USSR WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: February 2, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Nationale
e&PUh Release 2004/07/16: CIA-RDP79TOO912A00010
Assessnient
Center /
Secret
RP UWR 78-005
2 Febr a y 1978
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A00010001006g--6
USSR
Weekly Review
2 February 1978
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release
2 February 1978
25X1A
The Soviet Union and the Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background on Shcharanskiy's
Access to State Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Soviets Push Port Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
This publication is prepared by the USSR Division, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National
Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the personal judgments of
analysts on significant events or trends in Soviet foreign and domestic affairs.
Although the analysis centers on political matters, it discusses politically relevant
economic or strategic trends when appropriate. Differences of opinion are
sometimes aired to present consumers with a range of analytical views. Comments
the authors of the individual
and queries Plenrnp- Thpy should he directed to 7 1
articles or to
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
25X1
 Approved For Release 2
The Soviet Union and the Horn
Moscow's early interest in the Horn was probably not
part of a carefully conceived plan to expand Soviet influ-
ence in sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow was attracted-to the
Horn by its strategic location, particularly its proxim-
ity to the Middle East with its vast oil reserves and the
Indian Ocean with its major trade routes. The Soviets
moved into Somalia not only because it was an opportune
target for Soviet influence, but also because it could
serve as a counter to the US position in Ethiopia.
The Kremlin decided to increase the stakes when it
began to perceive that its involvement in Somalia could
further the USSR's claim to equality with the US as a
power able to project its influence far beyond its borders.
The deterioration of the Soviet position in the Middle
East in the early 1970s contributed to Moscow's decision
to increase its presence in Somalia, in part to repair
the damage to Soviet prestige and influence caused by the
Soviet-Egyptian rift. In African terms, Moscow saw
Somalia as another lever to exert Soviet influence in
sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps as a useful base from
which to exploit any opportunities in Kenya following
the death of Kenyatta. Finally, Moscow certainly found
Somalia a vantage point for monitoring US activity in
the Indian Ocean and expanding its own presence there.
The Tilt Toward Ethiopia
Complicating the effort to discern Soviet motives
in the Horn was Moscow's decision to aid Ethiopia and
later to back Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia over
the Ogaden. The decision in December 1976 to aid Ethiopia
led to the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia in Novem-
ber 1977. Why did Moscow risk its assets there?
In the first place, Moscow was certainly aware that
Ethiopia's potential for becoming an important power in
the Horn/Red Sea area and in Africa was greater than
2 February 1978
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
25X1
 Approved For Release 20W9Jf16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
Somalia's. Ethiopia has a population of approximately
29 million, about eight times the size of Somalia and
exceeded only by Egypt in the area. Although Ethiopia
is a desperately poor country, most of its land is arable
with sufficient rainfall to make it a major agricultural
producer in the region; the extent of its mineral wealth
is uncertain. Geographically, Ethiopia dominates the
lower portion of the Red Sea and its coast offers harbors,
which, while less desirable than Berbera, could be useful
to the Soviets.
Another factor that influenced the Soviet decision
was Moscow's perception of Mengistu as a more committed,
orthodox Marxist than Siad. The Soviets were uncomfort-
able with Siad's brand of "scientific socialism" and
looked askance at his attempt to reconcile "scientific
socialism" and Islam. Once the opportunity to establish
a Soviet presence in Ethiopia arose, however, Moscow was
not prepared to write off its investment in Somalia. The
evidence suggests that Moscow calculated that it could
successfully replace the US in Ethiopia and still maintain
its position in Somalia. Ethiopia, believing that this
was a realistic possibility, began to court Moscow in fact
because it hoped that the USSR could restrain the Somalis
in the Ogaden.
Moscow apparently assumed that because of Somali
dependence on the Soviet Union for military aid and spare
parts, it would be able to restrain Siad. In retrospect,
the Soviet and Ethiopian analysis was wrong. But the
Soviets did successfully balance between the two until
mid-November--four months after the outbreak of hostilities
in the Ogaden--and they still maintain diplomatic ties
with Somalia.
The Soviets in Ethiopia
With the loss of Somalia, Ethiopia is now Moscow's
sole foothold in the area. Moscow's immediate concern
is to-prove the value of Soviet assistance to the
Ethiopians. Moscow has sent large amounts of sophisticated
military equipment and several hundred Soviet advisers to
Ethiopia and underwritten the cost of a substantial
Cuban presence in hopes of stabilizing the Ethiopian
military position as soon as possible and, in the absence
of a negotiated settlement, preparing the Ethiopians to
retake the Ogaden.
2 February 1978
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 SRDP79T00912A000100010063-9
A prolonged conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia
might allow the Soviets to entrench themselves deeply
in Ethiopia, but Moscow probably does not relish a long
war because of its impact on its other interests. From
the African point of view Moscow is on the right side in
the Ogaden conflict, but many African states are nonethe-
less suspicious of the Soviet Union and would be opposed
to any deliberate effort by the Soviets to continue the
war. A protracted conflict might also adversely affect
Soviet relations with the Western powers.
A prolonged conflict in the Horn could also have a
negative impact within the Soviet Union. Although there
is no evidence of friction within the leadership over
Soviet policy in the Horn, differences did develop over
the Soviet involvement in the Angolan conflict in 1975
and early 1976. And Moscow's involvement in the protracted
no-win situation in Egypt ultimately turned into a humil-
iating experience for Moscow that generated some dissatis-
faction by elements of the Soviet military about Soviet
policy in the Middle East.
Moscow and a Negotiated Settlement
In the longer run, the Soviets may have to seek a
political solution to the conflict in order to establish
permanent peace in the Horn. Moscow will want to play
the decisive and indispensable role in any negotiations,
but it is uncertain that Soviet leaders would favor se-
rious talks before reversing the current military situa-
tion. Soviet suggestions thus far have been deliberately
ambiguous and for the most part nonstarters. Moreover
Siad is unwilling to negotiate while his forces are
doing well on the battlefield and Mengistu refuses to
while Somali troops are in the Ogaden.
Moscow would support a settlement that allowed it
to retain its dominant position in Ethiopia and that denied
Somalia a major foreign backer. In effect, this would
leave. Moscow the dominant foreign power in the region,
since Somalia, without a major patron, could not hope to
compete with a Soviet-backed Ethiopia in the Horn/Red
Sea areas. The Soviets do not see this as an unreason-
able goal. Moscow seems to have concluded that US ties
to Kenya--against which Somalia also has made territorial
claims--will preclude a major US military commitment to
Somalia.
2 February 1978
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
SECRET
While Moscow would welcome the opportunity to re-
gain its former status and facilities in Somalia, it is
unlikely that it would sacrifice a viable, united Ethi-
opia to achieve this. Berbera and other Soviet facil-
ities in Somalia were valuable and useful to the So-
viets in the Indian Ocean context but are not irreplace-
able. Recent Soviet activity suggests that Moscow be-,
lieves that Aden and possibly one or more Ethiopian
ports would be acceptable substitutes.
Moreover, Moscow probably calculates that the possi-
bility of a return to a position of influence in Moga-
discio in the near term is remote. Even in the unlikely
event that Ethiopian success in the Ogaden resulted in
Siad's political demise, Moscow would probably not find
it easy to return to Somalia. Even before they began
to support Ethiopia, the Soviets were unpopular, and
the war in the Ogaden has broad support from the Somali
people.
Consequences of an Ethiopian Victory
Moscow is aware that a political solution to the
Ethiopian-Somali conflict is the only way to a lasting
peace in the area, but it also realizes that in the short
term its Ethiopian client needs a military breakthrough.
Moscow has pumped military equipment into Ethiopia
faster than the Ethiopians can absorb it and in quanti-
ties in excess of what Ethiopia needs to retake Ogaden.
The scale of the Soviet buildup has caused concern in
some areas that Moscow might back an Ethiopian drive to
overrun Somalia.
The Soviets have occasionally played on this con-
cern, alleging that now they have given Mengistu what
he needs to win and that they are not sure they can
prevent his forces from crossing into Somalia. When
this threat has been used, it was clearly part of an
effort to get the Somalis to the negotiating table;
so far the Soviet warning has not impressed the Somalis
enough to bring this about.
Moscow almost certainly does not believe that its
interests would be served by a large-scale Ethiopian in-
vasion of Somalia, and the Soviets are likely to try to
prevent such a move. A massive invasion of Somalia would
virtually eliminate any prospect the Soviets might have
2 February 1978
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/1&CW1f -RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
to regain influence in Mogadiscio and would alienate
many already suspicious African states. Moscow might,
however, condone a tactical move to gain Somali territory
for use as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Although
even a move of this type would risk a negative response
from African states, Moscow might calculate that the
failure of the African states and the OAU to act decisively
after the Somali move into the Ogaden would mute any
criticism of a clearly tactical Ethiopian move into
Somalia. Moscow probably also believes that it can success-
fully portray a limited move into Somalia as part of a
determined effort to get both sides to withdraw from
occupied territory and reach a negotiated settlement. if
they can bring about a negotiated settlement, the Soviets
no doubt believe that any loss in status stemming from
their involvement could be quickly restored.
The US Connection
The Soviets cannot be confident about the level of
tolerance the US will display in the future regarding
Soviet activities in the Horn, but at this stage they
apparently gauge the political risks as tolerable and
the military risks as negligible. The USSR has not shown
any sign of being intimidated by US opposition to Soviet
actions, and, if the Kremlin does have reservations about
possible reactions from Washington, it gives the impression
that they need not be addressed until they become a reality.
Whatever their estimate of US reaction, Moscow's
behavior in Ethiopia suggests that it is prepared to
assume greater risks there. The Soviets probably expect
that future US reactions would be graduated in rough
correlation to their actions. Initially Moscow would
anticipate suasion and vague threats from the US, and if
Soviet involvement grows they may expect the US to support
joint regional efforts in a variety of ways.
Only in the event that the level of Soviet actions
continued to rise would the Soviets probably fear US
reactions outside the region that would impinge directly
on other areas of the bilateral relationship. They prob-
ably judge that the US would be reluctant to "link" SALT
or other important bilateral issues to Soviet performance
in Africa. But they are also sensitive to the possibility
2 February 1978
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
SECRET
that domestic US pressures on the administration to do
just that will grow if they continue or increase their
heavy involvement.
On balance, they would not expect the US to seek to
penalize them in SALT or probably most other arms control
forums. But they may believe that some lesser actions in
the bilateral field, such as holding up an export license
or canceling some planned visit, might be taken by Wash-
ington. Conceivably, moreover, they would not be sur-
prised if the US announced suspension of such bilateral
negotiations as the Indian Ocean arms restraint talks in
retaliation for Soviet noncooperation and troublemaking
in the Horn.
If things get worse, the Soviets would probably recog-
nize that some further souring on detente would come to
characterize US attitudes. However, although they are
quite aware that even a general, atmospheric worsening
could adversely affect specific bilateral dealings, they
may already have concluded that the tangible benefits of
detente with the US have become so devalued that the costs
of further deterioration are bearable. In the past, Moscow
has shown a willingness to devalue such costs if a specific
Soviet foreign policy goal, such as improving the "ob-
jective" basis of Soviet influence in an important area,
stands to be gained. SALT would be the most likely ex-
ception to this reasoning.
In the interim, Moscow's major worry as far as the
US is concerned is that at some point the Ethiopians them-
selves might ask Washington to play the role of mediator
in their struggle with Somalia. Presumably the recent
Soviet effort to get Addis Ababa to break relations with
the US was designed in part to foreclose such a possibility.
2 February 1978
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 gQEIRDP79T00912A000100010063-9
25X1
Background on Shcharanskiy's Access to State Secrets
One of the tenets of Moscow's case against imprisoned
dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy appears to be the claim
that he had access to state secrets prior to 1973,
when his initial application to emigrate to Israel was
denied. It is known that Shcharanskiy worked at a civilian
oil and gas research institute in Moscow before he was
fired as a result of his application to emigrate. What
is less well known is that Shcharanskiy apparently did
have access to classified information as a student during
the period from 1966 to 1972.
In 1972, Shcharanskiy graduated from the prestigious
Moscow Physico-Technical Institute (MFTI), which was
established in 1946 to provide a continuous flow of
highly qualified scientists into Soviet defense-related
research and production facilities. The institute
specializes in such fields as applied physics, aero-
mechanics, space research, radiotechnology, and applied
mathematics. Fewer than half of all entering students
are said to complete the demanding six-year course and
receive their diplomas. Located in the suburb of
Dolgoprudnyy about 15 kilometers north of Moscow, MFTI
maintains an average enrollment of about 5,000 students.
Applicants are selected on the basis of rigid and highly
competitive examinations in physics, mathematics,
chemistry, and English. Only 50 percent of each entering
class is selected from Moscow area applicants; the remainder
must come from elsewhere in the USSR. No foreign students
are admitted.
All MFTI students are reportedly required to have a
secret security clearance prior to being admitted.
Throughout their program of study students are instructed
and briefed on developments in both Soviet and foreign
military-related technology in their particular areas
of study, and classified references and training manuals
are used in some of the studies. In addition, all
2 February 1978
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 20 16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
students are required to participate in a reserve
officers training program, where classified training
materials are also employed. In their final years of
study, most MFTI students actually work at various
research or production enterprises in the Moscow area,
frequently in closed laboratories or production shops.
Most MFTI instructors are specialists drawn from
various defense-related facilities in and around Moscow
who teach at MFTI on a part-time basis. Everyone at
the school is briefed periodically on the importance of
not disclosing information about the facility, and a
KGB officer is permanently assigned to MFTI to counsel
the staff and students about their foreign contacts.
Shcharanskiy was apparently one of the last Jewish
students to graduate from MFTI. The school reportedly
closed its doors completely to Jewish applicants in
1970 in an effort to reduce intelligence losses
associated with a growing Jewish emigration problem.
In the early 1960s, more than 10 percent of the students
entering MFTI each year were Jewish. This figure had
dropped to four percent by 1966, the year Shcharanskiy
evidently entered the school. Furthermore, even those
Jewish students like Shcharanskiy who did manage to get
into MFTI during the 1960s have experienced serious
difficulties in obtaining good jobs in defense-related
facilities after graduation, despite MFTI's reputation
as the best scientific educational institution in the
USSR.
It is unlikely that Shcharanskiy's employment at
the Moscow oil and gas research institute after his
graduation involved a sensitive position with access to
classified information. Accordingly, both the denial
of Shcharanskiy's initial emigration application and
the current Soviet claims about his access to state
secrets are probably related to the classified training
and knowledge that Shcharanskiy acquired while he was
enrolled at MFTI.
2 February 1978
8
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 SEZIAAERDP79T00912A000100010063-9
Soviets Push Port Program
The Soviets have embarked on an ambitious port ex-
pansion and development program to increase productivity
through greater specialization and mechanization. The
show piece of this effort is Vostochnyy in the Soviet
Far East. This new city-port complex is designed to re-
lieve congestion at the older Soviet Far East ports and
to become the principal Soviet gateway to the Pacific,
a role that will greatly expand when the Baykal-Amur
Railroad is completed.
Shortcomings Detailed
Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Yuri Brezhnev, son
of Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev, has criticized
Soviet port operations and facilities, claiming that
dock delays have held back the Soviet economy and re-
sulted in waste. Brezhnev stated that Soviet ports have
low cargo-handling capacities and are short of modern
loading equipment, heated warehouses, and cold storage
facilities. He has acknowledged that unloading delays
have created shortages and have led to the spoilage of
goods. In addition, he noted that freight car shortages
have hampered port operations and called for more energetic
work from railway personnel.
The lack of an adequate labor force is a further con-
straint on Soviet port operations. While this does not
pose a major problem in the Baltic and Black Seas at
ports such as Leningrad and Odessa, the problem seriously
hinders operations in the Soviet Far East, delaying cargo
handling operations in the Nakhodka area.
2 February 1978
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 20 kgf 16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
Remedial Action Under Plan
The need to modernize and expand Soviet port facili-
ties is acknowledged in the current Five Year Plan (1976-
1980). In 1977, for instance, emphasis was placed on
increasing port capacities by constructing specialized,
high productivity cargo transshipment complexes, espe-
cially in the ports of Vostochnyy, Nagayevo, Novorossiysk,
Ilyechevsk, Arkhangelsk, and Tuapse. Of these, the most
significant is the new city-port complex being developed
at Vostochnyy on Vrangel Bay, 100 kilometers northeast
of Vladivostok. The complex will be completed sometime
in the mid-1980s at the earliest.
Vostochnyy is to become one of the Soviet Union's
major shipping centers and the future terminal of the
Baykal-Amur (BAM) Railroad. Parts of this facility are
already in operation, handling 1.5 million tons of cargo
in 1976 and presumably a larger amount in 1977. When
completed, the port's capacity is projected to be 40
million tons, four times the present cargo capacity of
nearby Nakhodka. The container facility can currently
handle 70,000 containers annually, about 60 percent of
its eventual capacity. A woodchip berth (annual capacity,
800,000 tons) and a timber berth (annual capacity, 400,000
cubic meters) have also begun operations. In 1978, a
coal complex, with an ultimate capacity of 10 million
tons a year, is scheduled to open. Three additional
facilities are planned: a general cargo berth, a grain
berth, and a berth for chemical products.
The physical constraints on expansion at Nakhodka
compelled the Soviets to undertake the construction of
Vostochnyy. Without it, the Soviets would be unable to
handle the export of coal and other raw materials whose
exploitation will proceed with the construction of the
BAM Railroad. Despite its priority, this project suffers
from the labor shortages and construction delays common
in distant Soviet regions such as Siberia and the Far
East. When finally completed, Vostochnyy will rank as
one of the world's largest ports and will play a leading
role in the economic development of eastern Siberia and
the Soviet Far East.
2 February 1978
10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
25X1
 Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010063-9