POST-MAO PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000900080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
Research Study
Port Mao Party-Military Relations:
The Role of the General Political Department
Secret
PR 76 10076
December 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
POST-MAO PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS:
THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
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Note: Several offices provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this
study. These included OCI, OSR, and CRS within the CIA, and components of the
DIA. Research and analysis was completed in early November 1976. Comments and
questions will be welcomed by the author
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CONTENTS
Page
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS .......................................... 1
DISCUSSION ...................................................... 5
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 5
II. THE GPD: LINKING PARTY AND MILITARY ................ 5
A. Organizational Relationships . . .............................. 5
1. Structural Relationship to the Party ...................... 5
2. Position in the PLA ..................................... 6
B. Internal Organization ...................................... 8
C. Functions ................................................. 8
1. Control ................................................. 8
a. Career Management .................................. 8
b. Surveillance .......................................... 10
c. Committee Structure . . ... . ............................ 10
2. Indoctrination ........................................... 11
3. Morale-Building ......................................... 12
4. Other Functions ......................................... 12
5. In Sum ................................................ 13
III. CURRENT STATUS ......................................... 13
A. As of November 1976 ..................................... 13
B. Whose Political Asset? .......................... . .......... 13
IV. DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK .......................... 14
A. Developments ............................................. 14
1. Strengthening the Organization ........................... 14
2. Status of the Director ................................... 14
B. Outlook .................................................. 15
Annex: A Brief History of the GPD ................................. 17
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The most important function of the General Political Department
(GPD) is that of ensuring the obedience of the military establishment to
the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. As part of this, the GPD
focuses loyalty on the Party's Chairman. In this role, the GPD is
expected to be of considerable value to the newly elected Chairman,
Hua Kuo-feng, in consolidating his position.
The GPD'S Place in the Political Structure
The GPD is at once a Party and a military organization. It is a
major component of the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) and is manned by uniformed military personnel. Yet it is also a
Party body, functioning primarily on behalf of the Party.
Organizationally, the GPD is directly subordinate to the powerful
Military Affairs Committee (MAC), the Politburo's subcommittee for
military matters. The GPD works for the MAC as its political staff.
Its principal mission is to insure the PLA's loyalty to and support of
the Party. To do this, the GPD has been given broad powers in the
fields of Party organization within the PLA, personnel actions,
propaganda, education, cultural activities, political loyalty, internal
security, morale, and military justice. The GPD is also authorized to
oversee strictly military activities, such as planning, training, oper-
ations, and logistic support, and to make sure that officers and units
performing these functions are efficient and are carrying out the Party's
wishes.
Its supervision of the PLA's "political work" apparatus gives the
GPD potent levers of influence over military personnel below its level.
There is no avenue to success except through Party membership and
cooperation with the system of Party controls. The system seems to
work; the bulk of the PLA is responsive to the Party.
Role in Hua's 'Coup'
It is not yet known (as of mid-November 1976) what role the GPD
played in the overnight purge of the four Leftist leaders in early
October. The most important of the Leftists, Chang Chun-chiao, the
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fourth-ranking Party leader, was also the Director of the GPD. The
organization appears to have survived the purge of its Director, but an
investigation into its ties with the purged leaders is probably taking
place.
Chang's role in the Cultural Revolution, as well as lack of time,
prevented Chang from expanding his influence in the PLA. Chang and
the other Leftist leaders were unpopular with senior military officers,
and during the year or so that Chang had headed the organization, he
failed to establish a system of controlling it through a set of longtime
proteges. Consequently, the GPD's potential for becoming an asset in a
contest for leadership of the Party was not tested. After Hua succeeded
in becoming Party Chairman, however, the GPD joined his camp at
once, and in so doing it no doubt represented the political preferences
of the bulk of the PLA's top leadership.
Developments Worth Watching
Two developments have affected the GPD over the past decade in
ways that are likely to influence its future performance:
- The first is the gradual but steady strengthening of the
organization since the Cultural Revolution. During that
campaign, the GPD was heavily purged and sidelined temporar-
ily as an important body. Now the GPD appears to have its full
complement of senior personnel and subdepartments, and it is
once again issuing directives on its own authority. This trend
points to further strengthening of its organizational structure
and a closer alignment between the GPD and conservative
military interests.
- The other development has been reflected in the professional
status and Party rank of GPD directors over the last decade. The
status of the GPD Director has been elevated in the Party from
that of an ordinary member of the Central Committee to
Politburo member to Politburo Standing Committee member; at
the same time the directorship has migrated out of the military's
political career channel. Of the last two directors, one was a
lifelong commander and his successor was a senior Party leader
with no military experience. At this writing, the GPD has no
Director; the next incumbent will provide a good indicator of
the balance of political influence between Chairman Hua and
senior military leaders. Initially, Hua probably will how to the
PLA and appoint a professional political officer to head the
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GPD. At some point, however, Hua may want his own man in
that position and might even name another career Party cadre to
the job,
Outlook for the GPD
The outlook for the GPD-as for the regime as a whole-will
probably be governed by the balance to be struck between Chairman
Hua and the military. In compensation for their support of Hua,
military leaders may press for a larger military budget or a greater
relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union than Hua and other Party
leaders would favor. Hua needs to be able to resist unacceptable
demands, and it thus will be to his long-term interest to strengthen his
control over the military.
Even if Chairman Hua quickly asserts his leadership over the PLA,
he can never he fully confident of the undivided loyalty of his military
subordinates. He will need the indoctrinating and watch-dog services of
the GPD, which itself will have to be watched and periodically
reorganized. Whether Hua will in fact be able to control the military is
still an open question, but the GPD is likely to play an important part
in his effort to do so.
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Secretariat Military Affairs Committee Other Departments of the
General Political Department ' General Staff Department General Logistics Department
Service Military
Arms Academies
Military Regions Main Force Units
r (Armies, Divisions, Etc.)
Figure 1. Position of the General Political Department.
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DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
This study is part of a larger effort to advance our
understanding of the political role played by the
military in China. The military's political influence
has again been demonstrated. Surely the Party's new
Chairman, Hua Kuo-feng, could not have risen to the
chairmanship of both the Party and its Military
Affairs Committee (MAC) or have destroyed the
leaders of the Leftists group* so quickly if he had not
received strong military support.
For the moment, the broad interests of the career
Party and civilian leaders like Hua and the profes-
sional military leaders appear to parallel each other.
However, it may not be long before they begin to
diverge. Hua came to power with the late Chairman
Mao's strong support but without a broad power base
of his own. His heavy indebtedness to the military for
its backing will remain. Yet if he is to consolidate his
position as the principal leader of China, he must re-
establish the Party's traditional domination of the
military. Thus, a period of Party-military tension is
likely to follow the current season of ebullient good-
will.
This study will center on the institutional relation-
ship between the Party and the military as well as take
into account the interests of the main actors. The
paper's thesis is that the relationship between the
Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is
complex and that the military establishment is
vulnerable to manipulation by Party leaders as well as
vice versa.
The General Political Department (GPD) is the core
of this relationship for three reasons. First, it is an
important military institution that bridges the divid-
ing line between the Party and the PLA. Second, it
performs important functions in the PLA for the
Party, especially for the Party Chairman. Among these
are its duties to focus military loyalty on the Party's
Chairman and to ferret out opposition to his policies
in the military establishment. Finally, the GPD could
also help prevent a military coup-or at least prevent
large numbers from joining it.
Thus, the GPD could play a key role in consolidat-
ing or undermining Chairman Hua's position in the
period of Party-military tension that seems likely to
face the PRC, *
II. THE GPD: LINKING PARTY AND MILITARY
A. Organizational Relationships
The GPD is a fusion of Party and military
organizations. The Party's formal definition of the
GPD states that it is "the highest leadership organ in
charge of the Party's ideological and organizational
work in the whole army."** It is an integral
component of the national headquarters of the PLA,
and it is manned by professional military officers. Yet
it is also a Party body; it functions primarily on behalf
of the Party, and its responsibility is principally to the
Party.
1. Structural Relationship to the Party
In its Party context, the GPD is directly subordinate
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to the powerful MAC (see Figure 1, p. 4). """
within the Chinese political spectrum, have demonstrated a **Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's "Regulations
preference for radical, ideologically charged views. The four most Concerning Political Work in the People's Liberation Army," first 25X1
prominent members of this group were arrested on 6-7 October promulgated in 1963. These "regulations" are still in force.
1976, and have clearly been purged.
*In this paper "Leftist" is used to refer to those leaders who,
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covert agents w o operate within the military
establishment and report separately to the Center.
The close linkage between the Party's leading
bodies-the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the
MAC-and the GPD was personified until recently in
Chang Chun-chiao, who was Director of the GPD,
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, de
facto Secretary-General (head of the Secretariat), and
a leading member of the MAC, and in these positions
was Hua Kuo-feng's principal rival for power.
The MAC is one of the principal organs of the
Central Committee and is, in reality, the Politburo's
subcommittee for military matters. The late Chairman
Mao headed the MAC for four decades; it is now
headed by Chairman Hua and includes ranking
members of the Politburo and many senior military
leaders (some of whom are also Politburo members).
The MAC sets military policy, makes all major
military decisions, and controls the PLA's best combat
forces. The GPD is described in official documents as
the "political department of the MAC," the GPD has
maintained this relationship with the MAC since the
GPD's origin in 1931.* It implements the MAC's
political decisions and policies, and it wields the
MAC's coercive instruments of control-the bodies
which conduct surveillance of the military, supervise
its internal Party system, and oversee personnel
decisions below its own level.
There are other ties between the GPD and the
Central Committee (meaning the Politburo). The
GPD is nominally subordinate and in some way
responsive to the Central Committee Secretariat,
which is directly subordinate to the Politburo Stand-
ing Committee. Although the exact relationship
between the GPD and the Secretariat is not known,
presumably the GPD reports in part to and receives
some direction from this key Party organization. The
GPD also assists the Central Committee's "political
security department"
In the PLA, the GPD is one of three "general
departments"-the other two being the General Staff
Department and the General Logistics Department.
These three, plus the headquarters of the navy, air
* For an account of the origins and history of the GPD, see the
Annex to this paper.
force, service arms, and senior military schools, make
up the PRC's national military leadership.
The GPD's relationship to these components of the
PLA headquarters-and to the rest of the military
establishment-is primarily to the Party committees
and other political organizations, such as the Commu-
nist Youth League, within these bodies. Throughout
the PLA, as in the government, each organization is
governed by a Party committee. GPD instructions and
orders, for instance, are directed to the Party
committees below its own level (see Figure 2, p. 7).
The Party committee structure cascades downward
from the MAC to the lowest level unit-the infantry
company or its equivalent. These committees are
normally headed by the unit's first political officer,
although there are examples of commanders perform-
ing that role,* Where the commander is first secretary,
he presumably passes the GPD's directives to the
political officer.
In addition to these Party committees, there are
"political departments" attached to all military unit
Party committees-except for the two lowest levels,
the companies and battalions. These political depart-
ments are mirror-images of the GPD, assisting their
respective committees in carrying out routine "politi-
cal work."** This includes not only political work in
* Among the 11 Military Region (MR) Party committees, the
three known first secretaries are MR Commanders (Canton,
Wuhan, and Tsinan MRs), and a fourth recently died (Com-
mander of Fuchou MR). This apparent systematic deviation from
the principle (at other levels) that the first political officer serves as
first secretary of the committee could be an indication of a shift of
power away from political officers to commanders. More likely,
however, it reflects a successful effort by the PLA to keep the
leadership of MR Party Committees in military hands.
The nominal first political officers of these four MRs are civilian
Party leaders. Senior Party leaders in Peking evidently did not want
these provincial civilian Party chiefs to head, concurrently, regional
military Party committees. Such an aggregation of power by local
civilian leaders may have appeared threatening to central Party
leaders, as did the former regional Party bureaus that were
abolished in 1966.
In these four cases, and probably in others, leadership of the MR
Party committee has been vested in the MR's highest-ranking
professional military officer, the commander. (The distinction
between military and civilian Party leader at the MR level becomes
blurred, in any case, because all MR commanders are important
Party figures in their own right: three MR commanders are full
members of the Politburo, and all the others are Central Committee
members.)
** "Political work" is a catchall term that includes indoctrina-
tion, personnel matters, cultural activities, sports and other morale-
building activities, and surveillance.
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Administrative Tactical Chain of Command
Chain of Command (Main Ground Forces)"
Army (approx. 48.000 men)
Party Committee
Political Department
Military District
Party Committee
Military
Sub-district
Party Committee
People's Armed
Department
Party Committee
Relationships Between Party Committees
f- Commaed(Sapervision
--0 Response
Division (5,000-14,00 men)
Party Committee
Regiment (approx. 3,000 men)
Party Committee
Battalion (approx. 1,000 men)
Party Committee
Company (100-120 men)
Party Branch Committee
? Identical hierarchies of Party committees and
supporting political departments exist in the air force
--air districts, air armies, divisions, and squadrons --
and in the navy -- fleets, districts, and squadrons.
?? Party committees and their political departments are responsible for not only the
unit immediately subordinate to them but also for the next subordinate echelon.
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their own unit, but also supervision of political work
in their subordinate units two echelons down. For
example, the political department of a regiment
exercises supervision of political work in its own
battalions and also in its battalions' companies. The
GPD itself is responsible for political work in the two
echelons below its level-in army and division-level
combat units and in the Military Region and Military
District (MD) headquarters, which are essentially
administrative organizations.
Some ambiguity exists between the hierarchy of
Party committees and their political departments. It
might seem that these two kinds of organizations are
separate entities and would logically have separate
chains of command or channels of communication.*
Recent evidence disputes this picture, however,
supporting a contrary view that the Party committees
make up the principal line of military as well as
political authority and that each of these committees
acts through its three principal components-its staff,
political, and logistics departments. The political
department of each unit is simply the political staff of
its parent Party committee, just as the GPD is
essentially the MAC's political work staff. When the
GPD issues orders, these orders are probably received
by all military bodies below the general department
level as though they had been issued by the MAC
itself. * *
B. Internal Organization
The GPD is organized internally into 10 or 11
subdivisions (see Figure 3, p. 9 for details). Although
the Propaganda Department normally outranks all
other departments, the Organization and Security
departments are probably more influential-and more
feared.
* The clearest statement of this view can be found in John
Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (Oxford University Press,
1967), pp. 107, 108, and 306.
** If such were not the case, there would be serious deficiencies in
the system. For instance, the GPD would have difficulty issuing
orders to MR Party Committees since the first secretary of these
committees (whether commander or first political officer) is
probably a member of the MAC, the GPD's parent body. Thus, the
GPD would be in the position of trying to supervise MR first
secretaries who were themselves members of a higher-level
organization. This would be a virtually impossible situation.
C. Functions
The main function of the GPD is to insure Party
control over the armed forces. To do this, the GPD
enjoys broad powers: it judges the performance of
senior officers under its jurisdiction and rewards or
punishes them; it covertly investigates political atti-
tudes and isolates PLA members suspected of disloy-
alty; and it indoctrinates, monitors the impact of its
indoctrination, and carries out a multitude of morale-
building activities.
The GPD's work consists mainly of administration
and policy implementation. The Party system in the
PLA is too extensive, however, for the GPD to oversee
in detail. There are, for example, at least 15,000
"branch" committees (company level) in the ground
forces alone.
According to Central Committee documents, the
GPD is supposed to draw up plans and regulations,
review PLA activities to ensure that these plans and
regulations have been carried out; to carry out its own
investigations and studies; to identify and publicize
model individuals and units; to coordinate its
activities with the other two general departments; and
to cooperate with the political police of the "political
security department" of the Central Party apparatus
and with the Ministry of Public Security.
a. Career Management
Probably the greatest power of the GPD lies in its
supervision of personnel actions and career develop-
ment. The GPD is under orders from the Central
Committee to implement the Party's cadre policies
and procedures throughout the PLA.
There is little detailed information on how the GPD
carries out this task. Presumably it formulates general
policy guidelines and monitors their implementation
at all levels below the general departments.
Political departments in units below the GPD hold
the service records and political dossiers of the
personnel in their units. These political departments
periodically evaluate each officer's performance and
recommend his promotion, demotion, or reassign-
ment. This recommendation is reviewed by the unit's
Party committee, which makes decisions on personnel
matters subject to review by the next higher Party
committee. Following GPD cadre policy, these politi-
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Secretary-General's Office
? General responsibility for indoctrination of the PLA,supervision of political
movements, selection and popularization of heroes, and so on
Probably the largest and highest-ranking of the GPD's subdivisions;
Propaganda Department personnel are usually listed ahead of the leaders of
other GPD components.
Propaganda Department
Culture Department
? Carries out Central Committee policy regarding art and literature inthePLA;
trains national-level military theatrical troupes, musical ensembles and bands,
and oversees PLA cultural performances on national holidays.
Organization Department
? Monitors the Party committee system in the PLA; implements theParty's
personnel policies, thereby affecting all members of the armed forces,
especially officers. This Is also a large and powerful GPD element; in terms of
the Party's power over individual careers, it may well be the most powerful.
Security Department
? This Is the GPD's political investigative force; It works closely with the Organi-
zation Dept. (above), with the Ministry of Public Security, and with the Party's
own more powerful "political security department."
Education Department
? Administers the GPD's political schools and establishes political curricula for
other military professional and service schools.
PhysicalCultureand Sports Department (?)
? If this organization has been reinstated since the cultural Revolution, it would
define sports and physical culture policy for thePLA and provide general
supervision and stimulation for PLA-wide sports competitions and meets.
Liaison Department
? Coordination with other Party and government bodies and with friendly foreign
military organizations. - - - -
Youth Work Department
?Probably directs the Communist Youth League within the PLA.
Journalism Department
? Probably is responsible for PLA-wide publications, such as Liberation Army
Daily, and for policy regarding all other military publications; also probably
provides training and administrative support to reporters and other military
media workers In national-level military organs.
Military Procuratorate
? Administers policy related to militaryjustice and oversees military courts.
Figure 3. Internal Structure of the General Political Department
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cal departments also recommend rewards and punish-
ments. The GPD probably reviews the personnel work
of the 11 MRs, the three Fleet headquarters, and the
army-level units of the ground and air forces; the GPD
may also monitor this work at division- and MD-level.
Thus, by the time an officer becomes the com-
mander or first political officer of a regiment or
squadron (equivalent to the rank of colonel in most
Western military organizations), he has probably
come to the attention of the GPD. Its influence is
probably most direct and crucial for the stratum of
officers from colonel up through the middle-ranking
general officer. *
When an officer is promoted to MR commander or
first political officer (approximately equal to a three-
star general in the US system), he probably owes his
new standing primarily to the MAC and to senior
leaders of the Party. Even though MR leaders are
members (or candidate members) of the MAC-and
thus rank above the GPD-they are still nominally
subordinate to the PLA's general departments includ-
ing the GPD and must respond to orders of the general
departments, taking them as coming from the MAC
itself. A negative report even on an MR leader from
the GPD could have an adverse effect on his career.
Beyond supervision of careers, the GPD has controls
over other personnel matters. The GPD sets leave
policy and regulates the care of military dependents.
It also looks after officers after they retire or are
transferred out of the military. The PLA's political
workers try to find suitable employment for ex-PLA
personnel as well as care for their dependents after
they die. Each former PLA officer's or enlisted man's
political dossier is turned over to the receiving civilian
Party committee when he is transferred out of the
PLA.
Another potent instrument of influence is the GPD's
political investigative force, with a system of informers
that operates covertly throughout the PLA, with
power to make arrests. This force is supposed to
* Equivalents to Western military ranks are necessarily imprecise
because the Chinese abandoned the use of conventional ranks in
1965 after using them for 10 years. A PLA officer is addressed
according to his current responsibility-regimental first political
officer so-and-so-or division commander so-and-so-rather than
by a specific rank.
protect the ideological purity of the PLA. Its reports
and assessments go into each PLA member's dossier
and either help or hurt his career. For severe cases of
political or other misbehavior, military prosecutors
and military courts back up the GPD's political
security system.
The GPD also cooperates closely with the Party's
own "central political security department," and
Central's agents operate covertly within the military
(as elsewhere in society), report separately to the Party
leadership, and probably handle the most serious and
delicate security cases, where actual disloyalty and
conspiracy are suspected.
Beyond the controls that affect individuals-control
of dossiers and careers, and control through fear of
political spies-much of the GPD's strength lies in its
mission to supervise the Party committee structure in
the PLA. From time to time, the Politburo has
directed that the Party committee system in the
military be strengthened. These occasions have pro-
vided opportunities for the GPD to re-examine the
composition of the PLA's major Party committees and
to recommend changes in their makeup. Occasionally,
the MAC has ordered the GPD to strengthen the
position of the first political officer and raise the
priority assigned to political work.
The position of the first political officer relative to
the commander is the keystone in the Party's (and the
GPD's) system of control. From its early days, the
Party has insisted on a system of dual command in its
armed forces whereby the commander and the first
political officer share responsibility and command.
Although this relationship has always been a source of
tension, it has worked more smoothly in China than in
the Soviet Union, where it was eventually modified in
favor of concentrating authority in the commander.
The Chinese system is deliberately biased in favor
of the first political officer. In theory, the Party
declares that authority in each unit rests with the
collective leadership of the whole Party committee.
This is supposed to mean that all members of a unit's
committee are accountable for the performance of
their unit. In practice, though, this usually means that
the first secretary of the committee is the unit's
dominant officer. According to the Party's own
regulations, the first secretary is normally the unit's
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first political officer, although occasionally the com-
mander serves in that role. I'ven when the commander
is the first secretary, however, the first political officer
has the right, under certain conditions, to counter-
mand the commander's orders and even to arrest him
if he is suspected of counterrevolutionary acts.
Since the early 1960s, the GPD has been under
orders to pay special attention to the functioning of
this system, especially at company level, thus assuring
continuing GPD evaluation of the Party committee
and political work system down to the lowest
organizational level.
The Party's current charter to the GPD orders it to
put ideology in first place." This is logical, given the
Party's conception of the PIA as a Party army. It also
reflects the extreme difficulties the Party experienced
in the late I 920s when it began to build its own army.
Then, when the Party's survival depended on weak
forces made up largely of illiterates, Party leaders
feared that if their armed units were wiped out by the
Nationalists, the Communist cause in China would
fail. Referring to those days, Chu Te, a founder of the
Chinese Red Army, once told an American journalist
that, "We aimed so to train our men that even if only
one escaped alive he would he able to rise up and lead
the people.-
Today, indoctrination is still intense. Much effort is
spent in focusing loyalty on the Party Chairman, the
"Central Committee," and the MAC. About one-
third of the average soldier's time is spent in some
form of indoctrination or other activity tinder the
political officer's supervision. About one-third of each
years recruits into the PI,A--300,000 to 400,000
persons out of around 1,000,000 annual recruits-be-
come Party members. ('T'hese soldiers usually retain
their Party membership after demobilization, and over
the years, have come to comprise a sizeable portion of
the total membership of the Party, probably 20 to 25
percent. This suggests that the GPD speaks to a
significant audience not only inside the military, but
in the civilian sector as well.)
While he is in the PIA, the average enlisted man
and junior officer is subjected to constant indoctrina-
Focusing PLA Loyalty on Chairman Hua: One of the GPD's Jobs
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tion. Officers and men are required to listen to
lectures; they read and discuss the GPD's national
newspaper, the Chieh-fang Chun Pao (Liberation
Army Daily); they criticize their own and each other's
political errors during periodic group confession and
"struggle" meetings; and their evenings are often
spent in watching movies or plays heavily laden with
political messages. The officer corps is made up almost
entirely of Party members, most of whom have
received at least some special training in leading
political work. Many officers can expect to attend, at
some point in their careers, one of the GPD's political
work colleges or institutes. Even if they choose not to
specialize in political work, PLA officers probably
receive some formal political instruction in every
military school that they attend. Ultimately, all
political training comes under GPD supervision.
3. Morale-Building
The political work system also monopolizes morale-
building activities. Sports activities are organized and
supervised by political work personnel. All cultural
events are sponsored by the political work system, and
unit reading rooms are filled with political reading
matter to be read under the observation of a
uniformed political worker.
The GPD is also interested in the material well-
being of the troops, although primary responsibility in
this area rests with the General Logistics Department
and its subordinate supply systems. The Central
Committee has instructed the GPD, however, that it
must assist the logistics organizations in improving the
welfare of military personnel.
In addition, the GPD, in coordination with local
civilian authorities, is supposed to take care of
disabled and discharged servicemen, their dependents,
and the dependents of "martyrs." The fact that
political officers can manipulate the material welfare
of individual PLA members and their dependents
gives the GPD and its agents additional levers of
influence.
Finally, the GPD works continuously on two
programs that are utopian in their objectives but give
the GPD additional bureaucratic stature. Both of
these programs began during the earliest days of the
Chinese Communist armed forces, and while neither
is unique to the PLA, both have been given greater
emphasis in China than in the USSR or Eastern
Europe.
One of these programs aims at fostering "revolu-
tionary unity" between officers and men. This
program seeks to prevent elitism in the officer corps.
Nearly all visible differences between the uniforms of
soldiers and officers have been eliminated. For
instance, all ranks and insignia were abolished in 1965
as part of this program. Officers are instructed to treat
their men well. Periodically officers are encouraged
(and sometimes coerced) to perform manual labor
alongside enlisted personnel and to eat and bunk with
them. Finally, officers must attend political meetings
where their men are encouraged to criticize them.
Most observers and defectors have commented favor-
ably on the effectiveness of this program in maintain-
ing high morale among enlisted personnel.
The other program aims at maintaining the
tradition of closeness between the armed forces and
the civilian masses. According to Party doctrine (based
on Mao's teachings), the military must be so united
with the civilian population that, if need be, it could
move among them like fish swimming in water. This
unity is sustained by frequent directives to soldiers and
officers to treat civilians kindly and with respect, and
by constant coordination between military and local
civilian Party organizations. Civil-military unity is
also put into practice. Military units stationed in rural
areas contribute substantial amounts of labor during
planting and harvest seasons and also aid some local
capital construction projects. Because the PLA's
enlisted troops are mostly young peasants, these
occasional tours in the fields are probably welcomed
as a refreshing change from military routine.
4. Other Functions
Finally, the GPD's organizational interests extend
beyond political work per se. The GPD has a general
responsibility for ensuring the combat-effectiveness of
the PLA and for making sure that the Party's "army-
building line and strategy" are followed. Among other
things, the GPD is supposed to make sure that military
as well as political discipline is upheld, that the PLA's
services and combat arms "always maintain sound
combat-readiness and high morale for training, and
raise the military training, tactical, and technical
levels of the troops."* The GPD has also been
instructed by the Central Committee to see that the
logistics service fulfills its tasks and that materiel,
* Central Committee's "Regulations Concerning Political Work
in the PLA."
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armaments, finance, transportation, health, and pro-
duction adequately meet the PLA's needs.
In wartime, the GPD is responsible for handling
prisoners of war and for carrying out psychological
warfare. Political officers performed these tasks in the
Korean war and in the 1962 border war with India.
This suggests that the GPD had, and probably still
has, some intelligence capabilities, at least those
required for psychological warfare planning and
operations and for collecting information from prison-
ers of war. More importantly, in wartime the GPD is
responsible for making sure that the armed forces
"adhere consistently to the policies of operation of the
Party Central Committee and its Military Affairs
Committee."*
5. In Sum
The foregoing survey of the GPD's structure and
functions indicates that it holds potent levers of
influence over military personnel below its level.
There is no avenue to success for the junior and
middle grade officer except through Party member-
ship and cooperation with the system of Party
controls. Virtually all activity is carried on under the
observation of some form of Party authority. Our best
information shows that the political system adminis-
tered by the GPD actually works and that the bulk of
the military establishment is responsive to the Party.
III. CURRENT STATUS
A. As of November 1976
It is not yet known (as of early November 1976)
what role the GPD played in the overnight purge of
Leftist leaders that occurred a few weeks after Mao's
death. The presence of GPD representatives in a
`victory' parade in Peking on 21 October 1976 and the
appearance of the senior GPD Deputy Director at a
diplomatic reception the next day (22 October)
indicated that the GPD was still active and that
Chang Chun-chiao's deputies in the GPD were not
purged with him. An investigation into the GPD's ties
with the purged Leftists, however, was probably
begun and may still be going on.
The political control apparatus below the GPD
appears to have been functioning normally since the
October purge. Up until the purge, it had been
leading a movement in the PLA to vilify former Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping who, among other things,
was Chief of the General Staff when he was purged in
April 1976. Since Mao's death on 9 September,
attacks on Teng have diminished and increasing stress
has been placed on loyalty to the Party, now headed
by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.
B. Whose Political Asset?
The GPD's role, if any, in Hua's "coup" seems to
have consisted of withholding its support from its own
Director, Chang Chun-chiao, the most important
victim of the purge. The ease with which Chang was
brought down, however, raises a question about the
GPD's value as an asset in a political power struggle.
Obviously, being Director of the GPD did not help
Chang much. But neither did his other, even more
potent power-bases, the Secretariat and membership
on the Standing Committee of the Politburo.*
Circumstantial evidence, however, provides some
plausible explanations as to why the GPD was of little
value to Chang.
First, after becoming Director in January 1975,
Chang did not, as far as is known, place any of his
longtime proteges in the GPD. He thus apparently
forfeited the advantage of controlling the organiza-
tion-as the Chinese tend to-through long-tested
subordinates. Instead, in staffing the organization, he
relied-or was forced by the MAC to rely-almost
exclusively on men who had been purged from the
GPD system during the Cultural Revolution and who
had since been rehabilitated. For example, confirmed
reports show that Deputy Director Liang Pi-yeh has
been in charge of the day-to-day administration of the
GPD for the past year. Liang, a Deputy Director
before the Cultural Revolution, was one of the first
casualties of that campaign and was publicly humil-
iated by Red Guards on several occasions in 1967. It
seems doubtful that Liang had much in common with
Chang Chun-chiao, who looked to the Cultural
Revolution, and his participation in it, to legitimize
his own rise to power.
* Reports agree that the four were arrested either at a Party
meeting or in their homes by small military/security units.
** Besides Liang, three other rehabilitees of the Cultural
Revolution were named to Deputy Director positions under Chang.
They were Fu Chung, about 80, who had been a Deputy Director
from 1954 to 1967; Hsu Li-ching, about 70, who had been a
Deputy Director from 1964 to 1967; and Huang Yu-kun, in his mid-
50s, who had been a political officer in the headquarters of the air
force during the 1960s until he was purged in 1967. Of these three,
Fu may have retired; he has not appeared since January 1976.
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Second, Chang evidently enjoyed little support
among the majority of military leaders above the GPD
level. These men were almost certainly apprehensive
as to how Chang might use the GPD's political and
security apparatus against them. They could look for
protection and support to such figures as Defense
Minister Yeh Chien-ying, who outranked Chang in
both the MAC and the Politburo, and Chen Hsi-lien,
the powerful Commander of the Peking MR on whose
goodwill Chang depended. Chang reportedly made
overtures to the military leadership in an effort to
broaden his support. Indeed, his appointment-or
acceptance--of experienced professional political offi-
cers within the GPD was probably a gesture to the
very PLA leaders who were wary of his association
with the political Left. These efforts failed to convince
many senior military leaders that he would be
responsive to their interests, however,
In any case Hua apparently preempted Chang,
moving before the latter had time to expand his
influence in the military establishment or to exploit
his position in the GPD. Had Chang remained GPD
head he might have tried to "radicalize" the PLA
below the GPD's level and thereby drive a wedge
between the bulk of the military establishment and its
generally conservative senior leaders. The prospect of
Cheng pursuing such a course may have figured in
Ilua's decision to move against him and his Leftist
colleagues at the earliest appropriate moment after
Mao's death.
After Hua succeeded in becoming Party Chairman,
the GPD apparently joined his camp immediately. In
so doing, it was no doubt reflecting a clear preference
for Hua over Chang, and in this sense was represent-
ing the political views of the military leadership.
sensitive work was parceled out to new, ad hoc bodies.
Although it was never terminated as an organization,
its existence was not officially acknowledged between
September 1967 and November 1969. The rebuilding
process began in late 1969 with the appointment of a
few senior leaders, but there was little indication of
activity. Positive reconstruction advanced rapidly only
after Chang Chun-chiao became Director in January
1975.
The GPD now appears to have its full complement
of senior personnel and subdepartments, although
some of the latter have not yet been publicly
identified. Moreover, it now issues directives to the
PLA on its own authority.
The process of further strengthening its bureaucratic
structure will probably resume after the review of its
involvement with the Leftists has been completed.
This trend points toward a growing concentration
on organization and, by implication, on order and
discipline. This would fit well with the apparent
conservative bent of senior PLA leaders. While these
leaders accept the subordination of the PLA to the
Party, they would probably prefer a GPD that would
supplement, rather than dominate, their efforts to
strengthen China's defenses. This, in fact, may be part
of the price that they will seek for supporting Hua,
and, if so, it seems to be one that he will have to pay,
at least initially. If this estimate is correct, we should
see continued strengthening of the GPD and also see it
align itself more closely with military concerns.
The other noteworthy development has been in the
character of the GPD's directors since the Cultural
Revolution. Since 1967, their Party rank has moved
steadily higher and their career profile has departed
increasingly from that of the political officer corps.
A. Developments
Two developments have affected the GPD in ways
that are likely to influence its future performance.
1. Strengthening the Organization
The first is the gradual reconstruction that the GPD
has undergone since 1969. The Cultural Revolution
severely damaged the GPD-its Director and all his
deputies were purged in 1967 and most of the GPD's
The last Director before the Cultural Revolution,
Hsiao Hua, a member of the Central Committee, was
indeed a career political officer. However, the next
incumbent, Li Te-sheng, was an alternate member of
the Politburo when named Director in September
1970; he was a life-long troop commander rather than
a political officer. He played an important part in the
downfall of his boss, Defense Minister (and Mao's
designated heir) Lin Piao, and was rewarded in 1973
by another promotion, this time to the Politburo's all-
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powerful Standing Committee where he became one
of five newly-created Vice-Chairmen of the Party.
The third step in this process occurred when Chang
Chun-chiao was named in January 1975 to replace Li,
who declined in favor in 1973 and was demoted in
1974. Chang, like Li, was a member of the Politburo's
Standing Committee. But Chang was a civilian whose
background had been concentrated in the Party
apparatus, especially in propaganda work.
Thus, over the past decade, incumbent directors
moved from an ordinary Central Committee member
to Politburo member and finally to the Politburo
Standing Committee. At the same time, the director-
ship migrated out of the military's political career
channel: from professional political officer to com-
mander to civilian. This development provides elo-
quent evidence of the political sensitivity that
attached itself to the control of the GPD during Mao's
declining years.
This precedent, if continued, could lead to prob-
lems for the GPD. It could also provide a good
indicator of the level of Party-military tension.
At present, Hua is probably so beholden to the
military that he will accept their recommendation
regarding candidates to head the GPD. If so, Hua will
probably name a professional PLA political officer,
such as the senior deputy director. (Even former GPD
Director Hsiao Hua cannot be ruled out.) However, at
some point, Chairman Hua may want his own man in
that position and might even name another career
Party cadre to the job.
B. Outlook
The outlook for the GPD will be governed by the
balance to be struck between Chairman Hua and the
military. Senior military leaders may want a number
of things that Hua will be reluctant to provide. For
instance, they may want more autonomy from the
Party in strictly professional military matters such as
forming new, less-Maoist military doctrines. They
may press for a larger military budget or for the
purchase of more Western technology than Hua and
other Party leaders desire.
They may also favor a
greater degree o relaxation of tension with the Soviet
Union-having a better sense of China's military
inferiority-than will civilian leaders.
It will be in Hua's interest to strengthen his control
over the military, and he will no doubt seek ways to
do so, While Hua may be willing to grant the
military more independence in military affairs, he
probably will eventually want to get the PLA's
political apparatus under his own control. The GPD
would be a valuable asset to Hua in consolidating his
position in the military and in fending off unreason-
able demands.
It is too early to predict how the GPD will fare in
this potentially fateful tug-of-war. Changes in the
GPD's relations with the Party, appointments to
leading posts in the GPD, and its behavior as an
organization will serve as useful indicators to the
process.
Even if Chairman Hua quickly asserts his leader-
ship over the military, he can never be fully confident
of the undivided loyalty of his military subordinates.
He will need the indoctrinating and watch-dog
services of the GPD, which itself will have to be
watched and periodically reorganized.
Whether Hua will in fact be able to control the
military is still an open question. The GPD is likely,
however, to play an important part in his effort
to do so.
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ANNEX
The beginning, 1931-1935, The current GPD traces
its lineage to 1931. In January of that year, a group of
young Chinese Communists who had recently re-
turned from Moscow seized control of the Party and
set out immediately to strengthen their control over
the "soviets" scattered about in mountainous regions
of central and southern China. This "returned
student" faction * organized a "Central Bureau of
Soviet Areas" and under it, a "Central Revolutionary
Military Committee" to unify their command over
the military assets of the "soviets." Under this military
committee, they created a "General Political Depart-
ment" to centralize the Party's political work in the
scattered military units. They named Mao Tse-tung,
who was at the time the chief political officer of the
largest component of the Red Army, to be the first
Director of this new Department. * *
* The faction included other Party leaders who were not returned
students. Most important was Chou En-lai. Chou had sponsored
many of the students for study in Moscow and supported their
leadership of the Party after they returned in 1930. With the aid of
their Comintern adviser, they gained control of the Party in 1931
and held on until their control over military affairs was successfully
challenged by Mao Tse-tung at the Tsun-i Conference of January
1935. During the 1931-1935 period, Chou's support of the
"returned students" was an important element in their power
because Chou headed the Politburo's Military Affairs Committee
(MAC). First organized in 1925, the MAC was the Party's principal
policy and decision-making group for military affairs. Chou, who
was at the time the Party's most experienced military-political
leader, headed the MAC from 1926 to January 1935.
** There had been one earlier "General Political Department."
At the "Nanchang Uprising," 1-5 August 1927, a "GPD" was
organized as part of the Revolutionary Committee that led this
uprising in Kiangsi province. This GPD faded away a month later
with the defeat of the Uprising forces in another province. This
short-lived predecessor of today's GPD was thinly staffed and
accomplished little during the "southern expedition" that followed
the collapse of the revolt at Nanchang. In the Party's postmortem of
the Nanchang Uprising, weaknesses in political organization, in
Party work among the troops, and in contacts with the civilian
population were strongly criticized as major causes of the failure of
the Uprising. Thus, the lessons learned from this defeat had a strong
influence on the priority that the Party gave thereafter to political
work in the military.
Mao headed the GPD for nearly a year. During
1931, the GPD probably amounted to little more than
his own staff. Mao used the organization to strengthen
his own position in the Kiangsi Soviet. The GPD
carried out land reform in the soviet and organized
the election of pro-Mao delegates to the First National
Congress of Chinese Soviets held at Juichin, Kiangsi in
November 1931. Mao and his supporters dominated
the "government" established by this Congress.
This demonstration of how the GPD could be used
was not lost on the central Party leadership. In order
to weaken Mao's influence in the military, the
"returned student" faction removed Mao from his
GPD post shortly after the First Congress and replaced
him with one of their own, 25 year-old Politburo
member Wang Chia-hsiang. *
The returned student group could now go around
Mao since they controlled key military positions both
above and below him even though he was left with his
title of First Political Officer of the Red Army: Chou
En-lai headed the MAC to which Mao was subordi-
nate, and now a "returned student" directed Mao's
political-military staff. It was only a matter of time
(less than two years) until the "returned students''
eased Mao out of his job as First Political Officer and
thus severely weakened him politically.**
Thus, in its first struggle between local military
leadership and central political forces, the GPD was
used as an instrument to undermine a prominent local
leader (Mao) and strengthen the position of the
dominant leadership group.
The "returned students" moved quickly to
strengthen the GPD and, through it, the Party's
* Mao was 37 years old at the time.
** Mao lost his seat on the MAC in August 1932 and was
replaced by Chou as First Political Officer of the Red Army in May
1933. Early in 1933 the "returned students" began a thinly
disguised mass criticism campaign against Mao's military and
political line.
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control of the Red Army in Kiangsi. They concen-
trated on building separate military and civil Party
organizations and reduced military involvement in
civilian political affairs. They drew up detailed
regulations that spelled out for the first time the
relationship between political officer and commander.
They increased Party membership among soldiers
from about one-third (under Mao) to nearly one-half
of the total force.
By mid-1934, the GPD was strong enough to carry
out a "red terror" against commanders who were
falling back before the Nationalists' Fifth Encircle-
ment Campaign. Sometime during this period, a
political security network was organized in the Red
Army. This network was controlled directly by the
Central Committee and was not subordinated to the
GPD; but it coordinated its activities with the GPD,
and some of its operatives probably used affiliation
with the GPD for "cover."
The Long March, 1935-1937. The second Director
of the GPD, Wang Chia-hsiang, was severely injured
in late 1934 in a Nationalist bombing raid. His wound
forced him into semiretirement and opium addiction.
As a consequence, acting directors or senior deputies
ran the GPD until Wang finally relinquished the GPD
directorship in 1950. The first of these was Chou En-
lai, who was concurrently in charge of the MAC. At
the famous Tsun-i Conference in January 1935, Chou
turned the GPD over to the just-ousted Secretary
General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
"returned student" faction leader Chin Pang-hsien.*
The Tsun-i Conference became the GPD's second
experience in power struggle. Faced with defeats in
Kiangsi that had forced the Party to commence its
Long March, the conference was essentially a crisis of
confidence in the Party's leadership. The main targets
of criticism were the military policy and strategy of
the "returned students" and their Comintern military
adviser, Otto Braun, who had virtually taken over
military command in mid-1934.
At Tsun-i, the Chinese Red Army commanders
forced the "returned students" to turn over the
chairmanship of the MAC to Mao Tse-tung. The
"returned students" retained, however, the secretary-
generalship of the Party (its highest office at the time)
* Chin, also known as Poku, was second only to Wang Ming in
the "returned student" group and had led the Party since Wang's
return to Moscow around September 1931.
and the directorship of the GPD. The GPD evidently
did nothing to oppose the transfer of the Party's senior
military post from Chou En-lai to Mao Tse-tung.
Taking its cue from the leaders of the "returned
student" group, the GPD acquiesced in the conse-
quences of the obvious failures of their generalship.
The "returned students" retained nominal leadership
of the GPD until about 1938 when Mao transferred
the acting directorship to Tan Cheng, one of his
closest followers.
In the course of the Long March, the GPD suffered
from the split between the forces led by Chang Kuo-
tao and those led by Mao. The GPD, along with most
of the General Staff, accompanied Chang while Mao
took the staff of the MAC with him to Shensi Province
in mid-1935. Little is known of the GPD in the period
in which it was with Chang's Fourth Front Army;
presumably, what was left of it rejoined Mao after
Chang's troops suffered crushing defeats in western
China in 1936. Also, it can be safely assumed that the
work of the GPD was carried out in Mao's First Front
Army by the staff of the MAC. After the two leaders'
armies were reunited in 1936, Mao tended to
centralize command and control of the Red Army in
the MAC. One observer noted that in 1937 the GPD
had become little more than the MAC's political work
staff. *
The Anti -Japanese and Civil War, 1937-1950.
During the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), however,
the GPD expanded rapidly.** In addition to its
regular work in the military, it also was given the task
of building up base areas behind Japanese lines. The
GPD absorbed thousands of students who migrated to
Yenan in the late 1930s and used them as political
workers in these base areas. After World War II, the
GPD continued to expand as CCP forces grew during
the second civil war with the Nationalists. Toward the
end of the civil war, the GPD was particularly active
in screening and indoctrinating Nationalists forces
that had been captured or had surrendered.
In the brief hiatus between the civil war and the
Korean war, the GPD vigorously supported the
* Chang Kuo-tao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party,
1928-1938 (University Press of Kansas, 1972), p.494.
** During this war, while the Nationalist and Communist Parties
joined forces against Japan, the GPD's name was changed to the
"Political Department of the Eighth Route Army." Its status and
functions remained unchanged, however, and after the war it
resumed its traditional name.
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regime's plans to modernize and reduce the size of the
military, which since 1948 was called the People's
Liberation Army (PLA). The plan to cut the size of
the PLA was shelved with the entry of the PRC into
the Korean war.
The Korean War. The Korean conflict brought the
GPD into modern warfare for the first time and
presented it with novel problems. The GPD enthusias-
tically supported the war, organizing recruitment
campaigns and establishing many new military
schools to train new (or retrain old) officers. But on the
Korean battlefield, fighting the world's strongest
army, the PLA's political system tended to break
down, especially after UN forces heat back the
Chinese offensives in the spring of 1951. Political
controls at company and battalion level were espe-
cially vulnerable, as casualties among experienced and
thoroughly indoctrinated cadres were heaviest there,
and replacements were difficult to find. The GPD's
prestige also may have suffered from the fact that,
although the Chinese succeeded in pushing the UN
forces out of most of North Korea, they failed to
validate Mao's dictum that a weak Communist force
can defeat a strong "imperalist" army. Part of this
.failure stemmed from the GPD's lack of success in
generating guerrilla warfare behind UN lines
Reaction to the Soviet Model. Another threat to the
GPD's prestige came from an unexpected quarter.
Through the early and mid-1950s the PLA accepted
massive amounts of Soviet arms and training. With
this aid came a different attitude toward the
relationship between the Party and the military: the
Soviets de-emphasized the Party and concentrated
more on the military mission. Although the Soviets
had altered the status of the political officer (commis-
sar) from time to time, in the 1950s they favored the
"unified command" of professional commanders,
with political officers serving as deputy commanders.
This approach was well received in the PLA,
especially by young commanders who had exper-
ienced modern warfare in Korea. The Soviet model
threatened the status of the Chinese political officer,
and, by extension, the status of the whole Party
structure in the military, including the GPD. Chinese
political officers had always been co-equal with
commanders, at least in principle. The Soviets also put
less emphasis than the Chinese on close relations with
the civilian population and on using the military as a
labor force.
Adverse reaction to the Soviet model began in 1955
with the GPD playing a leading role. About this time
Mao himself began expressing dissatisfaction with
other features of the Soviet model: its pace seemed too
slow and its methods too bureaucratic. Mao wanted
faster economic development, quicker social change,
and greater reliance on the masses.
In 1956, the GPD initiated a campaign in the
military to indirectly criticize the political features of
the Soviet model and strengthen the Chinese Commu-
nist political work tradition. Attacks were launched on
"dogmatism," long a code word for uncritical
imitation of the Soviets; officers (and later the whole
army) were ordered to study and to be examined on
Chinese Party history and theory; Party committees in
the PLA were reorganized and their leading role
stressed; and commanders were ordered to revive the
pre-1949 tradition of close, friendly relations between
officers and enlisted men. To emphasize the last point,
the GPD in 1957 began a program of forcing all able-
bodied officers to serve at least one month per year as
ordinary soldiers. Political officers were given more
combat training so that they could work more
effectively with commanders. All these programs were
merely an overture, however, to the intensive political
work that was to saturate the PLA from 1958 to 1964.
In 1958 a fundamental change occurred in PRC
military policy. This shift held major implications for
army-Party relations and for the GPD. Until 1958, the
Chinese had predicated their defense planning on a
heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for both arms and
training and for a nuclear umbrella. In early 1958,
Chinese negotiators failed to get the substantial
increases in military aid from the Soviet Union that
they had hoped for, including help in developing
nuclear weapons, without accepting Soviet controls
over the PLA. Consequently, Mao and others took a
decision in mid-1958 to rely no longer on the Soviet
Union for military support but, instead, to modernize
the PLA from China's own resources. This basic shift
meant running a higher risk of a US and Chinese
Nationalist invasion until PRC heavy industry and
technology could meet the PLA's needs. But Mao was
confident that the risks were acceptable and that
military autarky could be achieved.
To rationalize the coming period of relative
weakness, Mao insisted that his military concepts be
revived as the heart of the PLA's military strategy and
doctrine. This meant a revival of tight Party control
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over the military, a shift in emphasis away from
modern weapons toward highly-indoctrinated troops,*
and a reassertion of the tactics of protracted, guerrilla-
type warfare that the Communists had carried out
against the Japanese. Although Mao and others knew
that such an army could not prevent an invasion, they
were confident that it could eventually defeat any
likely invader and that the prospect of such a defeat
would deter any major invasion.
Substantial debate and controversy accompanied
this decision. In retrospect, the principal issue
probably was how best to make up for reduced or
Terminated Russian aid, and how and at what pace
he Chinese arms modernization programs should be
developed. Mao and Lin Piao opted for intensive
politicization and fast-paced military/industrial
schemes (as part of the Great Leap Forward). Defense
Minister Peng Te-huai and GPD Director Tan Cheng
apparently argued for continued development along
more conventional lines laid down by the Soviet
model that stressed military professionalism and a
dower paced industrial program. Other GPD leaders
may have favored Mao and Lin's initiative since the
GPD's role in a Soviet-type system would have been
diminished.
The 1958-1959 debate presented the GPD with an
historic opportunity to act as a spokesman for
professional military interests. Indeed, some top GPD
officers may have attempted to do so; the GPD
director was fired in late 1959 soon after Peng was
dismissed. But the GPD as a whole conformed with
Mao and Lin's new approach without a detectable
murmur.
Politicization of the PLA. From 1960 to 1964, the
GPD carried out the most vigorous political campaign
the PLA had ever experienced. Throughout the
period, the CCP's polemic against the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union was forcefully reiterated in
the PLA. "Dogmatism" came under severe attack,
and the main focus of both political and military work
shifted from large units (battalions and regiments, as
stressed by the Soviets) to the smaller, hundred-man
companies (long emphasized by Mao). Furthermore,
The shift in emphasis from weapons to men did not mean that
Mao denigrated the modernization of the PLA. Indeed, he wanted
faster modernization than most military leaders at the time believed
could he achieved from China's own resources But for troop morale
purposes, the human element was stressed and the power of modern
weapons-not vet available-was belittled.
Party committees at all levels were strengthened and
new GPD regulations on political work were promul-
gated in 1961 and 1963. These codes emphatically
stated the primacy of the political chain-of-command
and the precedence of political work over all other
activities.* Mao's doctrines were trumpeted as appli-
cable to every phase of military life and the world
revolution as a whole. Party membership was ex-
panded; criticism against many commanders took the
form of struggle sessions and big-character posters
(anticipating the Cultural Revolution by at least four
years); model soldier heroes were created; and an
evaluation system was devised that periodically
checked the political fitness of each member and
every unit of the PLA.
What had started in 1958 as a necessary re-
orientation of the military away from Soviet influence
and toward a more traditional Chinese approach
gradually shifted toward an emphasis on intensive
ideological indoctrination and purification. The cam-
paign was successful in maintaining relatively high
military morale and discipline during the economic
crisis of 1960-1961. But the GPD's impulse toward
political overkill was allowed to run virtually un-
checked during the early 1960s.
On balance, the results of the GPD's efforts pleased
Mao, and they probably played a large part in Mao's
choice of Lin Piao, rather than Liu Shao-chi, to he his
successor. By December 1963 the whole nation was
instructed to follow the PLA's political example and
imitate its practices and loyalty. Three months later,
all government and commercial organizations were
ordered to organize PLA-like political departments
under their party committees in order to help them
intensify their political work.
By 1965, a relaxation in the political atmosphere in
the military occurred, but the Party did not allow it to
last long. The officer corps soon came under criticism
for complacency and arrogance and all ranks and
insignia were abolished in order to diminish officers'
tendency toward elitism. But the main political event
of 1965 was the "debate" over how to defend the PRC
against a feared expansion of the Vietnam war. The
Party not only set the terms of this discussion, it also
made estimates of how the invasion would unfold and
* The new regulations did not increase the amount of time
allotted to political training, however. Then, as now, the PIA spent
about one-third of its time on political training and two-thirds on
military training.
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it dictated to the PLA how Chinese territory would be
defended. Professional officers were accused of want-
ing to put up a conventional defense along China's
frontiers with the PLA's main forces. The Party, on
the other hand, stressed using the militia and
promoted a strategy of drawing the US deep into
China. In this "debate," the GPD acted as a channel
for Party instructions to the PLA and evidently made
little effort to communicate professional military
advice to the Party. GPD Director Hsiao Hua survived
while Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ching was purged; mean-
while, the "debate" flagged as the US showed no
intention of attacking China and preparations for the
Cultural Revolution began to absorb more and more
of the GPD's attention.
The Cultural Revolution. In mid-1964 Mao had
decided to carry out a political campaign of unprec-
edented force and scope, designed to remold the Party
and revolutionize the whole country. After more than
a year of preparation, the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution got underway in late 1965 (officially in
May 1966). In mid-1966, the "Cultural Revolution
Group of the PLA" (PLA/CRG) was set up as a
special body under the GPD; its first chief was a
Deputy Director of the GPD.* The PLA/CRG was
created to assist the Politburo's "Central Cultural
Revolution Group" in carrying out the Cultural
Revolution in the military, mobilizing the PLA's
propaganda assets to support the movement through-
out the country, and purging PLA officers likely to
resist the Cultural Revolution as it unfolded.
About three months after the creation of the PLA/
CRG, Mme. Mao criticized its head for resisting a
large-scale purge in the PLA, and Lin Piao dismissed
him. The early efforts of the GPD to channel and
soften the Cultural Revolution in the military failed
almost as soon as they had begun.
The PLA/CRG was reorganized in January 1967
and was taken away from the GPD. Its nominal new
director was a Politburo member and one of the 10
marshals of the PRC named in 1955.** The new
PLA/CRG director was to work under the "direct
leadership of the Military Affairs Committee and the
Central Cultural Revolution Group," the latter being
* This was Liu Chih-chien, who was also named the senior
military representative to the Politburo's Cultural Revolution
Group, organized at about the same time.
** This was Hsu Hsiang-chien, a prestigious officer and a
Politburo member before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
Mme. Mao's center of operations. The new
PLA/CRG director did little, so far as is known.
This arrangement also soon proved unsatisfactory.
Before the end of January 1967 the new PLA/CRG
director came under strong Red Guard attack and was
dismissed in April. He was accused, among other
things, of trying to block Mme. Mao's efforts to keep
control of PLA/CRG activities and of being too much
under the influence of GPD Director Hsiao Hua.
Next, the PLA/CRG was removed even farther
from the GPD. It was placed under the direction of a
triumvirate consisting of the Minister of Public
Security, the Chief of the General Staff, and GPD
Director Hsiao. This group lasted until the dramatic
Wuhan Incident of August 1967 in which the
Commander of the Wuhan Military Region (MR)
appeared to be close to rebellion against the central
government. As a result of the Wuhan Incident, the
PLA/CRG was split into two separate bodies, and the
GPD, along with its Director and all its remaining
officers, dropped from sight.
For the remainder of the Cultural Revolution, PLA
political work was supervised by these two groups: one
used the PLA as an instrument to carry out the
Cultural Revolution in the rest of society and the
other approached the military establishment as a
target of the Cultural Revolution.*
Rebuilding the GPD and the Purge of Lin Pao,
When Lin began to slip from Mao's favor in 1969, one
of the first things that Mao evidently did was to
rehabilitate the GPD. Wall posters in the summer of
1969 began to refer again to the GPD; in November
1969 a new GPD Deputy Director was named, and by
about mid-1970 a new director *as in place.** Of the
first two deputy directors identified in the rebuilt
* The GPD, however, continued to function even though it
ceased to act in its own name. By 1969 both these groups came to be
dominated by two of Lin Piao's chief aides.
** Li Te-sheng was officially identified in September 1970 as the
new Director of the GPD. Before the Cultural Revolution Li had
been a career commander, rising to lead the 12th Army. During the
Cultural Revolution Li, one of the few PLA leaders known to be a
"leftist" activist, was promoted to Party and military chief of
Anhwei Province. He became an alternate member of the Politburo
at the 9th Party Congress in April 1969 and by late that year had
become a member of the MAC. In mid-1970 Li moved from
Anhwei to Peking and probably became GPD Director at that time
if not earlier. By late 1970, he was probably named Commander of
the Peking MR concurrently, in one of the first moves taken to
remove proteges of Lin Piao.
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GPD, one was a protege of Lin but the other was not.
The new Director, Li Te-sheng, definitely was not a
Lin protege, and he probably played a role in
building the case against Lin.
One may ask why the GPD did not nip Lin's 1971
"coup" attempt at an early stage. The answer
probably is that Mao's plans to purge Lin called for
building an overwhelming case against him. This took
time. Furthermore, since only members of Lin's
immediate family and personal staff were involved in
his flight, it could have been that the GPD (or the
Party's political security force) learned of Lin's flight
plans too late to act. In any case, the GPD performed
other functions nearly perfectly, preventing any
military move against Peking during or after the purge
of the man who had led the PLA since 1959 and who
seemed destined to succeed Mao. Again, the GPD
acted as a tool of Mao and the Party's other civilian
leaders.
Rebuilding the bureaucracy of the GPD since the
fall of Lin Piao has proceeded slowly. Li Te-sheng was
rewarded for his role in the Lin Piao affair with a
promotion to membership on the Politburo's Standing
Committee and one of five Party Vice Chairmanships
created in 1973. But he apparently soon lost favor
with Mao and was transferred out of Peking in the
closing days of 1973. The Director of the GPD during
1974 is still not known. At the Deputy Director level,
developments also came slowly. Prior to its disappear-
ance in August 1967, the GPD had had at least four
principal Deputies; in the 1969-1975 period, only two
Deputies were identified.* Only a few subordinate
officials were identified during this period.
The GPD Under Chang Chun-chiao. In early
January 1975, Chang Chun-chiao, another member of
the Politburo's Standing Committee and a career
Party cadre, was named Director of the GPD. Chang,
who later in the month became second-ranking Vice
Premier of the State Council, thus became one of the
most powerful men in the PRC.**
* Tien Wei-hsin and Huang Chih-yung were identified as GPD
Deputies in late 1969; Huang subsequently disappeared along with
i.in Piao in late 1971 and his place was taken by Wei Po-ting. Wei
was not officially identified, however, until mid-1974; he was
transferred to the Chengtu MR sometime in 1976.
** From at least 1973 to October 1976, Chang probably acted as
Secretary General of the Party and thus general supervisor of the
Party's vast bureaucracy.
After Chang became Director, the GPD made a
gradual but steady comeback. During 1975, four
experienced political officers were named to Deputy
Director positions: three were Deputies prior to the
GPD's suspension in 1967, the fourth had been the
head of the Air Force's Political Department. By early
1976, 15 subdepartment leaders and about 20 lower-
ranking GPD figures had reappeared-nearly all had
held positions in the pre-1967 GPD.*
Moreover, the GPD has become more active. It
promoted Mao's political campaign against former
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and resumed issuing
major policy statements. In November it issued a
"circular" to the PLA which directed military to
participate in the "Learn from Ta-chai" campaign.
This campaign, aimed primarily at the mechanization
of agriculture by 1985, is a key part of an ambitious
plan, endorsed by the Fourth National People's
Congress in January 1975, to completely modernize
China's economy and military forces by the year 2000.
Military support for the "Ta-chai" campaign thus
takes on strategic implications. Reminiscent of two
similar directives published during the Great Leap
Forward in 1959, the current "circular" commits the
military to provide manpower and material support to
rural communes "when conditions permit," in addi-
tion to making the PLA's own farms more efficient
and reclaiming more waste land for agriculture.
More recently, the GPD has been active in
discovering and suppressing opposition to the regime
that exploded during the Tienanmen Incident (riot) of
5 April 1976. The GPD's Security Department tried to
prevent the spread of pro-Teng propaganda in the
PLA, and the Propaganda Department appeared to be
keeping the PLA in step with the Party's gradual shift
toward a more "Leftist" line.
Since the purge of Chang Chun-chiao, Mme. Mao,
Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yuan in October
1976, the PLA's political apparatus has been working
vigorously to transfer the loyalty that was once
directed toward Mao to the new Chairman, Hua Kuo-
feng. In addition, it is marching in step with the Party
in attacking the Leftists, including Chang Chun-
chiao, for, among other things, trying to use the PLA
to overthrow Hua Kuo-feng.
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Conclusion
The history of the GPD reflects its importance as an
arm of the Party. So far as we know, it has faithfully
executed the Party's policies in the PLA, and it has
succeeded in keeping the bulk of the military obedient
* That is the GPD's main job: it cannot be expected to discover
every potential political security case, and the top-level leaders
implicated in the Lin Piao affair would have been primarily the
concern of the political security apparatus, not the GPD, which
lacked authority over them.
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to the Party even during times of dangerous stress,
such as the 1958-1959 controversy and the purge of
Lin Piao in 1971.* The GPD's failure to support
Chang Chun-chiao seems to be the only instance in
which it has acted in the interest of the military.
The record indicates that, until now at least, the
GPD has been brought under ever-tighter Party
control and has acted as an effective instrument of
Party control over the PLA rather than as a lever of
military influence on the Chinese political system.
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Secret
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