PROPOSED AID TO ANGOLAN REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002500240001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

,~ 1,:C,HIUrs
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OCI No. 0451/75
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
March 25, 1975
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Proposed Aid to Angolan Refugees
REFERENCE:
The facts and assumptions set forth in the referenced
cable are essentially correct. National elections may not
be held by October 31, however, as called for in the indepen-
dence agreement. If elections are not held, Angola will
enter into independence with a fragile coalition government
composed of the three liberation groups, without Portuguese
participation. Moreover, the national election law still to
be drafted could include a residency requirement that would
render refugees ineligible to vote. The Popular Movement
would certainly attempt to get such a provision enacted al-
though its chances of doing so are probably less than even.
'Holden Roberto and the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola would be the major benefactor in any refugee re-
settlement and voter registration program in Angola. Al-
though the exact number of refugees is unknown, US government
agencies have accepted 500,000-700,000 as a reasonable esti-
mate. The bulk of these refugees have lived in Zaire since
the early 1960's and during the anti-Portuguese insurgency
the National Front relied heavily on them for military
recruits and financial support. If these refugees return to
Angola in large numbers, they will represent.a powerful bloc
of political support for the National Front as well as a
source of military personnel. .
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Secret
The absence of US support would not result in the
collapse of Roberto's plan to resettle the refugees nor
would it seriously hurt his chances for a major political
role in an independent Angola. However, Agostinho Neto,
the president of the Soviet-backed.Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola and Roberto's chief rival, could succeed
in slowing down the refugee resettlement program through his
movement's representatives in the transitional government.
Thus, the US would stand to gain political credits with
Roberto by making alternate sources of assistance available.
Although US assistance is to be offered openly and to
all three liberation groups, Neto, a number of African nations
that support him, the Soviets, and the Armed Forces Movement
in Portugal will interpret the aid as an attempt to "stuff
the ballot box" in favor of the National Front. This inter-
pretation will gain credence from the fact that. the National
Front controls the ministries of agriculture,. interior, and
social affairs, on which it intends to rely heavily in
administering refugee resettlement and voter registration.
Beyond a shrill propaganda campaign that is likely to
sound self-pitying, there is little Roberto's opponents can
do to discredit the US or impede Roberto's refugee program.
The possibility exists that Neto, facing a landslide vote
against him, will attempt a coup out of desperation. His
organization, however, is outmanned and outgunned by the
National Front and would lose a military confrontation even
if it were to receive massive assistance from Moscow or
Lisbon, which seems highly unlikely.
US relations with Zaire might also be affected by in-
volvement in refugee resettlement. Zairian President Mobutu
has sought to obtain US support for the National Front for
many years, particularly since the Lisbon coup. The US has
turned aside his requests. Our assistance at this point,
however implemented, will be interpreted by Mobutu as en-
dorsement of the National Front. He will probably be
encouraged to pressure the US for other types of assistance
for Roberto, including military. For the moment Mobutu has
had to curtail his own support for the National Front because
of his government's serious financial difficulties.
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