THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 28, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
The USSR
ONAL AND
ITICAL ANALY.
Secret
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28 July 1977
' The Draft Constitution: Popov Proposes Radical
Restructuring of System for Managing Soviet
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Staffing the Party Bureaucracy: Stability
Remains the Watchword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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The Draft Constitution: Popov Proposes Radical
Restructuring of System for Managing Soviet Economy
An article by Professor G. Popov in Pravda on July
6 proposes several constitutional amendments which, if
adopted, would mean radical changes in the bureaucratic
structure for administering the Soviet economy. Although
most of Popov's ideas have been discussed in the Soviet
media on previous occasions, he is the first to propose
that they be written into the draft constitution.
Intersectoral Organs
Popov begins by proposing an amendment that would
specify that the all-union ministries and state commit-
tees are not only responsible for administering a given
sector of the economy throughout the USSR, but are also
jointly responsible for solving the most important "in-
tersectoral problems." According to Popov, the need for
a law defining the procedure and mechanism of the various
organs of management is "obvious."
Popov also asks if it is not "expedient" to name
in the constitution the "most typical" nodes of inter-
sectoral cooperation--Gosplan, Gossnab, the Ministry of
Finance, Gosstroy, and the USSR Central Statistical
Administration--and define precisely which group of or-
gans is responsible for the solution of any particular
group of problems as well as which of them bears the
major responsibility for this. The State Committee for
Science and Technology, for example, would be recognized
as having the primary responsibility for progress in the
technical fields.
Popov says it would be "useful" to have the new
constitution note the "special" role that Gosplan plays
among all the intersectoral organs as the "organizer"
of centralized economic statewide management. By the
same token, there should be provision for the creation
of new intersectoral organs--such as an interdepartmental
committee responsible for the "rational use of nature"
and environmental conservation.
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Popov notes that the draft constitution does not
include a list of ministries under the USSR Council of
ministers and supports the idea that the constitution
should provide maximum flexibility when it comes to
creating new ministries or amalgamating existing ones.
On the other hand, he questions the wisdom of the tendency
in recent years to split ministries up into smaller units,
noting that this has led to a situation in which indus-
trial ministries are "extremely heterogeneous" in their
functions.
Popov points out that some ministries are responsible
for sectors, others for subsectors, and still others
look after several closely related sectors. The "most
alarming" point, however, is the fact that the major
problems of scientific and technical progress which are
of a uniform nature are, as a rule, handled by several
different ministries. According to Popov, this arrange-
ment makes the solution of the problems "more difficult."
Amalgamation into Super Ministries
For Popov, the best way to accelerate scientific
and technical progress is to reorganize the system of
ministries--for the most part, enlarging them through
amalgamation. This will ensure that not only the main
elements for the output of the final product, but also
the basic factors for the growth of productivity and
the main directions of scientific and technical progress
are all in the same hands. Popov also says that it may
prove "expedient" in a number of cases to create spe-
cialized "supraministerial" organs for the management
of groups of homogeneous sectors which have "cropped
up" in various departments.
Popov also notes that the ministries differ in that
some control a sector throughout the country while others
operate through republic ministries and other sectors--
for example, highway construction--do not have any single
nationwide organ of leadership. Insisting that some
form of standardization is "essential" here, Popov argues
for the union-republic structure of management as the
"most promising." This would give a sector ministry
"representation" in each republic.
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This local "representation" could take the form of
a republic ministry or an industrial association, depend-
ing on the scale of production on the local scene, and
the extent of the rights possessed by the republic organs
would vary from sector to sector. Nevertheless, this
standardization would regulate the republic level organs'
efforts in developing enterprises subordinate to minis-
tries or other agencies at the national level, and it
also would provide a headquarters at the national level
for those sectors whose management has, at present, been
organized only at the republic level.
Turning to the territorial organs of management,
Popov notes that the draft constitution has broadened the
rights of the local organs of state management. Accord-
ing to Popov, however, it is "essential" to define what
proportion of the assets and above all what sectoral
capital investment must be realized on a centralized
basis and what proportion via the territorial organs or
with their "mandatory participation."
Popov also calls for a definition of the sources
for the formation of territorial funds--from the state
budget, from enterprise profits, from social insurance
deductions, and from payments for natural and manpower
resources--"the introduction of which has long been a
matter of urgency." In this connection, Popov notes that
logic "suggests" that ministries that are developing
production in already inhabited regions and cities must
make payments to the territorial organs since in such
cases the sector is relieved of the expenditure on the
construction of housing, the developing of transportation
systems, and so forth.
The Reshaping of Oblast Borders
Popov also points out that the administrative-ter-
ritorial boundaries have proved to be "divorced" from
the real borders of the production complexes that have
taken shape in the USSR. As a result, a single "economic
bloc" or even a single production association "frequently
finds itself under the jurisdiction of two, and even
three territorial organs." According to Popov, the "time
has come" to alter the borders of krays and oblasts "in
a whole series of cases."
Popov notes that this can be done in two ways: by
revising the administrative-territorial structure as a
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whole and bringing it into conformity with the economic
complexes that have taken shape, or by introducing
"economic zoning." In realizing the latter, however,
it is "essential" to provide in the constitution for the
procedures of economic zoning and the means of revising
this zoning, and the rights and duties of the organ of
management of such a zone.
According to Popov, this organ of management should
be a "collegial organ--a kind of regional committee or
ministry consisting of representatives of the sectoral
ministries and also republic, kray, and oblast organi-
zations operating in the zone." Popov denies that this
would mean the resurrection of the eovnarkhoa system
introduced by Khrushchev and discarded less than a year
after his ouster in October 1964, "even in an altered
form." According to Popov, the new organs of territorial
economic management would be restricted to coordinating
functions and solving local problems which can only be
poorly resolved or cannot be resolved at all by the
sectoral ministries operating within the region.
Popov also points out that the problems connected
with the development of the Russian Republic's Non-Black
Soil Zone confirm the "expediency" of providing in the
constitution for the creation of organs for "programmed-
targeted management." He says that the implementation
of some inter-sectoral and inter-regional programs will
require the creation of a temporary ministry or commit-
tee which would function for 15-20 years--such as, a
Ministry for the Non-Black Soil Zone. According to Popov,
it would be "useful" to have the new constitution specify
who would have the right to form such organs, what the
duties and term of activity of these organs would be,
and so forth.
Brezhnev and Popov's Proposals
In sum, Popov has set forth a lengthy list of pro-
posals which, if adopted, would usher in a period of
organizational changes reminiscent of the years under
Khrushchev, and very much at variance with the pattern
during the Brezhnev years. At first glance, it would
seem highly unlikely that Brezhnev and the other top
Soviet leaders would give a green light to such sweeping
changes at this time--if only because of the problems
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that such changes would create now that the draft con-
stitution has been solidly endorsed by all who have
met to "discuss" it.
On the other hand, most of the ideas put forth
in Popov's article have been aired in public on previous
occasions, and Brezhnev himself is on record as favoring
at least some of these changes--for example, the notion
that at least some of the industrial ministries should
be merged into larger units. The Soviet leadership
must recognize that at least some of the steps outlined
by Popov must be taken to improve the system for managing
the stagnating economy. Some Politburo members may also
have come to recognize that some changes must be made
more or less simultaneously, not in piecemeal fashion.
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Staffing the Party Bureaucracy: Stability Remains the
Watchword
During his speech at the 25th Party Congress in
February of last year, General Secretary Brezhnev pointed
out that an end had been put to repeated replacement of
party officials. He also noted that transfers occurred
only when required by the business at hand or by a need
to "strengthen" a given sector of work. He added, how-
ever, that this did not mean that it was possible to re-
tain people who could not pull their weight, were irre-
sponsible, or failed to move with the times. He expressed
confidence that the congress would support the idea that
"anyone who has lost the ability to assess his activity
critically, has lost contact with the masses, is influ-
enced by flatterers and sycophants, or has lost the trust
of the communists, cannot be a party leader."
Whatever the implications for leadership politics,
Brezhnev's remarks on the criteria for personnel changes
not only defended the policies that have enabled party
officials to enjoy an unprecedented period of job secu-
rity, but also provided a justification for the house-
cleanings that had taken place in certain parts of the
country since the 24th Party Congress in 1971. They also
may have been meant to give a green light to additional
changes in the future. The pace of such changes remains
very slow, however. This certainly is to the liking of
the "ins," but probably is very frustrating for younge
party officials who are bored with the "old ways" and
oppressed by the lack of headroom at present.
Changes in the Central Committee Apparatus
There has been some movement in the central party
bureaucracy since the 25th Congress, but certain of these
changes are of a fairly routine nature. For example,
the appointment of V. G. Afanasyev as chief editor of
Pravda in April 1976 was a follow-up to the elevation
of his predecessor, M. V. Zimyanin, to the CPSU Secre-
tariat at the congress. The appointment of R. I. Kosola-
pov as chief editor of Kommunist on the following day
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merely filled the vacancy created by Afanasyev's trans-
fer to the top job at Pravda.
On the-other hand, the elevation of V. A. Karlov
from first deputy chief to chief of the Central Committee's
Agriculture Department in May 1976 may have reflected a
more important issue--the status of Politburo member F.
D. Kulakov. Kulakov is believed to have headed` the ' Ag-
riculture Department up through the 25th Congress, even
after having become aCPSU secretary in September 1965 and
after having gained Politburo membership in 1971, kula-
kov may have vacated the top post-in the Agriculture De-
partment immediately after the 25th Congress', however.
An effort appears to have been made at that time to give
him broader responsibilities within the leadership--an
effort that seems to have petered out in recent months.
The appointment of K. V. Rusakov as head of the
Socialist Countries Department in March of this year
filled a vacancy that had existed since June 1972, when
Rusakov had left that post to join Brezhnev's`personal
staff. Rusakov's subsequent elevation to the CPSU Sec-
retariat at the May plenum makes him a much more power-
ful figure than he was during 1968-1972,when he''bper-
ated under the aegis of then CPSU Secretary, now Deputy
Premier K. F. Katushev. It is not clear, however, whether
Rusakov will be more powerful than Katushev was when he
was the CPSU secretary supervising the work of the So-
cialist Countries Department.
The appointment of Ye. M. Tyazhelnikovas'ch of of
the Propaganda Department in May of this year filled a
vacancy that had existed since April 1970, when V 1.
Stepakov was removed and posted abroad as Soviet ambas-
sador to Yugoslavia. It is noteworthy that thisisthe
only vacancy involving a top post with the central party
bureaucracy whose previous incumbent left Office under
a cloud, and that:it tooki`seven years to'fill theevacancy.
Tyazhelnikov's replacement as headdof the,-;Komsomol ' (youth)
organization is B. N. Pastukhov, hitherto $econa secretary
of that organization.
Chan es in Regional Party Commands in the Russian Republic
The` situation has been even more 'stable !1n 'Moseow,
Leningrad, and the 70 other provinces making up the RSFSR.
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N. F. Aksenov replaced the late A. V. Georgiyev as first
secretary in Altai Kray in April 1976. V. N. Makayev
moved up into the number-two post in the Moscow city
party organization in July 1976, after L. I. Grekov was
transferred to the number-two post in the Uzbek Republic
party organization. B. N. Yeltsin became first secretary
in Sverdlovsk Oblast in November 1976, after Ya. P. Ryahov
had been elevated to the CPSU Secretariat at the October
1976 plenum. V. K. Gusev became first secretary in Sara-
tov Oblast in November 1976, replacing A. I. Shibayev,
who had been elected head of the Soviet trade union or-
ganization. The vacancy created by the death of Ulyanovsk
Oblast first secretary A. A. Skochilov has yet to be filled.
It is noteworthy that none of the above mentioned
officials left office under a cloud, and that each vacancy
was filled by an individual who had come up through the
ranks in that particular organization. Aksenov had been
the chairman of the Altai Kray Executive Committee;
Makayev had been a party secretary with both the Moscow
city and oblast party organizations; Yeltsin had been a
party secretary with the Sverdlovsk organization; and
Gusev had been the number-two man in the Saratov party
command. The individual who eventually replaces Skochilov
in Ulyanovsk almost certainly will also prove to be a
"local boy who made good."
Changes in the Minority Republics
There have been no important changes in the Arme-
nian or Georgian party organizations, and the only major
change in the Transcaucasus came in April of this year,
when Yu. N. Pugachev replaced S. V. Kozlov as second
secretary in Azerbaydzhan. Kozlov, who had been ap-
pointed a secretary of the Soviet trade union organiza-
tion in March of this year, had held the number-two post
in Azerbaydzhan since May 1968, and was more than due for
reassignment. Shortly before his departure from Azer-
baydzhan, he had been awarded the honor certificate of
the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet "for serv-
ices to the republic"--a sign that he left the republic
in good order.
In Central Asia, A. G. Korkin replaced V. K. Mesyats
as Kazakhstan second secretary in August 1976--five months
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after Masyats had returned to Moscow to become USSR min-
ister of agriculture. G. S. Miroshkhin moved into Kor-
kin's previous job as republic party secretary (presum-
ably for industry) in November 1976--a major promotion
for the former second secretary of the Mangyshlak Oblast
party unit. The other change came in February of this
year, when U. K. Kushekov replaced S. Mukashev as first
secretary in Guryev Oblast, after the latter had become
head of the Kazakh Republic trade union organization.
Kushekov has been chairman of the Guryev Oblast Executive
Committee.
The only change in neighboring Kirgizia came in July
of this year, when K. Ye. Fomichenko replaced Yu. N.
Pugachev as republic second secretary after the latter's
reassignment to the number-two post in Azerbaydzhan. The
selection of Fomichenko, formerly head of a sector in the
Central Committee's Organizational-Party Work Department,
is in keeping with the tradition of putting a "man from
Moscow" in the number-two post in the minority republics.
Tadzhikistan also can point to but one major appointment,
the selection of G. Pallayev to head the party organiza-
tion in newly created Kurgan-Tyube Oblast. Pallayev had
been chairman of the republic's "Selkhoztekhnika" (Farm
Machinery) Organization.
The situation has been a bit more fluid in Turkmenia.
Ch. S. Karryyev replaced B. Geldyyev as republic party
secretary (presumably for industry) in August 1976, when
the latter retired for "health reasons." P. A. Annaorazov
replaced Karryyev as first secretary in Ashkhabad Oblast,
and was replaced as first secretary in Mary Oblast by
A. Akgayev, formerly chairman of the Executive Committee
there.
The other major change in Turkmenia came in June of
this year, when R. Khudayberdyyev replaced B. Charyyev
as first secretary in Chardzhou Oblast after the latter
had been ousted "for serious shortcomings in work." The
fact that Khudayberdyyev, formerly a rayon first secre-
tary in Chardzhou Oblast, was selected to replace Charyyev
is significant in itself, however. Under Khrushchev,
chances are that a decision would have been made to bring
someone in from outside to correct those "shortcomings,"
rather than trust the clean-up to local officials.
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In the meantime, the situation has been relatively
calm in Uzberkistan. The arrival of L. I. Grekov as
republic second secretary in July 1976--replacing V. G.
Lomonosov, who had been appointed chairman of the USSR
State Committee for Labor and Wages--has not set off a
house-cleaning in Uzberkistan. The only changes to date
came in February of this year, when A. K. Karimov re-
placed K. M. Murtazayev as first secretary in Bukhara
Oblast, after the latter had been named chairman of the
Uzbek Republic State Committee for Labor, and the selec-
tion of A. Karimov to replace A. A. Karimov as head of
the Surkhandarya Oblast party unit. We have no infor-
mation to date on the new head of the Surkhandarya party
command, but suspect that he has come up through the ranks
of that organization.
The situation has been even quieter in the Baltic
republics. The only change in Estonia came in March of
this year, when A. F. Ryuytel replaced F. S. Usanev as
party secretary for agriculture. Ushanev had retired
"on pension" after having held the post for 23 years;
Ryuytel is the former rector of the republic's agricul-
tural academy. The only change in Lativa took place in
October 1976, when G. K. Ziyemelis replaced B. K. Pugo
as first secretary of the Riga city party organization.
Pugo had been transferred "to other work"--a sign that
he may have left office under a cloud. Ziyemelis had
been chairman of the city Executive Committee, suggesting
that whatever cloud hung over Pugo did not extend to
other local officials in Riga.
Neighboring Lithuania also has had but one change
to date--the selection of A. M. K. Brazauskas as republic
party secretary (presumably for industry) in May of this
year, after A. A. Ferensas had been transferred to the
top post with the republic trade union organization.
Brazauskas had previously been the first deputy chairman
of the republic's planning organization.
In Belorussia, Ye. Ye. Sokolov replaced V. A.
Mikulich as party boss in Brest Oblast in March of this
year, when Mikulich moved over into the top party job
in Minsk Oblast after I. Ye. Polyakov replaced the late
F. A. Surganov as chairman of the Presidium of the re-
public's Supreme Soviet. Sokolov had been chief of the
agricultural department under the republic's central
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committee. The other change came in June of this year,
when G. G. Bartoshevich replaced V. A. Lepeshkin as head
of the Minsk city party organization. Lepeshkin had been
transferred "to other work"; we have no information on
Bartoshevich's background.
The Ukraine also has been relatively quiet since
the 25th Party Congress. Ye. V. Kachalovsky replaced
A. F. Vatchenko as first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast party organization in June 1976, after Vatchenko
had replaced I. S. Grushetsky as chairman of the Presidium
of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Grushetsky had "re--
tired on pension" at 72 years of age due to "deterio-
rating health," Kachalovsky had been second secretary of
the Dnepropetrovsk organization. The other changes came
in late June and early July of this year, after P. P.
Kozyr "retired on pension" from his job as first secre-
tary in Odessa Oblast. Kozyr was replaced there by N.
K. Kirichenko, who was replaced as first secretary in
the Crimea Oblast by V. S. Makarenko, formerly first
secretary of the Sevastopol city party organization in
that province.
Neighboring Moldavia also has but one change to
date--the selection of Ye. P. Kalenk to replace S. K.
Grossu as republic party secretary for industry after
Grossu's appointment as republic premier in November
1976. That move had been set in motion by the appoint-
ment of Grossu's predecessor, P. A. Paskar, to one of
the four first deputy chairmanships with the USSR Gos-
plan in July 1976.
In sum, relatively few important party jobs have
changed hands since the 25th Party Congress, and very
few party officials at this level have left office in
disgrace since then. There certainly have been more
cases of people being ousted for "cause" at lower eche-
lons--for example, at the rayon level--but here, too,
there have been relatively few cases that have been
brought to the public's eye. The party bureaucracy
usually has chosen to wash its dirty linen in private;
cases such as the recent one in Azerbaydzhan, in which
a rayon party secretary was sentenced to 13 years in a
labor camp for extortion, remain the exception to the
rule that says that even when such people must be pun-
ished, this must be done "quietly" lest the party's rep-
utation suffer from unnecessary "revelations."
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