LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 15, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
15 February 1979
Secret
RP LAR 79-006
15 February 1979
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F
LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
15 February 1979
CONTENTS
Cuba: Looking to the Nonaligned Summit
The Castro regime continues to demonstrate
that it sees the nonaligned summit in Havana
in September as one of the most promising op-
portunities of the decade to enhance Cuba's
prestige and improve its influence w
world's superpowers.
Jamaica: Opposition Infighting
Recent bickering among top leaders of the
opposition Jamaica Labor Party has slowed
the party's campaign to oust Prime Minister
Manley and have decreased the likelihood of
a near term election; nevertheless, trends
still favor the rise of the o osition and
Manley's continued decline.
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 Approved For
Cuban Chronology for January 1979
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//;
Cuba: Looking to the Nonaligned Summit
movement.
The Castro regime in recent weeks has continued to
demonstrate that it sees the nonaligned movement's summit
in Havana in September as one of the most promising oppor-
tunities of the decade to enhance the regime's prestige
and improve Cuba's influence in the eyes of the world's
superpowers. To promote the event's success, Havana is
exhibiting surprising flexibility in presummit politicking
with other movement members. What is missing, however,
is any indication that the desire to achieve Cuban goals
at the summit will induce Castro to compromise what he
views as revolutionary principles. The withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola or Ethiopia, for example, will
be determined more by immediate tactical realities than
by political considerations, although Castro would make
political capital in the nonaligned movement if condi-
tions in either of the African countries permitted a
reduction of Cuban forces.
Diplomatic Offensive
Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca, who returned home
in December after visiting seven nonaligned countries
was on the road again by mid-January on a trip that cli-
maxed at the end of the month in Maputo, Mozambique, at
the ministerial meeting of the nonaligned movement's Co-
ordinating Bureau. Seven other top Cuban Foreign Ministry
officials were on similar missions in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East. None of the eight travelers--not even
Malmierca--is a member of the decisionmaking elite in
Havana, indicating that they served primarily as messen-,
gers--delivering invitations, explaining Cuban policy,
and sounding out their hosts on key issues. Their travels
nevertheless underscore the importance Cuba attaches to
maximum attendance at the summit--especially by as many
chiefs of state as possible--to submerging contentious
issues that might derail the summit, and to keeping lines
of communication open to prevent the polarization of the
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Havana is leaving the door open for all members of
the nonaligned movement to attend, even such ideological
enemies as Zaire, Somalia, and Egypt. The Cubans realize
that their pretensions to Third World leadership--and
Castro's personal image as well--would suffer if a signifi-
cant number of nonaligned members were to boycott the
summit. Moreover, this would threaten nonaligned unity,
and a fragmented movement would be much less useful to
Castro during the three years--].979-82--he will s ve
as the movement's chairman. F_ T
Where no formal. ties exist, Havana is trying to
establish them. Where ties exist but diplomatic missions
have not been exchanged, the Cubans are promoting resident
embassies, offering the incentives of trade and technical
assistance and kelp in solving ]cost countries' problems
with their nei hbors.
The Nonaligned Movement's Importance to Cuba
Although Castro covets the prestige of the movement's
chairmanship and relishes the opportunity to assume a
high profile on the world stage, his interest in the
nonaligned movement is more practical. As the leader
of a small nation that views itself trapped in a super-
power environment, he sees an alliance of small coun-
tries as a promising alternative to close alignment with
either of the superpowers. While Castro realizes that
Cuba's ability to achieve greater independence from Moscow
is limited, he expects activist Cuban participation in
the movement to provide him greater leverage in his rela-
tions with the USSR. Mindful of the divisiveness inherent
in multilateral relationships, he believes he can provide
the dynamic leadership that the movement needs to press
successfully the demands of the "have nots." 25X1
The Cubans, nevertheless, have no illusions about
the differences that threaten the movement's unity.
Their plan appears to call for focusing on issues all
members can support, while deemphasizing more fractious
matters. On :issues that defy resolution, Havana appar-
ently will advocate quiet, private negotiations. 25X1
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The "Soviet-Surrogate" Issue
Havana's close links to Moscow have posed a persistent
to parry charges that Cuba was a Soviet surrogate.
embarrassment for it in nonaligned councils. When Castro
tried to promote the USSR as an ally of the nonaligned
nations during his address at the Algiers summit in 1973,
Libya's Qadhafi walked out and Prince Sihanouk angrily
interrupted Castro in midsentence. Cuba's awareness of
its vulnerability was reinforced at the time of the Co-
lombo summit in 1976 when Castro, in the wake of Cuba's
Angolan intervention, decided not to head the Cuban dele-
gation. Instead, he sent his chief foreign policy adviser
Malmierca ran into the issue again in Yugoslavia
on the first stop of his latest trip. His efforts to
elicit Belgrade's support--or at least agreement to remain
silent--regarding the Vietnamese-imposed regime in Kampu-
chea appear to have done nothing but reinforce Yugoslav
convictions that Havana is a Soviet pawn. The Yugoslav
Foreign Secretary, at a dinner in Malmierca's honor,
condemned "hegemony"--read Soviet domination--and blasted
foreign interference and intervention, a clear reference
to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The Kampuchean
affair also threatens to resurrect the specter of Soviet
surrogates achieving Moscow's goals through naked aggres-
sion, an image the Cubans have been trying to dispel
since their own interventions in Angola and Ethiopia.
as a Soviet stooge.
The "surrogate" issue promises to remain a source
of serious friction up to and through the summit. The
Cubans are unlikely to repeat their gaffe made at the
1973 Algiers summit, but they can hardly divest themselves
entirely of the puppet label, given their military and
economic dependence on the USSR and their close cooperation
with Moscow on such matters as Angola, Ethiopia, and
Kampuchea. Moreover, if one of the Cuban "astronauts"
now training in the USSR were to take part in a joint
space event prior to the summit, the result could be
the reverse of that intended; rather than boosting Cuban
prestige, the event could cement the impression of Cuba
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Other Hazards
Another peril on Havana's road to the summit is
the succession question in Algeria. The late Algerian
President Houari Boumediene personally salvaged Castro's
pride in 1973 when the Cuban leader was openly insulted
at the summit. While the Algerians have been providing
logistical assistance in preparation for the summit,
the Cubans are clearly uncertain about the amount of
support they can now count on from the country that has
been one of their firmest allies within the movement.
The possibility of the demise of 86-year-old President
Tito and the detrimental impact it could have on nonaligned
unity may also concern Havana. More importantly, however,
the Cubans would probably look upon Tito's passing as
the fortuitous elimination of a source of competition
to Castro and an opportunity to redirect the movement's
aims leftward without having to contend with the c cism
of a prestigious "elder statesman."
Outlook
The fate of the 1979 summit. has yet to be decided.
Although its opening in Havana will be a victory of sorts
for the Castro regime, its success is by no means guar-
anteed. Much will depend on the Cubans' ability over
the next seven months to quell explosive issues that
have the potential of seriously dividing the movement.
They are probably counting heavily on the reluctance of
many members to press their respective positions to the
point of endangering the movement's unity.
Much as the Cubans want a showcase summit, we be-
lieve they are prepared--in the unlikely event of an
irreconcilable confrontation in September--to maintain
an adamant stance on issues of principle even at the
cost of splitting the movement. Cuba could be expected
to risk provoking the ouster of some members from the
movement, because it believes the majority is willing
to suffer the withdrawal of a few pro-Western states
rather than see the movement collapse entirely. If
forced to choose, the Cubans probably would opt for
such a radicalized movemp
.
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Jamaica: Opposition Infighting
Recent serious bickering among top leaders of the
opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) has slowed the party's
increasingly effective campaign to oust Prime Minister
/ Michael Manley. Trends still strongly favor the JLP
/L and nni ni- to Mnnl en
' c continued rinr?l i non. but chances
w
for an election in the near term have decreased.
Opposition crisis
The leader of the JLP,'Edward Seaga, exposed the
infighting late last month by "conditionally" resigning
his party post less than two weeks after he led the most
Former Prime Minister
Hugh Shearer
successful antigovernment demonstrations in the seven
years of Manley's rule. Seaga apparently calculated
that the inevitable widespread clamor for his return
would greatly weaken the position of his longstanding
and troublesome rival, Hugh Shearer, a former prime minis-
ter and popular party leader. Shearer, who heads the
JLP's politically indispensable trade union affiliate,
angered Seaga because he was not among the majority of
opposition union officials actively supporting the demon-
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Seaga's power play has probably strengthened his
hand among party regulars and decreased chances of a
comeback by Shearer. The party leader has not succeeded,
however, in bringing under his thumb either the in-
dependent Shearer or the powerful union. Seaga withdrew
his resignation on 31 January apparently without achiev-
ing any of the concessions demanded from
Shearer.
Legacy of Friction
Differences between Seaga and Shearer date from
the early 1960s and stem largely from their contrasting
political styles and bases of support. Seaga, who served
as Shearer's respected economics minister, is a shrewd
political organizer and a hardworking technocrat whose
cold and calculating manner has not been a political
asset among the large Jamaican working class. A wealthy
Boston-born white man of Lebanese descent, he has nonethe-
less held for 1.6 years the parliamentary seat from one
of the country's poorest and blackest constituencies--a
seat previously contested an lost by the Afro-Jamaican
Shearer.
Shearer, on the other hand, is an outgoing politi-
cian with great personal appeal and a solid base of sup-
port among organized labor. Despite his natural abili-
ties, he was an increasingly ineffective prime minister
and a mediocre political tactician whose serious mistakes
helped boost the less-popular Seaga to the top spot in
the JLP. Although still widely admired, Shearer would
probably lose much of his su ort if he now tried openly
to topple Seaga.
Shearer's antipathy toward Seaga was probably firmly
set in 1974 when strong criticism of Shearer's stewardship,
especially among the private sector, forced him to give
up the party leadership. Shearer had led the JLP to
defeat in 1972--nearly losing his own seat--and to even
greater losses in the local elections of 1974. Rather
than support his beleaguered leader in a difficult period,
7 Seaga hastened Shearer's departure :by suddenly quitting
his key party post--perhaps setting the precedent for
his recent decision--and merely awaitin the inevitable
call to succession.
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Seaga's latest resignation has scut-
tled a JLP-sponsored myth that the two
men had reached a truce for the sake of
party unity and a near-term election vic-
tory. Although the JLP has become an in-
creasingly well-organized opposition with
an excellent chance of defeating Manley,
its leaders have not been prepared to
mount an effective election campaign.
Prospects
Manley has been helped by the JLP's
problems and will try hard to exploit
them. He is personally hostile toward
Seaga and would strongly prefer the more
cooperative Shearer as opposition leader
and--if the JLP must win--as the next
prime minister. Shearer and Manley--who
are rumored to be distant cousins--were
for 20 years friendly rivals when they
headed the country's two largest; unions.
Despite Manley's hopes, there is now
little chance for a change in the JLP's
top leadership or for a showdown between
Kingston Press Cartoon on
Seaga's resignation
Seaga and Shearer. Seaga has had to take time away from
his antigovernment campaign to mend party fences, but his
overall prospects are good and improving. Present trends
favor the election of the JLP even if that party must con-
tinually reconcile the differences between an aut tarian
technocrat and a proud labor boss.
Manley, on the other hand, faces serious economic
difficulties that could still force him to call an elec-
tion before the end of his term in 1981. Jamaicans blame
him for the sharp economic decline under his administra-
tion and for the strict International Monetary Fund -
inspired austerity that is almost certain to continue for
the next several years. The JLP rift has bought Manley
time, but it has not provided his troubled government
with new solutions.
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For January 1979
1 -1
1 January A special People's Government National
Assembly Session is held to mark the 20th
anniversary of the Cuban revolution.
Fidel Castro's address to the session
contains his strongest criticism of the
Carter administration.
2 January Military parade is held in Revolution
Square to mark 20th anniversary of Cuban
revolution. Raul Castro presides and
gives a speech highly critical of the
United States.
Fidel Castro and Raul Castro attend recep-
tion for all delegations visiting Cuba
for the 20th anniversary celebration.
3 January Cuban Ambassador to Vietnam Melba Hernandez
addresses national television audience
in Hanoi, and expresses Cuba's support
for the Vietnamese cause.
Fidel Castro meets with Soviet Politburo
member Romanov who is visiting Cuba for
the 20th anniversary celebration.
4 January Fidel Castro, interviewed by the Czecho-
slovak magazine International, says suc-
cess of the Cuban revolution is evidence
of the vitality of Marxism-Leninism.
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5 January Armed Forces Minister, Army General Raul
Castro, meets with South Yemen military
delegation led by Col. All Ahmad Nasir,
who is in Cuba for the 20th anniversary
celebration.
Party Secretariat. member Antonio Perez
Herrero meets with visiting Congolese
military delegation.
Raul Castro meets with Sao Tome Defense
Minister, Maj. Daniel Lima Daio, in Havana.
6 January Raul Castro meets in Havana with Captain
Fikre-Selassie Wodge:ress, Secretary General
of PMAC, the ruling council of Ethiopia.
7-9 January UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim visits
Cuba. He is met by Fidel Castro, with
whom he visits the Isle of Youth. This
is the first visit of a UN Secretary Gen-
eral since the October 1962 missile crisis.
8 January Cuban Culture Minister Armando Hart and
delegation arrive in Budapest, Hungary.
Division General Senen Casas Regueiro
meets with Tanzan:i.an military delegation
visiting Cuba.
9 January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca issues
a statement in support of Vietnam's position
and condemns China's military buildup on
Vietnam's border.
10 January Cuban military magazine Verde Olivo carries
article highly critical of China.
10-21 January Ramon Castro tours agricultural installa-
tions in Iraq.
11. January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca sends a
message to Kampuchean Foreign Ministry,
saying Cuba will reopen its embassy in
Phnom Penh.
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11 January Fidel Castro sends congratulatory message
to Heng Samrin, Chairman of Kampuchean
National United Front, on "their great
victory."
Union of Young Communists delegation headed
by Osvaldo Castro arrives in Afghanistan
at invitation of Afghan Youth Organization.
13 January
16 January
Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa denounces
the Pol Pot regime and attacks Prince
Sihanouk.
In Un Security Council, Cuban Ambassador
Roa scores "Chinese alliance with imperial-
ists."
17 January At dinner in Malmierca's honor, Yugoslav
Foreign Secretary condemns "any foreign
interference in other nation's affairs."
17-20 January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca visits
Belgrade, Yugoslavia to discuss nonaligned
matters.
18 January The New China News Agency announces that
Cuba and China have signed 1979 trade
protocol in Beijing. German Amado Blanco,
Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade signs
for Cuba. The Cuban press makes no mention
of this event.
19 January In Hanoi, Cuban Ambassador to Vietnam
Hernandez meets with her Kampuchean counter-
part, Ambassador Chea Soth.
German Amado Blanco, heading a Cuban trade
delegation, arrives in Pyongyang, North
Korea.
21-28 January Ramon Castro tours agricultural enterprises
in Romania.
22 January Cuba and Togo announce the establishment
of diplomatic relations.
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22 January Cuban Ambassador to Bulgaria Jose Alvarez
Bravo heads a delegation to the 14th Pales-
tinian National Council meeting in Damascus
and meets with PLO leader Yasir Arafat.
23 January Cuban Ambassador to Bangladesh Jose Lopez
Sanchez meets with President Major General
Siawz Rahman to discuss forthcoming non-
aligned summit.
23-26 January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca visits
East Germany. He meets with his counter-
part Oskar Fisher, party leader Erich
Honecker, and Premier Willi Stoph.
23-27 January Specialists of the member countries of
the Caribbean Development and Coopera-
tion Committee meet in Havana for plan-
ning sessions.
23-28 January Angolan President Neto arrives in Cuba
for a private visit. He is met by Fidel
Castro, with whom he tours the Isle of
Youth and Cienfuegos. This is Neto's
third visit to Cuba.
24 January Spain and Cuba sign five-year trade agree-
ment in Madrid. Signing for Cuba is vice
Minister of Foreign Trade Ricardo Cabrizas.
Cuban Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo
Fernandez Font meets with Roberto De
Almeida, Angolan Foreign Trade Minister
in Havana.
25 January Cuban Vice President for Foreign Affairs
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Angolan
Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge in Havana.
26-29 January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca pays
official visit to Poland. He meets with
party leader Edward Gierek to discuss
the scheduled nonaligned summit.
Division General Senen Casas Regueiro
meets in Havana with Admiral Rassokho,
Oceanography Chief of USSR Defense Minis-
try.
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26-29 January Cuban Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
Cabrizas visits Portugal to attend
Cuban-Portuguese mixed commission meet-
ing.
28 January Fidel Castro presides over military review
at General Maximo Gomez Academy in Havana
in honor of Jose Marti Column 2 of the
rebel army.
29 January Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca arrives
in Maputo, Mozambique to attend nonaligned
movement's Coordinating Bureau meeting,
in session until 2 February.
Eleven former prisoners in Cuban jails
for "crimes against the state" leave for
the United States.
30 January The Cuban Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution (DCR) and the Peoples De-
fense Committee (CTP) of South Yemen sign
a two-year cooperation agreement.
This information is all Unclassified.
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Sources of Copyrighted Photographs
Page 15 Kingston, Jama=ica Daily Gleaner, :16 December 1976 (Seaga)
Page 15 Kingston, Jamaica Daily Gleaner, 15 August 1977 (Shearer)
Page 17 Kingston, Jamaica Daily Gleaner, 24 January 1979 (Cartoon)
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