LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 18, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Latin America
A
AL
ANA
State Department review completed
SOURCED
Secret
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CFr,R FT
LATIN AMERICA
18 August 1977
Focus on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Panama: Likely Reactions to Canal Treaty . . . . . 7
Venezuela: Democratic Action Party
Chooses a Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Guyana: Poor Economic Record . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Colombia: New Role for Judicial Police
in Narcotics Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Peru: Reconciliation With ARPA? . . . . . . . . . 28
Uruguay: Elections in 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Cuban Travelers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Netherlands Antilles: Confrontation Over
Aruban Separatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of intelligence and
from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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Focus on Human Rights
This is the first in a series of monthly arti-
cles that will appear in, this publication
dealing with human rights on a regional basis.
Today's commentary was written b ORPA's
We
hope that this and subsequent articles will
generate a dialogue among readers of this
publication. Questions and comments may be
addressed to the author.
After six months of quiet diplomacy, public state-
ments, and implied warnings of possible reductions in
military and economic assistance, Latin American govern-
ment leaders have become convinced of the sincerity of
the US commitment to the defense of human rights. More
importantly, they are beginning to respond to the policy
and are, at least, sensitized to the principle that rule
of law and human liberty are values shared universally
( by all peoples and individuals regardless of govern-
mental institutions. This does not mean that North
American democratic institutions will immediately become
the norm in all of Latin America. On the contrary, the
military in most countries will remain in power in one
form or another for the foreseeable future. What it
does mean, however, is that most governments now appear
ready and able to curb and possibly even to prevent the
abuse of human rights that has occurred in the past.
The most dramatic new breakthrough occurred last
week. in Chile when President Pinochet announced his de-
cision to abolish the National Intelligence Directorate
(DINA). New guidelines suggest that most of DINA's per-
sonnel will be absorbed by a National Information Center
which will be subordinate to the Interior Ministry. In
addition, DINA's arrest and detention powers are being
transferred to the national police (Carabineros) and the
Judicial Police within the Defense Ministry. While
illegal activity is still possible under this arrange-
ment, it appears that opportunities for repressive
practices will be greatly reduced.
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-- The new agency will not report directly
to the president.
-- Both the Carabineros and the Judicial
Police are highly regarded professional
law enforcement organizations.
inochet
is now convinced that the Marxist threat
to his regime has diminished significantly.
Pi.nochet's decision on DINA closely follows his
announcement earlier last week that Chile would begin
a phased transition of power to civilian rule culminat-
ing in limited popular elections by 1985. Chile thus
joins the governments of Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and
Uruguay that have announced their intention to hold
elections in the next several years.
Meanwhile, Brazilian President Geisel has renewed
his warnings to they military high command that torture
and other abuses of human rights will not be tolerated
in the treatment of prisoners.
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In El Salvador, during the past few weeks the new
Romero administration has shown signs of a more light-
handed treatment of the political opposition and other
government critics. The President has initiated dis-
cussions with the major opposition Christian Democrats
in an effort to establish the ground rules for their
participation in the legislative and municipal elections
A small leftist demonstration was per-
mitted late last month, and most political exiles in
voluntary exile have been told that they may return.
It is too early to know if these favorable signs are
merely window-dressing or if they represent new govern-
mental policy. Opposition leaders, clergy, and exiles
are still skeptical, and there are still indications
that the White Warriors Union--believed to be connected
with the security forces--is still functioning.
Reasons for Change
There are a variety of reasons for Latin America's
changing view of the US human rights policy. In partic-
ular, there is a growing belief in the region that
Washington's defense of human rights has become the
major focus of US foreign policy. In that context, many
Latin Americans believe that it is useless to try to
change the global strategy of a super power, which in
the past has paid little attention to their arguments
or existence.
The Chileans, for example, have been debating
whether the risks of internal subversion are so great
that they have to risk jeopardizing their traditional
good relations with the US, especially when there is no
alternative benefactor. Thus, defending internal secu-
rity raises the question of external security--particu-
larly regarding the possibility of war with Peru. A
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June editorial. in the Chilean newspaper EZ Mercurio
summed it up best:: "One does not have to stand fast
nor ask for understanding from a wave breaking over
him. One must duck and let it pass over. So it is in
small countries' relations with large ones."
Another factor in the changing outlook is that the
internal security threat in the countries under military
.rule has diminished. Chilean President Pinochet and
Argentine President Videla, for example, both appear to
be confident that. subversives, while they can cause iso-
lated incidents, can no longer challenge the authority
of the government. or the process of forming new institu-
tions. The Uruguayans and. Paraguayans appear somewhat
less confident in. this regard. Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Peru have shown that they can handle potential dis-
ruptions. The El Salvadoreans have not yet been seri-
ously challenged.
The argument would seem to follow that if draconian
measures are no longer needed to maintain the security
of the state, the country can move toward a full rule
of law and normal political activity. Ecuador's an-
nounced return to civilian rule in 1978 and the subse-
quent announcements by Peru and Bolivia that they also
would hold elections in coming years seems to have had
a positive effect on Chile and Uruguay in that neither
country wants to be isolated from a prevailing political
trend. Moreover, none of the military governments wants
to admit that a return to the rule of law would weaken
its ability to maintain internal security.
In addition to these positive factors for change
on the human rights issue, there are several bilateral
and multilateral problems among the South American na-
tions that have continued to work against closer rela-
tions in general and anti-US attitudes in particular.
The threat of war in the Andes, resulting primarily
from Lima's acquisition of large quantities of sophis-
ticated Soviet arms, still inhibits full cooperative
relationships among Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.
There is also the continuing problem of Bolivian access
to the sea. Chilean-Argentine relations, in general,
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have been good, but now there is some irritation because
of the territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel.
Argentine-Brazilian relations had been improving, but
controversy over problems associated with the Itaipu
Dam on the Parana River are causing difficulty. Brazil,
in any case, has true international aspirations and
does not want to get bogged down in any regional
squabbles.
Outlook: Change, but No Change
Most Latin American governments are demonstrating
that they are ready to accept the new US policy on
human rights at least in theory, even though there may
be some backsliding in some countries if security or
other problems arise. The issue of democratic govern-
ment, however, is another story. Most of the countries
under military domination have come through some rough,
unpleasant times combatting insurgency, disorder, and
the "old politics." The military probably is not ready
or willing to allow this situation to recur.
7
In any case, Latin Americans have not had much
experience with national representative government.
Democracy in the area, in fact, has always been more
accurately described as elite government with lip serv-
ice being paid to the terms "popular suffrage" and
"parliamentary government." The urge to play at being
"democratic" and creating institutions that suggest
self-cjovernment has forever been present. The bottom-
line in Latin America, however, has always been pros-
perity and economic security over democratic institutions.
Right now, and for the foreseeable future, the
military seems to be the only traditional institution
with the discipline, power, and ability to provide a
framework for economic and political stability in Latin
America. The type of government that develops during
the next decade--the time frame for the projected return
to "democracy" in most countries--will have some simi-
larities to North American democratic institutions, but
will have some significant differences. The most im-
portant variance probably will be that significant
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policies and decisions will be made by the military
either as direct participants in government or as back-
ground directors.
BRIEF
NICARAGUA
Nicaraguan Government officials have reacted
strongly to the recently released Amnesty International
report: concerning alleged human rights violations. Of-
ficial commentary thus far has centered largely on dis-
paraging Amnesty International's sources of information
and political motives, rather than refuting specific
charges. Judging by press commentary on the report's
content, however, it appears that much of the informa-
tion is at least a year old.
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Panama: Likely Reactions to Canal Treaty
In contrast to the official Panamanian media's
trumpeting of the new canal treaty agreement, politically
astute people in Panama are awaiting details before tak-
ing a stand, and significant public reaction is yet to
come. The government expects criticism--especially from
student radicals and ultranationalists--for its neutrality
pact concessions allowing US intervention after the year
2000. Most Panamanians, however, are likely to be re-
lieved and satisfied that an agreement has been reached
after 13 years of negotiations. General Torrijos is
confident enough to allow relatively open debate, and
his control of the government machinery and most public
media should facilitate a popul.ar--and if necessary care-
fully controlled--endorsement in the constitutionally
required plebiscite. The other required step for rati-
fication--approval by the General's hand-picked legis-
lative assembly--is not likely to pose any problem.
Torrijos and the new treaty are vulnerable to
criticism from several articulate and vocal groups in
Panama. Ultranationalists, many of them business-oriented
lawyers and professionals, will. focus on the separate
treaty in which the US and Panama agree to maintain neu-
trality of the canal after the year 2000. The US press
has already billed this as a perpetual right to intervene.
Panamanian government spokesmen, had publicly promised
"never to sanction the first US intervention of the 21st
century."
Students, one of Torrijos' greatest concerns because
of their willingness to take to, the streets, will attack
the legitimization of a US military presence until the
year 2000. A far-left university group has already come
out against the accord. The Panamanian legislature's
rejection of a proposed 1947 treaty providing US base
rights has been a landmark of Panamanian nationalism,
and "Bases No" is a student rallying cry.
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Some members of the conservative business community--
still suspicious of Torrijos' ultimate political aims--
may give some backing to treaty foes. They have always
worried that if the Panamanian leader successfully nego-
tiated a new pact, he would be entrenched in power and
breed from any domestic restraints.
Finally, Torrijos' political foes in exile and at
home will use the opportunity for even limited public
debate to generate as much opposition to the treaty--and
the General---as possible. In addition to attacking par-
ticulars of the treaty, they will try to attract US
congressional attention to the Torrijos administration's
alleged violations of human rights, leftist political
leanings, and chummy relationships with Cuba and Libya,
among others,. Calls for the return of all exiles for a
truly national debate are likely to gather force.
Torrijos' "worst case" concern is that the disparate
opposition groups might find common ground in opposition
to the treaty and spark demonstrations by drawing upon
latent public dissatisfaction with Panama's economic re-
cession and government corruption.
Opposition Weaknesses
The ranks of the ultranationalists, however, have
been thinned? The exiling of more than a dozen out-
spoken figures on both the left and right in January
1976--most of whom have not been permitted to return--
also serves as a reminder to those who remain.
The far--left student groups are typically badly
factionalized, and this hampers their effectiveness.
The government has used a combination of dialogue and
the threat of military muscle to deal effectively with
radical fringe elements.
The apprehensions of the business elite, although
real, are likely to be muted. After suffering through
more than two years of unaccustomed economic slump, the
businessmen will be hopeful that the improved investment
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climate surrounding a new treaty will rescue the country
from its doldrums. One leading businessmen's organiza-
tion has already spoken out in favor of the new pact.
Government Strategy
The government, previously preoccupied with the
negotiations, has only now begun to focus on its rati-
fication strategy. The administration apparently hopes
to expedite public debate; Education Minister Royo in-
dicated the required plebiscite on the accord will be
held six weeks after the signing of the new treaty.
The government over the short term will apparently seek
to:
--Take advantage of the momentum generated by the
successful conclusion of lengthy negotiations.
--Lessen the opportunity for poorly organized op-
ponents--opposition parties have been banned since
1969--to counterattack.
--Minimize the impact of the inevitable highlighting
of Panamanian concessions during debate in the
US.
--Place the onus for possible treaty rejection by
the US Congress and the consequences squarely on
the US.
Despite Royo's statement, the government's customary
ad hoc political approach will. apply, and the timing of
the plebiscite could be modified to take into account
the course of domestic debate and the ratification process
in the US. Torrijos will be sensitive to charges that,
after 74 years of attempts to abrogate the 1903 treaty,
he is attempting to squelch debate.
Chief negotiator Escobar set the tone for the gov-
ernment's defense of the treaty in a major address to a
student group last Friday. Escobar admitted the pact
was far from perfect--he characterized some aspects as
"ugly"--but stressed that other paths, such as confronta-
tion, would yield far less. To help make their case,
he and other government spokesmen can also point to sub-
stantial gains in the new agreement, including:
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--Abrogation of the 1903 pact and its perpetuity
clause--the unfulfilled aspiration of all pre-
vious Panamanian governments.
---Substantial economic compensation---a $50- to $60-
million annuity, a $295-million loan-and-guarantee
package, and $50 million in military aid to re-
place the present $2.3-million annual payment.
---An end to the Canal Zone's government structure
and recovery of more than half of the zone's
territory.
--A sharing of defense responsibilities, coopera-
tion in administrative decisionmaking, and an
end to the US military presence by the year 2000.
Torrijos is confident enough of his own position
and the outcome of the plebiscite to allow relatively
open debate, provided his regime itself is not attacked.
His self-assurance is boosted by the fact that he con-
trols most of the media and can intimidate the rest.
In the weeks before treaty agreement was reached,
the ultranationalist Independent Lawyers Movement began
to criticize the government's conduct of the negotiations
in one of the semi-independent newspapers,. As it has
in the past, the government appointed a temporary censor
for sensitive articles.
Leftist Allies
Torrijos also has his allies on the left. The
Communist Party, in exchange for being allowed to
operate relatively freely, has backed the Torrijos rev-
olution since 1970 and mobilized public support for it.
The largest student organization, whose leaders eat
from the government's hand, is subject to official manip-
ulation.
Many past and present government officials--such
as chief negotiator Escobar, Labor Minister Ahumada,
and others--have nationalist leftist credentials and
will be rallying support to back the government's ex-
pected media blitz.
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The government will also be able to marshal im-
pressive international backing for the treaty. Almost
all Latin American leaders will be willing to provide
a public seal of approval, perhaps at a regional ceremony.
The five heads of state--from Venezuela, Mexico, Costa
Rica, Colombia, and Jamaica--who gathered in Bogota
earlier this month to back Torrijos' treaty stand will
provide even warmer support.
The Panamanian leader could secure Fidel Castro's
endorsement to help fend off domestic leftist criticism--
if he judges it expedient when balanced off against the
possibly counterproductive impact in the US. The Cuban
leader has publicly backed Torrijos' negotiating strategy
in the past.
The Latin American press has accorded the conceptual
agreement initially favorable treatment. It can be ex-
pected to throw solid support behind a treaty that will
be billed as a symbol of a new Latin American - US re-
lationship.
On the domestic front, Torrijos and his negotiators
met over the weekend with three ex-presidents of Panama
to brief them on the treaty. Although the presidents
delayed taking a public stance at this early date,
Torrijos will probably be able to win their endorsement.
Outlook
Torrijos apparently believes the real test for the
treaty will be in the US Congress, and he appears to
have devoted at least as much attention to that problem
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At home, the government expects criticism for its
concessions but probably foresees a reasonably convincing
public vote of confidence. Nearing nine years in power,
this is as close as Torrijos will have come to submitting
his rule to a public test, and, although that invites
some dangers and almost certain rough spots, most of the
cards are stacked in his favor. If 25X1
General Torrijos harbors ambitions to
be elected president in his own right, the referendum
could also serve as a iumping off point for the 1978
campaign.
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Venezuela: Democratic Action Party Chooses a Candidate
Later this month, ; he govern-
ing Democratic Action Party (AD) ,
Venezuela's oldest and -argest po-
litical party, will formally ratify
primary election winner Luis
Pinerua Ordaz as its nominee for
president.
The 55-year-old Pinerua became
virtually the certain choice of his
party once ex-President Romulo
Betancourt signified hir, preference
for the former interior minister
and secretary general of the party.
Betancourt's backing was enough to
secure Pinerua 62 percent. of the
vote cast in the AD's first presi-
dential preference primary last
month. His only opponent., Senator
Jaime Lusinchi, reportedly the fa-
vorite of President Carlos Andres Perez, won nearly 34
percent of the vote. Of more concern to senior party
officials was the unexpectedly high abstention. rate
among registered party members--nearly 40 percent. To
many, it signified a dangerous level of apathy and pos-
sible disaffection with a candidate who was teing pushed
by Betancourt and the party establishment.
In the weeks since the primary election, it has be-
come clear that Betancourt intends to play a dominant
role in Pinerua's election campaign and will, among
other things, chair the party's platform committee. In
a recent press conference, Pinerua outlined the princi-
pal themes of his campaign--themes which are very much
in keeping with Betancourt's emphasis on social justice,
militant anticommunism, discipline, and populism. Al-
though Pinerua has praised the present administration,
he has carefully avoided giving the impression that his
administration would continue the basic policies of the
Perez administration.
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Romulo Bentancourt (r) Luis Pinerua Ordaz (c.)
Jaime Lusinchi (L)
In fact, Pinerua could not do otherwise. It has
been clear for some time that President Carlos Andres
Perez and the AD old guard, led by Betancourt, have not
seen eye-to-eye on a number of domestic and foreign pol-
icy issues. Betancourt has made no secret of the fact
that he is appalled by what he considers the increasing
amount of corruption in the government. He distrusts
Perez' ties with leading figures in the business commu-
nity, including the so-called "12 Apostles"--new rich
industrialists who reportedly have been involved in
corrupt dealings with the government.
Moreover, Betancourt views with disfavor some of
Perez' initiatives in the field of foreign policy such
as the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with
Cuba--broken during Betancourt's administration--and the
extension of economic assistance in Latin America to
democratic and military regimes alike. Betancourt sees
Pinerua as the man who will return the AD to the true
path, purge the party of corrupt and ideologically weak
elements, aggressively promote the AD's basic tenets of
social and agrarian reform, and stand firm in opposition
to dictatorships of the left and right.
Betancourt's analysis of domestic and foreign pol-
icy may not be as sharp as it once was; there are sug-
gestions of senility in his most recent proposal that
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the American democracies unleash their armed forces to
wipe out all "the dictatorial governments that are the
scourge of the ;hemisphere" and replace these regimes
with democratic governments. Nevertheless, Betancourt
still rules with an iron hand in the house that Romulo
built, and will not permit either the party or its can-
didate to espouse policies not in keeping with his own
simplistic philosophy,
Jetancourt's increasing role in the Pinerua cam-
paign, in fact, could put the party and its nominee in
the embarrassing position of publicly advocating poli-
cies diametrically opposed to those pursued by President
Perez. There is little possibility of a party split,
however, similar to the one that occurred in 1967, which
in large measure contributed to the AD election defeat
the following year.
The nagging problem of presenting a united party in
the face of an expected aggressive challenge from the
opposition Social Christian Party still remains. The
party at the same time must attempt to agree on a philos-
ophy that takes into account the antecedents of the AD
and the great economic and social changes that have oc-
curred in Venezuela as a result of the massive oil re-
venues that have poured into the country.
For
AD
party leaders the problem is to determine
how much
the
country has changed since the last general
election
and
how many have changed with it. If the
party is
to
continue to claim to represent the Venezuelan
average
man,
it will have to decide who he is. Betancourt
and his protege Pinerua believe the party's future still
rests with its traditional basis of support among labor
and the peasants. Perez, primary candidate Jaime
Lusinchi, and younger party leaders believe it must
broaden its appeal to other groups. This struggle is
unlikely to be resolved by Betancourt's olympian pro-
nouncements or the issuance of a party platform; it will
persist until the question of party leadership is re-
solved after Romulo Betancourt dies.
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Guyana: Poor Economic Record
Guyana's economic difficulties, brought on by a
tightening foreign exchange squeeze, have worsened
markedly in recent weeks. With an election due by next
July, these problems, including industrial layoffs and
labor strife, spell trouble for the ailing Prime Minister
Burnham.
Guyana's balance-of-payments problems began to in-
tensify last year as a result of falling sugar prices
and production shortfalls in bauxite and rice. Sugar,
bauxite, and rice together account for about 80 percent
of Guyana's export earnings. Guyana achieved a record
spring rice crop this year, but low sugar prices, which
the government says are below production costs, and the
continuing lackluster performance in bauxite production
will prevent any improvement in the balance-of-payments
situation. Early this year, the government was forced
to resort to drastic import restrictions and other aus-
terity measures.
The inability to import needed materials has led
many private and state businesses--some of which are
themselves foreign exchange earners--to make major cut-
backs in work forces and in some cases to talk of shut-
downs. Labor-intensive industries, such as garment
making and food processing, have been particularly hard
hit. Spare parts shortages, moreover, are hampering the
maintenance of production equipment. A government offi-
cial stated recently that inability to import spare
parts has kept more than half of the government's trans-
portation equipment out of operation.
Austerity measures already on the books are likely
to cut imports this year to 16 percent below the 1976
level. Finance Minister Hope indicated last week, how-
ever, that further import cuts will be required if new
loans are not forthcoming soon. In order to maintain even
the current low level of imports for the rest of this year,
Guyana needs at least $50 million in new financing. The
country's gross foreign exchange holdings are reportedly
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less than $20 million--enough to cover only three weeks'
imports.
Guyana's economic difficulties have resulted in
mounting political problems for Burnham. In recent
months his support, particularly among workers, has be-
gun to erode. The opposition People's Progressive Party,
led by Cheddi Jagan, has been quick to try to exploit
the situation by striking alliances with radical splinter
parties that have had some recent success in appealing
to Afro-Guyanese workers hitherto loyal to Burnham.
On 9 August, Jagan moved to take advantage of Burn-
ham's difficulties and the divisions within the ruling
party by calling for the creation of a national patriotic
front. This appeal is apparently directed at the left
wing of Burnham's People's National Congress in an effort
to woo members who are dissatisfied with the more moderate
course he has recently pursued. It is unlikely that any
members of the ruling party would be willing to join such
a front, but Jagan's gambit will increase pressure on
Burnham to shift leftward.
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Colombia: New Role for Judicial Police in Narcotics
Control
Legislation was introduced recently in the Colombian
Congress authorizing President. Lopez to reform the
Judicial Police (JP), an investigative and prosecuting
body within the Ministry of Justice. At present, the
JP has elements attached to the country's various
security and enforcement organizations, but the force
lacks a cohesive and separate identity of its own.
Under the proposed reform, the JP will assume all
criminal investigative authority, including narcotics
control.
Attorney General Jaime Serrano, who has a reputa-
tion for cooperating with the US on bilateral narcotics
investigations, will be in charge of the reconstituted
JP unit. The new group will consist of volunteers and
will be modeled after the US Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. According to Serrano, this "highly trained,
disciplined, and elite force" is scheduled to begin
operating no later than August 1978.
In the past, narcotics control has primarily been
the responsibility of the Department of Administrative
Security (DAS). Drug interdiction and enforcement, how-
ever, has also been spread out. among competing organiza-
tions such as the Military Police, Customs, the Attorney
General's office, and the intelligence section (F-2) of
the uniformed National Police.
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Lopez apparently believes that a reorganization of
the JP will not only eliminate confusion and inefficiency
by centralizing drug enforcement efforts, but will also
serve to dismantle the venal F-2, thereby enabling him
to reduce, at least partially, the level of narcotics-
related corruption. Both actions appear to be a follow-
up to Lopez' meeting with a US delegation in Bogota last
month to discuss the drug problem in Colombia.
The change, if it can be effected, will mark an im-
portant step forward in future drug control efforts.
There are, however, still a number of serious problems
to overcome. For example, although the preliminary
plans for the reorganization are impressive in concept
and scope, they were hastily conceived and fail to
address the complex issues of logistics and orderly
transition. Indeed, during the changeover there is
likely to be an increase in trafficking as drug smug-
glers take advantage of the bureaucratic and administra-
tive disarray.
Perhaps even more important is the political sen-
sitivity and unpopularity of the reorganization itself.
The military command, which has control over the National
Police, does not favor reducing or eliminating the F-2.
It is not known, however, to what extent military
leaders are prepared to resist the reorganization, but
Lopez is admittedly concerned about their opposition.
It is interesting to speculate why Lopez, particu-
larly at this point in his administration, would en-
dorse a project of this magnitude, sensitivity, and
potential for failure when he faces a number of other
economic and political problems. The government is
bracing for a general strike as the labor unions, angry
over wage-devouring inflation, prepare to call a nation-
wide work stoppage, a situation that is likely to force
Lopez to reimpose a state of siege. In addition, the
presidential campaign is heating up as the date for party
primary elections draws nearer. Lopez could well devote
the remainder of time in office working on economic and
other domestic :issues, or he could play party politics,
enhancing his position of leadership within the Liberal
Party in preparation for his departure from the presi-
dency in August 1978.
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Peru: Reconciliation With APRA?
The leader of Peru's largest political party, Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre, told the US and British Ambassa-
dors in Lima on 12 August that he has agreed to talks
with President Morales Bermudez--perhaps as early as
') this week. The 82-year-old founder of the American Pop-
ular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) has been despised by
Peru's military establishment for more than four decades.
Recently, however, both sides have been cautiously
exploring reconciliation, and both hope to gain some-
thing: Morales Bermudez needs support to overcome seri-
ous economic and labor troubles facing his government;
Haya wants a role for his party in future elections
promised by the President.
Haya told the ambassadors that he anticipates an
appeal from Morales Bermudez for APRA support, particu-
larly on the labor front, the major source of APRA's
organized strength. Haya said he had given due warning
that he intends to raise with the President two of his
principal current preoccupations: Communist influence
in the government and press and administrative corrup-
tion. Although Haya would not commit himself, the am-
bassadors were left with the impression that he intended
to give cautious encouragement to Morales Bermudez' ef-
forts to keep the country on an even keel and that he
was prepared to indulge in some hard bargaining with
the Peruvian Government.
If the meeting with Haya. comes off, the ensuing
dialogue would encourage hopes for broad-based civilian-
military cooperation during the transition to civilian
rule. The President will probably face stiff criticism,
however, from the military which still retains a long
historical memory of violent confrontations with APRA
during the 1930s and opposes any reconciliation with
an archenemy. F7 I
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Lopez, however, is a complex, determined, and often
enigmatic individual. His concern over Colombia's drug
problem and his desire to do something about it may be
greater than many realize. He will make a significant
contribution to drug control efforts if, during his re-
maining time in office, he can see to it that the re-
organization of the Judicial Police is completed and
operational. His successor, however, will also have to 25X1
lend presidential backing to the narcotics issue if other
reforms and innovations needed to solve Colombia's
problem are to be enacted.
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Uruguay: Elections in 1981
President Mendez' announcement last week that na-
tional elections will be held in 1981 is not likely to
hasten the return anytime soon of normal political ac-
tivity. According to the presidential communique, po-
litical parties will continue to be banned until 1980.
Mendez' speech marks the government's first formal com-
mitment, however, to an election timetable.
Mendez' message provides little detail on the
electoral structure other than that "traditional parties"
will participate and there will be universal suffrage.
This and earlier government statements indicate that
only the Blanco and Colorado parties will have official
sanction to resume political activity, while "Marxist"
groups probably will be banned.
The military-dominated government no doubt will
closely supervise the period of political transition.
Mendez, in fact, cautioned in his speech against "exces-
sive and inopportune political activities." The Presi-
dent's use of the phrase "preserving [Uruguay] from
subversion and from previous political practices which
have now been overcome" signals the government's inten-
tion to prevent a return to former political practices.
Moreover, Navy chief Admiral Marquez recently stated
that after the election in 1981 the military will retain
control while the country progresses "toward the instal-
lation of a political government through several steps."
Constitutional elections normally would have been
held last November at the end of former President
J Bordaberry's term of office. A controversy between
Bordaberry and the military over the latter's continued
role in politics, however, led to Bordaberry's ouster
3 last summer. The ensuing government immediately sus-
pended elections and issued an institutional act depriv-
ing a large segment of the population of their political
rights. Mendez--named on 1 September as a figurehead
president for a five-year term--at the same time spoke
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of an eventual transition to democracy. Army commander
General Vadora last October outlined a vague plan for
returning the country to civilian rule beginning in
1981.
Mendel:' latest announcement--although provisional
and well-hedged--represents at least a sidestep in the
direction of a return to democracy. It was probably
timed to coincide with Assistant Secretary of State
Todman's visit to Uruguay this week. Despite the
timing and the vagueness of the announcement, the govern-
ment no doubt considers it has met its commitment to
begin the process leading to some form of participatory
government by 1981.
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Cuban Travelers
Raul Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the second-
and third-ranking members of the Cuban leadership, are
both traveling abroad on unspecified missions. The two
trips by high-level Cuban Government officials could
indicate that Havana is seeking additional backing from
the USSR for its aid programs in the Third World, wishes
to consult with its allies regarding Cuban activities in
Africa, or is merely attempting to maintain its high
profile among radical members in the Third World.
Raul Castro is on the road for the third time this
year. He traveled to Bulgaria in January and made a
trip to Angola in early June. On 18 July Ta:ss reported
that Castro and his wife Vilma Espin (a Central Commit-
tee member and president of the Cuban Women's Federation)
had arrived in Moscow for an "official" visit. The re-
port stated that Raul was responding to an invitation
by his counterpart, Soviet Defense Minister 11.imitriy
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Netherlands Antilles: Confrontation over Aruban
Separatism
Gilberto "Betico" Croes, the leading proponent of
Aruban separation from the six-island Netherlands
Antilles federation, has provoked a confrontation de-
signed to force the new Minister-President, S.G.M. "Boy"
Rozendal, to include Croes' party in the new coalition
and to dramatize Aruban desires for independence.
In the 19 June national election, Croes' People's
Electoral Movement (MEP) won five of Aruba's eight seats
in the 22-member Staten of the Netherlands Antilles
federation. While willing to grant greater local
autonomy to the individual islands, Rozendal has been
determined to keep the federation together. Convinced
that his concessions would not satisfy Croes, the Minister-
President made it clear that he would exclude the MEP from
the new governing coalition and instead would invite
Aruba's second largest party, the Aruban Patriotic Party
(PPA), to join.
When Rozendal's intention to exclude the MEP became
apparent, Croes called a mass rally on 2 August to demon-
strate his strength to the central government and to
intimidate leaders of the PPA from accepting Rozendal's
offer to join the ruling coalition. The participation
of some 2,500 people in the rally indicated--as did the
Aruban separatist referendum last March that passed with
nearly 84 percent of the vote--that the issue of greater
Aruban autonomy from the central government in rival
Curacao has wide popular appeal.
It is not at all clear, however, that the majority
of Arubans want to move as far or as rapidly as Croes.
For example, the MEP leader's fiery oratory at the rally
drew only a modest reaction from the crowd. Moreover,
the challenge to Croes by a :Former supporter and more
moderate advocate of Aruban separatism to explain the
l lengths to which he was willing to go in pursuit of his
objectives seemed to strike a responsive chord with the
audience.
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LATHE
,,t BAHAMAS
CUBA
HAITI
DOMINICAN
REFLIBLIC PUERTO RICO Map A
` Rn villa rl K)
SAB SINT MAARTEN
ER ANTI L L SINT EUSfATu~ At?a
E S UK1
~, Guatlaloupe
C t> (Pc.)
NETHER,ANDS
ANTILLLS ~. A.
~ 1; Martinlrfue
C p 1;' I R 13 1,- A A' 11 A/ Fra
Map B
ARUBA
CURAG O/
I ONAIRE
!T, TRINIDAD
~ and
TOBAQQ,
COLOMBIA f VENEZUELA
Map B
NETHERLANDS
ANTILLES.
ARUBA
SINT EUSTATIUS
Oranjestad0 '
CURACAO BONAIRE
Map A
SAINT MARTIN
(Fr.)
Saint Barthelemy
(Fr.)
LEEWARD
ISLANDS
WILLEMSTAD"
(also insular capital
of Carocoo)
BONAIRE
Kralendijk
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The confrontation with the central government in-
tensified on 12 August. The anger of MEP supporters
was fueled by the announcement the previous day of a
new cabinet that excluded the MEP while granting the
PPA three ministries. A small riot was touched off by
the arrest of two Aruban union leaders--who apparently
support the MEP--for sponsoring a pamphlet that threat-
ened the lives of PPA leaders? In addition, brief
sympathy strikes were declared in several key industries,
and several hundred tourists were temporarily stranded
in Aruba as the airport was closed and the telephone
system was shut off.
By the beginning of this week, the airport was
operating normally, and most workers had returned to
their jobs. The crisis has abated, but Croes--who has
a long history of intransigence and erratic behavior--
will continue to try to challenge the government. Most
recently, in what is probably a bluff, the MEP leader
hinted that he may unilaterally declare independence
from the federation. He sent messages asking for moral
and material support to many countries in the Caribbean
basin, including Cuba, as well as to the US. These
messages emphasized that, "the Aruban people possess
the inalienable right to self--determination."
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