SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1 19
Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
ORCON
Research Study
Soviet Policy and European Communism
Secret
PR 76 10069
October 1976
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11 CRT A-R DP79T00889A000800190001-1
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
SOVIET POLICY AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNISM
by
Gene Wicklund
The author is grateful for the many comments and suggestions which were
received from other CIA offices during the preparation of this study. Comments and
questions will be welcomed by the author on Red 1650.
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
SECRET
NOFORN/ NOCONTRACT /ORCON
CONTENTS
FOREWORD .......................................................
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ..........................................
DISCUSSION .......................................................
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................
II. GENERAL TRENDS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNISM ..........
A. Historical Background to Communist Discord .................
B. Challenges to Soviet Leadership .............................
C. International Conferences Mark Decline in Soviet Authority ...
D. Sources of Communist Disunity .............................
E. Autonomy the Central Issue ................................
F. The Present Balance ........................................
III. PORTUGAL ..................................................
A. National and Ideological Impulses Conflict ...................
B. Involvement in Portugal Contrary to Short-Term Soviet Interests ....
C. Soviet Assessment of PCP Prospects Pessimistic ...............
D. Ideological Influence on Soviet Policy Goals .................
E. Efforts to Limit Involvement in Portugal ....................
F. Extent of Soviet Involvement ...............................
G. Soviet Accommodation to PCP's Reduced Status ..............
H. Soviet Support of "Moderate" Tactics Consistent .............
1. Moscow's Failure to Dictate PCP Strategy ...................
J. Limitations on Soviet Influence .............................
IV. ITALY .......................................................
A. Are Communist Advances Compatible with Soviet Interests? ...
B. The Nature of the PCI ....................................
C. The Question of Goals ....................................
D. Soviet Tolerance of PCI Tactical Line .......................
E. PCI Tactics Coincide with Soviet Needs ....................
F. Soviet and PCI Differences Center on Issue of Autonomy .....
G. Portugal Strains PCI-CPSU Relationship ......................
H. The PCI and Eurocommunism ..............................
1. Moscow's Assessment .......................................
J. Moscow's Means of Control Limited ........................
K. The Bottom Line .........................................
iii
SECRET
Page
v
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
SECRET
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Page
A.
The Scope of Moscow's Spanish Problem ....................
18
B.
Origins of Moscow's Differences with the PCE ..............
19
C.
Moscow's Failure to Assert Control over the PCE ...........
20
D.
Soviet Efforts to Split the PCE .............................
20
E.
Soviet and PCE Interests are Contradictory ..................
21
A.
Importance of the PCF ....................................
22
B.
Past PCF Loyalty .........................................
22
C.
Significance of PCF Reversal of Course ......................
23
D.
Soviet and French Communist Interests Conflict ..............
24
E.
Implications for Moscow ....................................
25
VII. PRESENT TRENDS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
SOVIET POLICY .......................................... 26
A.
Soviets Face a Difficult Future .............................
26
B.
Short-Term Problems .......................................
26
C.
Long-Term Prospects ........................................
27
ANNEX
...........................................................
31
A.
Divided Soviet Counsels .....................................
31
B.
Points of Disagreements ......................................
31
iv
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
SECRET
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
FOREWORD
This study treats relations between the Soviets and the most important Western
European Communist Parties, those of France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. It reviews
the extent to which the objectives of these Parties correspond to the immediate and
more distant goals of Soviet policy, and examines the limitations on Moscow's ability
to control the actions of these Parties. It also focuses on the political and doctrinal
problems which the rise of a self-consciously independent Western European wing of
the Communist movement has caused for Moscow, and is likely to cause in the future.
V
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
SECRET
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
-The ideological, organizational, and financial pressures which the
Soviets can bring to bear on the major Western Parties may suffice
to hold these Parties in line on issues of marginal importance to
them, but Moscow is unable to control the actions of even the most
"loyal" of these Parties when issues which directly touch their most
vital interests are at stake.
-The principal objective of the Western Communists-the acquisi-
tion of political power-does not fully mesh with Moscow's near-
term interest in developing a stable pattern of economic and
political cooperation with the West, nor with the low-risk approach
to foreign political questions generally favored by the present
Soviet leaders.
-Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that the Soviets believe that
their longer-term interest in the reduction of US influence in
Europe and in the political neutralization of Western Europe will
be served by the accession to power of local Communist Parties.
-This conviction is supported by their judgment that their doctrinal
and political problems with the Western Communists, although
annoying and worrisome, are manageable and susceptible to
improvement.
-Moscow's judgment in this regard is not necessarily correct. In the
longer term-that is, beyond the next year or two-the proximity
to power of the major Western Parties is likely to accentuate their
tendency to give priority to considerations of political expediency,
thus heightening tensions in their relations with Moscow.
VII
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
SECRET
NOFORN/ NOCONTRACT /ORCON
DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
Europe is the heaviest weight in the East-West
balance of power, and it is there that any changes in
the dividing lines between East and West will have
the most serious implications. These lines have been
drawn not only on the basis of geopolitical divisions,
but also on the basis of adherence to conflicting
ideologies. It is this latter fact which lends such
significance to the recent rise in the influence and
prospects of the Communist Parties of southern
Europe.
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has advanced
furthest. Its electoral successes, most recently in the
legislative elections of June 1976, have brought it to
the verge of the "historic compromise" with the
Christian Democrats (DC) which it has sought since
1973 as a means of winning a formal role in
government. The achievements of the French Com-
munist Party (PCF) are less impressive, but in May
1974 it fell only inches short of its goal of putting the
candidate of the Union of the Left, Socialist Francois
Mitterrand, into the Elysee Palace as the President of
the French Republic. Its efforts are now centered on
the legislative elections scheduled for 1978, where it
hopes-again in conjunction with its Socialist elec-
toral ally-to win a majority.
On the southwestern periphery of Europe, the
Portuguese and Spanish Parties have emerged after
decades of obscurity to play an important role in the
affairs of their countries. The Portuguese coup of April
1974 catapulted the hitherto insignificant Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP) to prominence, initially as
the chief political ally of the ruling clique of military
officers. Even after the series of defeats it has absorbed
since mid-1975, the PCP retains considerable organi-
zational strength and a capacity to frustrate the
programs of the government in Lisbon. The Spanish
Communist Party (PCE), while as yet still illegal and
less successful than its brother Parties, is the strongest
voice in the incipient Spanish labor movement and
has made much progress in breaking out of the
political ghetto in which it had languished under
Franco.
If the European Communist movement were still
the near-monolith it was during much of the postwar
period, there could be no doubt that these develop-
ments would redound directly to the benefit of the
Soviet Union. However, the relationship is no longer
so simple. The rising tide of Communist influence in
Western Europe has been accompanied by an equally
visible erosion of the unity of the Communist
movement and a diminution of Soviet authority over
These parallel trends have made it much more
difficult to assess the implications of the rise of
Communist influence in southern Europe for the
balance of power between East and West. In order to
make any general assessment, some specific questions
must be answered.
-Do the Soviets possess the means to compel or
induce the Western Communists to act in
accordance with Moscow's wishes?
-To what extent do the objectives of the Western
Communists mesh with Soviet policy objectives,
both over the short-term and over the long-term?
-How significant are the doctrinal and political
problems which the rising influence of Western
European Communist Parties pose for the
Soviets?
While certain general observations can be made
about the state of Moscow's relations with West
European Communism, Soviet relations with each of
the four Parties with which this paper is concerned
cannot be fitted into one mold, The Parties themselves
range in character from the neo-Stalinist PCP to the
broad-based and "revisionist" Italian Party, and the
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
historical and political foundations of their relation-
ships with the CPSU are equally diverse. Answers to
the general questions posed above can be provided
only on the basis of an examination of the specific
features of Soviet relations with each of these Parties.
II. GENERAL TRENDS IN EUROPEAN
COMMUNISM
A. Historical Background to Communist
Discord
The decline in the solidarity of the international
Communist movement and in Soviet authority over it
is dramatic when viewed in historical perspective.
Soviet control of the international movement at its
origin was well-nigh absolute. The Comintern, or
Third International, which provided the organiza-
tional skeleton of the international movement from its
foundation in 1919 to its dissolution in 1943, was
entirely a Soviet creation. Its headquarters were in
Moscow, the bulk of its leadership and staff was
Soviet, and the principal condition for membership in
the organization was an unqualified acceptance of
Lenin's famous Twenty-One Principles. This was a list
of organizational and ideological rules designed to
ensure that foreign Parties were cast in the image of
the victorious Russian Bolsheviks.
And, in fact, foreign Parties were in large part mere
carbon copies of the Russian Party. Such tendencies to
independent thought and action as existed were
largely obliterated under the twin pressures of
domestic repression-which deepened the dependence
of many of the foreign Parties dependent on Soviet
support for their very survival-and Stalinist purges,
which struck some foreign Parties almost as severely as
they did the Soviet Party.
The abolition of the Comintern in 1943 was a
gesture to Moscow's wartime allies, and had no effect
on the reality of Moscow's dominance over the foreign
Parties, This continued to be virtually unshaken, as
was demonstrated by Moscow's ability in 1944-1945
to compel the large Italian and French Parties to
subordinate their own political ambitions to the needs
of Soviet foreign policy. Under Soviet instructions, the
French and Italians dismantled the large armed
resistance movements which they controlled and
joined in conservative-dominated governments of
national unity in order to enable Moscow to maintain
in good order the Grand Alliance with Washington
and London.
Moscow's control was more visibly demonstrated in
1947, at the foundation of the Cominform. This
truncated successor of the Comintern formally joined
the French and Italian Parties with the Soviet Party
and the Eastern European clients of the Soviet Union,
and was established in large part for the purpose of
compelling the French and Italian Communists to
subordinate their own immediate political interests to
an all-out struggle against the Marshall Plan. It was
again a mark of Soviet authority that the French and
Italian Parties obediently fell into line, thereby
cutting themselves off from participation in govern-
ment and consigning themselves to political isolation
and futility.
This was the high-water mark of Soviet authority,
however. Within a year the monolithic solidarity of
the Communist world had been broken, as Titoist
Yugoslavia openly defied Moscow and asserted its
right to define its own national policies. This first
serious setback to Soviet authority within the Commu-
nist movement, which did not occur until almost three
decades after the foundation of the Comintern, has
been followed by many others.
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership under Nikita
Khrushchev was itself instrumental in contributing to
the growth of fissures within the movement. Khrush-
chev's efforts to discredit the foreign and domestic
policies of his predecessor at the Soviet 20th Party
Congress in 1956 encouraged many foreign Commu-
nists to believe that now they would have greater
freedom to chart their own course. Among them was
Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI and a former
Comintern agent, who shortly after the 20th Congress
proclaimed the doctrine of "polycentrism," which
held that each national Party should be free to
develop its own road to Communism rather than
obeying the dictates of a single center-Moscow.
B. Challenges to Soviet Leadership
Moscow has never succeeded in closing the Pan-
dora's box opened at the 20th Congress. In the
ensuing two decades, it has had to cope with a series
of challenges to its leadership launched by both
Eastern and Western Communists. Each successive
threat to the Soviet position has contributed to the
overall process of political and ideological erosion,
2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
whatever the degree of Moscow's success in dealing
with them.
Moscow's bloody suppression of the Hungarian
revolt in 1956, although it checked the nationalist
threat to the USSR's Eastern European empire, cost
the Communist movement the support of many of its
most prominent adherents and led many foreign
Communists to question the moral basis of Soviet
authority. Moscow's success in isolating the Chinese
Communists from the mainstream of the Communist
movement after the open eruption of the Sino-Soviet
dispute in 1959 has not completely erased the divisive
effects of that quarrel. Quite apart from the relatively
small number of adherents the Chinese have been
able to win for the doctrines of Maoism, the major
non-Bloc Parties have been unwilling to go along with
Soviet efforts to formally excommunicate the Chinese.
Consequently, the Chinese problem remains as an
ulcer on the body of the Communist movement.
Similarly, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia
in 1968 had the effect of shoring up the position of
Soviet style ideological orthodoxy in Eastern Europe,
but only at the cost of adding greatly to the strains on
Moscow's relations with the major nonruling Parties.
C. International Conferences Mark
Decline in Soviet Authority
The successively less impressive results of the
international Communist conferences which have
taken place since the 20th Party Congress also mark
the decline in Moscow's authority over the Commu-
nist movement. The conference of 81 Parties held in
Moscow in 1960 produced a document which was a
carefully-worded compromise between the positions of
the Soviets and the Chinese. It is more memorable as
the last such meeting attended by the Chinese and as
the scene of a violent debate between the Soviet hosts
and their Chinese guests. The next-and last-World
Communist Conference met in 1969, five years
behind schedule. It was boycotted by the most
important Asian Parties, and produced a final
document which many European Parties, including
the Italians and Spanish, refused to endorse in full.
Finally, the recent Conference of European Com-
munist Parties (CECP), which met in June 1976,
produced a document which was signed by no one,
and, hence, binding on no one. It also failed to
specifically invoke "proletarian internationalism" or
to excoriate "anti-Sovietism," thereby falling short of
the standards established by previous conferences.
These two phrases have been used as codewords to
denote the obligation of all Communists to put the
promotion of Soviet interests before other concerns. It
was another mark of the movement's decline that
several Western European Communist leaders pub-
licly stated their expectation that the meeting would
be the last of its kind.
D. Sources of Communist Disunity
The sources of the disunity which have come to
plague the Communist movement are manifold, but
at bottom they all stem from the fading of the
movement's international ideals. The Communist
movement, from its origins as an international faith,
has moved steadily in the direction of becoming a
mere congeries of national Parties moved by parochial
considerations of political advantage.
The Soviets themselves have given the lead to this
trend. They long ago transformed the doctrine of
"socialist internationalism" from "one for all" to "all
for one"-the one being the USSR and the all
including all the other members of the international
movement. The moral authority which accrued to the
USSR as the homeland of Communism and the
dependence of foreign Communists on it for financial
and organizational support combined to win the
allegiance of foreign Communists to this tenet. The
powerful German Party's suicidal refusal to join forces
with the Socialists against the Nazi menace in the
1930s and the damaging tactical shifts imposed on the
French and Italian Communists in the immediate
postwar years were alike responses to the needs of
Soviet policy rather than to the dictates of political
reality in the countries involved.
The notion that the preservation and strengthening
of the Soviet state took precedence over all other
concerns could be maintained without difficulty only
as long as the Soviet Union remained alone as the
world's only Communist state. It has become steadily
more difficult to sustain as the Communist Bloc has
expanded to include many other states. The obvious
clashes of interest which have troubled relations
between these states, particularly the periodic convul-
sions which have shaken Eastern Europe and the Sino-
Soviet feud, have further contributed to an erosion of
Moscow's moral authority within the movement. It
has become more and more difficult for the Soviets to
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
justify their actions in terms of the common interests
of all Communists, not least because their positions
have come under the direct attack of other Commu-
nists, most consistently by the Chinese.
At the same time that the prestige of the Soviets
within the international movement has been in
decline, the prospects of some of the Western
European Parties have been in the ascendant. The
convergence of these two trend lines has contributed
to the uncertainty within the European Communist
movement. With the vision of power glimmering
before their eyes, some of these Parties-most signifi-
cantly, the French and Italian Parties, which together
dominate Western . European Communism-have
shown an increasing willingness to put their own
interests on a par with those of the Soviet Union, or
even ahead of them. In fact, they have begun to show
some of the same tendencies to think in basically
national terms as have those Parties which already
exercise power. The improvement in the domestic
power base of the larger Western Parties has also made
them better able to resist direct Soviet pressure.
E. Autonomy the Central Issue
The issues which divide the Soviets and these
Parties are often expressed in terms of ideological
conflict, and described as a struggle between the
proponents of "orthodoxy" and the supporters of
"revisionism." In fact, the issues in dispute between
the Soviets and the dissident Parties of the West vary
from case to case. On one issue, however, the dissident
Parties are united, and it is on this issue that they have
joined most effectively to resist the Soviets.
This is the issue of autonomy, or, as seen from the
Soviet perspective, discipline. The dissident Western
Parties--the Italian, Spanish and now the French-
insist with increasing vehemence on their right to
define their own interests and pursue them with
tactics of their own devising. The Soviets, for their
part, continue to insist that the interests of any single
Party must be subordinated to the common interests
of the international movement, and assert the right as
the senior member of that movement to have the
major voice in defining what these common interests
are.
This issue has been a bone of contention between
the Soviets and the dissident Parties, regardless of the
degree to which the Soviets may have agreed or
disagreed with the tactical line followed by any one of
these Parties, or have questioned its adherence to the
traditional Marxist-Leninist goal of class (one-party)
dictatorship.
In fact, the Soviets have soft-pedaled their suspi-
cions as to the ultimate loyalties of the Western
Parties. Moreover, despite occasional disagreements
on specific issues of political tactics, the Soviets have
no quarrel with the general features of the tactical line
followed by the Western Parties.
Apart from local differences, this line features a
common disavowal of revolutionary political and
social goals in favor of a moderate and "democratic"
program, and an emphasis on the "national" charac-
ter of the Party. This stance is intended to serve as the
basis for the establishment of electoral alliances with
Socialists and other non-Communist political ele-
ments which are capable together of forming a
majority. It is a strategy of the long-haul, with the
emphasis on caution and patience rather than the
violent or sudden seizure of power.
Despite its points of dissimilarity with the path
followed by the Russian Communists in their seizure
of power, the Soviets have lent their strong support to
the general features of this line. The CPSU acknowl-
edged the possibility of a peaceful path to Commu-
nism after the 20th Congress in 1956. Moscow's
support for the notion of forming electoral alliances
with Socialists and Social-Democrats was enunciated
at Karlovy Vary in 1967, and was reaffirmed even
after the occupation of Czechoslovakia.* This en-
dorsement was reaffirmed most recently at the 25th
Congress of the CPSU in February 1976, in General
Secretary Brezhnev's report to the Congress, where he
cited as an example for others the CPSU's determina-
tion to improve its relations with "progressive"
parties.
The Soviets have also been willing to accommodate
themselves to some--but not all-of the Western
Parties' efforts to convince their electorates of their
national character and freedom from international
commitments. Moscow's tolerance of the tactical
maneuvers of the Western Parties has been most
evident in its tacit approval of the line the French,
Italian, and Portuguese Parties have taken toward
* The Soviet Politburo's senior ideologue, M. A. Suslov, criticized
Communism's historical antipathy to collaboration with Social
Democracy as "unfounded" in March 1969.
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
membership in NATO. All have disclaimed any
intention of initiating a unilateral withdrawal from
the alliance if they should come to power. Moscow's
acceptance of this position has been indicated by its
willingness to publish accurate descriptions of the
positions the Parties have taken.* Not surprisingly,
Moscow has shown less understanding for the
circumstances which have led some of the West-
ern Communists-particularly the Spanish and
French-to demonstrate their independence by at-
tacks on Soviet internal policy.
There are. other broad limits to the support Moscow
is willing to extend to the maneuvers of the Western
Parties. One is Moscow's insistence that political
compromise must be accomplished without ideologi-
cal compromise. It is the essence of the Soviet position
that Communists must demonstrate political flexibil-
ity in order to put themselves into a position to seduce
their allies, but must guard against the danger that
they will themselves be seduced by the doctrines
espoused by their political rivals.**
Despite these reservations, Moscow's fundamental
support for the moderate line of the Western Parties is
unquestionable. Moscow's position stems from its
understanding of the requirements of the Western
European political environment and from the needs of
Soviet foreign policy. If a judgment is to be reached
on the basis of the history of Soviet relations with the
Western Communists, the latter consideration is the
more important. Moscow's efforts to reduce tensions
with the West and to build a structure of political and
economic cooperation with the major Western coun-
tries depend on a lessening of internal as well as
external tensions; hence, Moscow's present aversion to
aggressive action on the part of the European Parties.
It is the dissident Parties' conviction of Moscow's
readiness to subordinate the needs of the international
movement-or rather, of foreign Communists-to the
needs of Soviet foreign policy which makes them so
determined to oppose Moscow's efforts to assert its
leadership of the movement. Memories of Moscow's
* For example, see the interview with PCP leader Cunhal which
appeared in Pravda on 12 June 1976, and Pravda on the Italian
election campaign on 15 May 1976.
** At the 25th Congress, Brezhnev coupled his support for
cooperation between Communists and non-Communists to a
reminder that there could be "no question of an ideological
rapprochement."
past willingness to sacrifice the French and Italian
Parties' interests to Stalin's political and territorial
objectives in Europe have been kept alive by more
recent demonstrations of Soviet egocentrism. These
include Moscow's willingness to develop its relations
with the Spanish regime over the protests of the
proscribed PCE and its similar efforts to cultivate its
relations with the French government at the expense
of the electoral prospects of the French Communists.
(These incidents will be discussed in more detail in
subsequent sections of the paper.)
F. The Present Balance
The results of the CECP which met in East Berlin
on 29-30 June 1976 were indicative of the inability of
the Soviets to reassert their authority over the
European Communist movement. Moscow's failure
was all the more striking in that the Conference had
originally been conceived of-in 1974-as a vehicle
which would enable the Soviets to achieve such a
reassertion.
While the trend toward disintegration within the
European Communist movement is clear, it is much
less clear what stage the process has reached. The
mere fact that all the major European Parties,
including those most outspoken in their assertion of
independence, chose to attend the European Confer-
ence is proof that the ties which link the Communist
Parties are still in existence, even though weakened.
The dissident Parties cannot turn their backs on the
international movement without threatening the
unity of their own ranks. This is a principal source of
such leverage over the Western Communists as the
Soviet Union retains. The Soviets, on the other hand,
need their link with the European wing of the
Communist movement to confirm the legitimacy of
their own system and their policies. This is both
psychologically important and essential to the internal
standing of the Soviet leaders.
The main achievement of the European Conference
was to endorse Moscow's pursuit of detente with the
governments of the West as compatible with the
interests of Western Communism. This the document
did in fulsome detail. It went beyond this to register a
broad consensus of support for the main outlines of
Soviet foreign policy, including Soviet disarmament
proposals and the essentials of the Soviet position on
European security, the Middle East, and southern
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
The two faces of the Conference of-European Communist Parties. In the top photo,
a frowning L. I. Brezhnev and B. N. Ponomarev (the Soviet Party official
responsible for relations with nonruling Communist Parties) listen to the speeches of
delegates to the Congress. In the bottom photo, Brezhnev and Ponomarev are all
smiles as they meet publicly with Enrico Berlinguer, the independently-minded
leader of the Italian Communists. (Berlinguer is at the far left.)
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Africa. It is this broad coincidence of views that
permits the Soviets to retain their conviction that the
maintenance of their relationship with the Commu-
nist Parties of the West is on balance in their interests,
however annoying and troublesome may be some of
the actions of some of these Parties.
While these general observations apply to Soviet
relations with all of the dissident Parties, each of these
Parties responds more to the unique circumstances
which it faces than to any general rules of behavior.
From the Soviet perspective, there is no single or
simple solution to the problem of dealing with these
Parties.
At the same time, the Soviet leaders' efforts to
function as the leaders of the international Commu-
nist movement are complicated by the need to fulfill
their primary function as national leaders. The
immediate interests of the Soviet state do not often
coincide with the demands of the international
movement.
Ill. PORTUGAL
A. National and Ideological Impulses
Conflict
The difficulties which the Soviet leaders face in
reconciling their role as national leaders with claims to
leadership of the international Communist movement
have been evident in the Soviet response to develop-
ments in Portugal since the coup of 25 April 1974.
They have had to balance their diplomatic stake in a
relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe against
their ideological commitment to fostering radical
social and political change in the non-Communist
world. Their actions have demonstrated the degree to
which ideological commitments have been diluted by
diplomatic necessity, and, conversely, the limits
imposed on Soviet freedom of action by ideological
conviction and domestic political needs.
B. Involvement in Portugal Contrary to
Short-Term Soviet Interests
If the leaders of the Soviet Union were moved solely
by considerations of immediate diplomatic advan-
tage, involvement in the internal crisis which has
gripped Portugal since the overthrow of the rightist
Caetano regime in 1974 would have had little allure
for them. Portugal has little to offer in the way of
military, economic, or political advantage to the
USSR. Conversely, Soviet involvement in the affairs of
a state which was both a member of the Atlantic
Alliance and historically, culturally, and economically
a member of the Western World threatened to place
an intolerable strain on Moscow's relations with the
West. There is in fact considerable evidence that the
Soviet leaders shared this conclusion.
Moscow's lack of economic interest in Portugal has
been amply demonstrated over the past two years.
The existence of the Communist-influenced and
generally pro-Soviet military government which ruled
from September 1974 to September 1975 had no
appreciable effect on the levels of Soviet trade with
Portugal. Even after the conclusion of several highly
ballyhooed trade agreements, Soviet exports to and
imports from Portugal in September 1975 amounted
to no more than 1.4 percent and 0.8 percent of the
Portuguese totals.' The fact is that the Portuguese
economy, with its heavy dependence on agriculture,
has very little to offer the Soviets.
Neither have the Soviets displayed any interest in
establishing a military presence in Portugal. In spite of
the rumors which circulated in 1975 of such an
interest in acquiring naval basing rights in the Azores,
there is no evidence of any concrete Soviet approaches
to the Portuguese. Although it cannot be excluded
that Soviet naval planners had some interest in
Portuguese port facilities, it cannot have been very
great, given the priority assigned to the promotion of
Soviet interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
At any rate, it cannot have been great enough to
justify the risk of a strong Western reaction which
might have threatened the whole structure of East-
West relations. There is ample evidence that the
Soviets took this possibility seriously. They were at
pains during the height of the Portuguese internal
crisis in 1975 to persuade Western officials that they
were not responsible for the actions of the PCP-
which had attempted to use its influence on the ruling
military clique to purge its political opponents from
government and the media-and that they had no
intention of intervening in Portuguese affairs. The fact
that the Portuguese crisis and Western warnings
against Soviet intervention both peaked just as the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) was about to convene in Helsinki undoubt-
edly sensitized the Soviet leaders to the danger that a
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Western reaction against Portuguese developments
could result in a setback for their European policy.
Beyond the prospect of immediate diplomatic
setbacks, other, more fundamental, considerations of
Realpolitik argued against an open Soviet involve-
ment in Portugal. Geographic location was not least
among them. Portugal was far distant from the bases
of Soviet power, and close to those of the West.
A judicious assessment of the local balance of power
apparently led the Soviets to conclude that a
Communist government could not be maintained in
the face of Western opposition. According to a
clandestine report, a Hungarian intelligence estimate
concluded in early 1975 that the US would go to
unusual lengths in the wake of the Indochina debacle
to prevent the emergence of a Communist regime in
Portugal. More importantly, the estimate concluded
that the US was fully capable of achieving its
objectives.' This view presumably was shared by the
Soviets.
Indeed, at times the Soviet leaders openly hinted
that they expected Western intervention in Portugal.
Brezhnev, for example, reportedly told a West
German leader in July 1975 that he could not
understand why the West had not intervened in
Portugal at the first sign of unrest. He added that this
would have been accepted by the Soviets-albeit
publicly condemned-because Portugal "belongs" in
the Western camp.'
C. Soviet Assessment of PCP Prospects
Pessimistic
In any case, the Soviets apparently had little faith
in the ability of the Portuguese Communists to
maintain themselves in power whatever the extent of
Western, intervention. Soviet views of the PCP's
prospects-in contrast to those of many Western
observers-were tinged with pessimism even when the
Portuguese Party was at the apogee of its power. Thus,
in May 1975, at a time when the PCP was in the
midst of an all-out offensive against its opponents, a
Soviet official in Moscow privately told a Western
Communist that the PCP could not strengthen its
position without the support of the Portuguese
military, a fact which required it to subordinate its
more immediate ambitions to the overriding need to
maintain the sympathy of the military.'
A final factor militating against a Soviet involve-
ment on the side of the Portuguese Communists was
the ambivalent reaction of Western Communists to
the rise of the Portuguese Party. Some of the most
important of these Parties-notably the Italian and
Spanish-vocally criticized the revolutionary mili-
tance of the PCP, which threatened to undermine
their own efforts to present themselves as moderate
and "democratic" movements. Moscow's support for
the PCP was certain to complicate its relations with
these Parties, which were much more important than
the PCP both because of their size and because of the
greater strategic significance of their countries.
D. Ideological Influence on Soviet Policy
Goals
As suggested above, a sober and cynical calculation
of political interest would have led the Soviets to shy
away from any direct involvement with the PCP. That
they did not can be attributed to ideological
considerations-their need to justify their policy
programs before their own political constituencies in
ideological terms. This need can be seen, for example,
in their efforts to justify their pursuit of detente with
the West as a contribution to the world revolutionary
process. This is a standard theme of Soviet spokesmen,
who argue that detente, by lowering the level of East-
West tensions, increases the political acceptability of
Communist Parties to non-Communists and improves
their prospects for political gains.*
This claim helps explain the attention and support
Moscow accorded the PCP. By early 1975 it had
become the most conspicuous representative of West-
ern European Communism, and was cited by the
Soviets as an example of how Soviet policy facilitated
Communist advances in the capitalist world. The
Soviet leaders were particularly in need of some such
demonstration at that time to make up for the
psychological setback represented by the fall of the
Allende regime in Chile in September 1973. This
debacle led many Communists both in East and West
to question the possibility of a "peaceful" road to
socialism, Some Soviets-but not all-concluded that
Allende's fatal weakness lay in his failure to weed his
* The Soviet hand was apparent in the wording of the Document
adopted by the CECP. It asserted that detente "create(s) optimum
conditions for the development of the struggle of the working class
and all democratic forces."
8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Soviet Party Secretary B. N. Ponomarev (middle) greets Portuguese Party leader Alvaro
Cunhal (left) at the latter's arrival in Moscow at the head of a Portuguese government
delegation in 1974. Despite the appearance of Ponomarev at the airport, the visit produced
an agreement to play down the links between the two Parties.
enemies out of positions of power before they could
coalesce against him, and in his unpreparedness to use
force against them. This conclusion no doubt inclined
Moscow to respond favorably to the PCP, which
showed no comparable reluctance in 1974-1975 to
take the offensive against its rivals.
Even without the experience of Chile, the ideologi-
cal orthodoxy of the PCP would have attracted Soviet
support. The Portuguese Party, both before and after
its appearance on the Portuguese political stage, has
distinguished itself by its uncritical support of the
Soviets on both ideological and policy questions. It
has backed Moscow on every one of the key issues
which have divided the Communist movement-the
Sino-Soviet quarrel, Czechoslovakia, and Moscow's
claim to leadership of the Communist movement.
Moreover, the PCP's early successes provided welcome
support for the Soviets in their running debate with
the dissident Parties of the West, serving as "proof"
that loyal support for Moscow was not incompatible
with political success.*
* Soviet Party Secretary and International Department- Chief,
B, N. Ponomarev, for example, claimed in January 1975 that the
triumph of the PCP had demonstrated the importance of a
"consistent Marxist-Leninist line." Ponomarev, no doubt, had
"inconsistent" Marxist-Leninists like the Italians and Spanish in
mind when he spoke.
E. Efforts to Limit Involvement in Portugal
Moscow's reluctance from the outset to needlessly
jeopardize its relations with the West was visible in its
efforts to maintain a low official profile during the
height of the Portuguese political crisis. The behavior
of the Soviet diplomatic community in Lisbon-
diplomatic relations were established on 10 June
1974-was tailored to maintain a pose of noninvolve-
ment. Despite the presence of a Soviet diplomatic
complement of about 30 in Lisbon, the Soviet
Ambassador and his staff did their best to stay in the
background. This was evident in their failure to
develop any form of special relationship with the
leftist and pro-Soviet Vasco Goncalves, who served as
Premier from September 1974 to September 1975, or
to put themselves forward as advisors to the Portu-
guese Communists. With similar discretion, Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko's foreign policy report to a
Soviet Central Committee plenum in April 1975-at a
time when the Portuguese Communists had launched
an effort to oust their rivals from the government-
barely touched on Soviet relations with the Commu-
nist movement, and failed to mention Portugal at all.
Moscow also did its best to play down the links
between the Portuguese Party and the CPSU and
other Parties. It was officially announced, for exam-
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
pie, that the PCP leader, Alvaro Cunhal, on his return
to Lisbon on 30 April 1974, had come from Paris,
when in fact he had merely changed planes there on
his way home from exile in Eastern Europe. On
another occasion, Soviet officials are reported to have
intervened to block a pro-PCP demonstration by the
Austrian Party.5
Such a stance was reportedly endorsed by the
Portuguese Communists themselves, since, besides
helping to protect the Soviet Union's diplomatic
position with the West, it served to enhance the
domestic political appeal of the PCP as an "independ-
ent" movement. According to one report, Cunhal
asked Moscow in November 1974 to avoid any overly
demonstrative support for the PCP.6
Even Soviet press coverage of the Portuguese
revolution was tailored to de-emphasize the Soviet
involvement in Portugal. Soviet reportage initially was
limited to factual reports and replays of PCP
statements. In fact, the first direct Soviet press
commentary on developments in Portugal did not
appear until 21 February 1975, almost 10 months
after the revolution.'
F. Extent of Soviet Involvement
The Soviets remained committed to this stance of
ostensible noninvolvement until the summer of 1975.
In practice, Moscow's assertions of noninterest in the
affairs of post-revolutionary Portugal had always been
compromised by the steady flow of Soviet money to
the PCP. The precise amounts of the Soviet subsidy
are unknown, but they were enough to make the PCP
relatively affluent in comparison with its political
competition (as measured by such tangible criteria as
the number of posters, sound trucks, and full-time
organizers visible in electoral campaigns). The Soviets
took care, however, to confine their delivery of funds
to clandestine channels, a practice which helped
support their hands-off pose.
Soviet behavior changed during the period July-
September 1975, when the Portuguese Socialists and
Centrists, emboldened by their success in the April
elections to a Constituent Assembly, seized control of
the streets and began to stir up popular resentmentof
the Communists. Moreover, they were successful
enough to cause the Soviets to air publicly their fears
that another "Chile"-which would result in the total
destruction of the Communist Party-was in the
making. *
This prospect was sufficient to stir the Soviets from
their pose of noninvolvement. The obliteration of the
Portuguese Party at the hands of its enemies, a la
Chile, would have undermined the ideological under-
pinnings of Soviet detente policies, that is the claim
that these policies have paved the way for radical
political and social change in the capitalist world.
More importantly, the destruction of the PCP would
have damaged the prestige of the Soviet leader most
closely associated with detente-General Secretary
Brezhnev.
The change was most immediately apparent in the
harder line taken toward the Portuguese Socialists in
the Soviet press, which until July had balanced
criticism of their anti-Communist actions with pleas
for a return to the alliance with the PCP. Now the
Soviet organs went over to a frontal assault on the
Socialists. The leaders of the Portuguese Socialist Party
(PSP) were charged with having "deserted openly" to
the ranks of the anti-Communists.8
At the same time, the Soviets became more active in
rallying support for the PCP. Whereas only a few
months earlier they had discouraged public demon-
strations of foreign Communist support for the PCP,
they now began to organize manifestations of
"international solidarity" with the PCP. The first sign
of this came on 24 July, when Pravda approvingly
reported the Belgian Communist Party Chairman's
appeal for European leftists to lend "maximum
support" to the cause of the Portuguese revolution.9
Behind the scenes, Soviet officials were also active in
promoting international support for the PCP. For
example, a denunciation of Western interference in
the internal affairs of Portugal which appeared in the
Austrian Communist newspaper Volkstimme on 20
August reportedly was printed on the direct orders of
the Soviet Embassy in Vienna,10
The Soviets coupled these efforts with equally
energetic diplomatic efforts to block Western aid to
the opponents of the PCP. They launched a concerted
* For an example, see the "Observer" article which appeared in
Pravda on 19 August 1975. "Observer" stated flatly that "the
current reactionary sorties are reminiscent of what happened on the
threshold of the fascist coup in Chile." The "Observer" byline itself
is unusual, and is used to indicate that an article represents the
thinking of the Soviet government.
10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
effort to dissuade European Socialists from continuing
their support for the PSP against the PCP. Even Third
World Socialist leaders were asked to use their
"influence" with the Portuguese Socialists."
The Soviets also showed a new willingness to
polemicize with the West on the issue of intervention
in Portugal. They charged that Western support for
Portuguese anti-Communists constituted intervention
in Portuguese internal affairs and was in violation of
the CSCE agreement. The Soviet press first leveled
this charge in early August 1975, only a few days after
the CSCE summit had ended.* 12
G. Soviet Accommodation to PCP's
Reduced Status
That Moscow's goals were limited and confined
essentially to preventing the destruction of the PCP
became apparent with the resolution of the Portu-
guese crisis in the fall of 1975. This process proceeded
in stages, In September, the pro-Communist govern-
ment of Premier Goncalves was forced out and
replaced by a new lineup dominated by the Socialists.
In November, the government charged the Commu-
nists with involvement in an abortive leftist coup, and
used this as a pretext for moving against the
remaining Communist positions in the government
and the bureaucracy. This process culminated in July
1976, after PCP setbacks in the legislative elections in
April and the Presidential elections in June, when the
last Communist cabinet member lost his position as a
result of the Socialist Party's decision to form a
minority government.
Moscow has accepted this process with notable
equanimity. Once anti-Communist street violence
abated and it became clear that the Communists,
even if humbled, would survive, Soviet policy
retreated from the advanced positions it had occupied
during the summer of 1975. Soviet press condemna-
tions of the dominant Socialists gave way to appeals
for a "unity of the left" based on an alliance between
the Socialists and Communists. 13 In effect, the Soviets
have returned to the position of ostensible noninvolve-
ment they occupied before mid-1975. According to a
clandestine intelligence report, they have now turned
the job of maintaining liaison with the PCP over to
* In the process of polemicizing with the West over Portugal, they
contributed greatly to the deterioration in their relations with the
other major Western Parties, the Italian, Spanish, and French.
the East Germans.14 The use of the East Germans as a
cut-out makes clear their interest in obscuring their
links with the Portuguese Communists.
H. Soviet Support of "Moderate"
Tactics Consistent
In fact, the resolution of the Portuguese internal
crisis, even if at least temporarily in favor of the
Socialists, has permitted Soviet policy to return to its
original channel. Except during July-August 1975,
Moscow has consistently backed the formation of a
"united front" of the PCP and the Socialists and other
left-wing political elements on the basis of a jointly
acceptable program of political and economic
change.* The intention is to maximize the influence
of the PCP, which is supposed to make use of its
superior discipline to dominate any such coalition,
while reducing the risk of precipitating another
internal crisis. It is unlikely that the decision of the
Portuguese Socialists to form a minority government
will induce Moscow to turn away from this objective.
Soviet support for a cautious political strategy based
on the construction of political alliances and the
careful, step-by-step pursuit of social and political
objectives-in fact, for a strategy similar in many
ways to that pursued by the dissident Italian
Party-has been remarkably consistent. It was at the
heart of the initial Soviet reaction to the April coup,
and it has been since maintained in the face of both
political prosperity and adversity for the PCP.
During the initial phase of the Portuguese revolu-
tion (April-September 1974), power was shared un-
easily between the junior and generally leftist military
officers who had engineered the coup, and relatively
conservative senior officers and holdovers from the old
regime. Moscow's recommendations to the Portuguese
Communists were indicated when the Soviet press
approvingly noted the PCP's conclusion that the fluid
political situation demanded "an extremely flexible
but at the same time cautious policy, because haste
and miscalculation may lead to a loss of all gains."**
Moscow's main emphasis was on the need to unite the
forces of the left against the prospect of counterrevolu-
tion.
* See, for example, the article by V. Yermakov which appeared in
issue 21 of the journal New Times in May 1975.
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
The next phase (September 1974-July 1975) was
one in which the apparent prospects of the PCP
dramatically brightened. The conservative General
Antonio de Spinola was replaced in the Presidency by
the much more ambiguous figure of General Francisco
da Costa Gomes, and a leftist government with heavy
Communist representation was formed. The PCP was
emboldened to launch an offensive aimed at purging
its rivals from the media and the apparatus of
government. The Communist efforts were also aimed
against the Socialists and other non-Communist
supporters of the revolution, and amounted to a
discarding of the "united front" tactics it had
previously pursued.
There is considerable evidence that the Soviets did
not share the belief of the PCP that its bases of
support in the military and in labor were strong
enough to enable it to hold power against the
opposition of all other organized political forces.
Significantly, Moscow's first authoritative public
statement on Portugal, published as a lead article in
Pravda on 21 February 1975, stressed the importance
of maintaining the unity of all "democratic forces."
Pravda warned that a split in the forces of the left
would pave the way for a victory of "reaction and
fascism."
The collapse of a right-wing coup effort in March
1975 had the effect of increasing the confidence of the
PCP. The PCP moved to consolidate its control of the
press and broadcast media, and began to demand
punitive action against alleged "counterrevolution-
aries." Moscow expressed vocal support for the
Portuguese Communists, but showed its nervousness
by repeating its public warnings against any action
which might precipitate a split in the forces of the
left. *
1. Moscow's Failure to Dictate PCP Strategy
There is evidence that Moscow privately was much
more explicit and brought considerable pressure to
bear in an effort to dissuade the PCP from actions
which would result in its political isolation. According
to a clandestine report, the Soviet Ambassador in
Lisbon warned Premier Goncalves a few days after the
failure of the March coup that the rush of decrees
* For example, Pravda on 25 April 1975-the date of Portugal's
first free legislative elections-warned that any effort to force the
pace of the revolution would mean the "destruction of the new
Portugal."
involving profound political and economic changes
should be slowed.15 Soviet officials reportedly gave the
same message to a PCP functionary in Moscow later
in the month.16
Moscow's warnings were without any apparent
effect, but they were borne out by the reaction which
began to build against the Communists after mid-
year. This campaign, led by the Socialists and
moderate military officers, focused on efforts to oust
the government of Premier Goncalves, and by August
had developed irresistible momentum,
Again there is evidence that Moscow's admonitions
were ignored by the PCP. According to a clandestine
source, the Soviets warned a PCP delegation in mid-
July that it was a mistake for them to tie their fortunes
so closely to the highly unpopular Vasco Gonsalves.
At the same time, the Soviets made another effort to
persuade the PCP to make peace with the Socialists on
the grounds that a perpetuation of their feud could
cost the PCP the support of military officers grown
weary of political partisanship.* 17
Nonetheless, the PCP continued its war with the
Socialists and its support of the Vasco Goncalves
government up to the very eve of the latter's ouster on
29 August. Only the unbroken series of political
setbacks the PCP has suffered since September 1975
have brought it back to a course of action more in line
with Moscow's preferences for caution and carefully
phased advances.
J. Limitations on Soviet Influence
Moscow's apparent failure to impose its tactical
preferences on the Portuguese Communists in 1975 is
all the more noteworthy in view of the fact that the
cards appear to have been stacked in Moscow's favor.
The PCP was distinguished by its unblemished record
of support for the CPSU and its dependence on Soviet
financial support. Yet these factors, while quite
sufficient to ensure its backing for the main lines of
* It may be argued that Moscow's expressed reservations about
the actions of the PCP during this period were made merely to
assuage the suspicions of the West regarding Moscow's intentions in
Portugal, and that Moscow's continued financial support of the
PCP was more indicative of its true preferences. Against this, it must
be noted that the Soviets have been extremely reluctant to use the
financial weapon even against those Parties with which it has
disagreed most profoundly, such as the Spanish, undoubtedly
because of the extremely serious-and perhaps irrevocable-effect
such an action would have on their relations with that Party.
12
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Soviet foreign and domestic policy and the Soviet
interpretation of points of doctrine, were not adequate
to compel it to give up what it regarded as a chance to
take power. The behavior of the PCP in 1975, as well
as the more publicized dissidence of the French and
Italians, is indicative of the problems which the
erosion of discipline in the Communist movement can
pose for Soviet policy, regardless of the degree to
which the CPSU and these Parties may share a
community of purpose.
IV. ITALY
A. Are Communist Advances Compatible
with Soviet Interests?
Moscow's relations with the PCI confront it with a
problem of an entirely different order of magnitude.
Despite their occasional differences with the PCP, the
Soviets have had no reason to question the basic
identity of purpose between themselves and the PCP.
In Italy they must eventually confront the question of
whether the triumph of a major West European
Party-even assuming it can be brought about
without causing unacceptable damage to Soviet
foreign policy interests-is in the ultimate interests of
the Soviet Union. The Italian Party, unlike the
Portuguese, has given Moscow grounds to question its
Leninist credentials.
There is no sign that the Soviet leaders have
seriously faced up to the problem, and it is hardly
surprising that they have not done so. For them even
to raise the question would be to place in doubt some
of the central assumptions of the Soviet system,
including the validity of the Soviet system as a model
for political and social organization and the vitality of
the Leninist ideology they represent.
Events, however, may force the Soviets to face up to
the question. The advances registered by the Italian
Communists in the legislative elections of June 1976
have made it the near equal of the DC, with 34.4
percent of the vote to 38.7 percent. The outcome has
brought it within range of the "historic compromise"
with the DC which has been its proclaimed goal since
1973. The PCI envisions a grand coalition in which it
would share power on an equal basis with the DC.
Moreover, this coalition may have already begun to
take shape in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate,
where the PCI now holds seven important committee
chairmanships.
B. The Nature of the PCI
The PCI's advances are potentially troublesome for
the Soviets because of the nature of the Italian Party.
In some important respects, it differs from the
traditional image of a Marxist-Leninist Party. It is not
the Party of a highly disciplined and conspiratorial
revolutionary elite, but a mass Party with somewhat
looser standards of organizational discipline. It is not
an avowed enemy of "bourgeois democracy," but a
Party which has prospered under a parliamentary
system and whose hopes for power are attached to
that system, and which, moreover, has publicly
insisted on its commitment to the preservation of that
system.
Whereas the central question for Italy's Western
Allies is the extent to which Communist participation
in the Italian Government would threaten the bases of
Italy's constitutional system and alliance commit-
ments, the central question for Moscow is essentially
the opposite. To what degree has the PCI's involve-
ment in that system weakened its commitment to
force fundamental changes in Italy's domestic and
foreign political alignments, and would this commit-
ment be further weakened by participation in
government? Would, in fact, a PCI strengthened by
participation in government serve as a channel for the
intrusion of "subversive" Western ideas into the
Communist movement or into the Soviet Union itself?
C. The Question of Goals
The central Soviet concern is with the reliability of
the Italian Party's commitment to the traditional
goals of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The most
important of these are still-as listed by a leading
Soviet ideologue in a recent article-breaking "the
economic and political power of the monopolies" and
implementing "profound democratic reforms" in the
government and press.* In more straightforward
terms, the Soviets insist that a Communist Party must
be committed to the ultimate imposition of one-party
Communist control over the government, press, and
all other institutions of public life.
There is no doubt that the Soviet leadership harbors
serious misgivings about the PCI leadership's commit-
* A. I. Sobolev, head of the International Communist Movement
Section of the CPSU's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, writing in the
March 1976 issue of the journal, The Working Class and the
Contemporary World.
13
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
anent to these goals. According to clandestine intelli-
gence reporting, Soviet officials have regarded Enrico
Berlinguer's leadership with considerable suspicion
since its inception. They suspect it is motivated more
by considerations of short-term political advantage
than by revolutionary commitment, and that it is in
danger of completely losing sight of its long-term
goals. 18
Soviet doubts cannot have been eased by Berlin-
guer's repeated assertions that not only will the Italian
road to Communism differ from that followed by the
Soviet Union, but the very shape that Communist
society will assume in Italy will be different from that
which it has assumed in the Soviet Union. In
Berlinguer's words, Italian Communism will reflect
the "deep-seated democratic traditions" of Italy, and
among other things, will be characterized by a multi-
party system, trade union autonomy, freedom of
speech and religion, and a mixed-economy combining
elements of central planning and free enterprise.*
Altogether, it is a political vision far removed from the
Soviet system of absolute one-party rule, and poten-
tially dangerous to the stabilityof the Soviet system-
if Berlinguer means what he says.
The Soviets, however, are not certain that he does
mean what he says. Distasteful as it may be to the
Soviets, Berlinguer's line is perfectly acceptable to
them as a tactical gambit designed to bring Commu-
nist influence to bear on the government. This at least
is how some Soviet officials appear to understand it
and to represent it to their superiors.19
D. Soviet Tolerance of PCI Tactical Line
Indeed, the Soviets have not objected to the PCI's
tactics. Specifically, they have not opposed the PCI's
advocacy of an "historic compromise" nor its pledges
to maintain the constitutional system and alliance
obligations.
The Soviets have shown no inclination to attack the
fundamental tenets of the PCI's domestic line even
when relations have been most strained, as in the
period after the PCI condemnation of the occupation
of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet position at that time
was spelled out by a ranking official of the
International Department of the Central Committee/
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC/CPSU).
* From Berlinguer's speech to the CECP in East Berlin on 1 July
1976.
He was harshly critical of the PCI's stance on
Czechoslovakia which he characterized as a foreign
policy of expediency. Rather than criticizing the
domestic line of the PCI, however, the official
demanded an intensification of the tactics of accom-
modation with other political forces. He stressed the
need for the PCI to work for unity of action with all
leftist forces in the country, including Catholics. The
PCI was at all costs to avoid becoming a divisive force
in the country.20
This endorsement was reaffirmed the following
year, as it has been periodically since then. Moscow
treated the PCI's triumphs in the regional elections of
June 1975 and in the June 1976 national elections as
proof of the efficacy of these tactics. The regional
elections were hailed as a "graphic example" of the
successes which Communists had been able to win by
allying themselves with non-Communists in a struggle
for common objectives.* Brezhnev similarly endorsed
the most recent successes of the PCI-even while
warning. that it must take care
revolutionary character.
not to lose its
E. PCI Tactics Coincide with Soviet Needs
Indeed, when the Soviets have taken issue with the
PCI on specific issues of Italian domestic politics, it
has been to chide the PCI for adventurism and stress
the need for caution and "statesmanlike" action.
Thus, during the Italian economic and political crisis
in the spring of 1973, the Soviets repeatedly warned
the PCI against any action which might "aggravate"
the crisis. Brezhnev made it clear to Berlinguer during
a meeting in Moscow in March of that year that the
USSR's interest in good political and economic
relations with the West demanded stability in Italy.21
Similarly, the Soviets reacted with concern to the
Italian divorce referendum in 1974, which pitted the
PCI and other secular organizations against the
Church. According to a clandestine source, the Soviets
argued that PCI support for the right of divorce would
serve to isolate it from those Catholic bourgeois circles
whose support it needed to attain its objectives,22
Insofar as differences on the tactical line followed
by the Italian Communists have been the source of
* By Politburo member B. N. Ponomarev, in a speech commemo-
rating the 7th Comintern Congress, which enunciated the doctrine
of the Popular Front.
** At the CECP in East Berlin.
14
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
difficulties between them and the Soviets, it has been
as often as not the "moderation" of the Soviets which
has been at the root of it. Moscow's apprehension
about the consequences for Soviet policy interests of
political or economic instability in Italy has been
expressed in blunt terms to the PCI, and has fed the
suspicion that Moscow would be only too ready to
sacrifice the PCI's interests to its own.
According to a clandestine report, Brezhnev went so
far as to suggest to Berlinguer in 1973 that in
Moscow's eyes, the "historic compromise" could go
too far, Brezhnev hinted that the Soviets would not
like to see the PCI move beyond the stage of
influencing the Italian government to the stage of
actual participation in a government because this
would cause uneasiness in the West and might
damage the prospects for detente.23
Moscow's initial reaction to the 1976 elections has
been a mixture of approval and caution, and it has
specifically avoided supporting full-fledged PCI par-
ticipation in a coalition government. This is an
indication that Soviet support for the PCI's efforts is
still keyed to its ability to avoid generating a domestic
or international political upheaval. Moscow's own
political needs have had the ironic result of aligning it
behind the cautious Berlinguer, a leader for whom, as
already noted, they have in other respects little regard.
F. Soviet and PCI Differences Center on
Issue of Autonomy
One of the reasons the Soviets have been unhappy
with the leadership of the Italian Party has been the
increasing propensity it has shown to openly come out
against Moscow on foreign policy issues in which its
interests are directly at stake. The two areas in which
Soviet and Italian Communist interests most directly
conflict involve relations within the Communist
movement-where the PCI opposes Moscow's claims
to leadership-and within Western Europe-where
the PCI does not share the hostility of the Soviets
toward all institutions of European unity.
The former has been by far the most serious source
of conflict between the two Parties, at least up to this
point. The issue is autonomy. The Soviets still seek to
arrogate to themselves the right to rule on the
appropriateness of the policies of the PCI, as of other
Parties. The PCI for its part has openly resisted this
Soviet effort since 1964, when the final testament of
the PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti publicly made the
case for "polycentrism" in the international move-
ment.
The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968
was a landmark in the development of the PCI's
resistance to the CPSU's claim to authority over the
Communist movement. The PCI not only denounced
the Soviet invasion, but rejected the "Brezhnev
Doctrine" with which the Soviets sought to justify
their actions. The latter claimed for Moscow the right
to intervene in defense of Communism whenever and
wherever it perceived a threat to its existence, a claim
with obviously dangerous implications for the inde-
pendence of other Parties.
At the same time, the position that the Western
Parties have taken on this issue puts in question the
entire basis of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe,
Berlinguer's explicit reference to Czechoslovakia at the
East Berlin summit made it clear that the troublesome
issue of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe, even if
dormant, is not dead.
Moreover, Berlinguer linked the PCI's criticism of
Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia to the "more general
problem" of the "relationship between democracy
and socialism," thereby implicitly raising the threat
that the PCI might go on to take issue with Soviet
actions in defense of orthodoxy elsewhere, perhaps
even in the Soviet Union. The PCI heretofore has
been consciously chary of challenging Soviet actions
in Moscow's own sphere, but there have recently been
some cracks in its veneer of caution. Moscow
undoubtedly took note of the PCI Party newspaper
L'Unita's reference to an appeal for support to the
participants in the East Berlin summit from Andrey
Sakharov and other Soviet dissidents. According to a
clandestine report, the Soviets had already protested
in late 1975 a PCI decision to permit its Party press to
reprint items critical of the USSR which had
previously appeared in other newspapers.24
The same concern for autonomy has been responsi-
ble for PCI resistance to Soviet efforts to move against
the Chinese within the Communist movement. The
Italians have little sympathy for Maoist doctrine, but
have firmly resisted any action which might restrict
the right of any Party to determine its own course
autonomously. The effort by the Italians and other
dissident Parties to obtain assurances that the CECP
would not be used by the Soviets for anti-Chinese
15
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
purposes was a principal factor in the two-year delay
in the convocation of the East Berlin meeting.
G. Portugal Strains PCI-CPSU Relationship
The PCI line on Portugal directly contradicted that
of the Soviets. The PCP's machinations, particularly
its success in banning the Portuguese Christian
Democrats after the March 1975 coup attempt, had a
direct impact on the Italian scene, where the PCI's
hopes for a share of power depended on an alliance
with the Italian DC, The PCI reacted with public
disavowals of the PCP's actions and with an open
flirtation with Mario Soares, the leader of the
Portuguese Socialists and the principal enemy of the
PCP. The gulf between the Italian and Portuguese
Parties was marked by the PCI's attendance at the
PSP Congress in January 1975 and its absence from
the PCP Congress three months earlier.
However, the PCI's differences with Moscow did
not reach their peak until August 1975. On 6 August,
an article by a Soviet ideologue named K. I. Zarodov,
the editor of the Prague-based journal Problems of
Peace and Socialism, appeared in Pravda. Zarodov
directed his attacks against unnamed "modern concil-
iators," who he charged, were unable or unwillingto
recognize the existence of a revolutionary situation.
He asserted that when Communists had a preponder-
ance of actual strength, as distinct from electoral
strength, they should use it. Zarodov, in effect,
charged that "some" Parties had confused means with
ends, and had given up revolution in favor of
transient parliamentary advantages. His comments
were clearly applicable to the Italians, who had
criticized the PCP for its efforts to overturn the results
of the elections in which it had been defeated.*
The timing of the article also suggested that the
Italians were intended to be among the primary
addressees of Zarodov's strictures. It appeared in
Pravda the day before a PCI delegation arrived in
Moscow for talks with the Soviets, with the problem
of Portugal at the head of the agenda. A PCI official
later alleged that the delegation travelled to Moscow
to intercede with the Soviets on behalf and at the
behest of the Portuguese Socialists.25
* The authoritative nature of the article was indicated the
following-month when Brezhnev personally received the author in a
well-publicized meeting.
The results of the Zarodov article were much more
significant than the specific nature of his charges,
These had been heard more than once before in the
course of Moscow's intermittent debates with the
dissident Communists. This time, however, they had
the effect of accelerating the PCI's theretofore
tentative efforts to dissociate itself from some of the
most repressive features of Soviet doctrine and
practice. These efforts have grown into a wholesale
rejection-at least in theory-of the kind of one-party
regimes established in Moscow and the Warsaw Pact
countries. The process was capped by Berlinguer's
assertion in East Berlin that the "models of socialist
societies followed in Eastern European countries"
have no relevance for the countries of Western
Europe.
H. The PCI and Eurocommunism
Of even greater import for the future of Soviet
relations with the PCI and European Communism as
a whole was the impetus the quarrel over the Zarodov
theses gave to the Italian Party's efforts to assert a role
of regional leadership. Within two weeks of Brezh-
nev's September meeting with Zarodov, Berlinguer
and the PCF's Marchais had met in Paris for
consultations. They met again in Rome on 15
November.
The fruit of these consultations was contained in a
joint declaration released the same day.* It resembled
a similar declaration signed by the Italian and
* The key passages of this document are worth quoting in detail.
They are: "In this spirit (of democracy) all the freedoms--the
results both of the great democratic bourgeois revolutions and of the
great popular struggles of this century which have been led by the
working class-must be guaranteed and developed. This applies to
the freedom of thought and expression, of the press, assembly and
association, the freedom to demonstrate, the free movement of
people at home and abroad, the inviolability of private life,
religious freedoms. the complete freedom of expression of currents of
thought and of every philosophical, cultural and artistic freedom.
The French and Italian Communists declare themselves in favor of
the plurality of political parties, of the right to existence and
activity of opposition parties, of the free formation and the
possibility of the democratic alternation of majorities and minor-
ities, of the secularity and democratic functions of the state, and of
the independence of justice. . . .
The PCI and PCF assign to all these conditions of democratic life
the status of principles. Their position is not tactical but stems from
their analysis of the specific objectives and historical conditions of
their countries and their consideration of international experiences
as a whole."
16
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
Spanish Parties in July in its reaffirmation of the two
Parties' commitment to parliamentary democracy and
disavowal of authoritarian intentions. It was much
more significant than the former document, however,
in that the French Party had traditionally functioned
as an ally of the CPSU and as the PCI's chief rival for
leadership of the Western Parties, The tactical alliance
of these two mass Parties, by far the most important in
Western Europe, if it endures, could well do mortal
damage to the CPSU's efforts to maintain its authority
over the movement in the West.
The unease which the document aroused in
Moscow was demonstrated by the failure of the Soviet
press to mention it. A terse TASS release issued on 17
November noted only that the French and Italian
Party leaders had met for talks on "questions of
mutual interest." There has been no further public
comment.
Even before this, the increasingly Western Euro-
pean orientation of the PCI represented a problem for
the Soviets. The Berlinguer leadership of the PCI
professes to see its own future and that of Italy in the
context of a socialist Europe, but it is the "little
Europe" of the European Communities (EC). It
supports and participates in the institutions of the EC,
and has increasingly tended to reduce its participation
in Soviet-dominated international organizations in
favor of participation in Western European organiza-
tions. It is an active and constructive participant in
the European Parliament. It has changed its status in
the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions from that of full to associate member in order
to qualify for membership in the European Trade
Union Confederation, and it is a staunch public
supporter of the EC. It has also turned its attention to
improving relations with the powerful Social-
Democratic Parties of Northern Europe.
1. Moscow's Assessment
The Soviets have reacted to these developments
with some ambivalence. On the one hand, they have
been disturbed by the anti-Soviet overtones of the
PCI's efforts to cast itself in a European image,
particularly its tendency to treat both the US and the
USSR equally as outsiders in Western Europe. On the
other hand, they have shown a considerable willing-
ness to accept the maneuvers of the PCI as unpleasant
necessities imposed on it by the realities of its political
environment.
They can take some comfort in the fact that in its
internal organization, the PCI is still structured on
recognizably Marxist-Leninist lines, emphasizing hier-
archical control from the top. This is a key point to
the Soviet leaders, as demonstrated by their propensity
to privately lecture Italian leaders when they detect
signs of slackness in the Italian Party's control of its
subordinate organizations, 26 Despite some reservations
on the part of the Soviets, the PCI's internal standards
still seem acceptable to them.
Beyond this, their tolerance for the PCI rests on
their conviction that the expansion of the influence
and power of the PCI are in the long-term strategic
interests of the USSR. One veteran Soviet commenta-
tor recently expressed the Soviet view of the implica-
tions of PCI-or PCF-participation in government
for the strategic rivalry between East and West in
unusually candid terms. He saw both military and
political advantages for the Soviet Union. In his view,
the "operational plans" of the NATO Alliance would
be "upset" and "a left-wing breakthrough would
strike straight at (the) backbone" of the EC.*
Moscow's difficulties with the Italian Communists
are compounded by its relative lack of leverage over
them. The channels of influence which are usually at
its disposal in dealing with foreign Communists are in
the case of the PCI either partially or completely
blocked.
Money-Moscow's role as the paymaster of the
international movement-in the case of the PCI has
become a less effective instrument. Soviet financial
assistance is still important to the PCI, but it is no
longer vital. According to clandestine intelligence
reports, the relative importance of the Soviet subsidy
to the PCI budget has shrunk. According to the most
recent information, it has varied between $4.5 and
$7.5 million annually in recent years. At the same
time Soviet financial assistance has become relatively
less important. Soviet contributions have remained
relatively stable, but the PCI's own financial re-
sources-dues and contributions, income from Party
enterprises, and subsidies from the state under a new
political finance law-have grown. The estimated
Soviet subsidy in 1974 constituted a share somewhat
less than 20 percent of the annual acknowledged
17
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
budget of $36,6 million.* The limited effectiveness of
money as a weapon was demonstrated when the
Soviets attempted to put it to use after the PCI's
condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968. Moscow's threats to reduce its financial
support for the PCI, and some actual cutbacks did not
cause the PCI to abandon its opposition to the
Czechoslovak occupation.
A second traditional channel of Soviet influence
over the affairs of other Parties-the presence of
reliable "friends" of the USSR within their leader-
ships--is an increasingly less helpful factor within the
PCI. Berlinguer has steadily placed his own allies in
positions of influence and authority within the Party
since becoming Secretary General in 1972. In the
process, many Moscow loyalists have been eased out.
This process peaked at the 14th Congress of the PCI in
March 1975. The pro-Soviet Armando Cossuta was
dropped from the Party Secretariat. His departure
apparently left the Soviets with no dependable and
well-placed supporters at the top levels of the PCI.
According to one report, officials within the Interna-
tional Department of the CC/CPSU were reduced to
hoping that Gianni Cervetti, a new member of the
PCI Secretariat, could be cultivated as a "successor"
to Cossuta.27
A final element of Soviet influence within the PCI,
the loyalty to the USSR of many of the activists who
form the base of the PCI, is by no means a negligible
factor. The orthodox Marxist-Leninists, who are
variously estimated to comprise 20-25 percent of the
Party membership serve to inhibit-but not pro-
hibit-the leadership of the PCI from direct clashes
with the CPSU. The PCI leadership apparently is
taking direct action to deal with this problem of dual
loyalties within the ranks of the PCI. According to a
reliable clandestine source, two officials of the
CC/CPSU who were in attendance at the March
Congress of the PCI, complained of the steady drop in
participation by PCI members in political training
programs conducted by the CPSU. According to the
Soviets, PCI participation at this time is practically
nil. This., as both the Soviets and Italians are
undoubtedly aware, will eventually weaken the ties
between Moscow and Italian Communist activists.28
* This information is taken from the OPR Research Study,
311-75, "The Communist Party of Italy," June 1975, SECRET/
NOFORN/NOCON/ORCON.
K. The Bottom Line
In the last analysis, the Soviets cannot-any more
than Italy's Western Allies-be certain which PCI is
the real one. Neither can they count on being able to
determine the course of development within the PCI.
They can only hope-as they still do-that the
ultimate aims of the Italian Party correspond to their
own goals, and take such action as they can to
maintain the links between the PCI and the CPSU
and to bring to bear the influence which remains to
them.
V. SPAIN
"The defense of the Soviet Union and the
socialist system in its entirety is an obligation
and a necessity." (From an official history of the
PCE, 1960.)
"Moscow, where our dreams first began to
come true, was for a long time a kind of Rome for
us. We spoke of the great October Socialist
Revolution as if it were Christmas. This was the
period of our infancy. Today we have grown
up.... We are beginning to lose the characteris-
tics of a church." (Santiago Carillo, Secretary
General of the PCE, speaking at the East Berlin
Conference of Communist Parties in June 1976,)
A. The Scope of Moscow's Spanish
Problem
These two citations mark the path traversed by the
PCE in the course of a few years, and are suggestive of
the difficulties which the Soviets face in dealing with
the PCE. These difficulties are both more and less
serious than those they must confront in coping with
the PCI.
They are more serious in that the PCE has been
more outspoken and consistent in its rejection of
Moscow's authoritarian practices and doctrines than
the PCI, and at least equally determined in its
opposition to Moscow's efforts to assert its authority
over the movement. Along with the PCI, it was one of
the most consistent opponents of Moscow's efforts to
push through a document which would serve as a
binding statement of principle in East Berlin.
They are less serious in that Spain is intrinsically less
important than Italy, and the Spanish Party is both
much smaller and much farther removed from power
than the Italian. While the Italian Party has already
18
SECRET
pproved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
become in many ways an unacknowledged partner in
government with the Christian Democrats, the Span-
ish Party has yet to win the right to operate legally in
Spain. Its comparative weakness means that the
Soviets are not under the pressure of time to resolve
the differences between them.
B. Origins of Moscow's Differences
with the PCE
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia precipitated
the first open rift between the PCE and the CPSU,
even though there were earlier signs that the PCE had
begun to distance itself from the CPSU. The most
significant of these were the close and friendly
relations maintained between the PCE and the
Romanian Communists in the mid-1960s, at a time
when relations between Bucharest and Moscow were
at their nadir.
The Spanish Party's gradual disaffection from the
CPSU was a product of both internal and external
factors. Following the failure of an experiment with
terrorist tactics in the 1950s, a new Party leadership
under General Secretary Santiago Carillo Solares
decided that the PCE's only chance for success lay in
collaboration with the other potentially anti-Franco
forces in Spanish society. This shift coincided with the
turn away from Cold War confrontation begun under
Khrushchev, and was encouraged by the Soviet
leader. The PCE leadership was shaken by his ouster
in October 1964, and was slow to warm to his
successors.
This inauspicious start to the relationship between
the Spanish Communists and the reigning Soviet
leadership proved to be a portent of things to come.
The PCE's domestic situation and the political tactics
this seemed to dictate tended to bring them into
alignment with the more "reformist" elements of
Western Communism-especially the PCI-and in-
creasingly distanced them from the Soviets. Relations
between the two Parties were further aggravated by
Moscow's persistent inclination to put the interests of
Spanish Communism second to the needs of Soviet
diplomacy, as demonstrated by indications of Soviet
interest in a diplomatic rapprochement with the
Franco regime (in 1970 the Soviets opened a
commercial office in Madrid which has exercised
quasi-diplomatic functions).
Following the PCE's public denunciation of the
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
differences between the two Parties rapidly expanded
to include most of the points at issue in the
Communist movement. The PCE opposed Soviet
efforts to ostracize the Chinese and defended China's
right to define its own policies, and it has continued to
take vigorous issue with Moscow over Czechoslovakia.
Along with the Italians, Yugoslavs, Romanians, and
other dissident Parties the Spaniards also refused to
fully endorse the document of the International
Communist Conference in 1969.
The results of a plenum of the Central Committee
of the PCE in September 1973 dramatically demon-
strated just how far the process of deterioration had
advanced. A report submitted to the plenum and later
published as an article by Manuel Ascarate Diaz, a
close associate of Carillo, amounted to a virtual
declaration of independence from the CPSU. It broke
sharply with the Soviets on issues of both domestic
and foreign policy.
Santiago Carillo Solares, the belligerently independent
leader of the Spanish Communist Party.
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
On the domestic front, it went well beyond
advocacy of a tactical alliance with other anti-Franco
forces-which the Soviets could support-to renounce
the goal of a single-party state and to proclaim itself
in favor of "democratic socialism." Even more
strikingly, it renounced the concept of "an official
philosophy" and pledged its support of an "open
ideological struggle between all democratic trends." It
asserted that to do otherwise would be to force a new
regime to construct a police state. It went on to
repudiate "the specific features of other revolutions
and the particular experiences of other Communist
Parties," in words which were clearly directed at the
CPSU. The PCE went on to enunciate its support for
"a truly European alternative." This it defined as a
"Europe which is not subject to the Atlantic burden
but which maintains good relations with the US, as
with the USSR and China and other countries."
Finally, the PCE document elevated its suspicions
of the Soviet commitment to Western Communism to
the level of Party dogma. It proclaimed the need to
struggle against any tendency "to identify coexistence
with the `status quo', and detente with the freezing of
the existing social structure in the world ...." It went
on to cite a number of specific Soviet actions which
contributed to its fear that Moscow was indifferent to
the cause of Spanish and other European Commu-
nists. 29
The Spanish Party has gone on to demonstrate its
disaffection with Moscow in deeds as well as words,
The PCE has been a firm supporter of the Portuguese
Socialists, a stance marked by its attendance at the
PSP Congress and its failure to appear at the PCP
Congress, and it has worked quietly to rally support
for the PSP in the European left.
C. Moscow's Failure to Assert Control
Over the PCE
The post-Czechoslovak experience has demon-
strated that the PCE is effectively beyond Moscow's
reach, even though it has made a major effort to crush
the Spanish dissidents. At first impression, the levers
available to Moscow would appear to have been
sufficient to bend the PCE to its will. While even in
the 1960s the PCE had had considerable success in
meeting its own financial needs from contributions, it
was in great need of the technical and logistical
support which enabled it to function as an under-
ground organization within Spain: press and broad-
casting facilities,. housing, jobs and office facilities for
its militants abroad, aid in establishing cover for
clandestine activities, and courier services. For this
assistance, the PCE was heavily dependent on the
Soviets, their East European allies, and the then-
loyalist French Party. In addition, many veteran
members of the PCE and of the civil war retained a
loyalty to the Soviet Union. Others, including the civil
war heroine and current honorary Chairman of the
PCE, Dolores Ibarurri (La Passionaria), had lived in
exile in the Soviet Union and received stipends from
the Soviet state.
The initial Soviet reaction to the PCE's denuncia-
tion of its actions in Czechoslovakia was an attempt to
force the PCE into submission. Subsidies from the
CPSU and other Bloc Parties were cut back sharply-
but not cut off-as a reminder to the Spanish of the
CPSU's control over the financial resources of the
PCE. According to one report, Soviet Politburo
member M. A. Suslov violently reminded Santiago
Carillo at a meeting in 1968 that the PCE was "only
living by the grace of the Soviet Union and its
Communist Party."30
D. Soviet Efforts to Split the PCE
The most serious threat to the PCE was not the
cutback in Bloc funding, which to a considerable
extent was offset by the success of fund drives
conducted by the PCE among European leftists and
by contributions from sympathetic Parties, including
the PCI. Soviet sponsorship of a dissident, pro-Soviet
faction within the leadership of the PCE was a much
more serious danger. Nevertheless, the initial effort
failed, and by 1970 the leading pro-Soviets had been
expelled from the PCE. Three of them-Eduardo
Garcia-Lopez, Agustin Gomez de Segura Pagola, and
Enrique Lister-then joined together to form a new,
"authentic" Communist Party which eventually
adopted the name, the Spanish Communist Workers
Party (PCOE).
The Soviets lent the dissidents both material and
moral support. As a result of Soviet subsidies, the
dissidents were able to launch a rival publication to
the official organ of the PCE and to finance a
significant organizational effort. Moscow also facili-
tated their efforts to proselytize the large and
influential Spanish Communist exile community
within the USSR. On the other hand, Soviet support
had distinct limits, and Moscow was parsimonious
20
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
enough to arouse frequent complaints from Lister and
other dissident leaders.
Still more significant to the ultimate defeat of the
dissidents was the Soviet failure to formally acknowl-
edge them as the "true" representatives of Spanish
Communism. Indeed, Soviet support to the PCOE
was seriously restricted by Moscow's reluctance to
force matters to the stage of an open and complete
break with the PCE, or to be openly identified with an
effort to split the Spanish Party.
As already noted, Soviet funding of the official
PCE, while reduced, was not ended. Nor did contacts
between the PCE and the CPSU cease. Even during
the very months when the struggle between the
Santiago Carillo group and the pro-Soviet dissidents
was most tense, both the PCE and the CPSU carefully
kept up a facade of fraternal cordiality, for example,
by continuing to meet occasionally.
The PCE leaders' motivation in contributing to this
charade was simple: They did not want to give the
Soviets a pretext for ending all forms of support.
Moscow's motivation was more complex. Its reluc-
tance to launch a frontal attack on the PCE may have
reflected concern at the impact this would have on
relations with other European Parties, including the
French Party, within which the PCE enjoyed wide-
spread support.
Perhaps the most important factor in Moscow's
caution was its lack of confidence in the ability of the
dissidents to achieve their goals. The Soviets made it
quite clear to the leaders of the PCOE that an increase
in Soviet support was contingent on their ability to
establish a solid political base. According to one
report, the Soviets would have preferred that the
Lister-Garcia-Gomez faction remain in the PCE to
influence the Carillo leadership from within, and
regarded their open defiance of Carillo and his
adherents as "adventurism." The Soviets reportedly
informed the dissidents in 1970, possibly at their
founding meeting in August, that they would lend
their full support to them only if they succeeded in
controlling the organization of the PCE Congress
scheduled for 1971.31 However, not only was this not
accomplished, by 1973 the PCOE itself had been
overcome by factionalism, and two of the original
three leaders had been again purged. The factionalism
within the PCOE made it clear to both the PCE and
the CPSU that the PCOE was not a serious rival to the
official Party.
Faced with seemingly incompatible alternatives,
the Soviets have followed an erratic middle course in
an effort to avoid any irrevocable policy commitment.
Thus, in February 1974 they took public issue with
the policy position adopted by the PCE the previous
September, charging among other things that it "reeks
of nationalism" and "lacks one ounce of proletarian
internationalism."32 Almost simultaneously, however,
they undertook moves designed to promote a formal
reconciliation with the PCE. Franco's illness in July
1974 evidently acted to spur the pace of Soviet efforts.
These bore fruit in October 1974, when a PCE
delegation headed by Carillo and Azcarate visited
Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. The talks
produced a paper confirmation of the "normaliza-
tion" of relations between the two Parties in the form
of a joint communique which pledged both Parties to
contribute to an improvement in relations and to the
"voluntary coordination" of their actions. It also
pledged both Parties not to support "splitters" within
the ranks of the other, which in effect constituted a
Soviet pledge not to continue its support of the Lister
group.
The reconciliation was more apparent than real,
however. Notably, the Soviets have acted covertly to
keep the Lister faction in operation. Although they
have avoided direct support for , the PCOE, the
Spanish dissidents apparently have continued to
receive a trickle of support from other Bloc countries,
who are clearly acting as Moscow's agents in this
instance.33 (The East Germans had earlier maintained
a similar relationship with the official PCE when the
Party's relations with the Soviets were still frozen.)
E. Soviet and PCE Interests Are
Contradictory
Even though in some ways the political line of the
PCE conforms to Soviet preferences, at least in its
emphasis on moderate, "democratic" goals calculated
to sooth the anxieties of Spain's neighbors, the Soviets
have ample reason to question whether its long-term
objectives are in line with the interests of the Soviet
Union. The Soviets must be particularly disturbed by
the Spanish Party's advocacy of diplomatic equi-
distance between the US and USSR, and by its critical
views of the main lines of Soviet foreign policy. On
this latter point, it goes well beyond the PCI, which,
21
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
on matters not immediately pertaining to its own
interests, is generally supportive of Soviet foreign
policy positions. The PCE, on the other hand, has
questioned the Soviet rationale for East-West detente
and the relevance of this Soviet policy for the goals of
West European Communists.
Moreover, the PCE has been at least as critical of
Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as it has of the US
role in Western Europe. It has coupled its demands for
an end to the US military presence in Western Europe
to an equally explicit demand for a Soviet pullback
from Eastern Europe. Carillo has even gone on record,
as in a Time interview in 1975, that he would not be
disposed to demand the withdrawal of US forces from
Spain until Soviet forces had been withdrawn from
Czechoslovakia.34
Nevertheless, the Soviets can see little immediate
alternative to efforts to moderate their dispute with
the PCE. The mere fact that its prospects have
improved under the monarchical government of Juan
Carlos-and it is now deemed likely to be legalized in
the foreseeable future-has heightened Moscow's
interest in settling their differences.
Their ability to succeed in this effort, however, is
questionable, not least because the immediate inter-
ests of the CPSU and the PCE are quite different. The
Soviets are inclined, by reason of their strategic rivalry
with Washington, to strive to enhance their political
and economic influence with the Spanish Govern-
ment, As a first step, this demands the establishment
of full diplomatic relations, which have not existed
since the Spanish Civil War. The PCE insists that
Moscow must make any diplomatic rapprochement
with Madrid contingent on Spanish government
concessions to the PCE. Any Soviet gesture toward
Juan Carlos in the absence of such concessions will
inevitably embitter its relations with the PCE.
Against this immediate incompatibility of interests,
the Soviets can only persist in their efforts to wear
down the PCE's truculent independence. As one way
of doing this, according to a clandestine intelligence
source, the Soviets are now promoting contacts
between "loyal" Parties and the PCE.36 In the last
analysis, Moscow is reduced to pinning its hope on a
more favorable evolution within the PCE leadership
after the departure of Carillo. If this hope should be
unfounded, Moscow is likely to lend even less weight
to the interests of the PCE than it now does, with
predictably negative consequences for its relations
with that Party.
VI. FRANCE
A. Importance of the PCF
Moscow's relations with the PCF are infinitely more
important to it than its ties with the PCE, and the
cleavages which have suddenly appeared between the
PCF and the CPSU are of correspondingly greater
significance. Unlike Spain, France is a major Euro-
pean power and has been a primary target of Soviet
diplomatic overtures since the mid-1960s.
Moreover, the French Party is a much greater
domestic political factor than the PCE, There is a real
possibility that the Alliance of the Left in which it is
linked to the Socialists. and the small Radical Left
Party may win a majority in the legislative elections
scheduled for 1978. The state of relations between the
CPSU and the PCF could therefore come to have a
bearing on the state of relations between the French
and Soviet governments.
The PCF is important to Moscow for one additional
reason. Along with the PCI, it is one of the mainstays
of the European Communist movement. In contrast
to the PCI, the French Party has heretofore been
distinguished by its orthodoxy and loyalty to Moscow.
Much of Moscow's past success in its struggles to
preserve its authority over the Western European
Communist movement has depended on the support
of the French Party. The increasing readiness the PCF
has shown to align itself in opposition, to the Soviets
since late 1975 has correspondingly serious implica-
tions for Moscow's position vis-a-vis the main body of
Western European Communism. The link the PCF
has forged with the PCI, if it should endure, raises the
prospect that Moscow may find itself isolated from
both the Asian and Western European wings of
Communism.
B. Past PCF Loyalty
With the exception of an interlude in 1968-1969,
when the PCF momentarily joined other Western
European Parties in opposition to the Soviet occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia, the PCF historically func-
tioned as a loyal ally of the CPSU, and frequently as
its agent in maintaining discipline among-the Western
European Parties. It proved willing in 1971 to cut
22
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
back its support of the PCE-whose principal patron
it had been until that time-at the behest of the
Soviets.36 At the Brussels Conference of Western
European Communist Parties in January 1974, the
PCF was instrumental in excluding the anti-Soviet
faction of the divided Greek Communist Party from
the conference. It directly attacked the Spanish
Communists on the floor of the conference-report-
edly at the instigation of a CPSU official.37 As for
Portugal, PCF chief Marchais engaged in a bitter
polemic in 1975 with the Italians and Spanish on the
issue of their "interference" on behalf of the
Portuguese Socialists.
The traditional guidelines for PCF behavior in the
international movement were reaffirmed in early 1972
by jean Kanapa, the PCF official with overall
responsibility for foreign policy. Kanapa reportedly
told an audience of PCF officials that the primary
duty of the PCF was solidarity with the countries of
the Soviet Bloc, and first of all with the USSR itself.
Anti-Sovietism, according to Kanapa, was to be
regarded as a crime .31
The PCF was an equally reliable supporter of Soviet
policy objectives beyond the sphere of the Communist
movement. In regard to the two principal great power
rivals of the USSR, Marchais has been a bitter critic of
the sins of Maoism, and has been equally harsh in
criticizing France's political, military, and economic
links with the US and the other members of the
Atlantic Alliance. Even on issues of more immediate
relevance to France and the PCF, the French Party's
views have generally coincided with Soviet policy
positions. This has been evident in the Party's attitude
toward European economic integration, where-in
contrast to the PCI-it has been only a reluctant and
critical participant in the institutions of the EC.
C. Significance of PCF Reversal of Course
Almost overnight, the relationship between the PCF
and the CPSU has changed dramatically. The PCF's
entente with the PCI in the fall of 1975 marked its
shift from the role of a reliable agent of Soviet
influence to a strident proponent of national auton-
omy.
The suddenness of the reversal was exemplified by
the change in the PCF's position during the prelimi-
nary negotiations for the June summit of European
Communist Parties in East Berlin. When the negotia-
tions began in late 1974 the PCF was still adhering to
the pro-Soviet line. Its position changed drastically
during meetings held in October and November 1975,
where it suddenly emerged as a critic of the document
prepared by the East Germans and the Soviets.
Indeed, by the spring of 1976 it had reportedly
become the most recalcitrant of all the dissident
Parties in dealing with the Soviets, and its objections
reportedly were the last to be overcome.39
Similarly, the PCF has emerged overnight from the
status of an apologist and defender of the Soviet
system to a critic of Soviet violations of "human
rights." At the 22nd Congress of the PCF in February
1976, and in the presence of Soviet Politburo member
A. P. Kirilenko, Marchais ventured to open his address
to the Congress with an attack on the Soviets for
"unjust and unjustifiable acts of repression against
Soviet citizens." 40
The same Congress witnessed a move to formally
drop the French Party's commitment to the "dictator-
ship of the proletariat." This hoary phrase has been
symbolic of the French Party's commitment to a
Soviet-style one-party dictatorship. As such, it was
clearly out of phase with the PCF's efforts to sell itself
The French Communist's present aversion to association
with the Soviets is a repudiation of their own recent past.
In this 1972 photo, B. N. Ponomarev (far right) embraces
French Communist leader Jacques Duclos at the opening
of an international Communist conference in Paris. The
smiling onlooker at the for left is V. V. Zagladin, now the
First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the
CC/CPSU.
23
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
to the French electorate as a proponent of democratic
change, and its elimination is an entirely logical step.
In fact, as sudden as was the PCF's turnabout in late
1975-1976, it had its roots in the PCF's longstanding
efforts to convince the French electorate of its
"national"and democratic character. These efforts
date back to the 1960s, and were responsible for such
earlier phenomena as the PCF's criticism of the
Czechoslovak invasion in 1968. What is new in the
PCF's position is its determination and consistency, a
change to which Moscow's persistent disregard of PCF
interests has contributed heavily.
The PCF actions represent an attack on doctrines
which are central to the Soviet catachism. In this, as
in their open criticism of the workings of the Soviet
system and in the obduracy of their newfound
opposition to Soviet leadership of the international
movement, the French verbally have gone beyond the
Italian Party. The PCI's positions have evolved more
slowly and are more consistently with their own past,
and they have less need to assert their "independ-
ence" in dramatic terms. The PCF, on the other hand,
must take drastic action to overcome the credibility
gap which afflicts it. The commitment to democratic
freedoms on which it has based its electoral platform
since the formation of the Alliance of the Left in 1972
is in sharp contrast to the dictatorial structure of the
Party. The contrast was demonstrated vividly in the
very action by which the Party moved toward
disavowing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" at its
last Congress, a step which, radical as it was, was
nonetheless adopted "unanimously."
D. Soviet and French Communist Interests
Conflict
It is highly questionable whether anything of
significance has happened to the internal character of
the French Party. What has changed, however, is the
PCF's determination to put its own interests ahead of
those of the international movement and the CPSU.
In many ways, Moscow's present difficulties with the
PCF arise because of its consistent subordination of
the interests of the PCF to Soviet raison d'etat. Since
the Presidency of Charles deGaulle, whose efforts to
move Fiance to a position more nearly equidistant
between the two military blocs in Europe meshed with
Soviet objectives, the Soviets have made the mainte-
nance of good relations with France one of the pillars
of their policy toward the West. Unfortunately for the
PCF, Moscow's interest in good relations with a
conservative government in Paris has become increas-
ingly incompatible with the advancement of Commu-
nist interests in France.
The Soviets have never hesitated in choosing
between the two. During the reign of deGaulle, they
issued a virtual prohibition against active and open
Communist opposition to the General. The Soviets
justified this prohibition on the grounds that
deGaulle's foreign policies served the interests of the
USSR and the working class.41 The Soviet position has
remained virtually unchanged through the Pompidou
administration and even into the present administra-
tion of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. It has been qualified
only to the extent that the ban on Communist
opposition to the French administration is to be
maintained only insofar as the French administration
perpetuates the foreign policy line of deGaulle.42 In
practice, this has meant no significant change,
although the Soviets have been critical of some
elements of the Giscard government's foreign policy,
such as its show of interest in improving relations with
the US.43
Soviet intervention in French Party affairs has been
directed not merely at hobbling the PCF's opposition
to the government, but even on occasion at actively
undercutting the French Communists. This was
clearly the case during the French presidential
elections of 1974, when the Soviet ambassador held a
well-publicized meeting with Giscard, much to the
consternation of the Communists and the candidate
of the Left Alliance, Francois Mitterrand of the
Socialist Party. This undercut the PCF's efforts to
portray Giscard as an "Atlanticist," and possibly may
have tipped the balance in an election won by a razor-
thin margin.
Moscow's coolness toward the electoral coalition of
Communists, Socialists, and Left Radicals concluded
in 1972 was evident from the very beginning. M. A.
Suslov, who led the Soviet delegation to the PCF
Congress in December 1972, conspicuously failed to
mention this coalition in his address to the Congress.
Moscow's interest in good relations with the Giscard
government helps to explain its attitude toward the
Left Alliance, but the Soviets also have less Machi-
avellian reasons to be critical of it. Privately, they
have criticized it to other European Communists on
the grounds that it was based on a "weak" agreement
which conceded too much to the Socialists. They have
specifically warned that the French agreement is not
24
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
to be considered a prototype for similar agreements in
other Western European countries.44 The Soviets have
traditionally made their support of coalition politics
conditional on the dominance of the Communist
Party within the alliance, a condition which has not
been met in France, where the Socialist Party has
replaced the PCF as the leading representative of the
French left. Moscow's unhappiness with this fact is
aggravated by its distrust of Mitterrand, who in the
past has been loudly critical of Soviet policies in
Eastern Europe and at home.
The net effect of Soviet actions was to force the
PCF to face up to the possibility that its in-
terests did not coincide with those of the Soviet
Union. The first signs of the French Party's reassess-
ment of its relationship with Moscow appeared in the
aftermath of the 1974 presidential elections. In two
articles which appeared in June, the PCF newspaper,
L'Humanite, attacked the theses advanced earlier by
a Soviet scholar. L'Humanite asserted that "it was a
grave error" to suggest as had the Soviet, that
"coexistence will suffice to solve the great economic
and social problems in a country like ours." The
Soviet leadership, rather than the Soviet academic,
was the obvious target of L'Humanite's strictures, and
the clear implication was that the PCF was becoming
restive in the face of Moscow's inclination to
subordinate French Communist interests to those of
Soviet policy.
Nevertheless, the differences between the two
Parties might have subsided for some time if the
Zarodov article had not forced the French into open
disagreement with Moscow. The initial reaction of the
PCF was to dismiss the article as "unimportant" and
of no relevance to the situation in France. This
nonchalance could not be sustained in the face of the
strong public reaction to the article in France, and
widespread speculation that it presaged a Soviet move
to turn the international movement back in the
direction of revolution-speculation which threatened
to do serious damage to the PCF's electoral appeal.
On 4 September, the PCF took direct exception to
the Zarodov thesis in a front-page article in L'Human-
ite, The article specifically criticized Zarodov's dis-
missal of electoral democracy and disavowed his
alleged attempt to reduce Communist principles "to
lifeless formulae which would be applicable always
and everywhere." In contrast to its behavior after
previous flare-ups, the PCF this time has shown no
disposition to back down from its positions. According
to numerous accounts, the PCF leadership, is now
convinced that the CPSU has no interest in seeing it in
power, and some leaders are prepared to contemplate
a break with the CPSU.45
E. Implications for Moscow
The fact that there is little evidence that anything
of significance has changed in the PCF's internal
structure is less important to the Soviets than it is to
France's Western neighbors or to the French elector-
ate. The crucial point for the Soviets where the PCF is
concerned is that their authority has been challenged,
not whether the challenging Party is democratic
or-like the Chinese or Romanians-authoritarian in
its internal organization and purposes. There is ample
evidence that the Soviets take the rebellion of the PCF
very seriously and are determined to oppose it.
According to clandestine intelligence information, the
Soviets intend to surreptitiously support the French
government's efforts against the PCF in the hope that
a weakened PCF will once again be forced to turn to
Moscow for support. According to one report from a
reliable source, the Soviets have already covertly
approached the French government with an offer to
supply them with information which could be used to
discredit Marchais.46
In all likelihood, the Soviets have been encouraged
to act by their belief that considerable opposition to
the new line of the PCF exists within the French
Party. There are numerous, if generally vague, reports
of dissatisfaction with the direction Marchais has
given the Party, both within the leadership and the
rank and file, and of nervousness on the part of
Marchais and his allies.47 Moscow was able to use the
same sort of sentiment to good effect in 1968-1969 to
compel the PCF to cease its criticism of Soviet actions
in Czechoslovakia.
It is questionable whether Soviet actions will have
the same effect this time. With the prospect of
winning a legislative majority based on the Alliance of
the Left a real possibility, there is a considerable
incentive for PCF officials to stay with a potential
winner. In the end, the success of Moscow's efforts to
reverse the trend of developments within the French
Party may depend on circumstances beyond its
control. If the PCF should fare badly in the next
elections-particularly if the Socialists should con-
tinue to profit more from their Alliance than the
PCF-it is possible that Moscow's efforts may have
25
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
some impact. If the French Communists do suffi-
ciently well at the polls to provide a pragmatic
justification for Marchais' actions, it is difficult to see
that the Soviets are likely to have much success in
bringing him back into line. In that case, Moscow's
machinations are likely to have the effect-as they did
in the PCE-of reinforcing the French Party's
determination to pursue its own interests without
regard for the wishes of the CPSU.
VII. PRESENT TRENDS AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
SOVIET POLICY
A. Soviets Face a Difficult Future
maximizing their influence in Western Europe.
Moreover, the differences between the Soviets and
even the most revisionist of the Western Parties should
not be exaggerated. Despite the Western Parties'
assertion of their autonomy, they continue to have a
broad community of interests with the Soviets,
particularly on questions of foreign policy. This is
especially true with regard to the Third World, where
the Soviets and the Western Communists come
together in opposition to "neo-colonialism" and
support of "natural liberation movements''-as in the
Middle East, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia. In
Western Europe, they also have a common interest in
reducing American political and economic influence,
even though the Western Parties no longer want to see
a simple substitution of Soviet power for that of the
As Moscow looks ahead, it can be certain of little
except that its relations with the Communist Parties of
Western Europe are sure to become even more
complex than they are presently. The impulse toward
autonomy on the part of the most important of these
Parties is based on hard political realities, chief among
them the recognition by Western European Commu-
nist leaders that their interests are not served by close
identification with the USSR. Even "loyal" Parties
such as the PCP are in the process of learning
painfully that a close identification with the USSR is
not advantageous politically. Equally important to
the future of Moscow's relationship with the Western
European Parties is the mounting confidence of their
leaders that defiance of the Soviet Union no longer
carries with it the threat of internal schism. The
significance of this feeling of self-confidence among
the Western Communist leaders can be seen in the
French Party's abrupt switch from docility to defi-
ance.
Thus, Moscow is no longer in a position to assert the
proposition (and to gain the acquiescence of the
Western Parties for it) that what serves the interests of
the USSR serves the interests of the other Parties. A
further consequence is that the Soviets will be faced
with increasing frequency with situations in which
they must choose between their immediate diplomatic
interests and their long-term goals, Yet, while Moscow
may be uncomfortable with this situation, it is clearly
preferable to the most likely alternative, a condition of
open political strife or schism with the major Western
Parties. This would subject the Soviets to attack on
both their Eastern and Western ideological flanks, as
well as complicating the primary political objective of
The ideological bond which unites the Soviets with
the Western Communists is not to be dismissed. Even
the most nationally minded of the Western Commu-
nist leaders sees himself as a member of an ideological
community in which the Soviets are the most senior
and powerful member, and sees a corresponding gulf
between himself and the most leftist of socialists. The
power of this sentiment is best demonstrated, even
though in a somewhat different context, by Yugo-
slavia's Tito, who despite a running quarrel of almost
three decade's duration, has been unable to separate
himself from Moscow once and for all.
B. Short-Term Problems
PCI; The contingency with which the Soviets are
most likely to be faced in the next year or two is the
participation of the Italian Party in government, but
this would not necessarily cause them any serious
problems. The PCI fully shares-for reasons of its
own-Moscow's interest in avoiding a head-on
political confrontation and possible political or social
upheaval within Italy, and its careful pursuit of power
would seem to be fully in accord with Moscow's
preferences.
This says nothing about the Soviet reaction to the
PCI's use of power, if and when it should acquire it.
Moscow, no doubt, would react badly if the PCI, in
power, should choose to remain true to its electoral
commitments and preserve Italy's democratic institu-
tions and links with the West, and if it chose to
promote this line as an alternative to the Soviet
system. Similarly, the Soviets would be unhappy if the
26
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
PCI should go so far in the direction of allaying
American suspicions as to produce a fundamental
change in its foreign political orientation. However,
the Soviets cannot be certain, any more than Western
observers, of the PCI's ultimate behavior. In the
interim, they seem disposed to give it the benefit of
the doubt.
On the other hand, Moscow would not be unhappy
if the PCI failed to gain formal entry into the
government. Its doubts about the reliability of the
PCI are serious enough that it might welcome an
opportunity to avoid putting them to the test.
However, it is hardly likely to come out in open
opposition to the PCI's entry into the government, no
matter how serious its suspicions. To do so would do
further irreparable harm to Moscow's claim to
leadership of the movement.
PCE: The Soviets are faced with a different
problem in Spain. There they would like to normalize
their relations with the monarchist government, but
this would leave them vulnerable to charges that they
had "betrayed" the still illegal PCE. The best
solution, from their point of view, would be to induce
the Spanish government to legalize the PCE before
the establishment of diplomatic relations.
They are unlikely to do any more than the
minimum in promoting the interests of the PCE,
which in their eyes has been the most obnoxious of all
the dissident Parties of the West. Rather they appear
to be pinning all their hopes on a change in the policy
line of the PCE after the departure of the aging
Carillo leadership. In the meantime, the PCE is not
likely to improve its position to the point where the
Soviets would have to face up to the implications of
having it in power. At present it is generally
considered to have a relatively narrow base of support,
well under 20 percent of the electorate.
PCP: The Soviets were undoubtedly disappointed
when the PCP was dropped from the government in
July 1976, but they appear in general to be satisfied
with the PCP's present situation, in which it retains
strong bases of strength in the trade union movement
and in the south. Moscow's preference all along has
been for a long-term strategy of building political
alliances, rather than for an isolated Communist
government with a precarious grip on power. This is a
strategy which has now been imposed upon the PCP
by the force of circumstances.
PCF: The problem they face in France is potential-
ly the most troublesome. Not only has the French
Party adopted an abrasively anti-Soviet line, but-in
contrast to the Italian situation-the Soviets see it as
being in danger of domination by the much larger
Socialist Party. Most serious of all, the PCF has begun
to push the Soviets to choose openly between their
commitment to good relations with the existing
government and their commitment to the prosperity
of French Communism. This has the potential of
becoming a serious
leadership.
embarrassment for the Soviet
This latter circumstance probably helps explain the
contrast between the Soviet efforts to undermine the
leadership of the PCF and their tolerance of Berlin-
guer, who has made no such demands for the PCI. If
the CPSU's campaign against Marchais should fail, as
it well might, the Soviets again would face the
inescapable necessity of choosing openly between
state interest and ideological commitment. Whatever
they choose to do, it will be costly for them.
C. Long-Term Prospects
Despite the difficulties they face,
that the Soviet leaders have altered
that their long-term interests are tied
of Communism in Europe. The best
there is no sign
their conviction
to the expansion
evidence of that
is their continuing commitment to keeping the
international movement in being, and their continu-
ing sub-rosa support of even those Parties with which
they have the most difficulties.
This is not to say that the Soviet judgment is
correct. In particular, the postwar history of the
Communist world suggests that the Soviet leaders'
view of their ability to manage the Western Commu-
nists is overly optimistic, and based more on
ideological assumptions than on rational calculation.
Only in Bulgaria, where unique ethnic, historical, and
cultural links exist, have the Soviets been able to
maintain their authority over a "fraternal" govern-
ment in the absence of a military occupation force.
Once in power, if this were to happen, the Italian,
French, Spanish, or Portuguese Communists would be
likely to allow national and particularistic interests to
dominate in their relations with the USSR, thus
following in the path already taken by the Chinese,
Yugoslavs, Romanians, and others.
Even without participation in government, the
process is already well advanced, and is showing signs
27
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
of a dramatic acceleration, as witness the Spanish
Communist leaders' public dismissal of "proletarian
internationalism" as a concept which has outlived its
time; the French Communists' move to renounce the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" as the stated objec-
tive of the Party; and the PCI's restatement of its
commitment to a multi-Party system and rejection of
the Soviet system as totally inapplicable to Italy.
There is a real prospect that within the next few
years the Communist movement will experience
another historic split, and one of potentially even
greater moment for the Soviet Union than the break
with China. The schism with China crippled Mos-
cow's influence over the Asian wing of the Communist
movement and plunged it into a confrontation with
another great power rival, but posed no ideological
threat within Eastern Europe and the USSR itself
where Maoism has had almost no appeal, even to
dissidents.
The Soviet Bloc is not likely to be equally
impervious to the attractions of a less rigid and easier-
going Western European variant of Communism akin
to democratic socialism. The most serious threat to
Soviet and Eastern European orthodoxy has always
come from the right, from the direction of liberal
"reformism." If one or more of the "revisionist"
Parties wins power in the next year or two, or more
likely, a share of power in a coalition government,
such a development would inevitably lend a new
legitimacy to the "revisionist" doctrines they espouse.
In fact, some Soviet dissidents-the historian Roy
Medvedyev, for example-have already taken to
citing Western European Communist doctrines to
justify the democratic reforms they advocate for the
Soviet system.
The fiinancial and organizational instruments at
Moscow's disposal are probably adequate to hold
most or all of the lesser Parties in line for the next few
years, but it is unlikely that Soviet threats or pressure
will be enough to compel the larger Parties to reverse
their present course. The Spanish and Italians have
already proven their ability to withstand Soviet
pressure, and Marchais presumably would not have
launched the PCF on its new course if he had not had
considerable confidence in his ability to withstand
Soviet pressure. If pressure tactics are employed, their
most likely effect is to further embitter relations
between the Soviets and the dissident Parties.
Another option for Moscow is to formally anathe-
matize the Italians, French, and Spanish leaders and
to attempt to split their Parties. It is probably entirely
within its power to precipitate a breakaway by one or
more pro-Soviet leaders, but it is unclear what
significance this would have in real political terms.
Even if-a pro-Soviet breakaway group should carry an
appreciable share of a Party's membership with it, this
would not be of major significance unless it proved
capable of challenging the "revisionists" at the polls.
The temptation for Moscow to launch an open
assault on one or more of the dissident Parties must
also be tempered by the knowledge that it can no
longer effectively quarantine a dissident Party. As
long as the entente which has developed between the
Spanish, Italians, and French endures, this possibility
will be effectively foreclosed.
In view of the inadequacy of the weapons at their
disposal, the Soviets are likely to have great difficulty
in mustering the resolve necessary to undertake
forceful action against the Western dissidents. More-
over, the assumption that rising Communist influence
in the West helps to tip the East-West balance in
Moscow's favor will continue to induce ambivalence
in Moscow.
Still the Soviets must at some point retaliate against
direct attacks, however inadequate the means at their
disposal. There seems at the moment a fair chance
that this point will be reached within the next few
years, given the electoral advantage Western Commu-
nist leaders see in challenging the CPSU. Unless the
PCI should suffer serious reversals in the next year or
so, or the PCF lose ground in the 1978 elections, the
outlook is for a continued deterioration of Moscow's
relationship with these important Parties.
Any of a number of quite possible developments
could serve to accelerate the deterioration in Mos-
cow's relations with the Western Parties. One such
possibility would be a situation in which the Soviets
were forced to use force to maintain their position in
Eastern Europe. This would inevitably force the
Western European Communists into denunciations of
Soviet actions, and an intensification in the bitterness
of Moscow's polemics with the Western Parties would
be entirely predictable. Soviet meddling in Yugoslav
affairs after the passing of Tito would have the same
result. Similarly, if any of-the Western Parties should
identify itself with "anti-Soviet" positions as a
28
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
participant in government, this would force a Soviet
reaction, as would any fundamental alteration of the
basically hostile relations between the Western Parties
and Washington.
Moscow's response to provocation will be all the
more extreme if it perceives its direct interests to be
threatened. This clearly would be the case if the
Soviets believed that the virus of "revisionism" had
taken hold in one or more of the East European
Parties or the CPSU, or it should finally perceive the
actions of Western European Communists as unquali-
fiedly detrimental to Soviet interests.
Under such circumstances, the Soviets would be
likely to couple an offensive against Western "revi-
sionism" with pressure for an ideological crackdown
in Eastern Europe. Such a campaign could spill over
to effect East-West relations in general if-as is quite
possible-Moscow were to revert to a state of Cold
War defensiveness and move to restrict East-West
exchanges in order to block the spread of the
infection. Neither logic nor Soviet history provides any
grounds to doubt that the political survival instinct of
the Soviet leaders would take precedence over any
particular policy interest, including Brezhnev's cher-
ished "Peace Program."
Several developments which could have a crucial
impact on the changing relationship between the
Soviets and the Western European Parties are almost
certain to take place within the next two to five years.
The ability of the major Parties to convert their stance
of "moderation" and "independence" into political
gains will be tested in the immediate future, in France
by the 1978 legislative elections, and in Italy by the
ability or inability of the PCI over the next year or two
to continue expanding its political influence in the
face of a weak and demoralized opposition. If either
Party should seriously stumble, this would provide
ammunition for the Soviets and the more orthodox
Leninists within their own ranks, and possibly cause
the Italians and French to retreat from their present
positions. Continued gains, on the other hand, are
likely to confirm them in their present course and
strengthen the positions of the leaders who have
brought them there.
Crucial events beyond the borders of Western
Europe will also take place during this period. Tito's
days are clearly numbered, and we have already made
reference to the strains which Soviet interference in
Yugoslavia would impose on Moscow's relations with
the PCI and other Western Parties. Finally, changes
which will affect relations within the Communist
movement are almost certain to occur in Moscow
itself. Most, if not all of the men at the top of the
Soviet hierarchy, who range in age from 69 to 74, are
likely to be gone. The arrival of a new generation of
Soviet leaders will inevitably impart new nuances and
tactical shifts to the direction of Soviet policy, even
though its main lines may be undisturbed. Any
changes which new leaders undertake, even if not far-
reaching, could prove to be unsettling to Moscow's
relations with the Western Parties. Moreover, a new
Soviet leadership, at least in its initial period in power,
will enjoy even less claim to leadership within the
international movement than the Brezhnev leader-
ship, thus opening the way to further self-assertiveness
on the part of the Western Parties.
29
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
ANNEX
A. Divided Soviet Counsels
The preceding sections have treated Soviet policy as
if it were the product of a unitary actor. This, of
course, is not the case. Soviet policy is the product of
many individuals and many institutions, which
among them represent a considerable spectrum of
opinions and interests. This spectrum is clearly much
narrower than it is in more pluralistic states, but it is
nonetheless real. Policy is the final product of a
complex bureaucratic process in which competing
interests are balanced, melded, and occasionally
overridden.
The ambivalence and occasional contradictions
which have often characterized Soviet policy in the
areas here discussed are in themselves a proof that
Soviet counsels are divided as often as not. On
occasion Soviet officials have been in open disarray, as
in the aftermath of Zarodov's Pravda article. Some
Soviet spokesmen tried to dismiss the article as a
mistake. One Soviet official in West Germany went so
far as to say that he and "other senior Soviet officials"
disavowed the article.48
B. Points of Disagreement
There is some evidence concerning the participants
in the leadership debate and the views they represent.
On 17 March, shortly after the 25th Party Congress,
the senior Party ideologue, Politburo member M. A.
Suslov, publicly condemned so-called "national" and
"regional" forms of Communism as tendencies di-
rectly harmful to the cause of the working class.
Suslov's remarks were clearly directed at the Italian,
Spanish and French Parties-and were a clear
escalation of the more nuanced views expressed by
Brezhnev at the Party Congress.
The contentious nature of Suslov's belligerent
remarks was demonstrated the next day when Pravda
deleted them from its summary of his speech. The
implication that Suslov's remarks had gone beyond
the Politburo consensus, and presumably beyond the
limits favored by Brezhnev, received some indirect
confirmation on 22 April, when KGB chief Andropov
spoke for the Politburo on the occasion of the
anniversary of Lenin's birth. Andropov, a reputed
Politburo "moderate" despite his security responsibil-
ities, asserted that "sectarianism" was as great a
danger to Communism as "reformism." Andropov's
equation of the sin of the overly ardent revolutionaries
with that of the overly cautious practitioners of
political maneuver seemed calculated to right the
balance upset by Suslov.
Some accounts of a meeting between Berlinguer
and Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev
during the Party Congress indicate that differences
between the Soviet hierarchs were openly exposed to
the Italians. According to these accounts, the Italians
found Brezhnev much more sympathetic to the
tactical exigencies of their situation than his associ-
ates.49 The quarrel would appear to be between those
who, like Brezhnev, are prepared to minimize
doctrinal differences for the sake of political advan-
tage, and those who, like Suslov, are opposed to any
doctrinal backsliding.
It is nonetheless much easier to identify the issues
than the participants in this internal debate. The
issues emerge in the media and in the comments of
Soviet officials, albeit often only incompletely and in
disguised form. The key participants-those officials
who occupy policymaking positions-almost never
express their personal views for the public record.
The main issues involved are clear. The fundamen-
tal point of doctrinal differences is the question of
whether the West-as some Soviet propagandists have
proclaimed-is experiencing a "decisive crisis" as a
result of the combined impact of political, social, and
economic difficulties.
If capitalism is indeed in crisis, the West has moved
from a pre-revolutionary to a revolutionary stage. This
in turn would necessitate a turn from the conciliatory
31
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
policies appropriate to a pre-revolutionary phase to
the determined bid for power appropriate to a
revolutionary phase of development. The answer to
this question would also dictate the attitude to be
taken toward political or social upheaval in the West.
If the West is in a revolutionary phase, upheaval must
be regarded in a positive light; if not, in a negative
light.
Sharply divergent positions have been staked out on
these and related questions in the Soviet press and
journals. Zarodov's militant article was striking for the
prominence lent it by its publication in Pravda and by
Brezhnev's tacit endorsement. Ideas similar to those
expressed, by Zarodov have maintained their grip on a
sizeable portion of the Soviet apparat, that faction
labelled as "neo-Stalinist" by its opponents. The
opposing viewpoint also has been expressed.*
Zarodov disposes of the question of assessing the
present state of capitalism with the assertion that
Lenin had described the present age as a "revolution-
ary" era,. Consequently, there is no question of
limiting the goals of the revolutionary party to those
appropriate to a preliminary historical phase. Limited
"reformist" goals have meaning only insofar as they
serve as a "prologue to socialist revolution;" there can
be "no `wall' between the democratic and socialist
stages of revolution in the (revolutionary) era;" and
socialist revolution is only possible under the hegem-
ony of the "party of the proletariat."
Articles by A. A. Galkin (in Questions of Philosophy
in September 1974) and T. T. Timofeyev (in
Questions of Philosophy in May 1975 and in Working
Class in the September-October 1975 issue) and an
unsigned editorial article in the August 1975 issue of
Questions of Philosophy have put forward a sharply
distinct position. Where the doctrinaire Zarodov and
company insist that the doctrinal purity of the
Communist Party must take precedence over the
formation and preservation of political alliances, the
"moderates" argue that the formation and expansion
of broadly based "socio-political" alliances is the most
pressing need of the present time. Where the
doctrinaire ideologues emphasize the need to push
from the "democratic"to the Socialist stage of the
revolutionary process without undue delay, the
moderates insist that those who belittle the impor-
*Most consistently by the Chief of the Institute of the World
Workers' Movement, T. T. Timofeyev, and his subordinate, A. A.
Galkin.
tance of a definite and prolonged stage of the
"general democratic" struggle are guilty of "adven-
turism" and "left-opportunism."
It is possible to treat these differences as mere
matters of nuance. The "moderates" do not deny the
necessity of eventually moving from the "democratic"
phase to the phase of socialist revolution, nor do the
doctrinaires reject the need for broad political
alliances in the initial stages of the revolutionary
process.
It is in the differing attitudes concerning the
significance of the various political, economic, and
sociological difficulties said to comprise the "crisis of
capitalism" that fundamental philosophical differ-
ences between the two groups can be found. It is not
simply that the moderates dispute the notion that the
West is on the brink of revolutionary upheaval. Not
even Zarodov made that assertion. It is that the
moderates challenge the assumption that the collapse
of bourgeois-democratic institutions in the advanced
capitalist countries would redound to the benefit of
Communism. They cite the lessons of Hitler and
Mussolini to argue that the most likely beneficiary of
a severe crisis in the West would be the extreme right.
According to Galkin, "The greater the instability of
the situation (in the West) . . . the greater the `social
yearning' for a strong hand able to restore order."
Furthermore, he argued that under certain circum-
stances, "similar sentiments could capture a part of
the working class."
Timofeyev has made the same case. In his article in
the May issue of Questions of Philosophy he pointedly
reaffirmed the relevance of a key thesis of the Seventh
Comintern Congress. "The workers in a number of
capitalist countries `must choose specifically today not
between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois de-
mocracy, but between a bourgeois democracy and
fascism."
The most far-ranging development of the theme
that conditions in the West are not propitious for
Communist advances was made in an unsigned
editorial which appeared in the August issue of
Questions of Philosophy. This not only endorsed the
view that fascism rather than Communism would
emerge the victor from any period of major social
upheaval in the West, but concluded that the most
effective obstacle to the triumph of fascism was the
ruling bourgeoisie, which was "vitally interested" in
32
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
protecting the "democratic forms" it had created. In
contrast, the working class was markedly susceptible
to the "social demogogy"of fascism.
The joint interests of all "progressives" demand a
united front against the common enemy-" the left
extremist, pseudo-revolutionary and fascist groups
that are often joined both on the level of theoretical
and propagandistic formulations and in practical
actions." Moreover, the editorial concluded that the
conditions which applied within the developed
countries of the West also applied to the world as a
whole: "The solution of these . . . require the
cooperation of heterogeneous socio-economic forces
on a world-wide scale and assumes their acceptance of
a specific system of mutual obligations."
The contrast to the views put forward by doctrin-
aires of the Zarodov stripe clearly is both real and
substantive, and is indicative of the differences which
exist among Soviet officialdom. The fact that the
Questions of Philosophy editorial was released for
publication on 6 August, the very day that Zarodov's
article appeared in Pravda, is also illustrative of those
differences.
It is also clear that the doctrinaires have had the
better part of this intramural struggle in recent
months. Whereas Zarodov has been received by
Brezhnev, the editorial board of Problems of Philos-
ophy has been the subject of frequent critical scrutiny
by Party officials. The same August issue which
contained the article quoted above also featured the
transcript of one such critical review of the journal's
performance.
Nevertheless, it does not seem that the struggle has
been resolved in favor of rigid orthodoxy. Signs of a
tilt in the direction of dogmatism have not been
accompanied by any evidence of concrete Soviet
support for a shift to a more revolutionary posture on
the part of the Western Parties. Despite Brezhnev's
reception of Zarodov, his behavior at the CECP was
markedly conciliatory. To the contrary, Soviet pol-
icy-as distinct from doctrine-still inclines in the
direction of relative moderation.
Moreover, Soviet spokesmen with a more direct
involvement in policy have continued to show
restraint in their public utterances. Thus, V. V.
Zagladin, the Deputy Chief of the International
Department of the CC/CPSU, sounded a rather
subdued note in two recent articles (in the September-
October 1975 issue of Working Class and the
November issue of Questions of Philosophy). Zagladin
indicated that the "crisis of capitalism" was to be
regarded as a prolonged illness rather than a token of
imminent collapse. The immediate task was the
removal of the "objective and subjective difficulties in
the path of the formation of the preconditions for
socialist revolution" (emphasis added). Brezhnev
himself endorsed this position in his report to the 25th
Congress, noting that Communists did not expect the
"imminent collapse" of capitalism.
33
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
1 Embassy Lisbon Airgram, 19 Jan 1976, Unclassified.
2 TDFIRDB-315/05026-75, 25 Apr 1975, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
3 TDFIRDB-315/07950-75, 23 Jul 1975, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
4 TDFI E1-314/02842-75, 21 May 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
5 TDFIR-314/01293-75, 21 Mar 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
6 TDFIIRDB-315/12151-74, 4 Dec 1974, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
7 According to FBIS analysts, a Pravda editorial article on 21
February was the "first authoritative discussion" of events in
Portugal. Bee the 26 February 1975 article in the FBIS publication,
Trends in Communist Propaganda.
8Izvestia, 15 Jul 1975.
8 Pravda, 24 Jul 1975.
10 TDFIR-314/04155-75, 22 Aug 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
11 President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, hardly an influential
figure in Portugal,. reported receiving a personal letter from
Brezhnev in which he was asked to intercede with the PSP to
stabilize the situation in Portugal. Embassy Dar Es-Salaam 4218, 10
Sep 1975, CONFIDENTIAL.
12 See the TASS release of 9 August and Pravda of 10 August
1975.
13 The Soviet public response to the legislative elections of April
1976 followed this line. See Pravda of 29 April 1976.
14 TDI'IRDB-315/05536-76, 2 Jun 1976, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
16 TDFIR-314/01811-75, 26 Mar 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
16 This was Octavio Pato, the PCP functionary responsible for
international liaison. Embassy Lisbon 2051, 10 Apr 1975, CONFI-
DENTIAL.
17 TDFIRDB-315/07815-75, 19 Jul 1975, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
18 TDCS-314/01124-71, 4 Feb 1971, SECRET/NOFORN.
19 TDFIRDB-315/00669-76, 20 Jan 1976, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON. The official mentioned in this report is
V. V. Zagladin, the 1st Deputy Chief of the International
Department of the Central Committee.
20 DDI Intelligence Report, "Red Power and Prospects in Italy,"
No. 1709/71, Jun 1971, SECRET/NOFORN.
21 TDCS-314/02679-73, 30 Mar 1973, SECRET/NOFORN.
22 TDFIR-314/00617-74, 26 Jan 1974, SECRET/NOFORN.
23 TDCS-314/02679-73, 30 Mar 1973, SECRET/NOFORN.
24 TDFIRDB-315/00771-76, op. cit.
25 TDFIR-314/04594-75, 24 Sep 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
26 TDFIR-314/02679-73, op. cit.
27 FIR-311/01353-75, 29 Jul 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
28 TDFIR-314/02690-75, 8 May 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
28 RFE Research Paper., "Spanish CP's Charter of Independ-
ence," 6 Mar 1974, Unclassified.
30 CSC] Study, "The Communist Party of Spain," CSCI
316/02789-69, Jul 1969, SECRET/NOFORN.
31 CS-311/01810-71, 9 Mar 1971, SECRET/NOFORN.
32 Party Life (Partinaya_Zhizn') Feb 1974.
33 TDFIRDB-315/11498-74, 19 Nov 1974, SECRET/NOFORN/
NOCON. According to this report, a PCOE official was denied
entry to the USSR in late 1974, but "warmly received" in East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
14 Time, Jul 28, 1975.
35 TDFIR-314/01717-75, 21 Mar 1975, SECRET/NOFORN.
36 CS-311/07854-71, 8 Nov 1971, SECRET/NOFORN.
37 FIRDB-312/01202-74, 22 Mar 1974, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
38 CSDB-312/00912-72, 28 Feb 1972, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
39 TDFIRDB-315/01848-76, 20 Feb 1976, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
4o New York Times, 4 Feb 1976.
41 TDCSDB-315/03309-69, 8 Aug 1969, SECRET/NOFORN/
NOCON/ORCON.
42 Ibid.
43 The Soviets showed their displeasure with Giscard by
publishing markedly hostile articles in the central press during his
October 1975 visit to Moscow. See Pravda articles of 15, 16, 25
October.
44 TDCSDB-315/10482-?72, 13 Dec 1972, SECRET/NOFORN/
NOCON/ORCON.
45 See, for example, TDFIR-314/01349-76, 16 Apr 1976,
SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON.
46 TDFIRDB-315/05524-76, 2 Jun 1976, SECRET/NO-
FORN/NOCON/ORCON.
47 See, for example, TDFIR-314/02103, 25 Jun 1976, SE-
CRET/NOFORN/NOCON/ORCON.
34
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/12/11: CIA-RDP79T00889AO00800190001-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/12/11 : CIA-RDP79T00889A000800190001-1