AFTER MAO: FACTOR AND CONTINGENCIES IN THE SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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After Mao: Factors and Contingencies
in the Succession
Secret
PR 76 10063
August 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AFTER MAO: FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES
IN THE SUCCESSION
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Note: The writer is grateful for contributions by other offices of CIA, although formal
coordination was not sought. Research and analysis was completed in mid-August 1976.
Comments and questions will be welcomed by the author
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTORY NOTE ............................................ 1
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS ...........................................
3
THE DISCUSSION ..................................................
7
Mao's Deterioration ..................................................
7
Access and Influence ............................................... S
Three Dramatic Possibilities ............... . . . . . . . 10
An Attempted Coup ................................................ 10
Revolt of the Regional Leaders ............. . . . . . . . . 12
A Soviet Military Attack 14
Future Distribution of Power ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
No Commanding Figure or Faction .... 15
A Possible Equitable Distribution ..... . 20
Three Inescapable Policy-Questions ............... . . . . 23
The Relationship to Mao's "Thought" ................................ 23
"Rehabilitation" or Reversal ......................................... 24
The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle ............... . . . .... . . . . . . 25
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The reason for writing this paper is that Mao Tse-tung, who has
dominated the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than 40 years,
may soon be totally incapacitated or dead, and that his degree of
dominance has been such that his departure will profoundly affect the
Chinese scene, regardless of whether violence is avoided.
The enormous power and authority of the Chairman must somehow
be divided-by agreement or through struggle-among a number of
successors, This paper attempts to identify the key figures and
contending factions.
This paper is organized sequentially, considering factors and
contingencies in three periods: prior to Mao's death, around the time of
death, and after death (meaning, a few months). In the first period, the
question of access to and influence on Mao arises. In the second period,
there are at least three dramatic possibilities: an attempted coup in
Peking, intervention by Military Region leaders outside Peking, and a
Soviet attack. In the third period, power must be distributed, and there
seem to be at least three inescapable policy-questions for those who
share in it: their relationship to Mao's "thought," their attitude toward
the "rehabilitation" of leaders brought down in the Cultural
Revolution, and their management of the Chinese position in the Sino-
Soviet-American triangle. (It is recognized that other controversial issues
might be taken up on their merits or for factional advantage.)
Throughout this paper, the words Leftist(s), Centrist(s), and
Rightist(s) are used to indicate points on the Chinese political spectrum.
These words do not imply fixed and predictable positions on every
possible issue, but refer to apparent predilections. These designations are
assigned to individuals and factions primarily in terms of apparent
allegiance to and fervor for Mao's fundamental revolutionary vision.
This revolutionary vision (put summarily) calls for the creation,
through continuing "class struggle," of a completely politicized and
selfless, ideologically-motivated man, and of an egalitarian and largely
self-sufficient China, in which differences between mental and manual
labor, industry and agriculture, the city and the countryside have been
abolished. It also calls for the creation of Maoist-type Communist
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parties, responsive to the CCP, to take power in other countries; but this
objective has increasingly conflicted with, and been subordinated to,
Mao's intense nationalism and the need as he has seen it to protect
China's national security against Soviet "social-imperialism."
It is hoped that this presentation of selected factors and contingencies
will be of some value to the reader in the months ahead, even though
much of the paper is highly conjectural.
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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
Mao Tse-tung, 82, appears to be deteriorating rapidly, and China is
probably already under some degree of "collective" leadership.
Those with the greatest access to Mao, and in the best position to
influence whatever decisions he is able to make in his last months,
appear to be the Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, Mao's latest and current
favorite, and the police figure Wang Tung-hsing, the head of Mao's
personal bodyguard. Hua will probably bear the mark of Mao's favor
into the post-Mao struggle, although this will not assure Hua's primacy
in the successor leadership.
DRAMATIC, BUT UNLIKELY, POSSIBILITIES
There is a possibility-to be taken seriously-of a coup at the time of
Mao's death. The passed-over and unpopular Leftists, fearful about
their futures, or Rightist military leaders, fearful of the Leftists, might
conspire with the most important figures of the physical security
apparatus-the leaders of the Peking Military Region (MR) and of the
smaller inner-core forces. However, the key security figures seem
unlikely to cooperate in any coup. Moreover, any hypothetical group of
conspirators would have to have the cooperation or assent of the main-
force armies of the Peking MR (not just the MR commanders);
otherwise the coup could be quickly reversed. A coup would carry a high
risk of splitting the military forces of the MR, leading to armed clashes
among them, in turn risking the spread of armed conflict throughout
China. Almost all of the post-Mao leaders would probably wish to avoid
this.
Intervention in the succession process by leaders of the 10 MRs
outside Peking seems most unlikely unless Peking itself is in a state of
chaos and the conflict has spread further. While the Russians might
offer-especially in a state of civil war-to provide substantial material
support to a group of MR leaders whom they believed to be pro-Soviet,
no such leaders can now be identified, and the central leaders are
unlikely to allow the situation to deteriorate to the point that either the
outlying MR leaders or the Russians would attempt to intervene.
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A Soviet attack on China at the time of Mao's death seems the least
likely of the dramatic possibilities. There are too many obstacles to a
meaningful military or political victory for the Russians. Beyond this,
with Mao's death there will be a qualitatively new political situation for
Moscow to try to exploit. The sensible course for the Russians, with their
most implacable enemy departed, will be to talk, not fight.
A TENSE "COLLECTIVE"
Mao's successors, even if they have been working reasonably well
together during Mao's deterioration, and even if they avoid violence at
the time of Mao's, death, will still face a difficult problem in distributing
power among themselves in the immediate post-Mao period. This will
be especially true if the leaders decide to retire the post of Chairman,
which would place Hua Kuo-feng on a collision course with the Leftist
Chang Chun-chiao for the post of Secretary-General of the Party, then
the Party's topmost position. (In a showdown in the Politburo, Hua
would-seem likely to attract more votes and to have a better claim to the
support of military and security forces.) The preferable course would
seem to be to retain the Chairmanship, dividing power between Hua
(continuing for a time as First Vice-Chairman) and Chang (continuing
as Secretary-General).
No one person, whatever his title, will be able to dominate the Party
as Mao had. Nor, probably, can any single faction-whether Centrist,
Rightist, Leftist, or other. The group that dominates will probably prove
to be some combination of the strongest figures from all points of the
political spectrum.
In addition to the difficulty of calculating the perceptions of various
leaders as to one another's strengths (especially, military/security
support) too little is known of the personal character of the conjectured
key figures to permit a confident judgment as to whether all or most of
them would prove able to subordinate their serious differences with
others, and their personal ambitions, to the common good. On balance,
however, it seems likely that most of the key figures, acting from a sense
of national interest, will be able to agree upon some form of "collective"
leadership-one which, at least for a time, will conceal the extent of
their differences.
A POSSIBLE EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT
There is a possible distribution of power among the most important
figures which would seem equitable to outside observers. The center-line
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in such a "collective" would run through the Center of the Chinese
political spectrum-" moderate" in Chinese terms, although still more
"revolutionary" than, say, the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. The constellation would be:
-The Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, c. 56, as the Party's principal
officer;
-The Leftist Chang Chun-chiao, c. 64, as next-ranking officer or
Premier;
-The Rightist old Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, 78, and the "wild
card" Chen Hsi-lien, 63, remaining respectively Minister of
Defense and Commander of the Peking MR, the principal
figures of the Military Affairs Committee which controls and
directs the armed forces;*
-The Centrist Chi Teng-kuei, in his late 40s, remaining the Party's
supervisor of organizational work and the other key figure (first
political officer) of the Peking MR, and becoming the back-up
for Hua or Chang in the Party or governmental structure;
-Another "wild card," Wang Tung-hsing, 60, continuing in the
role of director of the Party's political security apparatus (secret
police);
-Most of the above, plus one of the lesser Leftists-the now
second-ranking Vice-Chairman, young Wang Hung-wen, about
40, or Madame Mao, 61, or the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan,
about 45-as composing the bulk of the Politburo Standing
Committee, the core of Party power; and
-The Rightist Chiao Kuan-hua, 64, the very able protege of Chou
En-lai, continuing as Foreign Minister.
CENTRIST POLICIES
A centrist leadership of this kind would be expected to take Centrist
positions on three inescapable policy-questions: the group's relationship
to Mao's "thought," the concept of "rehabilitation," and the Sino-
Soviet-American triangle.
Mao's successors will almost certainly affirm their fidelity to his
"thought," in the interest of continuity and because they have been so
*The term "wild card" is used herein for a leader whose record does not permit his classification as Left,
Center, or Right, but whose power is such that his support would be of great value to any classifiable
contender. It may turn out that the "wild cards" make the critical difference in shaping the succession.
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intimately associated with his policies. Some of the disruptive
manifestations of Mao's "thought," however, can and very probably
will be modified, but quietly, employing other aspects of the "thought"
to justify this.
Mao's policy of "rehabilitation"-of thousands of Party cadres,
government functionaries, and military leaders brought down in the
Cultural Revolution, many of whom are again in important posts-will
probably be reaffirmed, although many will remain purged. Any
attempt by Leftist leaders to reverse this policy would probably lead to
their own downfall.
Mao's successors may move to reduce the tension in the Sino-Soviet
relationship, even in the immediate post-Mao period. For example,
there seems a good chance that the Chinese will quietly modify their
demands in the border dispute. This might be seen as having the
additional advantage of inducing the US to move more rapidly toward
"normalization" of relations with Peking.
It is not expected, however, that the Chinese will adopt a policy of
equidistance from the USSR and the US. The probability seems strong
that the USSR will remain the "main enemy," and that Mao's
successors will persist in the policy of attempting to use the US as a
strategic counterweight to the USSR. If for no other reason than that
Peking's exploration of the potential of the US connection has not yet
been completed, almost any constellation of post-Mao leaders could be
expected to continue the process of exploration, even while complaining
that the pace of "normalization" of relations is too slow.
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THE DISCUSSION
MAO'S DETERIORATION
Mao Tse-tung, 82 last December, has appeared to
be deteriorating rapidly since March of this year. He is
already incapacitated to the point that he no longer
makes even brief appearances, and he may become
totally incapacitated, or die, within the next few
months. (See photograph.)
As of October 1975, Mao impressed perceptive
foreign visitors as still clearly the dominant figure in
China, and it was just at that time that Mao
personally set in motion the process that was to
culminate in the purge of Teng Hsiao-ping in 1976.
Mao was still lucid in December and January, and was
credibly reported to have personally nominated Hua
Kuo-feng to replace Teng as Acting Premier in late
January. On 23 February, he met for about an hour
and 40 minutes with former President Nixon.
Mao did not appear again until 17 March, at which
time he gave a strong impression of diminished vigor.
Nevertheless, he was credibly reported to be
continuing to provide general instructions on the
management of the anti-Teng campaign, and the
rapid and severe 7 April response to the Tienanmen
demonstrations of early April-including the purge of
Teng and the appointments of Hua Kuo-feng (as First
Vice-Chairman and Premier), both credibly attributed
to Mao's initiative-looked as though Mao were still
in command. *
'"It may reasonably be asked why, if the terms Leftist, Centrist,
and Rightist are meaningful, Mao named the Centrist Hua Kuo-
feng to these key posts rather than elevating two Leftists (Wang
Hung-wen and Chang Chun-chiao) who were hierarchically next in
line for those posts-Leftists whose policy predilections had been
closer to Mao's heart. The apparent answer is that Mao lacked
confidence in the Leftists' ability to conduct China's affairs in the
difficult period which Mao knew to lie ahead, and that he chose
Hua as the ablest administrator for that period, the nearest thing to
another Chou En-lai, who was not an ideologue at all but a manager
and conciliator, and who nevertheless was the only one of Mao's
principal lieutenants of the past 15 years to have remained in Mao's
favor until his death. (See photograph on page 9.) Hua was a
"compromise"-not one forced on Mao by other leaders, but in the
sense that Hua was (as Mao saw it) a man like Chou, who could be
relied upon to avoid the excesses repeatedly committed by the
Leftists while not abandoning Mao's long-term objectives as a
Rightist would. Mao stopped short of formally designating Hua as
his successor, in the way that the Leftist Lin Piao had been
designated.
Mao appeared twice in April for brief conversations.
In the second of these, he had a new English-language
interpreter, the Harvard-educated Chi Chao-chu,
suggesting at least the possibility of a need for someone
quick-witted enough to `cover' for Mao on occasion,
concealing possible gaps in Mao's comprehension and
supplying plausible answers when Mao could not.
Again in May Mao appeared twice briefly, looking
very enfeebled. His head lolled, he was clearly
partially paralyzed on his right side, and may have
been partially paralyzed on his left.
In mid-June Mao failed to meet with a visiting
head-of-state, and a spokesman reportedly cited a
"Central Committee" (or "Party Central," meaning
Politburo Standing Committee) decision to put an end
to Mao's audiences with foreign visitors, on grounds of
failing health (obviously the real reason) and
preoccupation with other concerns. That Mao himself
was-strikingly-not said to have made this decision
(unlike his 1958 decision to give up the post of state
chairman), or even to have acquiesced in it, raised
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questions as to the degree to which Mao could still
dominate the Party leadership, and as to the degree to
which China might already be under a "collective"
leadership.
Nevertheless, as of mid-August there was some
reason to believe that Mao was still making decisions.
The shift to a harder line (by various Chinese
spokesmen, in talks with Americans) on the problem of
Taiwan than Premier Hua Kuo-feng had been
taking-actually, a counterproductive line-could
probably have been imposed only by someone with
greater authority than Hua, which narrows the field to
just one man, Mao himself, who is known to have
expressed impatience about this issue. Lacking
evidence of Mao's total incapacitation, it must be
presumed that Mao is still able to intervene effectively
when he chooses to do so.
Access and Influence: Various observers have noted
the possibility that Mao will not soon die, but will
linger on, continuing to deteriorate until he not only
can no longer dominate the Party but cannot even take
part in the decision-making process, so that he is
simply being used by others acting in his name.
There would seem to be at least two stages in such a
decline. One would be that in which a deteriorated but
still authoritative Mao is increasingly susceptible to
the influence of the few other leaders who have access
to him (perhaps the stage that we are in now), and the
other would be that in which he would be simply a
vegetable, like Lenin in his last months, allowing for a
third possible stage in which the one condition would
pass into the other.
In recent months, those who have visibly had access
to Mao are of course those who have appeared with
him in his meetings with foreign visitors: First Vice-
Chairman and Premier Hua Kuo-feng, Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and Mao's interpreters and
nurses. In his more private life, in which major
decisions are made, there are probably at least two
others: Madame Mao, who reportedly is again living
with Mao and may still be the head of his personal
secretariat (managing his mail and running his
errands), and Wang Tung-hsing, the head of his
personal bodyguard. * There are probably others who
have access occasionally, including some or all of the
other three active members (besides Mao and Hua) of
the Politburo Standing Committee: the Leftists Chang
Chun-chiao and (possibly) Wang Hung-wen-the two
leaders passed over when Hua was named-and the
Rightest old Marshal Yeh Chien-ying.
Thus leading figures of the Center, Left, and Right
all still have access.**
"factional" leadership below Mao's level. These have not been
factions in an extreme sense, barely distinguishable from
conspiracies, but loosely-organized factions in the sense that Mao
himself has approved: persons with common predilections who tend
to offer Mao options which he himself has described as Left,
Centrist, and Right. (In periods of Left turns or course-corrections,
the Leftists, or "radicals," or ideologues have had the foremost roles;
in periods of Right turns, the comparatively Rightist, "moderate,"
pragmatic leaders.) At present, the principal figure in the
management of China's affairs appears to be a Centrist. Although
Mao has made the final decisions on large matters of policy and has
manipulated his "factions," standing above them as the final
arbiter, these factions have appeared to have special interests and
have tended to manipulate the situation so as to advance these
interests, sometimes at the expense of other groups, and in this sense
can be said to have manipulated Mao himself.
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Left to right:
Chu Te, principal founder of the Chinese Communist armed forces; degraded in the
Cultural Revolution, restored to nominal position in 1969, died in limited favor in July 1976.
Chou En-lai, the PRC's only Premier until 1976, Mao's first lieutenant in the period 1970=
1976, died in favor in January 1976; now being indirectly denigrated in the anti-Teng
campaign.
Chen Yun, for many years the regime's foremost economic specialist, set aside in the
early 1960s and criticized during the Cultural Revolution; still alive but inactive.
Liu Shao-chi, Mao's first lieutenant from the early 1940s until 1965, at which time he
was Mao's designated successor; in 1966, became the highest-ranking victim of the Cultural
Revolution and the prime symbol of all opposition to Mao's policies; has made no
appearance after that time, although may still be alive.
Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party's dominant figure for more than 40 years
and its only Chairman since 1943, now ill and apparently dying; his present role in the Party's
leadership, apart from his citation as the authority for every major policy, cannot be judged.
Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary-General of the Party and Liu Shao-chi's principal deputy in
the period 1954-1966, purged with Liu in 1966; "rehabilitated" by Mao, and returned to
power in 1974, in 1975 (with Chou's illness) was wielding power second only to Mao's; under
attack as a "capitalist-roader" since February 1976, replaced at that time as Acting Premier,
removed from all posts in April 1976.
Lin Piao, distinguished as a military leader, succeeded Liu Shao-chi as Mao's first
lieutenant in 1966, and in 1969 was designated in the Party Constitution as Mao's successor;
clashed with Mao in 1969-1970, apparently planned a coup against Mao in 1971, was killed
in a plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971 while fleeing from his imminent purge.
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Of these figures, Hua Kuo-feng is the nearest thing
to a designated successor, named as Senior Vice-
Chairman, the man in whom Mao in recent months
has publicly and privately expressed the greatest
confidence. He has been observed to have a close and
warm personal relationship with Mao, and has one
advantage none of the others has: he speaks Mao's
language, Mao's native Hunanese,* Wang Tung-
hsing has been the leader physically closest to Mao
since about 1950, virtually a constant companion,
even accompanying Mao on his travels (which
Madame Mao does not); while Wang cannot
Wang seems to be completely identified with Mao, to
want what Mao wants; although Wang may turn out
to have a mind of his own, a mind already busy
making calculations as to what "factional" group in
the leadership it would be most advantageous to
himself to support, the presumption has to be that
Wang is now a supporter of Mao's clearly-marked
favorite, Hua.
In sum, at all stages of Mao's hypothetical
deterioration, it seems likely that Hua Kuo-feng,
reinforced by Wang Tung-hsing, will have the greatest
access to Mao and the greatest influence with him,
and will be in the best position of any leader to act-or
try to act-in Mao's name.
Nevertheless, so long as Mao retains the loyalty of
the physical and political security apparatuses, he can
probably continue to make whatever changes he likes
in the Party leadership, and some of those with access
to him may be attempting to manipulate him into
making some.
It is not hard to imagine the passed-over and
demoted Leftists endeavoring to persuade Mao that
the realization of his revolutionary objectives can be
accomplished only if the helm is in their hands.
Neither is it hard to imagine the Centrist and
Rightist leaders with access to Mao trying to bring
Mao to believe that the Leftists still have too much
potential for disruption, and should be deprived of
*Hua is a native of Shansi in North China, but served for more
than 20 years as a Party secretary in Hunan before Mao brought him
to Peking in 1971.
those important organizational posts which they still
have.
It is further possible that Hua Kuo-feng, now in line
to succeed Mao, recognizing the importance of having
a blindly loyal security chief and having doubts as to
whether Wang Tung-hsing would give to him
anything like the loyalty that Wang has given Mao,
will attempt to transfer more and more of the overall
security account into his own (Hug's) hands before
Mao's death. Hua may regard some one of his own
lieutenants as having precisely the qualities he requires
in a security chief.
The possibilities for exercising influence-' undue'
influence-on Mao are of course many, too many to
enumerate. On balance, one concludes that Hua will
be able to survive as the most important figure after
Mao himself, and that he will have Wang's support as
Mao would wish, although one cannot count on it.*
THREE DRAMATIC POSSIBILITIES
There are some dramatic and highly disruptive
contingencies that could occur on Mao's death. The
most important of these are a coup employing military
and security forces of the Peking MR, military
intervention by some of the leaders of the 10 MRs
outside Peking, and a Soviet attack on China. An
attempted coup is a serious possibility; the other two
seem most unlikely except in the event of a coup.
An Attempted Coup: The possibility of a coup has
to be taken seriously, because of the sharp differences
among various leaders and because there. are forces in
Peking which could probably bring off a coup, at least
initially. The passed-over and unpopular Leftists,
fearful about their futures, or Rightist military leaders,
fearful of the Leftists, might conspire with the most
important figures of the physical security
apparatus-the leaders of the Peking MR and of the
smaller inner-core forces--to seize their opponents and
even the Centrist figures like Hua Kuo-feng who have
kept the balance. The three key physical security
figures, acting just by themselves, could probably carry
*One obvious complicating factor, if Mao's deterioration is
prolonged, is the credibility problem. That is, in the nature of the
case it seems likely that the dwindling few like Hua and Wang who
have access to Mao will have increasing difficulty in persuading the
many who do not have access that (a) the outsiders are being told the
full truth about Mao's instructions, and that (b) Mao is in any
condition to formulate instructions which deserve respect and
obedience.
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out a successful coup. The question of whether there
will be an attempted coup at the time of Mao's death
(no real possibility is seen before that time) is
sometimes put in the form of: Who will be the first to
learn of Mao's death? Who, that is, might have private
knowledge of the death even for an hour or two, and
might thereby be in a position to issue orders in Mao's
name which would be accepted as proceeding from
Mao and would be acted on?
There seem only limited gains to be made by being
the `first to know' of Mao's death, if indeed there is
any `first.' The circumstances of Mao's last days may
be such that other key figures, operating in teams, will
be able to keep vigil around the clock, as is said to have
been the case in the death of Stalin, in order to keep
any one of them from having private knowledge. Even
on the assumptions that this is not done and that
Wang Tung-hsing himself is not on the scene, the
bodyguard forces protecting Mao (as the Soviet police
were protecting Stalin) could be expected to report at
once to Wang.
There is a hypothetical possibility that Wang, acting
on his own or in concert with some principal to whom
he had secretly pledged allegiance, could move
swiftly-using only the forces responsive to
himself-to effect the arrest of certain other Party
leaders before the remaining leaders were even awake.
But this scenario looks implausible. Wang's security
forces would have to be perfectly responsive to him:
that is, each of his deputies ordered to arrest one of the
top leaders of the Party (and, necessarily, his entire
family, and household staff, in order to keep the fact
from being made known to other top figures) would
have to be willing to take such extreme action without
attempting to verify that the order did in fact come
from Mao, and all of the blocks of arrests would have
to be perfectly coordinated, carried out at the same
moment at several different points in Peking, also in
order to preserve secrecy and prevent the mobilization
of stronger military forces by other leaders. *
* In this connection, the failure of those who attempted the coup
in Indonesia in 1965 to capture just one of the several key military
leaders, on the eve of the coup, is instructive. Although all of the
other key generals were successfully taken, the escape of just
one-thus enabling the army to rally-was an important factor in
the failure of the coup, ending with the capture and execution of the
conspirators and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist
Party. See "Indonesia 1965-The Coup that Backfired," December
1968.
One version of this scenario is that Wang and
Madame Mao might act together (with Madame Mao
informing Wang if she were the first to know), on
behalf of the "Shanghai group''-the Leftists-with
which she is affiliated. This presumes that Madame
Mao has persuaded Wang, contrary to the visible
evidence, that it was Mao's will to have these true
"revolutionary successors" in fact succeed him.
A somewhat more plausible form of a coup-more
plausible than simultaneous arrests throughout
Peking-would be one in which all of the top leaders
are summoned to the deathbed of a dying or
(unbeknownst to them) already dead Mao, at which
time one faction is arrested by Wang's small security
force on the scene, on behalf of some other faction. But
it seems likely that those summoned would have
alerted others, so that this could not be carried out in
secret.
In any case, there is the entire question of the
morning after. Even if Wang and his principals were
prepared to arrest and confine a number of the other
top leaders (an action which might set loose all of the
powerful forces in China making for instability and
insurrection), they would have to have the cooperation
or assent of other military forces in the Peking area,
especially the main-force armies of the Peking MR;
otherwise, the coup could be quickly reversed. And
even if they did have the military's cooperation or
assent, the military would be in a position to dominate
the leadership emerging from the coup.* It is hard to
believe that any of the civilian leaders-Left or
Right-would willingly arrange what would be in
effect a military dictatorship.
Those in the best position to carry out a coup would
seem to be the three most important figures of the
physical security apparatus acting together-Wang
Tung-hsing at the inner core and Chen Hsi-lien and
Chi Teng-kuei, respectively Commander and 1st
Political Officer of the Peking MR, to whom the main-
force armies of the MR would probably be responsive,
at least initially. (See photograph.) These three, each
of them perhaps acting in the belief that he would not
otherwise hold high position in the post-Mao 25X1
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otherwise be purged as a danger to other leaders), by
acting together could probably easily dispose of the
four principal Leftists, who do not command either
regular or security forces. Wang, Chen, and Chi could
probably p:revail against Hua Kuo-feng too, or against
any other group,
However, this hypothetical troika would also have
to face the problem of the morning after, justifying
their actions to the military forces they had employed
in the coup and to military forces throughout China.
They might be sufficiently persuasive to prevent a
successful armed rebellion against themselves (another
way in which a military dictatorship could come to
power)-which is the reason for regarding a coup as
more than a marginal possibility. But a coup even by
these three key figures would seem to carry a high risk
of splitting the military forces of the Peking MR,
leading to armed clashes among elements of them, in
turn risking the spread of armed conflict throughout
China to a state of anarchy or civil war. This situation
would carry the greatest risk of Soviet intervention, in
the form of support of selected elements of the armed
forces or of an outright Soviet attack. Those who are in
the best position to carry out a coup-each of whom is
on record as hard-line anti-Soviet-would probably be
unwilling to accept such risks.
Revolt oar the Regional Leaders: There has long been
speculation that the MR leaders-often called the
powerful MR leaders-might forcibly intervene in the
succession process. Such speculation has perhaps been
strengthened by the consideration that, of the several
MR commanders who seemed to be-or possibly to
be-in some degree of political trouble as of early 1975
(at least one or two of whom seemed likely not to
survive their prolonged examinations), not one has yet
fallen*-as if Mao and. other leaders were afraid to
move against any of them or were being blocked by
central military leaders. (See map, facing.)
It still seems to be the case, however, that the MR
leaders are not very powerful outside of their military
regions (and can be bypassed even within them). The
purge of several of them in the Lin Piao affair, the
mass transfer of MR commanders in 1973, the
replacement of several career military men by career
Party cadres in political officer posts, the removal of
MR commanders from their most important political
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Military Regions of China
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(and probably of main-force armies, although these
changes are riot announced)-these and other actions
have combined to return the MR leaders to what
appear to be the subordinate positions which they had
accepted without serious challenge in the years before
the Cultural Revolution and continued to accept
during the Cultural Revolution.
The MR leaders outside Peking still do not appear to
constitute a unified, purposive group. No single MR
outside Peking could possibly conduct a successful
offensive against the capital with its own resources. It
would be very difficult (although not impossible) for
the leaders of a group of MRs to conspire successfully,
and equally difficult-owing to the controls all along
the line-for them to bring their forces into action.
There is still the marginal possibility of the use of
bombers or missiles located in the various MRs being
used against Peking. But the probability remains that
the command-and-control system is secure, and it is
hard to see `.Show such weapons could be employed
effectively in any case.
There also' remains the possibility of Soviet material
support for a key MR (e.g., Shenyang) or a group of
MRs, giving. those forces the capability for sustained
operations which they do not now have, but this does
not seem a serious possibility unless armed conflict in
Peking itself spreads throughout China to a situation
approaching that of civil war, and some elements of
the contending forces make known to Moscow that
they support a reconciliation with the USSR.
Further, having come through the public
demonstrations that surrounded the mass mourning for
Chou En-lai and the changes in the leadership (at
which time every MR lined up to proclaim its support
of the changes), the central leadership is not likely to
let any political campaign-e,g., the continuing anti-
Teng campaign-get so out of control as to make it
necessary to return the military to political power
throughout China. Neither is Peking likely to alarm
the MR leaders by threatening a large-scale purge of
them.
It still seems true that only the leaders of the Peking
MR (discussed above in connection with a possible
coup) have substantial capability to affect the shape of
the succession, either by making their weight
felt-without actual intervention-on the side of a
contender or group of contenders or by sending their
forces into action. To do the latter would, as noted
above, incur substantial risk.
Thus it still seems true, as it did in early 1975,* that
the best course for the regional leaders in the period in
which the succession is being shaped, and the course
which most if not all of them are likely to follow, is to
be passive, accepting whatever arrangements are
worked out in Peking (just as they did in April). If they
do refrain from attempting to interfere (simply voting
or counselling as individuals when invited to do so),
they are likely to continue to be substantially
represented in the new Politburo, to have greater
influence in the Politburo than they have thus far had,
and, in most cases, to retain their present posts and
powers-a better situation, in many respects, than to
be caught up in the hazardous infighting in Peking.
A Soviet Military Attack: Some observers have long
believed that a Soviet attack on China at the time of
Mao's death is a strong possibility, a possibility
presumably enhanced by the Soviet observation in
recent months that the leadership has failed to
maintain its "unity and stability" and by the sound
conclusion that it will not magically become unified
by Mao's death. There is evidence that the Chinese
themselves genuinely fear the possibility of a Soviet
attack at that time.
A case can be made for it: essentially, that the
Russians have believed for years that the largest
reservoir of pro-Soviet sentiment (or perhaps more
precisely, of the least strong anti-Soviet sentiment) is to
be found in the Chinese military; that some Chinese
military leaders may intervene in the succession
process in order to prevent the accession to power of
the Leftist (and most anti-Soviet) group; and that
those leaders would be willing to undertake joint
operations with Soviet forces. In this connection, a
possibly disaffected military leader, Li Te-sheng,
removed from his post as a Vice-Chairman of the Party
in January 1975 and severely criticized before and
after, is still the Commander of the Shenyang MR, the
Northeast area through which a Soviet ground attack
would presumably come (as it did in 1945, against
Japanese forces there), With or without Li Te-sheng
(who is still a Politburo member, and would probably
The problem was considered then in OPH 203-75, "China's
Regional and Provincial Leaders: Roles in the Succession."
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not care to exchange his high position for permanent
status as a traitor, another Lin Piao), there is no doubt
that Soviet forces could drive deep into the Northeast
and force the Chinese back into their last recourse of
"people's war."
In 1969, when the level of Chinese provocation on
the Sino-Soviet border was high, the Russians did
indeed encourage, both publicly and privately, the
view that they might attack China, by a nuclear strike
or conventional means or both, and the Chinese were
clearly alarmed by this. Moreover, in the years since,
Soviet spokesmen have occasionally indicated that
present Soviet policy toward China is the "softest"
possible, that there are forces in the Soviet leadership
which favor a much harsher policy, forces held in
check by Brezhnev's sober coalition. But since 1969 the
Chinese generally have refrained from military
provocation, and the Russians have repeatedly
disclaimed, again both publicly and privately, any
intention to strike the Chinese in the absence of such
provocation. It seems virtually certain that, at the time
of the succession, the Chinese (who showed their
alertness to the problem during the leadership changes
in April) will take care not to offer any military
provocation to the USSR, any case for the "hawks" in
the Soviet leadership (who probably really do exist,
and who probably do figure in Chinese calculations).
The Soviet disclaimers can probably be accepted.
There are sound military and political reasons for not
attacking China at any time: e.g., the probability of
bogging down huge forces for years in a land action,
the stigma of first use of nuclear weapons and the
inability of such weapons to distinguish between
friends and enemies, the Chinese capability of a
(limited) nuclear counter-strike, the impossibility of
successful occupation of China for a prolonged period,
the importance of not "freezing" Chinese hostility for
decades or centuries to come, and so on.
There are additional reasons for not intervening at
the time of the succession: the possibility that a Soviet
attack, far from increasing whatever disunity existed in
the Chinese leadership, would draw the Chinese
leaders together to act against what they would see as
the worst of all situations, subordination to the USSR;
their own ignorance of the Chinese leadership, their
lack of evidence as to which Chinese leaders-the anti-
Mao "patriots" they have spoken of-they might
effectively intervene on behalf of (they seem genuinely
not to know which of the current leaders, if elevated to
supreme power by Soviet arms, might turn out to be
reliably pro-Soviet-in the qualified sense that, say,
Peng Te-huai was); and the lack of assurance, even if
they see some combination of central and regional
military leaders rising up against the civilian leaders at
the time of the succession, that the group would be
able to survive or if in power would be pro-Soviet. *
As previously suggested, a state of civil war in China
might seriously tempt the USSR to extend support to
the most promising contenders, and this argument
holds for the possibility of a Soviet attack as well. A
Soviet attack seems most likely-that is, least
unlikely-if military as well as political power is
fragmented throughout China, so that Soviet military
intervention would not appear so nakedly to be
undertaken against "China." One good reason for
regarding the possibility of a Soviet attack as marginal
is that there seems only a marginal possibility that the
Chinese leadership-however disunited and
contentious-will allow the situation to deteriorate to
a condition of civil war.
Beyond this, the strongest reason for refraining from
military intervention is that, with Mao's death, the
Russians will have a qualitatively new situation to
exploit, without incurring any stigma or risk. Their
most implacable enemy will have departed, and the
successor group is bound to feel insecure, more
vulnerable to Soviet political initiatives. There are
surely advantages to the Russians in reducing Chinese
hostility if possible. The sensible course for the
Russians, and the one that they are expected to follow,
before, during, and at least for a time after the
succession, will be to talk, not fight.
No Commanding Figure or Faction: Assuming,
then, that the three key figures of the physical security
apparatus do not attempt a coup in the hours
surrounding Mao's death, that there is no revolt by the
MR leaders, and that there is no Soviet attack, Mao's
successors-even if they have been working reasonably
well as a "collective" during the period of Mao's
*For a careful examination of Chinese leaders in terms of possible
softness toward the USSR, see PR 76 10046, "Sino-Soviet Detente? The
Views of China's Leaders."
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deterioration-will still face a serious problem in
distributing power among themselves in the
immediate post-Mao period.
First, will there be any single commanding figure?
That is, is there any one of the successors to whom the
others would "naturally" be expected to turn for
leadership?
If Chou En-lai were still alive and well, Chou would
probably be that man, for most of the leadership (all
but the hard Leftists); and, if he had lasted, Teng
Hsiao-ping might conceivably have been in Chou's
position. In their absence, no one seems to stand out,
as having been a national-level leader for many years,
as commanding great respect for his demonstrated
achievements over the range of a leader's concern, and
as being at the same time vigorous and vital,
projecting the image of the new China.
It is easier to eliminate candidates than to choose
one. Of the current Vice-Chairmen, Wang Hung-wen
is too young and unproven, leaving Hua Kuo-feng (the
present First Vice-Chairman) and Yeh Chien-ying,
who, although old and infirm and almost entirely a
military man, can be regarded as a marginal candidate
owing to his general popularity and to his prestige as
the last of the Old Guard still active in the inner circle.
(See photograph.) Of the other Leftists (besides
Wang), Chiang Ching is female and is probably
disliked by most other Party leaders, and Yao Wen-
yuan is both young and unpopular and has been only
a propagandist, leaving only Chang Chun-chiao of
this group. Of the other Rightists (besides Yeh), Li
Hsien-nien is also old and infirm, and Chiao Kuan-
hua has not really been a leader, simply a specialist in
foreign affairs-leaving only Yeh in this group. Of the
other Centrists (besides Hua), Chi Teng-kuei is
probably not well enough known, and Wu Te has not
indicated a capacity for much greater responsibility
than his present role in managing the affairs of the
Peking municipality-leaving only Hua Kuo-feng as
above. Of the two unclassifiable or "wild card"
leaders, Wang Tung-hsing has been a very narrow
security specialist, leaving only Chen Hsi-lien, a career
military man, of this group, *
*"Wild card" is a term used herein for a leader whose record does
not permit him to be classified with any confidence as Left, Center,
or Right, but whose power is such that his support would be of great
value to the classifiable leaders who in general seem to be better
candidates for the top Party posts.
Of these four putative candidates-Hua, Yeh,
Chang, and Chen, in order of current rank-to assume
the Chairmanship immediately upon or very soon after
Mao's death, assuming that Party leaders feel a need
for another Chairman so soon, Hua Kuo-feng would
seem to have the best chance. This conclusion rests on
a judgment that most of Mao's successors, in the
immediate post-Mao period, would find it easier to
group temporarily around Mao's own choice as his
principal successor than they would around anyone
else, that Hua is better-qualified than Yeh, and that
there would be less objection to the smooth, pleasant
Hua than to either Chang or Chen.*
*The Party Constitution does not provide for a First Vice-
Chairman (a post which did not exist when it was written) to succeed
to the Chairmanship automatically. It specifies instead that a
plenary session of the Central Committee must elect the Chairman
and other Party officers. But a decision by the "Central Committee"
can be made very rapidly if necessary-as witness Hua's own
appointment within two days of the Tienanmen rioting. Presumably
the matter would come to a vote in the Politburo. In an honest (i.e.,
uncoerced) balloting, the four demonstrable Leftists would
constitute a small minority of the 16 full (voting) members, almost
certainly unable to attract enough supporters from the other 12 to
put their own man in the Chairmanship. In the unlikely event that
both of the "wild cards" could be played by the Leftists-a credible
threat of coordinated intervention on their behalf by military and
security forces-sufficient "votes" might follow. In any event, the
immediate distribution of power seems likely to depend heavily on
the perception of the voters as to which contenders for high position
have what degree of military/security support.
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Actually there seems a fair possibility that the Party
will retire the post of Chairman. Mao has made even
the post so awesome, the very word "Chairman" so
inseparable from himself at the national level, that it
may be retired out of respect for him. If so, presumably
all of the Vice-Chairmanships would disappearat the
same time, leaving Hua Kuo-feng with only the
Premier's post and putting him on a collision course
with Chang Chun-chiao for the Secretary-General's
post, which would then be the Party's most important
position.
There seems a stronger possibility that the Party will
operate for a. time, perhaps a prolonged period,
without a Chairman, because, for the above reasons,
no Party leader would feel comfortable in the post; but
that the post itself will not be retired.* Hua could
presumably remain First Vice-Chairman under such
circumstances, and the de facto leader of the Party,
much as the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) for
years has been run by its senior Vice-Chairman. There
would seem at a minimum a need for some one leader
to be recognized as the senior figure, the man to
convene the meetings (e.g., Politburo Standing
Committee) necessary to convene other Party meetings
(full Politburo, expanded Politburo, Central
*The Chinese could of course finesse the problem of a
"Chairman" by redesignating the topmost post as that of General
Secretary or First Secretary, but that would eliminate the post of
Secretary-General, leaving Hua and Chang still on collision course.
Committee) in turn necessary to work out the
distribution of power and to put the Central
Committee's seal of approval on it, even if that man
could not expect-as he could not-to dominate such
meetings. To recognize the designated First Vice-
Chairman, Hua, as that man would seem the least
disruptive course.
It would seem to make the best sense to name a new
Chairman, after a suitable period of mourning in
which Hua is recognized as the de facto Chairman.
The Chairman's post would then be balanced by the
Secretary-General's post, permitting both Hua and
Chang to occupy key Party posts and thus allowing
them to divide the power. Whatever the arrangement,
no individual-Hua, Chang, or whoever-would be
able to dominate the Party as Mao had.
If there is no single commanding figure, neither does
there seem to be the prospect of any one commanding
faction.
The Leftists do not appear to have the
organizational strength. Chang Chun-chiao is the
strongest figure in that group, but in recent years the
Secretary-General's post has not seemed to be anything
like as powerful as it once was (under Teng Hsiao-
ping) and Chang does not seem to have a firm grip on
the General Political Department (GPD), a grip
maintained through his own proteges which would
MADAME MAO (Chiang Ching)
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ensure its obedience to him in a Party crisis.* Wang
Hung-wen may still be a Vice-Chairman of the MAC
(as well as of the Party), but can act only with the
consent of other MAC officers. Madame Mao has no
power apart from Mao, and is simply a name to be
exploited. Yao Wen-yuan has only some part of the
propaganda apparatus, the equivalent of the old
Propaganda Department. (See photograph.) In sum,
the only way in which this group could take power
would be in an alliance with opportunistic military
leaders, who, first, would seem to have no good reason
to ally with them, and, second, would dominate any
such alliance (just as they would in a coup). It would
not be surprising to see some members of this Leftist
group excluded from the leadership after Mao's
death. **
The strength of the Rightists is probably
concentrated in the military leaders-demonstrably in
Yoh Chien-ying, who although old. and ailing will
FOUR STRONG MEN: Chang Chun-chiao, Wang
Tung-hsing, Hua Kuo-feng, Chen Hsi-lien
probably be a key figure in the immediate post-Mao
period, much as he was used to rally the military in the
Lin Piao affair; and just possibly in Chen Hsi-lien,
whose background and associations would seem to
place him with the Rightists but who probably has to
be regarded as Unclassified, i.e., as a "wild card" who
might play himself in support of another leader at
almost any point in the spectrum. The good will of the
military will be extremely important to the non-
military leaders, some of whom may be able to play
military cards, but they will probably seek to avoid
bringing the military into military action (the cards
can be played simply by being shown in Politburo
voting, or perhaps even by bluffing, by making a
credible claim of support by military and security
elements not directly represented in the Politburo
meetings). While an effort by the military itself to
impose a military dictatorship is of course conceivable,
any military intervention seems more likely to be on
behalf of whatever group of leaders whom the
military-meaning that portion of the military in a
position to intervene-believes to be best-disposed
toward themselves. On the record, this group would
certainly seem to be some combination of the Center
and the Right, not the Left.*
The strength of the Centrists is spread throughout
the Party apparatus, the government machinery, and
the security forces. But the group does not include
military leaders in the sense of career military men,
unless the "wild card" Chen Hsi-lien has already
pledged his allegiance to it. This group appears to be
in the same position vis-a-vis the military as the
military are toward it: that is, they seem to need each
other, neither as a group has both the military strength
and the managerial skills to enable it to dominate and
govern by itself.
The two Unclassified or "wild card" leaders, Chen
Hsi-lien and Wang Tung-hsing, constitute a
significant group with just the two of them, by virtue
of their control of military and security forces which
can take swift action in crises. But they do not make a
strong enough pair to dominate, by themselves, the
*Some observers conjecture that the Leftists control the militia,
and that the Left could employ it effectively as a counter. The bulk
of the evidence to date seems to indicate that both propositions are
mistaken: that military men in general handle the militia's affairs
(including supply of weapons), and that in almost any given area the
militia would be no match for the PLA.
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post-Mao situation; they too would have to act in
combination with key figures of other groups. * If both
Chen and Wang are truly "wild cards," acting
purposively together they would be a formidable
combination, perhaps able to be the "king-makers" for
any group of contenders of their choice; and
separately, working for different contending groups,
they might plunge the leadership into chaos.
Unfortunately, there is no solid information on the
state of their relationships with each other or with any
other Party leader except Mao himself.**
There.seems only one sense in which the immediate
post-Mao leadership can be regarded as likely to be
dominated by a small group. This would be some
combination of the strongest figures of the Center,
Left, Right, and Unclassified: namely, Hua Kuo-feng
and Chi Teng-kuei of the Center; Chang Chun-chiao
of the Left; Yeh Chien-ying of the Right; and Chen
Hsi-lien and Wang Tung-hsing of the "wild cards."
Most observers would add a seventh figure, Wang
Hung-wen of the Left, and some would substitute or
add another, the PLA's Chief-of-Staff when one is
named, a probable Rightist (like the present acting
chief).
Further, little is known of the personal character of
these conjectured key figures. The distribution of
power would seem to depend heavily upon this factor
as well as upon perceptions of one another's strengths:
specifically, whether all or most of them would prove
able to subordinate their serious differences with
others, and their personal ambitions, to the general
good, the appearance of stability and of national
purpose. Perhaps they will prove unable to do so, even
temporarily. On balance, however, it seems likely that
most of the key figures, acting from a sense of national
interest, will be able to agree upon some form of
"collective" leadership, one which, at least for a time,
will conceal the extent of their differences and the
degree of tension among them.
A Possible Equitable Distribution: There are serious
observers of the Chinese scene who contend that any
*Wang might be sub-classified as a very special kind of card, one
permanently affixed to the Mao-card and to be discarded with it.
But on balance, this seems doubtful.
**There is some reason to believe that Chen has pleasant
relationships with both Hua Kuo-feng and Chang Chun-chiao,
which would he only prudent for all three; Wang has been entirely
Mao's man.
speculation as to the shape of the post-Mao leadership
is simply a waste of time, as too little can be set forth
with sufficient confidence to be of value to the reader.
Nevertheless, the effort must be made, if only because
some constellations seem more likely than others.
It has already been conceded that there are several
serious contingencies in any assessment of the post-
Mao situation: e.g., (a) that Mao will change his mind
again and will once more upset the arrangements for
the succession which he has made (this was always the
principal contingency in calculating Teng Hsiao-
ping's status, and, in the event, was the main factor);
(b) that there will be a successful coup, perhaps led by
key figures of the physical security apparatus; (c) that
any such coup will be overturned by some
combination of military forces in the Peking area,
resulting in a de facto military dictatorship or armed
conflict; (d) that main-force armies in other military
regions will revolt against the national leadership (or
lack of it) and plunge China into something like a civil
war; (e) that the USSR will intervene, either in the
form of supporting certain Chinese military forces or in
the form of an attack on China by Soviet forces; and
(f) that Chinese leaders are so divided and hostile that
they will not care about an appearance of stability and
will immediately engage in an all-out struggle for
power upon Mao's death.
If each of those six contingencies is arbitrarily
assigned some substantial chance of coming to pass
(the first three the highest, the other three the lowest),
then the odds might already be almost even that some
one of them will occur (even if the particular
one cannot be foreseen), and the odds may therefore
not be much better than even that anything very
useful can be said about the shape of the post-Mao
leadership in terms of particular leaders. If other, more
remote contingencies are added (e.g., the assassination
of Mao by a member of his personal staff or medical
team, the sudden death of one or more of the principal
actors in the succession, a Soviet attack or a Sino-
Soviet reconciliation before Mao's departure, the
revolt of the masses throughout China), then the odds
might fall to less than even. So it seems best to offer a
brief conjecture, to emphasize that this conjecture is
highly conjectural, and to warn earnestly against
betting heavily on it as a probable outcome.
The most reasonable-seeming distribution of power
in the most important posts, on present evidence, looks
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POLITBURO
Hua Kuo-feng, dejure
Standing Committee
or ide facto Chairman
Vice-Chairman
Yeh Chien-ying,
Vice-Chairman
Chang Chun-chiao,
Vice-Chairman?
Wang Hung-wen,
Wang Tung-hsing
IMMEDIATE POST-MAO PERIOD
(Highly Conjectural)
Secretary-General?
Generalist
Organizational Work
Political Security
to be something like the following (although what
looks reasonable to Western observers may not look
reasonable to the Chinese themselves)*:
-Hua Kuo-feng as Party Chairman, and perhaps
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
concurrently (as the Party Constitution now
provides), although there seems a good chance that
the Constitution will be changed in order to avoid
such a concentration of power in one man's hands, a
precaution to avoid "another Mao"; or to be
Secretary-General if the post of Chairman is retired.
-Chang Chun-chiao as the (continuing) de facto
or (newly-proclaimed) de jure Secretary-General of
the Party (if Hua is to be Chairman), the Party post
-rhe writer apologizes for introducing so many contingencies
even into his "reasonable" hypothetical distribution of power, but
sees no way to avoid this without misleading the reader as to our
state of knowledge.
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Military Affairs
Committee State Council
Chairman or Premier (if no
Standing Ctte leading Party post)
Standing Ctte? Premier?
Chairman or
de facto Chairman
Standing Ctte?
Vice-Chairman? Vice-Premier;
Commander, Peking MR
Standing Ctte? Premier or Vice-Premier;
1st PolOff, Peking MR
Standing Ctte?
next in importance to that of Chairman; with the
possibility that Wang Hung-wen will be retained in
the leadership as Chang's deputy, although with
much less power.
-Yeh Chien-ying and Chen Hsi-lien as the de
facto heads of the MAC, either with Hua as the de
jure Chairman if the Constitution is unchanged or
with one of the two (probably Yeh, first) moving up
to Chairman if the Constitution is changed, with
Yeh remaining Minister of Defense and with Chen
retaining the critically important post of
commander of the Peking MR.
-Hua Kuo-feng to continue
concurrently if he does not occupy the post of MAC
Chairman concurrently with that of Party
Chairman, or if the post of Party Chairman is
retired; or Chang Chun-chiao to be Premier
concurrently with his Secretary-General's post if
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Hua becomes both Party Chairman and MAC
Chairman (thus ranking Chang in the two most
important hierarchies).
-Chi Teng-kuei as Premier if Hua is both Party
Chairman and MAC Chairman and wishes to
prevent-and has enough support to prevent-
Chang Chun-chiao from being both Premier and
Secretary-General, or if in the absence of a
Chairmanship Chang loses the contention for the
Secretary-General's post and is not offered the post
of Premier; and Chi in any case to have the
responsibility for supervising the Party's
organizational work, probably remaining First
Political Officer of the Peking MR as well.
-Wang Tung-hsing to continue as the director of
the Party's central political security department and
of the Central Committee's General Office, inter
alia continuing to supervise the security forces that
protect the Party leaders.
-Chiao Kuan-hua, the Chou En-lai protege who
is clearly the best-qualified man for the job, to
continue as Foreign Minister.
Some such arrangements would provide the
smoothest possible transition from the currently-
existing situation and, on the assumption that Hua
and Chang are not forced to compete for the Secretary-
General's post, would reduce the possibility that any
one of the seriously disruptive scenarios will in fact
occur. Secondary arrangements might reasonably
include:
-The naming of most of the above-cited primary
leaders below Hua's level as Vice-Chairmen of the
Party and as the core of the Politburo's Standing
Committee and the naming of at least one of the
three lesser Leftists (Wang Hung-wen, Madame
Mao, Yao Wen-yuan) to the Standing Committee as
well;
-And the confirmation (re-election) of most
members of the current Politburo, moving up one or
two of the alternates who symbolize important
groups (women, minorities, labor), adding a few key
figures. from the many to choose among in the
structures of power and the governmental
machinery (e.g., a new Chief-of-Staff, a new
Minister of Public Security, the head of the State
Planning Commission, two or three promising
provincial-level figures such as half of the above-
named leaders themselves were until the 1970s).
The contingencies which probably deserve
emphasis, in offering one of these configurations as a
moderately credible one for the immediate post-Mao
period, seem to be the following:
-That Mao before he dies will choose to do and
will prove able to do what he pointedly did not do in
naming Hua Kuo-feng First Vice-Chairman and
Premier, i.e., to strengthen the Left organizationally
at the expense of the Center and Right, in which
case we might see Chang Chun-chiao in a position
to be installed as Party Chairman (or as Secretary-
General in the absence of a Chairman) with the
support of leftist or opportunist military leaders,
with Wang Hung-wen moved up to become the
Party's Secretary-General and with both Madame
Mao and Yao Wen-yuan added to the Politburo's
Standing Committee, and Hua Kuo-feng being only
the Premier (if that);
-That Chen Hsi-lien will be perceived by other
leaders, either before or after Mao's death, as
potentially too powerful and ambitious, and that
arrangements will be made to ease him out, in favor
of some other military leader who would not have a
strong personal following in the Peking MR and
would be perceived as more docile;
-That Wang Tung-hsing will similarly be
regarded by other leaders as potentially too
dangerous to all of them, with his control of the
most sensitive personnel records (including records
of positions taken at Party meetings) and his control
of the bodyguard forces which constitute the
innermost ring of security, that some part of the
security apparatus will be successfully used against
Wang in somewhat the same way that Beriya was
taken, and that Hua (or whoever) will be able to
place his own man (as Mao has done for so long) in
the critically important post of director of the
political security apparatus; and
-That Wang Hung-wen (who has probably
made himself an adversary of the military) will be
seen by other leaders as thinking of himself as
"another Mao," and that they will act together
against him, excluding him entirely from the
leadership.
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But none of these possibilities seems strong enough
to shake the judgment that one of the configurations
outlined earlier is the best possibility for the general
shape of the immediate post-Mao leadership.
If that is a more-or-less accurate picture, then, this
would be a "collective" dominated in fact by a
coalition of career Party cadres and career military
men, in which the strongest single figure would be the
Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, although he could not
dominate the Party in anything like the way that Mao
had done. Next in importance would probably be the
non-extreme Leftist Chang Chun-chiao, and after that
the military leaders Yeh and Chen, one a Rightist, one
a "wild card" backing the Center. At the next level of
power would be the Centrist Chi Teng-kuei and the
"wild card" Wang Tung-hsing, the latter probably,
like Chen Hsi-lien, backing the Center. The center line
in this constellation, which would dominate the
Politburo Standing Committee and would probably be
replicated (with some rearrangement) in the MAC,
would run in fact directly through the Center of the
Chinese political spectrum as now perceived-
"moderate" in Chinese terms, although still more
"revolutionary" than, say, the leadership of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But one must
reiterate another caveat here: while some such
arrangement might hold for the immediate post-Mao
period, it seems probable-owing to personal
ambition, irreconcilable differences on policy, and the
unpredictability of the "wild cards''-that it would
prove unstable over the longer run.
THREE INESCAPABLE POLICY-QUESTIONS
of conspirators and more recently used privately by
Chinese officials in the wake of Chou En-lai's death
and Teng Hsiao-ping's purge: for tyranny instead of
leadership, for placing himself above the Party, for
egomania, for refusal to share power and for blaming
others for his own mistakes, for falsifying history to
protect himself, for treachery to faithful lieutenants,
for the doctrinaire pursuit of illusory goals at immense
human cost, for indifference to the welfare of the
masses, and so on.
But most members of the inner circle of the
successors will owe their rise to high position to Mao's
campaigns of the past decade, and most in fact to
Mao's personal selection of them for preferment, and
they cannot degrade him or his "thought" in the
immediate post-Mao period without undermining
themselves while they are still insecure. Despite their
own mixed feelings, and the temptation to exploit the
negative feelings about Mao that are now probably
widespread in the Party and even in the "masses" that
have been his constituency (Lin Piao had a good case,
and there has been a marked increase in the
willingness of Chinese, both officials and common
men, to express anti-Mao sentiment in the past year,
most strikingly in the Tienanmen rioting), it seems
likely that most of the successors would agree that
continuity must be maintained. The Leftists would
certainly so contend, as otherwise they would have no
legitimacy at all, The Centrists and Rightists might
rejoice in the downfall of the Leftists, but they already
have a stronger organizational position than do the
Leftists (an advantage given them by Mao himself, as
everyone is aware), and they do not need to discredit
Mao in order to keep this advantage and if necessary
to use it.
A Centrist leadership of this kind would be expected
to take Centrist positions on three inescapable policy-
questions: the group's relationship to Mao's
"thought," the concept of "rehabilitation," and the
Sino-Soviet-American triangle.
The Relationship to Mao's "Thought": Mao's
successors must immediately define in some fashion
their relationship with the 40-plus years of Mao's
leadership of the Party, the dominance of his person
and his "thought."
The successors have the option, of course, of
denouncing and disowning Mao, in roughly the terms
of the "571" document attributed to Lin Piao's group
On the other hand, it seems most improbable that
any individual or any single group of Mao's successors
will be allowed to present himself or herself or
themselves as the guardian or guardians of Mao's
"thought." Among the current leaders, only Wang
Hung-wen and Madame Mao seem conceivably to be
inexperienced or simple-minded enough to try to do
this, an effort which if undertaken would surely fail,
whether in Party councils or in an appeal to the
"masses." Probably neither will do so, but other
leaders may nevertheless choose to get rid of
both-judging (as noted above) that Wang does
indeed think of himself as "another Mao" and that the
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very unpopular Madame Mao is not necessary for the
preservation of continuity.
Mao's posthumous immunity may not extend to
some of his "socialist new things"-e.g., the mass
study of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought (in which
the Party and populace have been saturated for years),
the three-in-one combination in which old, middle-
aged and young people are given theoretically equal
representation in leadership organs, the assignment of
millions of cadres to "May 7th" schools for productive
labor and reindoctrination, the creation and
popularization of (Madame Mao's) "revolutionary"
plays, the ?'open door" management of universities
(e.g., admission only after at least two years of labor,
continued labor while studying, direction by worker-
peasant-soldier propaganda teams), and the dispatch
of the great majority of educated youth-more than 12
million so far-to the countryside to settle perma-
nently. These policies are all controversial, and some
will probably be modified, but it would seem that this
could be done at a deliberate pace, without attacking
either the "thought" embodied in the policies or the
man himself.
In sum, Mao is of course vulnerable, and some
degrading of him in his Stalinist role will probably take
place sooner or later-perhaps within a three-year
period corresponding to that between Stalin's death
and Khrushchev's "secret" speech. But this will
probably not occur in the immediate post-Mao period.
"Rehabilitation" or Reversal: A potentially highly
disruptive issue, for the successors, is that of the
"rehabilitation"-now an accomplished fact, but one
which could be reversed-of thousands of Party
cadres, government functionaries, and military leaders
brought down in the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of
whom are probably now in important positions again
(including one member of the Politburo). Although
this has been Mao's own policy since 1967, the year
after the great purges began, an attempt to reverse it
could be linked to a defense of the Cultural Revolution
itself.
The link has in fact already been made, in the anti-
Teng campaign, with Mao leading the way. Teng has
been charged-more or less credibly-with trying to
return to the Good Old Days before the Cultural
Revolution, with denigrating the Cultural Revolution
("the present is not as good as the past"), with
attempting to reverse verdicts (inter alia, on those
condemned), and with restoring to office discredited
old cadres. There is no doubt that Teng was primarily
or partially responsible--especially during 1975-for
rehabilitating a large number of old cadres, including
many of his old associates and proteges from his years
(1954-1966) as the Party's Secretary-General.
Any attempt to repurge the "rehabilitees" en masse
would almost certainly come from the Leftists, who
played leading roles in the purges, who rose at the
expense of those purged, who felt threatened
themselves by the return of such figures as Teng, and
who would like to open up all those jobs for the young
people who constitute their putative following (Wang
Hung-wen has reportedly said this frankly, with respect
to senior military positions held in part by
rehabilitees). But Chang Chun-chiao, the most
strongly-based and apparently least extreme Leftist,
has himself been associated with the policy of
rehabilitation, and even if the Leftists were to act as a
group they would on this issue as on others be
outgunned. Hua Kuo-feng, Chi Teng-kuei, and Wang
Tung-hsing have all strongly associated themselves
with the rehabilitation policy, and also, owing to their
organizational positions, have probably played large
roles in effecting the rehabilitations. The latter is
almost certainly also true of the leading military men
like Yeh Chien-ying and Chen Hsi-lien, who have
helped to restore their old comrades (excluding the
conspirators of the Lin Piao affair) throughout the
military establishment and might be expected (Yeh
certainly, Chen probably) to resist any attempt to
change the current professionalism and conservative
cast of the upper levels of the armed forces. *
There is the outside possibility that the Leftists-or
some of them-will attempt to bypass the rest of the
Party leadership and appeal directly to the masses,
much as Mao did in the Cultural Revolution. This
would be a call to complete the Cultural Revolution,
or to carry out another Cultural Revolution (Mao
himself is the authority for the dictum that further
Cultural Revolutions will be necessary periodically),
and this time to sweep out all of the hidden supporters
of Teng Hsiao-ping, meaning in effect the great
majority of the rehabilitees.
*For a thorough survey of the character of the central leadership
organs of the PLA, see PR 76 10048 and PR 76 10058J, "The
Reconstruction of the Chinese Central Military Leadership."
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o ao s e tnl lve y p
determined by the masses. That is, a contender for To make 25X1
high position who regards his prospects as otherwise such a threat would probably leatote downfall of
poor could argue with some justification that the those who had made it.
It is even conceivable that the Leftists will contend control of the Party apparatus, is an internal threat
that the shape of the succession itself-in the absence that almost all members of the inner circle-includin
f M d f' t' 1 -ex ressed will-should be Chan -are probably determined to eliminate.II
concept of the Cultural Revolution is the essence or
culmination of Mao's "thought" (the highest form of
"struggle"), and that the masses should therefore be
given the opportunity to select those who will protect
and preserve his "thought." (The likeliest carriers of
this particular virulence look to be Wang Hung-wen
and Yao Wen-yuan, who owe their rise wholly to the
Cultural Revolution and who might believe that they
have a strong base of support in the young.)
But the problem for any such challenger-on either
the issue of "rehabilitation" or the issue of the entire
configuration of the succession-seems obvious: that
the impetus for another Cultural Revolution could
come only from a leader who was already in possession
of something like Mao's power (otherwise, the Party
already faithfully represents the masses), who could
use the masses as a weapon against those unresponsive
to himself personally as the embodiment of truth, and
who among other things could completely control the
propaganda apparatus employed to rouse the masses.
There is no Leftist on the current scene who has
anything like Mao's charisma, who could send the
masses out into the streets on his or her behalf.
Although two prominent Leftists, Chang and Yao, do
seem to have the largest roles in directing the
propaganda apparatus for Mao now, there is no way
they can expect to keep these positions against the
wishes of other Party leaders after Mao's death unless
they also control the military establishment, and there
seems virtually no prospect of that. Chang's GPD does
not control the armed forces, it works for those who
control them; while the GPD is a vital organ, and
Chang might be able to use the GPD to support his
own or another's candidacy for high position
(redirecting the PLA's loyalty from Mao to someone
else, even himself), in itself it seems clearly to be an
insufficient vehicle for "king-making," and Chang
himself needs the good will of the senior military men
who appear to dominate the MAC, of which the GPD
is the instrument.
In sum, the prospect of another Cultural
Revolution, another mass campaign outside the
The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle: Another
inescapable issue for Mao's successors in the
immediate post-Mao period-as inescapable as that of
defining their relationship to Mao himself-is that of
the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet-American
triangle.* This is true not only because Peking's policy
toward the USSR-and consequently its policy toward
the US-has been so closely identified with Mao's
personal intransigence toward the Soviets and his
personal advocacy of the opening to the US, so that a
qualitatively new situation will arise with his death,
but because Moscow will not allow the successors to
escape the issue. That is, with the menacing presence
of half a million Soviet troops on the border as an
incentive to Peking to negotiate, the Russians will
almost certainly renew overtures to the Chinese for an
improvement in relations, beginning with a border
settlement,
Almost all of those expected to be key figures in the
succession have put themselves repeatedly on record as
hard-line anti-Soviet, and in recent months, following
the changes in the leadership, Chinese leaders have
been at pains to reaffirm that their fundamental
foreign policies-meaning those since 1969, when the
USSR officially became the "main enemy" and the US
began to emerge as a potential tacit ally against the
USSR-will not change. But these leaders have had no
choice, because Mao has continued to dominate the
Party and has shown himself to be willing and able to
continue to purge it, and any sign of a resolution less
firm than Mao's would have served to remove the
offender from leadership. (That was not, however, the
reason for Teng Hsiao-ping's purge.)
It has never been credible, a priori, that every
member of a group as large as the Chinese leadership
would feel the same degree of hostility to the USSR
that Mao has felt; or even that every member of the
insights he has drawn from their studies, PR 76 10006C, "The Chances
of Sino-Soviet Reconciliation after Mao's Death," and PR 76
10052C, "The Foreign Policies of China's Successor Leadership."
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topmost group of successors-the inner circle of a
dozen or so-would feel so. Moreover, it has long
seemed likely, in the nature of the case, even if every
key figure of the succession were fully as hostile to the
USSR as Mao has been, that considerations of national
interest would lead to some sentiment among Mao's
successors for an easing of the tension. Further, it has
long seemed possible that some group in the successor
leadership would try to exploit the Sino-Soviet-
American issue for factional advantage, perhaps
irrespective of its genuine views; just as Lin Piao
opposed an improvement in relations with the US in
part because his main rival for influence with Mao,
Chou En-lai, favored such an improvement (and vice
versa), so the Leftists and Rightists in China after
Mao's death, although no longer competing for
influence with Mao, might manipulate the issue
against each other. The intelligence problems here
have been to identify the "soft" figures (least hostile to
the USSR) in the leadership, to calculate their weight
in the succession, to determine how far they (or other
leaders for other reasons) would be willing to go in
order to ease tensions, and to assess the value of the
Sino-Soviet-American issue as a counter in factional
politics.
There seems virtually no chance of a radical change
in Chinese policy toward either the USSR or the US in
the months following Mao's death. Just as they cannot
repudiate Mao personally and the concept of his
"thought" in general in the immediate post-Mao
period without undermining themselves, so they
cannot radically alter these particular policies without
repudiating Mao. The anti-Soviet policy has been at
the center of almost all of Mao's policies-meaning
the policies of the Party as a whole- for more than a
decade, even prior to the Cultural Revolution, and in
recent years the (sharply qualified) pro-American
policy has been a function of that policy; to repudiate
that policy would thus bring into question'the entire
fabric of Chinese policy. This would be true regardless
of whether the immediate post-Mao succession were to
be dominated by the Left, the Center, or the Right.
However, ithere is some room for a very limited
easing of the tension with the Soviets in the immediate
post-Mao period, without giving the appearance of
repudiating Mao himself, And the incentive will be
greater than it has been; that is, those Soviet troops
along the border will be worth something psychologi-
cally to Moscow at the time of the succession, as
Chinese fears of a Soviet attack at that time will (as the
Chinese themselves have indicated) have increased.
Although the Chinese cannot be expected to take the
initiative to send a delegation to Moscow soon after
Mao's death (a repudiation of Mao, a humiliation for
themselves), it is conceivable that they would agree to
a "summit" meeting in Peking, and in any case the
border issue is not in fact central to the overall struggle
against Soviet "social-imperialism." The Chinese
could recognize this by quietly withdrawing their
demand for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the
border as a precondition for beginning serious talks
(just as the Russians could quietly withdraw some part
of the troops as a gesture of good faith), While the
prospects for an early settlement of the border issue are
small (the Chinese would have to agree to
compensation for, rather than gain possession of, a
disputed river island), a modest compromise on the
matter of troop withdrawal would help to insure the
Chinese against the possibility that these troops would
actually be used.*
Over the longer run, the situation looks more
complicated. Ironically, the group likely to be the most
uncompromisingly anti-Soviet, the Leftists, is likely
also to be the most firmly anti-American, while the
groups likely to be least anti-American, the Centrists
and the Rightists, are likely also to be the least harshly
anti-Soviet (although still clearly anti-Soviet).
The Russians themselves have regarded the
Leftists-specifying Madame Mao and the three
"Shanghai radicals" Chang Chun-chiao, Wang
Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan-as the hard core of
intransigent hostility to the USSR in the anticipated
successor leadership, because the members of this
group have seemed genuinely to share Mao's view of
the need to persist in the struggle against "revisionism"
on all fronts. On the other hand, although associating
themselves nominally with the opening to the US
while Mao lives, ll
but Chang have seemed to suggest a blind ideological
adherence to orthodox, fundamentalist, "revolution-
ary" attitudes which call for as great hostility toward
the US as toward the USSR-essentially a policy of
*The Chinese would probably expect a limited easing of tension
with the USSR to have the additional advantage of concerning the
US, thus inducing the US to move more rapidly toward
"normalization" of relations with Peking,
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equidistance from two absolute enemies (the policy
favored by the "ultra-Leftist" Lin Piao), regardless of
the strategic situation and considerations of national
interest.
The Russians entertained no hopes of Teng Hsiao-
ping (who had been as intransigently anti-Soviet for
many years as Mao could possibly have wished), but
they were quick to express some hope for Hua Kuo-
feng, of whose record of anti-Soviet pronouncements
the appeared to be unaware
Presuma y Hua s pu IT an priva e
remarks in recent months have reduced if not
extinguished those hopes, and the Russians have no
ground for more than minimal hopes from others of
the conjectured Centrist group. But, as earlier
suggested, the Russians have had hope for years from
elements of the Right, and in particular from Chinese
military leaders, even though they have seemed
genuinely unable to identify-since 1959-the pro-
Soviet or the least anti-Soviet individuals in the
military. The hope was stimulated by the Peng Te-
huai affair of 1959, in which Defense Minister Peng
frankly advocated an improvement in relations with
the USSR, was fed by the Lin Piao affair of 1971
(which implied that there were other "closet" anti-
Maoists in the Chinese military leadership), and has
been watered in recent years by certain features of the
anti-Confucian campaign of 1974, the "Water
Margin" campaign of 1975, and the anti-Teng
campaign of 1976-in all of which the regime's
propaganda has reflected Mao's continuing fear that
he has not managed to extinguish pro-Soviet feeling
(or anti-anti-Soviet feeling) in China, especially
among the military. The Russians are probably right in
believing that for whatever combination of
reasons-pro-Soviet feeling, fear of the USSR,
considerations of national or professional or factional
interest-there are important elements of the
professional military who do favor a substantial
improvement in relations with the USSR (even though
we too are unable to identify individuals as more than
possibly feeling this way).
It follows, then, that the happiest outcome for the
Russians would probably be domination of the
successor leadership by a Rightist faction in which the
military would have a strong voice. * This outcome is
unlikely, but the next best outcome, for Moscow,
would seem to he the accession to dominance of a
coalition of career Party cadres and career military
men, on a Centrist balance, in which the military
would also have a strong voice, inasmuch as the career
Party cadres would depend for their survival upon
retaining the military's good will. And this seems the
most likely outcome, the arrangement with the best
chance of c
i
t
om
ng
o pass, even though it seems little
more than an even-money bet.
One variation of the `military dictatorship' scenario
would be very awkward for the Russians to deal with.
That would be an alliance between the Leftists and
opportunistic military leaders, if the latter were to
include Chen Hsi-lien and his personal following in
the strategic Peking MR. That improbable union
would coalesce those believed to be most anti-Soviet
on one hand and least anti-Soviet on the other. The
military would be expected to dominate the alliance,
but the civilians might be formulating and carrying
out its foreign policy. Perhaps fortunately for almost
everyone, that scenario seems to have small chance of
coming to pass,
There does not seem to be any possible constellation
of successors to Mao which would wish to restore the
Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-1953, returning the US to
its place as the main enemy of both. The worst that the
US has to fear is a Chinese policy of equidistance. * *
The probability-because the prospect of either Leftist
domination or a Leftist-military alliance is small-is
that the USSR will remain the "main enemy," and
that Mao's successors will continue to explore the
possibility of effectively employing the US
strategic counterweight to the USSR.
The Sino-Soviet-American triangle can of course
become an issue in factional politics, between those
who genuinely favor (or would pretend to favor) a
policy of equidistance, and those who genuinely favor
*Russian officials sometimes express a sardonic hope that the
Leftists will triumph and will then mismanage China into a state of
collapse, but this does not seem to be their genuine calculation.
**This is believed to be the policy-preference of the Leftists, but it
would not be a net gain for the US$R, as the Leftists would be less
inclined to improve relations with the USSR than would other
factions or groupings. I.e., `what you make in St. Louis you lose in
Detroit.'
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(or would pretend to favor) the greatest degree of
improvement: in relations with the USSR. Although the
former group would be expected to argue mainly on
ideological grounds for a withdrawal from the US
connection (the equal threats to the True Doctrine
from "imperialism" and "social-imperialism" ), the
two groups could employ similar pragmatic arguments
to justify their opposed positions-arguments which
have surfaced from time to time in various
pronouncements and commentaries directed to
different audiences. These would be:
-that for many years, the determination of the
US to resist Soviet advances has been declining;
-that partly because of this, there has been a
shift in the military balance of power in favor of the
USSR, a shift which further erodes the US will to
resist;
-that in consequence, the US is betting heavily
on the success of "detente" with the USSR, a
detente which will prove to be an "illusion" for the
US as the USSR will go on behaving as it always has,
under cover of detente, but which will prove to be a
disaster for China, as China will have no leverage on
either;
-that American relations with the USSR are far
more important to the US than relations with China
can possibly be, as China is no great military threat
to the US, is of little value in deterring a Soviet
attack on the US, and would not be of great value as
an ally in war;
-that it is not the US which is now deterring an
attack on China, and that the US would do nothing
for China in the event of a Soviet attack on China;
-that as a practical matter, the principal US
interest in China is in the border issue (i.e., keeping
it unsettled), which `forces' the USSR to invest
heavily in the China front and reduces the threat on
the European front where the US strategic interest
really lies;
-that the US is determined to prevent Peking
from taking over Taiwan;
-and, in sum, that the US has simply been using
China to get a better deal from Moscow.
For one group, these arguments would add up to a
policy of abandoning efforts to "normalize" relations
with the US; for the other, to a policy of following the
same course as the US and reducing tensions with the
USSR as much as possible, beginning by accepting
Soviet terms for a border settlement.
While elements of the argument might be accepted
by almost all of the key figures of the post-Mao
leadership (the USSR is obviously a more important
country at this time than is China, simply a regional
power; and a genuine concern about the military
balance and the current state of US resolve seems to
come through Chinese statements to all audiences),
and while the two positions may be put forward over
the longer term, the argument as an argument does not
seem worth much to either of the two possible groups
at the extremes of the foreign policy range in a contest
for position at the time of the succession. In other
words, most of the key figures have accepted a
different argument, so that, if one or the other of these
two hypothetical groups has not already won the
struggle for power but has to try to persuade other
leaders to adopt its foreign policies, neither of them
would be able to do it.
Public and private statements by Chinese leaders,
both in recent years and recent months, have seemed
to make clear that those concerned with foreign policy,
including most of those expected to be the key figures
of the post-Mao leadership, have a picture of the Sino-
Soviet-American triangle something like this:
-that China must have a counterweight to the
USSR under any circumstances (even if there is a
substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations,
and only a limited improvement is expected), and
there is simply no alternative to the US;
-that the US is still militarily powerful (almost as
strong as the USSR), and means to remain so;
-that the US does in fact help both to deter a
Soviet attack on China and to resist Soviet efforts to
establish "hegemony" in the Far East, and has
declared its intention to continue to do so (cf.
President Ford's remarks on this theme during his
visit to Peking last December);
-that the Soviet-American detente is in fact
limited and precarious;
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-that the US does indeed perceive China-with
its land mass and huge population-as of value
strategically, a value that can only increase with the
increase of Chinese military power;
-that normalization of relations with the US
(full diplomatic relations) of course will require
some time, and cannot be expected in the next few
months;
-that the Taiwan issue, while vexatious, is much
less important than the strategic issue, and China
can afford to "wait," as regards the annexation of
Taiwan;
-and that, in sum, Sino-American relations,
while imperfect, are more-or-less satisfactory.
In other words, to put the matter in minimal terms,
the Chinese are far from having completed their
exploration of the possibilities for a profitable
relationship with the US, and it would be on the face
of it absurd to close off those possibilities, or to move
rapidly toward an accommodation with the USSR,
without at least completing the process of exploration.
Earlier calculations as to the distribution of power in
the immediate post-Mao period (lasting at least for
some months) were that the "collective" would
probably be headed by the Centrist Hua Kuo-feng,
who would probably retain Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua. (See photograph.) Both Hua and Chiao
have associated themselves with the above-
summarized position in a credible fashion (i.e., it
seems to be what they genuinely believe,
independently of Mao), and most of the others
expected to be key figures in the post-Mao leadership
are associated with it to some degree. Although a
leadership completely dominated by the doctrinaire
Leftists might choose to close off the opening to the US
in the immediate post-Mao period, there seems little
chance of such dominance. Any other constellation of
post-Mao leaders, even a military dictatorship, could
be expected to continue the process of exploration,
even while continuing to complain (as are the current
leaders) that the pace of "normalization" of Sino-
American relations is too slow,*
*The three standard demands for "normalization" will
presumably continue (in this period) to be the severance of US
diplomatic relations with Taipei, the withdrawal of US armed forces
from Taiwan, and the abrogation of the US-ROC Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954.
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