-
Although President Romero is the titular head of ORDEN,
the organization is the responsibility of the chief control
officer, Col. Luis Benedicto Rodriguez, who also serves
as chief of the presidential staff. Actual administration
is probably in the hands of retired Col. Antonio Ramirez
Pena, the executive control officer.
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(usually sergeants) who command local ORDEN units.
the comandantes locales--army noncommissioned officers
A two-man team of comandantes departamentales, or
liaison officers, is assigned to each of the 14 depart-
ments. They are in direct radio communication with the
casa presidencial and convey requirements and orders to 25X1
Formal recruitment into ORDEN comes after regular
military service or through government employment in ser-
vice industries--such as road construction, maintenance,
and garbage collection. Informal recruitment, which ac-
2- counts for the majority of ORDEN's cadre, consists of
campesinos who indicate an interest in serving on one
of the patrullas cantonales, or canton patrols.
Three basic categories of campesinos join ORDEN:
-- Pequenos proprietarios--owners of small plots
of land, accounting for no more than 15 percent
of ORDEN's membership.
-- Colonos--permanent employees of larger haciendas
or comprising about 40 percent of
ORDEN's membership.
-- Campesinos itnerantes--intinerant workers who
constitute the rest of ORDEN's membership.
I I
The campesinos join for a variety of reasons. Per-
haps the most significant is that an ORDEN member may
carry arms--pistols and machetes--which are important
symbols of machismo. According to the political opposi-
tion, ORDEN members also have a tacit immunity from ar-
rest for certain petty crimes. In addition, ORDEN per-
sonnel apparently do not have to pay taxes, and they re-
ceive other special benefits and status unavailable
to nonmembers.
Within each of the 261 municipios there are two
roughly parallel structures--a civil action, exclusively
ORDEN group supervised by the mayor, and a military unit
of the ServiciosTerritoriales (the Salvadoran military
reserve structure) under the control of an active-duty
noncommissioned officer. Confusion about these two
groups arises from the fact that the same men frequently
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belong to both units and even perform some of the same
functions--conducting classes in civics, holding pro-
government meetings, and carrying out limited security
duties. Both groups have approximately 15 to 20 members,
but the military-led wing is considered to be the more
prestigious. There is one ORDEN patrol of some 10 to 20
recruits in each of the 2,261 cantons. This means a
range, therefore, of some 30,000 to 60,000 ORDEN members
scattered throughout the country.
The Role ORDEN Plays
At the national level, ORDEN publishes a magazine
filled with pictures of members and government officials
meeting to discuss civismo, democracia, and nacionalismo--
the ideological cornerstones of the organization. There
/ are also photographs of sporting events, youth associa-
tions, and festive gatherings that ORDEN sponsors and
supports on what apparently is a small annual budget.
In addition, press coverage is frequently afforded to
ORDEN activities such as the donation of an old sewing
machine to a rural home economics course. F_ I 25X1
At the local level, ORDEN patrols are called on to
quell minor disturbances, particularly if a regular na-
tional police or army unit is unavailable. ORDEN mem-
bers reportedly have also been used on occasion to aug-
ORDEN's real significance is not in this rather
narrow, overt role, but in the more questionable, under-
lying role it reputedly plays. Some in El Salvador--
particularly among the legal opposition and certain left-
ist groups--claim that ORDEN participates in electoral
fraud on behalf of the PCN and that the organization is
in reality a paramilitary, antirevolutionary strike force
trained by the National Guard. It has also been alleged
that elements of ORDEN, either in conjunction with legally
constituted security forces or acting on their own initia-
tive, have taken violent, repressive actions against church,
campesino, and labor groups in the countryside.
Several privately funded groups concerned with charges
of human rights violations have looked into these accusa-
tions. Their reports--although partly based on question-
able evidence and the testimony of secondhand witnesses--
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point to ORDEN as the primary factor in many of the re-
pressive acts committed in the country over the last
several years: unexplained disappearances, assassina-
tions of Catholic priests, the murder of political op-
position members, and the beating and intimidation of
voters seeking to cast a ballot for opposition parties.
There have also been instances in which violence that
reportedly occurred between members of ORDEN and antigov-
ernment factions was not related to political or organiza-
tional causes, but resulted solely from personal differ-
ences arising over women or money. Moreover, ORDEN may
have received the blame for certain heavyhanded, repres-
sive activities when some of its members--who also happen
to occupy simultaneous posts in the Servicios Territor-
iales--were acting under orders as military reservists.
Assessment
The military government's ability to manipulate and
misuse ORDEN may be circumscribed by certain factors.
First, ORDEN is both a highly visible and highly regarded
institution. Despite its limited capabilities, it appar-
ently has benefited a number of people and has earned the
goodwill of a large segment of society. The government
will, therefore, be somewhat cautious about how and where
it employs the organization. Second, ORDEN members prob-
ably will do the government's bidding only up to a point.
ORDEN recruits are also members of the community in which
they serve and are mindful of the need not to alienate
their fellow citizens.
It is likely that President Romero and his succes-
sor will continue using ORDEN primarily as a political or-
ganization--an informal, rural affiliate of the PCN and a
vehicle for dispensing propaganda to, and maintaining an
element of political control over, the rural masses. In
this context, ORDEN can be expected to have a role in
future, fraudulent elections.
The outlook for ORDEN as a security force is somewhat
less certain. Obviously, the military government perceives
a threat from a variety of groups and has undoubtedly tried
surreptitiously on occasion to suppress such groups.
ORDEN forces have probably been used for this purpose
in the past and may be utilized again.
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If a nationwide resistance movement develops against
the government, it seems improbable that ORDEN's full
organizational force would align itself with the military.
Given a scenario of less than widespread revolution but
one of increasing rural restiveness, it is more likely--
and perhaps potentially more dangerous--that certain
ORDEN patrols will initiate their own repressive acts.
It is also possible that the military government could
single out certain fervent ORDEN members and form them
into special civilian platoons willing to carry out highly
repressive acts on behalf of, yet unattributable to, the
government.
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CUBAN CHRONOLOGY (U)
Cuba and Ethiopia sign labor coopera-
tion agreement. Cuban labor experts
will study ways to restructure Ethi-
opian wage and labor practices along
"socialist guidelines."
Lionel Soto, PCC Central Committee
member, heads party delegation to
Ireland.
Fidel Castro addresses first contin-
gent of Che Guevara teachers' detach-
ment to return from Angolan service.
Castro says second group will serve
two-year tours.
1-5 March Army Gen. Raul Castro, leading mili-
tary delegation, visits Sofia, Bul-
garia. Meets with Chairman Zhivkov
on 2 March. Official visit ends on
5 March, but Castro and wife remain
in Bulgaria on vacation until 19 March.
3 March Benin Politburo member Adho Boko
Ignase meets with Blas Roca, chairman
of People's National Assembly, to
learn how the Assembly operates.
Raul Roa, Cuban UN Ambassador, tells
Security Council that the interna-
tional community should give moral,
political, financial, and material
support to the Zimbabwe patriots.
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5-9 March I. V. Arkhipov, deputy chairman of
USSR Council of Ministers, visits
Cuba. Met by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
Meets with Fidel Castro on 9 March.
Arkhipov is in Cuba to attend ninth
session of USSR-Cuba Intergovernmen-
tal Commission.
Ethiopian President Mengistu visits
Cuban construction site in Ethiopia
accompanied by PCC Central Committee
member Raul Curbelo.
Cuban UN mission makes public a letter
sent by them to the Security Council
denouncing Israeli mistreatment of
Palestinians.
6-8 March Ninth meeting of USSR-Cuba Intergov-
ernmental Commission held in Havana.
Meeting covers economic, scientific,
and technical cooperation. Protocol
signed 8 March.
Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Rene
Anillo meets with East German For-
eign Minister Oskar Fischer in East
Berlin.
Council of State appoints Humberto
Perez a vice president of the Council
of Ministers. He will continue as
president of the central planning
board.
The Cubans working in Vietnam attend
solidarity activity at Ho Chi Minh
Internationalist Group headquarters.
They will remain in Vietnam and help
defend it.
Vice President Flavio Bravo attends
inauguration of new Venezuelan Presi-
dent Luis Herrera..
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12-13 March First congress of the Federation of
University Students (FEU) is held in
Havana. Representatives of 50 inter-
national youth organizations, 480
delegates, and 3,000 guests attend.
14 March Fidel Castro addresses the closing
session of FEU congress.
Central Committee member Jaime Crombet
is named Cuban Ambassador to Angola.
Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca is
interviewed by Prensa Latina. He says
it is possible that Iran will join
nonaligned group.
15 March commentary carried on Havana Domestic
Television says that the coup in Gre-
nada is "a victory for the people."
Council of State designates Fermin
Rodriguez Ambassador to Cyprus.
Fidel Castro meets with Bashir Mustafa
Sayed, Deputy Secretary General of
Polisario Front, and his delegation
visiting Cuba.
Sixth congress of the Continental
Organization of Latin American Stu-
dents (OCLAE) is held in Havana.
Representatives from 29 countries
and 43 youth organizations attend.
Chairman Zhivkov meets with Raul Cas-
tro in Sofia. Bilateral cooperation
and international problems are dis-
cussed.
Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa accuses
China of betraying the principles of
Marxism-Leninism in the Security
Council.
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Granma has long article critical of
Midd elel East peace accord and the US
role in it.
19 March Fidel Castro sends congratulatory
message to new Algerian Prime Minister
Mohamed 'Abd al--Ghani. He stresses
close relations between Cuba and Al-
geria.
21-23 March
Fidel Castro presents Cuba's 20th
anniversary medal to outgoing Soviet
Ambassador Nikita Tolubeyev.
Raul Leon Torras, head of Cuba's Na-
tional Bank, meets with French Economy
Minister Rene Monory in Paris to dis-
cuss bilateral relations.
"Official sources" in Havana deny that
Cuban troops are present in Kampuchea.
They say that Chinese have spread
these rumors as part of a campaign
against Cuba.
Meeting of public health experts of
nonaligned countries is held in Ha-
vana. Delegations from 29 countries
attend.
A delegation from the Iraq Peoples
Army visiting Cuba at the invitation
of the Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution tours Cienfuegos Prov-
ince.
23 March Fidel Castro speaks at dedication of
a hospital in the city of Cienfuegos.
He lists countries where Cuban medical
personnel are serving, including with
Polisario forces..
Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa asks the
Security Council to condemn South Af-
rica for its continued aggression
against Angola.
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26 March
26-30 March
27 March
27-29 March
28 March
The first group of 370 Mozambican
students (of a more than 1,000-member
contingent) arrives on the Isle of
Youth.
Delegation of US health experts, led
by US surgeon general, arrives in Cuba
at invitation of Cuban Public Health
Minister.
Polish Premier Jaroszewicz pays offi-
cial visit to Cuba. Greeted by Fidel
Castro, who presents him with the Jose
Marti order.
Cuba and Panama sign scientific and
technical cooperation agreement in the
areas of agriculture and the sugarcane
industry.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez attends CEMA
Executive Committee meeting in Moscow.
Interior Minister Sergio del Valle
presides over the celebration in Ha-
vana of the third anniversary of the
victory of the Angolan people.
Dr. Ziolo Marinello delivers invita-
tion from Fidel Castro to Sri Lanka
President Junius Jayrewardene to at-
tend nonaligned summit. This is the
first invitation issued.
Cuban Ambassador to Vietnam Melba
Hernandez presents her credentials
to the President of the Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Council and
is accredited to Kampuchea.
Council of State designates Julio
Garcia Olivera Ambassador to East
Germany.
31 March Council of State designates Carlos
Alonso Moreno Ambassador to Finland.
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Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in
East Berlin to attend Cuba - East Ger-
many Intergovernmental commission
meeting.
Cuba is elected to the chairmanship
of the Group of '77 for a three-month
period.
Algerian Construction Minister arrives
in Cuba for working visit.
The above article is Unclassified.
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