'DEMOCRATIC CAMBODIA': AN EXPERIMENT IN RADICALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000900110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
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Research Study
"Democratic Cambodia".-
An Experiment in Radicalism
Secret
PR 76 10078
December 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
"DEMOCRATIC CAMBODIA":
AN EXPERIMENT IN RADICALISM
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Note: In the preparation of this study, the Office of Political Research consulted
other offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Their comments and suggestions
were appreciated and used. Comments would be welcomed by the author
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CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS ....................... . .................... v
I.
THE DOMESTIC SITUATION: A MAVERICK REGIME ....... 1
A.
B.
C.
D.
Politico-Economic Radicalism ................................ 1
Departure From the "Conventional" Communist Model ....... 2
Ideological Departure: Communism Without a Party? .......... 2
Middle-Class Leadership .................................... 3
II.
FOREIGN RELATIONS: STRIVING FOR INDEPENDENCE ..... 4
A.
B,
C.
D.
In Search of Security ....................................... 4
Ideological Neutralism ..................... . ................. 5
The Shedding of Isolationism ............................... 6
The Shackles of Foreign Assistance ......... . ................ 7
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
Since the fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Khmer
Communists have shown themselves to be the most extreme of the
world's totalitarian regimes. The regime's politico-economic policies
have been characterized by the total mobilization of the Cambodian
people. The forced resettlement of the entire urban population in the
rural areas has been justified as a means to create a huge permanent
labor force in the countryside. The unprecedented cruelty with which
the experiment was carried out resulted in the death of hundreds of
thousands of people including almost the entire educated stratum.
Unorthodox economic practices, such as the complete abolition of
private ownership and the departure from a money economy, reflect
the Khmer Communists' determination to implement a social system
that is alien to other Communist countries. The regime has departed
from Marxist-Leninist practice by refusing to identify "Democratic
Cambodia" as a member of the Communist camp. The Khmer
Communists' vagueness about the country's political system and their
avoidance until recently of standard Communist terminology are
actions amounting to a unique "Cambodian model."
The most striking departure has been the regime's decision to keep
the Khmer Communist Party (KCP) underground. The denial of the
Communist Party's leading role in the post-revolutionary period, and
the use of the vague term "revolutionary organization" in lieu of the
Party are innovations without precedent in Communist practice.
Indications are that the continued underground status of the KCP
did not diminish its decision-making role in the political life of the
regime. Recent evidence that Prime Minister Pol Pot and KCP General
Secretary Saloth Sar are the same person tends to strengthen that
conclusion.
In the area of foreign policies, the Khmer Communist regime is
concerned above all with maintaining Cambodia's independence.
Especially fearful of Vietnamese ambitions, the regime pursues a policy
of neutrality, nonalignment and nonparticipation in any military bloc
or regional alliance.
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Having no overt Communist Party of its own, Cambodia restricts
its relations with other Communist countries to state-level contacts.
Despite its overwhelming reliance on China for economic and military
assistance, the regime has avoided forming an ideological alliance with
Peking. Cambodia does not even have diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union, but by refraining from public polemics with Moscow, the
Khmer Communists are keeping the door open to future ties with the
Kremlin.
Recent efforts to ease Cambodia's initial diplomatic isolation are
expected to continue. For the time being, however, the regime is not
likely to change its hostile attitude toward the US or to make any
overtures to the US.
The Khmer Communists have lately been showing an increasing
interest in forming economic and trade contacts with the rest of the
world. However, the continued scarcity of export commodities and the
virtual lack of hard currency earnings is likely to prevent the regime
from substantially reducing its reliance on Chinese economic and
military aid for some years to come.
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DISCUSSION
1. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION: A MAVERICK
REGIME
A. Politico-Economic Radicalism
With its takeover of Phnom Penh in April 1975, the
new Cambodian regime, controlled by hard-line
elements of the Khmer Communist movement,
embarked on a unique totalitarian experiment. The
most appalling features of this experiment have been
the uprooting of the population of the urban areas
and the use of forced labor on a national scale. Both
of these features are unprecedented in the history of
the Communist movement.
In trying to justify their actions, the Khmer
Communist leaders have put forward a variety of
considerations. They argued that the lack of foodstuffs
in the cities swollen by the influx of refugees left no
alternative but to return the city-dwellers into the
rural areas. The same move was supposed to remedy
the problem of the depleted population in the
countryside which would have otherwise precluded
the completion of basic agricultural tasks.
In stark terms, the strategy worked. Having forced
the total city population to settle in agricultural
cooperatives, the regime eliminated the need for
transporting large quantities of food into the urban
centers. Through the introduction of mass forced
labor, the Khmer Communists were able to claim a
satisfactory harvest of rice by the end of the year. The
utilization of millions of people for the construction of
a giant country-wide system of dikes and embank-
ments has been aimed at reducing the country's
dependence on weather conditions in the future.
The political considerations have been closely
related to the economic ones. The Khmer Communists
calculated that a swollen urban population, expe-
riencing a severe shortage of food and other consumer
goods, could become a source of resistance to their
administration. By driving the entire city population
to the countryside and moving them around at will,
the regime managed to cower potentially hostile
elements and to prevent the emergence of organized
opposition in the civilian population. Psychological as
well as material factors, such as the feeling of
rootlessness, separation from other family members,
newly-found poverty and the fear of cruel punish-
ments have effectively prevented former city-dwellers
from resisting the totalitarian rule of the new regime. *
Indications are that despite the relatively small
number of guards assigned to individual agricultural
collectives-equivalent to the former villages-resist-
ance to the Khmer Communist administration has
manifested itself mainly in the form of attempted
escape rather than in outbreaks of physical hostility
against the regime.
Ideological considerations also played a part in the
Khmer Communists' decision to strip the cities of their
population. The extreme cruelty with which the
experiment was carried out reflects a mixture of naive
utopianism and intense Khmer nationalism which
may be a reaction to 90 years of French colonial rule.
The difficult conditions experienced by the Khmer
Communists during years of guerrilla existence inten-
sified their resentment toward the "embourgeois-
ment" of the urban population, their alleged aban-
donment of Cambodia's cultural and national her-
itage and indulgence in Western-type conveniences.
Besides serving an economic function, therefore, the
driving of the city-dwellers into the countryside and
exposing them to extremely harsh living and working
conditions may have been motivated by a naive
attempt to punish them for the acceptance of what
the new regime considered a corrupt, reactionary way
of life.
* The regime's systematic attempt to eliminate all those
connected with previous administrations, particularly members of
the educated stratum, combined with the spread of various diseases
such as malaria, is believed to have led to the death of hundreds of
thousands of people, possibly over 10 percent of the entire
population.
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B. Departure From the "Conventional" "conventional" Communist pattern and to establish a
Communist Model uniquely Cambodian model.
The economic system introduced by the Khmer
Communists following the takeover contradicts the
economic theories of Marxism-Leninism. The most
extreme features of the Cambodian economic experi-
ment have been the banning of all private property
except the most essential personal belongings of the
individual, the abolition of the wage system, and the
nationwide return to a barter economy in the place of
money as the means of exchange. * These features
reflect an attempt to adopt a social system based on
economic utopianism, one which had been envisaged
in some early Marxist theoretical works but was
discarded by Communist regimes once in power.**
There are still other areas in which the Khmer
Communists remain out of step with the political
patterns of established Communist regimes. The new
state Constitution, adopted in December 1975, had
been drawn up with apparent disregard for the
experience of other Communist countries. Judging by
its organizational structure as outlined in the Consti-
tution, Cambodia is basically a Communist-type
republic. Up to now, however, the regime has failed to
specify the exact political system of the new state. As a
result of this, the text of the Constitution includes no
reference either to the abolition of the former
monarchy or to the transition to a republican system.
The lack of definitions amounting to the concealment
of established facts have been due to the Khmer
leadership's efforts to avoid identification with the
In an extraordinary move, following the takeover the regime
abolished the monetary system. People are being compensated for
their labor in the form of meager rice rations. The basic industrial
items produced by local workshops and the few factories now in
operation are "sold" to the rural co-operatives in exchange for the
agricultural products grown by the latter.
** Soviet theoretical literature routinely condemns "egalitarian-
ism" as a petty-bourgeois utopian theory which seeks to prove the
possibility of eliminating capitalistic contradictions by means of the
evenhanded redistribution of private property. In China, too,
manifestations of egalitarianism have in recent years been
condemned by the Party as being utopian and not in conformity
with the existing conditions of socialism. The Chinese state
Constitution includes specific provisions sanctioning the continued
existence of private plots and so-called side-line production in the
countryside. In early 1975, left-radical elements, while conceding
that commodity production, an unequal wage system and the
money economy were still necessary at the current stage of
economic development in China, described the elimination of those
"bourgeois" practices as a long-term goal.
In contrast to the usual Communist practice, the
regime chose the ambiguous term "Democratic
Cambodia" as the official name of the country. The
name implies no direct organizational ties with the
Communist world and allows the Khmer Communists
to claim membership in the less-structured conglom-
eration of bloc-free nations known as the nonaligned
movement.
C. Ideological Departure: Communism
Without a Party?
The potentially most significant departure from the
"conventional" pattern lies in the regime's refusal to
publicly identify the KCP as the leading force in
Democratic Cambodia's political life. Neither the
Constitution nor any other document issued by the
Cambodian leadership since the takeover has made
any reference to the KCP's position vis-a-vis the state
or confirmed the very existence of the Party.
Indications are, however, that the ideological
departure of the regime may he a tactical measure
and as such a temporary one. The KCP is known to
exist, although its organizational form and member-
ship remain secret." Some of the top leaders of the
Cambodian insurgency have been identified as
leading functionaries of the underground KCP. The
same men are in charge of the highest offices of the
Cambodian Communist state.
There are a number of possible explanations for the
regime's continued refusal to bring the KCP into the
open. For one thing, the long years of guerrilla
existence instilled a strong sense of secretiveness and
elitism into the Party leadership which might be
difficult to overcome under the new conditions of
overt political existence. The same leaders may believe
that the KCP's reemergence from its underground
status would necessitate the incorporation of new
members, a move that might result in diluting its
strong revolutionary discipline and turning the Party
into a looser, less cohesive organization. Further, the
Khmer Communists may have wanted to avoid
* The Cambodian Communist organization was founded in
September 1951, follow;ng the dissolution of the Indochinese
Communist Party which cleared the way for the formation of
national Communist parties in Indochina. Initially known as the
Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party, the organization assumed
its present name only in 1966.
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identifying the Party as the leading force during the
initial period of repression which has led to the
displacement of millions and the violent death of
hundreds of thousands of Cambodians.
Even more important, the decision to keep the
Party out of sight enables the Khmer Communists to
remain silent on their earlier ideological and organiza-
tional association with the Lao Dong Party, ties that
the Vietnamese may try to utilize in an attempt to
interfere with Cambodian developments. The under-
ground existence of the KCP allows the regime to
avoid direct party relations with the Vietnamese
Communists.
Rather than acknowledging the leading role of the
KCP, the Khmer Communists invented a unique new
entity, the so-called "revolutionary organization."
First used in the early 1970s, the term is but a facade
for the Communist Party. As such, the revolutionary
organization has been attributed the same powers and
qualities other Communist regimes assign to their
respective parties. Accordingly, the victory of the
Khmer Communist insurgency has been due to the
"clearsighted leadership" of the revolutionary organi-
zation. The same organization is held responsible for
charting the present and future course of the
Cambodian revolution.
As a result of the regime's secretiveness about the
nature of the revolutionary organization, the term has
assumed an almost mythical quality. Being a substi-
tute for the actual KCP, the revolutionary organiza-
tion is not likely to have such formal components as a
Central Committee or Politburo. In contrast, the real
KCP which remains underground, is believed to have
an organizational structure of its own-including a
Central Committee-whose members occupy impor-
tant positions in the state apparatus. Recent informa-
tion identifying Prime Minister Pol Pot as being
identical with KCP Secretary General Saloth Sar
suggests that the Party has retained firm control over
the state administration and is in charge of the
political course of the regime.
D. Middle-Class Leadership
Following nationwide "elections" in March 1976,
the Khmer Communists formally established the new
executive and legislative structure of the Cambodian
state. The most important offices that emerged in the
wake of the election farce have been a State
Presidency, the Government of Democratic Cambodia
and the Standing Committee of the regime's quasi-
legislative organ, the People's Representative Assem-
bly. A survey of nine top functionaries holding
responsible posts in these offices, as listed in the
attached chart, reveals some of the essential character-
istics of the leaders of Democratic Cambodia.
There are important similarities in age, family and
educational backgrounds as well as in professional
experience. The nine men and women included in the
survey all appear to be in their mid or late 40s; most
are of middle-class origin and highly educated.
Almost without exception they received some kind of
schooling in France, an experience that tends to
encourage a sense of comradeship within such groups.
Almost all of those surveyed qualify as members of
the Cambodian "intelligentsia." Having occupied
administrative or educational posts upon their return
from France, they disappeared from Phnom Penh in
the 1960s to join the anti-Sihanouk forces gathering in
the hills and jungles of Cambodia. Having established
themselves as leading functionaries of the Khmer
insurgency, some were included in Prince Sihanouk's
Peking-based exile government in the early 1970s.
Finally, they came to form the top leadership of the
new executive and legislative organs of Democratic
Cambodia in April 1976.
This leadership is also characterized by a significant
degree of nepotism. Two government ministers, Ieng
Thirith and Yun Yat, are the wives of two Deputy
Prime Ministers, leng Sary and Son Sen respectively.
Moreover, leng Thirith happens to be the sister of
Khieu Ponnary, who is married to Prime Minister and
KCP General Secretary Pol Pot/Saloth Sar.
The latter, appointed Prime Minister of Democratic
Cambodia in April 1976, appears to be the single most
influential member of the Khmer Communist leader-
ship. Born about 1928, Pol Pot/Saloth Sar studied
technical subjects in Phnom Penh before taking a
course in electronics in France. Having returned to
Cambodia in the mid-1950s, he became active in
leftist journalistic circles and participated in the
organization of the People's Party, a Communist front
organization. Married to Khieu Ponnary, a former
schoolteacher, Pol Pot/Saloth Sar was probably
accepted by members of the Cambodian French-
educated professional-administrative elite as a mem-
ber of the same group. Pol Pot/Saloth Sar disappeared
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fn nr Phnom Penh is 1963 and joined the underground
Khmer Communist organization in which he became
Gc neral Secretary in 1972.
I'he positive identification of Pol Pot and Saloth Sar
as the same person elped clarify the
power relationships between the two main executive
organs of the Cambodian state, the State Presidency
and the government. Up to then, the State Presidency
under the chairmanship of Khieu Samphan, a
nationally recognized personality of solid revolu-
tionary credentials, appeared to wield equal powers
wish the government under the little-known Prime
Minister Poll Pot. The new information on Pol Pot's
real identity, however, effectively changes that judg-
ment.
A decision issued by the Khmer Communist
leadership in late September authorizing the Prime
Minister to take temporary leave from his post "in
orcer to take care of his health which has been had for
several months," shed some doubt about his future in
the (ambodian hierarchy. However, subsequent
de-clopments suggest that Pol Pot/Saloth Sar may be
genuinely ill, and remains in favor politically.* His
temporary absence from political activity may serve as
another reminder of the secrecy that continues to
surround all personalities in Communist Cambodia.
II. FOREIGN RELATIONS: STRIVING
FOR INDEPENDENCE
A. In Search of Security
Since coming to power in April 1975, the Khmer
Communists have shown as deep a concern about
maintaining Cambodia's independence from Vietnam
as the administrations before them. They have paid
lip service to the country's historical tradition in the
same fashion as the governments they succeeded and
adopted fundamentally the same foreign policy
Despite the Septemher anmm1FIcrrnent concerning his tenmpo-
ranl Ieave on medical grounds, Pot Pots name continues to appear
in Cambodian broadcasts suggesting that he retains the post of
Prime Minister. 't'he official Cambodian media has thus far failed
to confirm Pol Pot as being identical with Saloth Sar. As long as the
KCP is to remain "underground," Salolli Sar is not likely to be
mentioned in any official capacity in the regime.
Left: Prime Minister "Pol Pot" of Democratic Cambodia. Photo was distributed by the Vietnamese News
Agency following the visit of a Vietnamese journalist delegation in Cambodia last July. Right: Man tentatively
identified as Saloth Sar, secretary general of the underground Khmer Communist Party in 1973. Recent
evidence indicates that the two men are the some person.
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principles formulated by Norodom Sihanouk some
two decades earlier. The most important components
of those principles are: independence, neutrality,
nonalignment and opposition to all forms of foreign
interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.
One of the regime's basic preoccupations is to
prevent foreign military encroachments on Cambo-
dian territory. The new state Constitution of Demo-
cratic Cambodia includes a special provision "abso-
lutely rejecting" the establishment of foreign military
bases on Cambodian soil, a pledge that the regime has
been repeating both in the context of bilateral
relations and that of the security of the entire
Southeast Asia region.
Like Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s, the
Cambodian Communist leaders are hoping to find
some sort of a guarantee for the country's security in
Cambodia's association with the nonaligned move-
ment. There is a direct relationship between the
regime's pledges of nonalignment and nonparticipa-
tion in military blocs and regional alliances, and its
refusal to acknowledge Cambodia's status as a full-
fledged Communist state. The regime is trying to use
Cambodia's membership in the Third World as an
excuse for basing its relations with other Communist
countries on the basically apolitical idea of peaceful
coexistence rather than on the principles of "proletar-
ian internationalism."
The Khmer Communists' close political and eco-
nomic relations with China serves to accentuate the
differences in political orientation between them and
the Vietnamese who appear to be forming increasingly
close ties with the Soviet Union. In its relations with
Cambodia, Hanoi's primary aim is to overcome the
regime's opposition to the spread of Vietnamese
influence in Southeast Asia. Out of tactical consider-
ations, therefore, the Vietnamese have been trying to
avoid any further deterioration of their relations with
Phnom Penh and appear eager to broaden their
present limited economic and political contacts with
the Cambodian Communists.
B. Ideological Neutralism
The lack of an overt party organization has enabled
the Khmer Communists to avoid forming direct party-
to-party relations with other Communist regimes. In
communications with friendly Communist govern-
ments, the Cambodians routinely praise the "clear-
sighted leadership" of the party involved, without
referring to direct party-level ties as such. In
discussions of Cambodia's relations with other Com-
munist regimes, the party reference is invariably
omitted and the existence of friendly contacts between
"governments" and "peoples" is stressed.
Up to now, in their contacts with the Cambodian
regime, most Communist governments have accepted
this formulation, although for different reasons. The
more independent-minded members of the Commu-
nist camp-Cuba, North Korea, Romania and Yugo-
slavia-view the Cambodian experiment as useful in
reinforcing their arguments against any binding
common pattern that would tend to subordinate them
to the USSR.
The Chinese Communists, who see Cambodia as a
bulwark against creeping Soviet expansionism in
Southeast Asia, not only accept the Cambodian stand
but have become the primary supporters of the Khmer
Communist regime.
The Soviet Union and its closest allies, with whom
Cambodia has thus far refused to establish diplomatic
relations, refrain from criticizing the Khmer Commu-
nist experiment in the fear of driving Phnom Penh
even closer to Peking.
The regime's unwillingness to identify Democratic
Cambodia as a Communist country has allowed the
Khmer Communists on the whole to refrain from
using standard Marxist-Leninist terminology. This
omission is particularly significant when it comes to
terms some Communist regimes consider offensive,
such as "revisionist," "dogmatist," etc. By omitting
the use of such terminology, the Khmer Communists
have managed to retain a semblance of neutralism in
the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking.
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Despite their close economic and political ties with
the Chinese, the regime has resisted full ideological
identification with Chinese Communism. In its
contacts with Peking, the Cambodian leadership
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aspects of Cambodian-Chinese relations speak of the
friendship between the two "countries" and two
`peoples" without implying direct relations between
the two parties. At the same time, despite their refusal
to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet
UJnion, the Khmer Communists have refrained from
engaging in public polemics with the Soviet leader-
ship on political or ideological issues. Instead, the
regime has retained occasional contacts with Moscow
in the form of anniversary messages and greetings, in
conformity with the minimum standards of protocol
between independent Communist states.
Possibly as a sign of disagreement within the Khmer
t :ommunist leadership on Cambodia's indebtedness
to Mao Tse-tung, in statements devoted to Mao's
memory last September the regime came near to
abandoning its neutralist line on ideological issues. A
eulogy delivered by Prime Minister Pol Pot/Saloth Sar
on the occasion of Mao's funeral used an unusual
ormulation equating the role of the revolutionary
organization-the term used by the Khmer Commu-
nists in lieu of the Party-with that of the Communist
I'arty of China. The same eulogy also maintained that
the revolutionary organization, like the Chinese
Communist Party, adhered to the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, a statement never before made by
any Cambodian Communist leader in public. More-
over, Pol Pot/Saloth Sar departed from earlier
Cambodian practice by praising Mao as the "most
:prominent teacher in the international revolutionary
movement since Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin."
A subsequent Cambodian broadcast, made on the
occasion of the Chinese national day celebrations in
early October, paraphrased the above statements in a
manner implying even closer identity with Chinese
ideological formulations. The broadcast in effect
misquoted Pol Pot in alleging that
... The Comrade Prime Minister of our country remarked that
the Chinese revolution under the wise and correct leadership of
Chairman Mao produced experiences which have set the best
and most valuable examples for the contemporary world
revolutionary movement since Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.
Despite the references to a "revolutionary" rather
than a "Communist" movement, the above state-
ments tended considerably to weaken the Khmer
Communists' earlier effort to retain a neutral stand
between China and the Soviet Union.
However, indications are that this bias toward the
Chinese ideological line was only temporary: by mid-
October a new formulation appeared, considerably
watering down the role attributed to Mao in shaping
Marxist theory and avoiding any references to Stalin
as one of the "prominent teachers" of the interna-
tional revolutionary movement. The new formulation
described Mao as a mere "inheritor" of the theories of
Marx and Lenin and made no mention whatsoever of
Stalin. *
C. The Shedding of Isolationism
The isolationism that characterized the first year of
Khmer Communist rule has since given way to
increasing receptiveness to foreign contacts. Through-
out 1975 the Cambodian regime maintained diplo-
matic ties only with Communist regimes it considered
free from Moscow's domination.** However, the
standards laid down by the Cambodians were flexible
enough to include, in addition to China and Albania,
regimes of such diverse political and ideological
orientations as Cuba, North Korea, Romania, Yugo-
slavia and Laos.
Following the takeover, the Cambodian regime's
relations with Vietnam showed increasing strains due
to continued Vietnamese incursions into Cambodian
territory and conflicting territorial claims-particu-
larly concerning some offshore islands-that remain
outstanding. These differences, compounded by Cam-
bodia's concern over the growing friendship between
Hanoi and Moscow, have kept political relations
between the two neighboring regimes at an unusually
low level. Despite diplomatic contacts and the
inauguration of a Hanoi-Phnom Penh flight last
September, economic relations between Vietnam and
Cambodia are virtually nonexistent. In defining their
relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
* Statement by the head of the Cambodian economic delegation
in Peking. Peking NCNA in English 13 October 1976.
** The single exception was Thailand; the regime negotiated
diplomatic relations with Bangkok in October 1975 without,
however, exchanging embassies. As of the end of 1976, contacts are
still being maintained at the liaison office level.
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Cambodian leaders have referred to unspecified
"hardships and obstacles" which, according to them,
must be overcome if contacts are to develop on a
friendly basis. *
In contrast, the Cambodian regime's relations with
its closest non-Communist neighbor, Thailand, have
been progressing relatively smoothly. Despite poten-
tially serious problems between the two countries,
such as the presence of over 10,000 Cambodian
refugees on Thai territory, Phnom Penh's handling of
its relations with Thailand has been characterized by
a large degree of flexibility. At the time of establishing
diplomatic relations with the Thai Government in late
1975, the Khmer Communists defied a concerted Lao-
Vietnamese campaign against Bangkok, aimed at
pressuring the Thais to rid the country of American
presence. One year later, the Khmer refusal to echo
Vietnamese propaganda attacks on Thailand follow-
ing the Thai military coup, suggested the regime's
eagerness to retain a balance between its Communist
and non-Communist neighbors.
In 1976, Cambodia recognized more non-Commu-
nist governments, particularly members of the Third
World. Moreover, the Khmer Communists also
negotiated recognition-although without exchanging
ambassadors-with selected industrialized nations
such as Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Japan.
The regime's main criterion in establishing relations
with any given country is that country's willingness to
abide by the general principles of Cambodia's foreign
policies without pressing for an embassy in Phnom
Penh. The Khmer Communists' reluctance to accom-
modate more than a handful of diplomatic represen-
tatives in the capital appear to be based on both
economic and security considerations. Experiences of
Communist diplomats stationed in Cambodia may
help dissuade other governments from exposing their
personnel to the hardships and restrictions of Phnom
Penh living.
The one area in which the Khmer Communists
continue to show a complete lack of flexibility is their
attitude toward the US. Anti-Americanism remains an
integral part of the regime's political philosophy. The
Siem Reap "bombing" incident may have been
specifically designed to make the US a scapegoat for
Cambodia's internal and external difficulties. The
extreme anti-American propaganda is also being used
by the regime to justify its continued repression of the
population. Cambodia's rigid anti-US stance is out of
line with that of most other Communist regimes; it is
comparable only with the policies of North Korea and
Albania, countries subject to political and economic
isolation similar to that of the Cambodian regime.
Any change in Cambodia's anti-US stand is likely to
reflect a calculation that a less hostile position may
facilitate the acquisition of economic aid from the
West.
D. The Shackles of Foreign Assistance
The regime's radical economic practices, its reliance
on the permanent resettlement and total mobilization
of the population reflect an obsession with the
development of agricultural production. Specifically,
the Khmer Communists want to produce a sufficient
amount of rice for export even if it means to keep the
population on starvation rations. * The use of forced
labor on a nationwide scale for the construction of an
elaborate system of dikes and field embankments is
aimed at eventually reducing Cambodia's depen-
dence on the annual rainfall. In the long run,
however, the extreme means by which the Khmer
Communists hope to accelerate the fulfillment of the
agricultural tasks-the complete abolition of private
property and material incentives-must slow down
progress.
The emptying of the urban areas of their inhabi-
tants and the permanent settlement of the city
population in the countryside are bound to have a
detrimental effect on the rehabilitation of the industry
which was severely damaged during the war. There
are no plans to expand the country's industrial
capacity,** and the systematic elimination of the
educated professional strata should for a long time
necessitate dependence on less sophisticated technol-
ogies. As a result of this, Cambodia will remain reliant
on its traditional commodities for export, such as
lumber, crepe rubber and rice.
* References to these obstacles were included in an interview by
Cambodian Prime Minister Pol Pot to a Vietnamese journalist
delegation last July and in a speech by Deputy Prime Minister leng
Sary at a Vietnamese embassy reception last September.
engaged in agricultural production ranges from one-half to one full
condensed milk can of rice.
** As stated by Prime Minister Pol Pot in his interview with a
Vietnamese journalist delegation, 20 July 1976.
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Since the takeover, the Khmer Communist regime
has been overwhelmingly dependent on Chinese
economic and military assistance.* It was with
Chinese help that the regime rehabilitated some of its
transport facilities, opened up its only seaport for
shipping and put some of its industrial plants back
into operation. Although the financial terms of
Chinese assistance are not known, the long-term
reliance on China is bound to pose some economic
and political problems. Economically, the steady flow
of material and technological assistance provided by
the Chinese is likely to increase the Cambodian
regime's indebtedness to Peking. Politically, the
combination of that indebtedness and the growing
Chinese presence in Cambodia would tend further ro
restrict the regime's limited freedom of action in the
area of foreign relations.
In a possible effort to reduce its dependence on the
Chinese, in the second part of 1976 the Cambodian
regime made some attempts toward the establishment
of economic contacts with foreign countries, mainly
friendly Communist regimes and members of the
Third World. In September, a Cambodian economic
delegation held extensive talks with Yugoslav, Alba-
nian and Romanian economic experts; the same
delegation visited North Korea in early October.
About the same time, the regime established contacts
* During 1975 and 1976, Cambodia did receive some assistance
also from the North Korean regime. Indications are that a small
number of North Korean technicians may be working in the
country.
with nonaligned groups by participating in interna-
tional conferences on economic and industrial cooper-
ation among Third 'World nations. The Cambodians
also began to drop hints of their willingness to initiate
trade relations with a limited number of industrial
countries. *
None of these exploratory moves is known to have
produced any concrete results. However, by making
such contacts, the regime signalled its interest in
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements on
trade and economic cooperation with a broader group
of nations. The fundamental, long-term problem the
Khmer Communists are facing in this respect is the
continued scarcity of exportable commodities and the
resultant lack of foreign currency earnings. Economic
relations with foreign countries, Communist or other-
wise, must therefore be conducted mainly on the basis
of new grants and credit arrangements which would
further increase Cambodia's financial obligations to
the outside world. Consequently, even if it were to
broaden its economic contacts to a growing number of
foreign countries, the regime is not likely for some
time to come to free itself from its present one-sided
dependence on China for economic and military
assistance.
* As something of an exploratory venture, in August 1976 the
Cambodian Government set up a quasi-official trading company in
Hong Kong. With the exception of some minor initial purchases,
the office, called the Ren Fung Company Ltd., appears to be
inactive.
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Secret
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