LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 28, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIA review(s)
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Latin America
Secret
131
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LATIN AMERICA
28 July 1977
CONTENTS
Chile: Breaking New Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bahamas: Pindling Reelected. . .
Bolivia: Return of Gary Prado . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Bolivia: Banzer Elaborates on
Constitutionalization Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Cuban National Assembly (Part I). . . . . . . . . . 14
El Salvador's New Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and
from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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7
Chile: Breaking New Ground
President Pinochet's speech on July 9 setting forth
a timetable for the return to civilian government has
evoked widespread comment within Chile--some of it
critical of the timing and details of the plan.
Nevertheless, most politically astute Chil-
eans evidently see the move as positive; they believe
that Pinochet has opened doors that he will be unable to
close. Debate over Chile's political future appears to
be gathering momentum and may put additional pressure on
the military for further liberalization.
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The timing of the announcement caught many officials
by surprise, but most cited it as a step in the right
direction. Some of the government's most conservative
/ backers even suggested that there was room for modifi-
cation. Foreign Minister Carvajal--a hardliner and
staunch backer of the President--told the US embassy
that the timetable might be accelerated; right-wing
idealogue and presidential adviser Jaime Guzman said the
7 program was "flexible." The time span forecast by
1 Pinochet seemed to rankle other military and civilian
supporters who believe it would prolong military rule
unduly. Critics allude to the possibility that Pinochet
could stay in power until 1991.
The most outspoken criticism came from Air Force
Chief and junta member General Leigh, whose blunt remarks
are indicative of indignation within the junta over not
being consulted on important matters. In a semipublic
forum and in the presence of foreign ambassadors, General
Leigh expressed his disagreement with the extended time
3 frame of Pinochet's plan. Leigh stated that the three-
phase program was much more conservative and restrictive
than he had been led to believe. In public statements,
Leigh had already made it clear that the junta had not
been polled for its opinions, but merely informed of the
general outlines of the new policies.
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Both Leigh and his navy counterpart, Admiral Merino,
have been pressing for a more rapid transition from
military rule. Lifting the state of siege and curtailing
the extraordinary powers of the President's intelligence
chief have been high on their list of priorities. Many
top army leaders also thought a statement of intention
by the government was long overdue. The combined impact
of this thinking within the military and the interna-
tional isolation of Chile contributed strongly to forcing
Pinochet's hand.
Criticism from the officially banned Christian Demo-
cratic Party was predictable. While the plan was wel-
comed in principle, the party argued that it did not go
far enough in setting limits to present authoritarian
is the right of the Chilean people to determine eir own
form of government and the pace of political transition.
At least one party official has questioned the Christian
Democrat's decision to flatly reject Pinochet's initia-
tive, suggesting that some sectors may be encouraged by
recent developments and willing to work toward a modus
vivendi with the government. It would be uncharacter-
istic, however, for Pinochet to swallow his pride and
consider opening a dialogue with political leaders such
as former president Eduardo Frei. To most of the armed
forces leadership, Frei and his party are still anathema.
restrictions. The bottom line,
Despite some domestic grumbling over details of the
long-time process disclosed by Pinochet, the Chilean
government was pleased with the generally positive re-
action of the US government, and Santiago probably hopes
that it marks a turning point in relations. Obviously
sensitive to the appearance of trying to placate inter-
national opinion, Chilean spokesmen were at pains to
point out that the President acted with a "sovereign
mandate" and that the move was "a spontaneous gesture"
that in no way responded to external pressures. Mean-
while, the Foreign Ministry reacted with distinct satis-
faction to official statements by the French and Belgian
governments noting the "great importance" of the speech.
Whatever the long-term implications of the proposed
blueprint, the decision to go public with it at this time
has definitely started the political pot simmering.
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Politically sophisticated Chileans--long accustomed to
democratic practices--see this as the beginning of a new
stage; few believe that the nostrums prescribed by
Pinochet will survive in their present form. As Pinochet
turns to translating his vague ideas on the transition
to constitutionality into reality, he probably will have
3 to take into account the diversity of opinion within
military and civilian circles regarding the future struc-
ture of government. On the other hand, there is little
chance that the Chilean military will preside over the
rebirth of the same system that existed prior to 1973.
In time, hardliners within the President's entourage
may moderate their views enough to reach some kind of
accommodation with influential political sectors of so-
ciety. As the wounds of the past heal, the prospects for
a more open and tolerant government will increase. The
restoration of a true democratic process will be con-
ditioned by many factors--not all of which can be pre-
dicted now--but the chances at least look better for the
future than they have at any point since the military
takeover.
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Bahamas: Pindling Reelected
Prime Minister Pindling. and his Progressive Liberal
Party (PLP) were returned to power in the July 19 elec-
tion with a lopsided majority of at least 30 of 38 seats
in the House of Assembly. Pindling--who won more handily
than expected--achieved his victory by reminding the
electorate that he was the leader of the country's first
black party and by persuading them that his government
had tried over the last decade to improve the lot of the
-'less affluent. At. the same time, he succeeded in his ef-
fort to link the two major opposition parties with the
white commercial establishment.
Pindling's lackluster campaign was more than offset
by the strength of the PLP's electoral machinery. Recent
defectors from the ruling party who ran as independents
failed to gain a single seat. The parliamentary redis-
tricting carried out. last December also paid dividends
for the ruling party. The PLP increased its margin in
the House of Assembly by at least one seat despite a loss
in popular vote of about 4 percent.
In a mild surprise, the Bahamas Democratic Party--by
winning 5 seats--outpolled the other major opposition
party, the Free National Movement (FNM), which won in
only two districts. The FNM--from which the BDP broke
away last fall--was expected to provide stiff opposition
for Pindling, but the movement fared well only on Grand
Bahama where the impact of unemployment and the country's
other economic problems have been felt most severely.
The future of the FNM looks dim. Its driving force, Cecil
Wallace-Whitfield, a one-time Pindling rival, lost badly
and may retire from politics.
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The Bahamas can be expected to continue to hew to a
mildly left-of-center course under a new Pindling govern-
ment. While occasional irritants may arise for the US
in dealing with The Bahamas, no serious issues stand in
the way of continued good relations. It will be next
month at least until Pindling appoints a new government
and mid-October before the parliament reconvenes. Given
the usual pace of government business in The Bahamas,
negotiations for renewal of US base rights may be pushed
back until next year.
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Bolivia: Return of Gary Prado
After three years of exile and insignificant assign-
ments at home, Lt. Col. Gary Prado returned to La Paz
recently to serve as military adviser to Presiae nt
Banzer. Ironically, Prado--
once, and perhaps still, con-
sidered the army's fastest
rising star--spent the last
few years in relative obscurity
because of his leading role in
two coup attempts in 1974
against the Banzer government.
Before his exile, Prado
held a. number of high-powered
positions, including that of
commander of the prestigious
"Tarapaca" Armored Regiment in
La Paz and deputy commander of
the Bolivian Military Academy.
Much of his popularity comes
from the influence he exerted
over the present group of com-
pany grade officers during the
latter assignment.
Prado's status was enhanced by his family':, par-
ticipation in domestic politics; his father wa: a former
minister of defense, and his brother, until he eras fired
by Banzer in 1973, a minister of planning. Pr,.!o's
reputation grew substantially as a result of t.' alleq-
edly major role he played in the capture of "On" Guevara
in 1967.
Prado is behind his peers in rank--most nin full
colonels--but muc} of the
officer corps still looks to him for leadership. His
decision to return to the army and to accept unles.irable
assignments increased his stature, especially conq
younger officers.
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Banzer brought Prado to the presidential palace in
part to keep close watch on his activities. To an ex-
tent, the President is taking a calculated risk by
placing him in a position of influence. Indeed, Prado's
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have contact with him.
Prado is generally considered to be the best offi-
r cer in the military, however, and Banzer is sufficiently
confident of his current position within the military to
take the risk. Banzer, in fact, probably wants to use
3 Prado to ease the discontent which is present in the
Bolivian military in the best. of times.
Banzer's recent announcement of a timetable, albeit
vague, for returning the country to constitutional gov-
ernment is a potentially divisive factor among the mil-
itary. The president probably hopes that Prado, who
has said he favors a popular and nationalist government,
will help to keep tensions low among his collegues.
Prado's experience demonstrates again that coup-
plotting in the Bolivian military is not necessarily the
end of a promising career. He once was thought to be
presidential material, and some officers believe that
his potential now may be as,great as ever.
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Bolivia: Banze:r Elaborates on Constitutionalization
Plans
President Banzer's latest public announcement of
his plans for returning Bolivia to democracy by 1980
marks the President's strongest commitment yet to the
process. In a speech earlier this month, the President
spoke of a two-phase plan beginning in 1978 with the
formation of an institutional base and ending in August
1980 with a constitutional government.
Banzer envisions that laws for significant political
reform will be consolidated, with popular consultation,
in a revised constitution during the 1978-79 period.
A congress with "real representation of the people,"
according to the President, will function in specialized
work groups to provide a balance for the executive and
judicial branches. Political parties will be regulated
by statute to reflect Banzer's idea that they should be
motivated by a "desire for public service" and free
from the need to serve or submit to "subordinate" con-
cepts.
Eanzer's plans have reintroduced the subject of
politics into Bolivian society after a long hiatus.
Leaders of Bolivia's two major political parties, the
Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the Bolivian
Socialist Falange, were cautiously optimistic about the
President's speech. Both welcomed the timetable, but
expressed skepticism about the forms and procedures in-
volved in Banzer's scheme. The party leaders are uneasy
about the future of their groups--political parties were
suspended in 1974---and reportedly will formulate their
own positions on constitutionalization at special as-
semblies. The Falange is scheduled to hold a national
convention--already declared illegal by the government--
next month.
Some administration officials reportedly are un-
happy with the idea of constitutionalization in two
and one half years. US embassy reports of rumors about
upcoming cabinet and military changes may mean that
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Banzer is preparing to reinforce his position by placing
his supporters in positions of strength and removing op-
ponents to jobs of little importance.
Nevertheless, Banzer's messages to date contain
little insight concerning the means by which Bolivia is
to arrive at democracy. So far, the President has
spoken in general terms of popular consultation, consti-
tutional revision, and a congress, but has not mentioned
plebiscites, constituent assemblies, or elections. Ban-
zer probably will continue to monitor closely the reac-
tion to his announcements on the subject and reveal his
plans accordingly.
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The Cuban National Assembly (Part I)*
The Cuban National People's Assembly, a body created
in last year's governmental reorganization, held its
first regular session this month. The short duration--
three days--and the rubber stamp atmosphere of its pro-
ceedings clearly demonstrated that the Assembly--nomi-
nally the supreme governmental institution in Cuba--has
no real political power. In the Cuban political system,
policy decisions are made by the Political Bureau of the
Cuban Communist Party. The Assembly's main purpose is
to provide symbolic legitimacy to those policies. When
the National Assembly is not in session, the authority
to approve laws is vested in the Council of State.
Before this month, the Assembly had met only once:
a two-day special session convoked last December to
"debate" the new constitution and the 1976-1980 Five-
Year Plan, to "select" the membership of the Council of
State, and to approve the appointments to the Council of
Ministers. Rather than discussing or "debating" these
issues, the Assembly spent most of its special session
listening to and applauding Fidel Castro's reading of the
13-hour long General Report. The Assembly approved unani-
mously everything that was put before it.
The same pattern prevailed in the first regular
session. The delegates were concerned with eight draft
bills that ranged from such mundane subjects as the pro-
tection of national monuments to substantive issues such
as modifying Cuba's judicial system. Most of the bills
were passed unanimously, and the few changes made by the
delegates did not alter the effect of the laws.
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The delegates spent the rest of their time estab-
lishing rules of procedure and appointing committees.
These committees will each be concerned with a specific
governmental function. The Cuban press has identified
only eight of the 20 committees (See table). The role
of the committees is not yet clear, but it is unlikely
that they will possess meaningful. political power. They
will probably perform a housekeeping function so that
the 450-plus Assembly deputies--all of whom have full
time jobs elsewhere in the government or party--are more
thoroughly briefed beforehand on the matters to be tabled
at the Assembly's semi-annual sessions.
Committees of the Cuban National Assembly
Committee Name Chairman
Defense and Internal Order BGen Sixto Batista Santana*
Arts and Culture Nicolas Guillen Batista*
Construction and Construction Josefina Rebellon
Materials
Children's Care and Women's Vilma Espin*
Equality
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El Salvador's New Government
.Against a. backdrop of electoral fraud, violence,
and the threat of more violence, a conservative cavalry
officer, Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero, was inaugurated
President on July 1 for a 5-year term. He and his cabi-
net--composed largely of ci-
vilian technicians--will face
the same problems and pressures
as preceding administrations,
but his emphasis on the law-
and-order theme indicates an
even tougher stand against
left-wing extremists. As for
right-wing terrorists--specif-
ically the White Warriors Un-
ion (UGB), which is believed
to have some degree of govern-
ment sanction--Romero has told
them publicly
that law and order
The New President
During his military ca-
reer, Romero has earned a reputation as a competent, de-
pendable leader, an avowed anticommunist, and a strict
disciplinarian. He has always encouraged his subordi-
nates to air their ideas and grievances, and since taking
office he has initiated discussions with the major op-
position party and the labor sector. Given his basic-
ally conservative and paternalistic viewpoint, however,
he will probably find it difficult to conduct any sort
of dialogue with extremist groups, especially kidnapers
and terrorists.
The New Cabinet
Romero is willing to learn from, and delegate au-
thority to, persons who are specialists in various fields.
His cabinet, predominantly technicians, reflects this.
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--Minister of Finance Rene Lopez Bertrand was
a magistrate of the Court of Accounts from
1974 to 1977, having previously served as
director of Central Accounting for the
Ministry of Finance.
--Minister of Economy Roberto Ortiz has served
for a number of years as manager of the Sal-
vadoran Institute of Industrial Development,
manager of the Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry, and as an officer of the Central
Reserve Bank.
--Minister of Planning Roberto Chico is both
an economist and an accountant. He served
as technical director of the National Plan-
ning Council from 1971 until 1976, when he
became minister. He is one of the four hold-
overs from the Molina administration.
--Minister of Justice Rafael Flores y Flores
is a lawyer and former penal court judge.
He was subsecretary of justice from 1974 to
1976 and is one of the four-holdovers from
the Molina cabinet, having served briefly
as minister of the presidency.
--Minister of Public Health Cesar Augusto
Escalante, is a medical doctor, as is tra-
ditional in this post.
--Minister of Agriculture Jose Rutilio Aguilera
is an engineer-agronomist, a former professor
of agronomic sciences, and former assistant
manager of the Agricultural Development Bank.
--Minister of Public Works Leon Rivas is a
civil engineer and was a professor of engi-
neering and architecture from 1968 to 1970.
Since then he has been an engineering con-
sultant.
Four ministries are headed by military officers.
Two of these--defense and interior--are traditionally
filled by military officers, but the appointment of
military officers as minister of foreign affairs and
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minister of labor reflects Romero's tendency to rely
on his fellow officers to handle potentially troublesome
areas in which he may want to assume a more direct role.
--Minister of Foreign Affairs Alvaro Ernesto
Martinez is by training a military engineer
who retired from the army in 1963 as a major.
Although he has traveled widely and served
as military attache in several countries and
as ambassador to the UK, his experience in
foreign policy is limited.
--Minister of Labor Roberto Escobar holds the
rank of Lt. Colonel and has a law degree
from the University of El Salvador. He has
broad experience in nonmilitary activities,
many of them political, and served as under-
secretary of agriculture and livestock from
1974 to ].975 when he was given the portfolio
a. minister. His lack of a military image
may, lessen potential. resistance in labor
sectors to having a military man head that
ministry.
Minister of Defense General Federico Castillo
is a dedicated, professional soldier and a
moderate conservative. He has close personal
and professional ties with both Molina and
Romero and is a holdover in this post from
the previous administration, having moved up
from subsecretary when Romero resigned to run
for the presidency.
-?-Minister of Interior General Armando Rojas
is an intelligent, alert, and conscientious
officer who has held a number of command
positions; since the mid-1960s, the most
recent of which was Chief of the Armed Forces
General Staff. A friend and respected col-
league of Romero, he will be in a key posi-
tion to implement the new government's policy
toward demonstrations and other disturbances.
One surprise on the list of appointments was that
of Carlos Antonio Herrera as minister of education. This
post is traditionally given to a technician and, like
other cabinet posts, to a member of the governing party
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or an independent. Herrera is neither. He is a lawyer
by training, and his career has been almost entirely
concerned with politics as a member of the major opposi-
tion party, the Christian Democratic Party. His appoint-
ment may indicate that the governing party and the
military hope to improve relations with the noncommunist
opposition.
Old Problems for the New Government
The new government will. face the same serious
problems in the socioeconomic field that have plagued
its predecessors for decades--a large and growing popu-
lation, limited land resources, unemployment, and the
need to provide food, housing, education, and medical
care to a large mass living at or near the subsistence
level. Although Romero has promised to continue the
programs of his predecessors to raise the standard of
living of lower and middle income families, he will un-
doubtedly encounter resistance from wealthy landowners
and businessmen and will very likely yield to strong
pressure on their part.
Equally serious are problems in the political field
that have been growing during the past two administra-
tions as the government has increasingly resorted to
heavy-handed tactics in answer to criticism. This has
left Romero and his team a legacy of ill will both at
home and abroad.
Romero has taken some initial steps to combat this
by opening a dialogue with the Christian Democrats, en-
couraged perhaps by the party's distancing itself from
its coalition partners of the far left, and with several
labor organizations. He seems to realize that the govern-
ment cannot continue to be as heavy-handed with dissi-
dents as in the past, but his frequent emphasis on law
and order indicates that he will meet violence with
violence if necessary.
How far he will actually go in curbing the activ-
ities of the UGB is still an open question. This group,
which has threatened the Jesuit community with assassina-
t:ion, may be a facade for extra-legal activities of the
government itself. As the deadline for carrying out
this threat approached, Romero finally bowed to pressure
from the US embassy to make a public statement condemning
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Romero is a great admirer of the US and would like
j to see his country's ties with the US strengthened. his
J view of the US stand on human rights as intervention in
El Salvador's internal affairs, however, is likely to
continue to be a stumbling block. Romero is unlikely
to be totally unresponsive to US demarches on behalf
of US citizens, but thus far he has not furthered the
/ Y investigation into one disappearance.
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