CUBA: THE REVOLUTION MATURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002500410001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1975
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02500410001-0
Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
Cuba: The Revolution Matures
Confidential
April 15, 1975
No. 0090/75
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Summary
April 15, 1975
The 16-year-old Castro regime has entered a new and significant level of
political development characterized by growing Soviet influence, the rejection of the
utopian schemes that once overburdened the economy, a more pragmatic attitude in
domestic and foreign policy, the reorganization of virtually the entire ruling struc-
ture, and movement toward joint as opposed. to individual--leadership. The revolu-
tion has matured in no small part because of the emergence as Castro's chief advisers
of a small faction of pre-revolutionary communists who have displaced some of the
"Fidelistas"--an elite made up mainly of Fidel and Raul Castro's comrades-in-arms
from the guerrilla warfare days of 1957-58.
At the end of the last decade, Castro was at last persuaded of the need for a
change in direction by a number of factors:
? His administration had reached the nadir of its popularity.
? He faced Soviet pressure, isolation in the international arena, and economic
brankruptcy.
? His problems were peaking at the very time his political maneuverability had
neared its lower limits.
Alienation of the US and heavy dependence on massive external assistance had
left him little alternative but to submit to the "advice" of the USSR and of those in
Cuba who most closely reflected Soviet points of view. This "advice," the accept-
ance of which was presumably a condition of continued high levels of Soviet aid,
included an insistence that Castro put his house in order so that the aid would not
be wasted. He immediately set about doing so despite the realization that such
institutional mechanisms as national elections, a constitution, and a party congress
will build some checks and balances into the system that he has completely
dominated.
At the regime's uppermost level, members of the two main political factions
have differing opinions on a broad range of matters. Despite this divergence,
however, the only significant minority in the leadership- the "old" communist
faction-is now being permitted a major role in shaping policy. This minority can be
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
25X1A I f the Office of Current Intelligence,
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expected to try to capitalize on this belated recognition of its skills by solidifying its
gains and expanding its influence even further. The institutionalization process
appears to be the embodiment of that effort.
There is no reason to believe, however, that Castro is losing control or that a
power struggle is in the making. He is aware that basic changes in his flamboyant
style of rule are required, and he is willing to accept them as long as they do not
threaten his real sources of power-his control of the military and security forces,
and his magnetic hold on the Cuban masses.
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Factions Within the Leadership
The Cuban leadership today is made up primarily of the guerrilla
faction of the defunct July 26 Movement, the more flexible members of the
"old" or pre-Castro communist party (the Popular Socialist Party), and a
smattering of technicians and opportunists-some of whom had their origins
in the pre-Castro Student Revolutionary Directorate-who are basically loyal
to Fidel. Castro's guerrilla faction, which includes in its ranks a number of
professional military officers jailed in the mid-1950s for anti-Batista activ-
ities, has the backing of the armed forces and security service. It is the
strongest in terms of naked power and also has the greatest representation on
the party Central Committee and other organizations. It is this strength that
for more than a decade gave Fidel the clear authority to indulge his penchant
for making most decisions himself.
In the wake of the political and economic problems arising from the
attempt to produce ten million tons of sugar in the 1970 harvest, however,
Castro realized the need for a fundamental change in his style of governing.
For lack of alternatives, he turned to "old" communists such as Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez and Blas Roca, whose advice he had spurned for so long
but whose credibility with Cuba's Soviet patrons was of supreme impor-
tance. Since 1970, therefore, the "old" communist faction, because of its
affiliation with Moscow and the superior organizational skills of its members,
has gained influence out of all proportion to its representation in the top
offices of the party. None of its members, for instance, holds a seat in the
Political Bureau.
Moreover, the successes of the policies developed since 1970 for the
Castro regime by Rodriguez and Roca (in close cooperation with Moscow)
stand out in vivid contrast to the failures of the policies of the pre-1970 era,
when the guerrilla elite rubber-stamped Fidel's decisions. Steady economic
improvement has strengthened the ascendancy of what is in fact, a minority
faction in the leadership. Thus, the guerrilla elite maintains its grasp on the
power structure, while the weaker "old" communist faction is pre-eminent
in the policy-making field.
The key to this paradoxical relationship is Castro. As long as he sees no
threat to his own position in using the "old" communists as a source of
technical and administrative skills, the "Fidelistas" will accept his judgment
and permit the paradox to continue. Neither the fanatical anti-communists
of the July 26 Movement nor the die-hard anti-Fidelistas of the original
communist party are around to fan the flames of friction, and both elements
of the regime's leadership now find it convenient to stress their similarities
rather than their differences.
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THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
POLITICAL BUREAU
Tide! -ASTRO-- First Tecretary
RauI =:ASTRO- Secons,, SBCnldry
Qsvaldo Dorticos Sergio del Valle
Juan Almeida Guillermo Garcia
=1,d CASTRO--C nan n~as
Raul CASTRO- Deputy (211i r' rv
Osvaldo DORTICOS Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Antonio PEREZ
Jorge RISOUET
Isidoro MALMIERCA
Raul GARCIA
Jose ABRANTES
Joel DOMENECH
Jose LLANUSA
Rogelio ACEVEDO
Osvaldo DORTICOS
Antonio E. LUSSON
Armando ACOSTA
Victor E. DREKE
Manuel LUZARDO
Sovero AGUIRRE
Vilma ESPIN
Jose R. MACHADO
Juan ALMEIDA
Manuel E. FAJARDO
Isidoro MALMIERCA
lose M. ALVAREZ
Marcelo FERNANDEZ
Juan MARINELLO
Emilio ARAGONITES
Oscar FERNANCEZ
Miguel MARTIN
Jose ARTEAGA
Harold FERRER
Joaquin MENDEZ
Flavio BRAVO
Calixto GARCIA
Raul MENDENDEZ
Julio E. CAMACHO
Guillermo GARCIA
Arnaldo MILIAN
(Lino CARRERA.S
Julio A. GARCIA
Carlos MIR
Ernesto CASI,AS
Pedro M. GARCIA
Pedro MIRET
Brtlarmino CASTILLA
Raul GARCIA
Jesus MONTANE
Tidei CASTRO
Elena GIL
Jose NARANJO
Raul CASTRO
Pablo GROBART
Arnaldo OCHOA
Angel Joel CHAVECO
Orestes GUERRA
Mario OLIVA
Foure CHOMON
Raul GUERRA
Filiberto OLIVERA
Osmani CIENFUEGOS
Secundino GUERRA
Ramon PARDO
Leopoldo CINTRAS
Armando HARI
Antonio PEREZ
Abelardo COLOME
Joel IGLESIAS
Faustino PEREZ
Raul CURBELO
Omar H. ISER
Walfredo PEREZ
Sergio DEL VALLE
Rienerio JIMENEiZ
Manuel PINEIRO
Manuel DIAZ
Rolando KINDELAN
Lizardo PROENZA
PINAR DEL RIO-Julio E. CAMACHO
HAVANA-Jose R. MACHADO
MATANZAS--Julian RIZO
Ramiro Valdes
Armando Hart
Bias ROCA
Pedro MIRET
Foure CHOMON
Jose RAMIREZ
Jorge RISOUET
Raul ROA
Bias ROCA
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Orlando RODRIGUEZ
Basllio RODRIGUEZ
Urt lnio ROJAS
Celia SANCHEZ
Aldo SANTAMARIA
Hayden SANTAMARIA
Rene de los SANTOS
Clementine SERRA
Jose R. SILVA
Lionel 50TO
Julio TARRAU
Diodes TORRALBA
Felipe TORRES
Ramiro VALDES
Anibal VELAZ
Roberto VIERA
Luis A. ZAYAS
LAS VILLAS--Arnaldo MILIAN
CAMAGUEY -Raul CURBELO
ORIENTE- Armando HART
Military Depc rtment
American Department
Afro-Asian Department
Internal Education Department
Construction D