SOVIET UNION- EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300230001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

149
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Secret
Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
OTES
Secret
December 10, 1975
SC No. 00554/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E 0. 11652. exemption category:
958(1). (2), and (3)
+lutomaticaliv declassified on:
date impossible to determine
10"Ho"1101110101 ow 1110 9, "Now, 1111": ,4, 4"Wll,Mmpppmmwmwm
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 10, 1975
25X1 D
Summit Meeting in Warsaw.
Sofia's Balancing Act 3
During the Demirel Visit. . . . . . . . . . .
Yugoslavs in Sour Mood Over 5
Proposed Economic Policies for 1976 . . . . .
Ceausescu on Emigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR Academy of Sciences 9
Elects New Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet Visitor 11
Highlights During November. . . . . . . . . . .
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Summit Meeting in Warsaw
General Secretary Brezhnev, five of his East
European counterparts, and Mongolian party leader
Tsedenbal--all of whom were attending the Polish con-
gress--held a short "summit" meeting in Warsaw on
December 9. Romania, which sent a second-level dele-
gation to the congress, was not represented.
A short communique released by Tass said only
that the participants gave special attention to ways
to implement the European security accord and that
disarmament measures must accompany political relaxa-
tion. Discussion may have focused on Brezhnev's pro-
posal, publicly aired the same day, for pan-European
meetings to be held on such problems as the environ-
ment and energy.
The leaders also "exchanged opinions" on the
problems of further cooperation between their coun-
tries--language that suggests a variety of proposals
and viewpoints were aired.
Moscow may have wanted to take advantage of
Ceausescu's absence by discussing informally with its
loyalist allies such sensitive issues as preparations
for the European Communist Party Conference, polemics
with China, and CEMA integration. Romania holds dis-
senting positions on all these issues. Convening the
meeting without Ceausescu underscores Romanian isola-
tion and may provoke uneasiness in Bucharest.
It is unclear whether this meeting rules out the
possibility of a CEMA summit in the near future. An
economic summit had been expected before year's end,
but recent reporting suggests that it has been pushed
back until next year. (CONFIDENTIAL)
December 10, 1975
SECRET MORAY
25X1A
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Sofia's Balancing Act During the Demirel Visit
Sofia gave a particularly warm and cordial
welcome to Turkish Prime Minister Demirel during
his visit to Bulgaria last week. The Bulgarians
tried to use the trip to demonstrate their "even-
handed" treatment of the Turks and Greeks and to
enhance the image of party/state leader Zhivkov as
an "international statesman."
The Bulgarians are trying hard to maintain an
equilibrium in their new-found friendship with
Athens and Ankara. They were determined to see
that their reception of Demirel matched the atten-
tion lavished on Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis
last July and constantly inquired whether the Turks
were completely happy with all arrangements.
On bilateral economic matters, Sofia appar-
ently pushed for closer cooperation than Ankara
wanted. The two leaders examined transit traffic
problems, focusing on congestion of road and rail
traffic at the Turkish border. Zhivkov first
raised the matter with Demirel during their summit
last July, and the communique summarizing last
week's talks commits both sides to solving the
problems "in the shortest possible time." The
Bulgarians also pressed for formation of a joint
transport company and suggested an agreement on
Black Sea shipping--both of which the Turks side-
stepped. The two sides did, however, agree to
expand cooperation in the area of electrical
energy.
Zhivkov and Demirel signed a bilateral "joint
declaration of principles," along with the usual
communique. Noting that their views "coincide on
almost all questions," they called for Israeli
withdrawal from occupied territory, endorsed dis-
armament under strict international control, and
December 10, 1975
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hailed the process of detente. On Balkan coopera-
tion, they pledged to further relations "above all
on a bilateral basis," but supported "in principle"
multilateral initiatives in the interest of the
Balkan states.
On Cyprus, both stated the "positions of
their governments"--a euphemism for divergence,
but agreed on the need to preserve the "independ-
ence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
alignment" of Cyprus. The communique also refers
to "honoring the interests of the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots." Ankara may feel it scored a few
points by including this phrase, since it conforms
to the Turkish position that two separate "communi-
ties" exist. The Bulgarians, however, explicitly
refused to endorse the word "communities," and
the language settled on closely parallels that
contained in other communiques that Bulgaria has
signed.
Zhivkov and Demirel apparently avoided one
potentially disruptive bilateral issue--Bulgaria's
ethnic Turkish minority. Under the provisions of
a 1956 agreement, Sofia has issued passports to
approximately 40,000 ethnic Turks who wish to
emigrate. Ankara has been unwilling, however, to
issue entry visas because of the economic and
security problems the emigres would create. Demirel
agreed in principle to accept the group and to
hold discussions within a month to work out details.
The US embassy in Sofia points out that Zhivkov
--instead of Bulgarian Premier Todorov--clearly
emerged as the host for the Turkish prime minister.
This was probably an effort to boost Zhivkov's
personal prestige. All regional Balkan prime
ministers or heads of state except Tito have now
visited Bulgaria this year. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
December 10, 1975
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Yugoslavs in Sour Mood Over
Proposed Economic Policies for 1976
The annual round of grumbling about Belgrade's
federal budget proposals seems louder than usual this
year, and even previously privileged sectors--like
the military--appear to be feeling the pinch.
Belgrade's economic plans for 1976 forecast a
19.3 percent increase in federal spending--well be-
hind the current annual inflation rate of about 25
percent. All the numbers are not yet known, but the
fact that the major interest, groups are complaining
suggests that the slower rate of increased spending
is being applied equitably.
The well-developed northern republics, Croatia
and Slovenia, customarily grouse about being over-
taxed for the benefit of the less-developed southern
areas. Again this year, these two "have" republics
are sharply critical of the federal regime's dicta-
tion of economic policy to the republics, particularly
in setting investment limits for the :Local economies.
The less-developed regions normally receive sup-
plemental federal funds, in theory to help them catch
up with the north. These developmental funds have
usually assured a measure of protection for the poorer
areas from budget squeezes. This year, however, the
picture has changed. A parliamentary delegate from
Kosovo--the poorest area of Yugoslavia--recently com-
plained that the province faces nearly 300 percent
higher payments into the federal budget this year.
He also said Kosovo's take from special development
funds in 1976 will fall short of the amount forecast
in the long-range development plan.
The Yugoslav Defense Ministry, which over the
past few years has had sizable increases in invest-
ment for its modernization program, also appears to
December 10, 1975
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be tightening its belt. A deputy defense minister
told the parliament last Friday that the ministry's
alloted funds for 1976 would "ensure the present,
but not the desired level of equipment and modern-
ization."
Even the trade unions--which in recent years
have made few waves--are warning about the impact on
employment of slower investment rates by the govern-
ment.
Premier Bijedic's handling of economic policy,
which has been criticized heavily over the past year,
may once again come to the fore. In point of fact,
the decision for a tougher anti-inflationary budget
in 1976 appears to have been thoroughly discussed at
top party levels. The regime's attempt to trim Yugo-
slav expectations may require scapegoats, however,
particularly while the possibility of demagogic ap-
peal by pro-Soviet factions is of serious concern in
Belgrade. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
December 10, 1975
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Ceausescu on Emigration
President Ceausescu, speaking to the councils of
ethnic Hungarian and German minorities in Romania on
December 3, delivered the most negative Romanian pro-
nouncements on the subject of emigration since the
Helsinki summit.
The Romanian leader said that many of those who
have already emigrated as well as those who now wish
to leave are "deserters." He asserted that the place
for every Romanian citizen, Hungarian, German, Serb
or Jew, is "here" building a new society. "We cannot
accept or encourage those who wish to run away, think-
ing they will find a warmer nest somewhere."
Ceausescu's comments do not mean that Bucharest
has changed its policy on Jewish emigration. His
words do, however, reflect the regime's serious con-
cern over the possible snowball effect on Germans
and others wishing to emigrate as a result of the
Jackson-Vanik legislation, the recent agreement be-
tween Bonn and Warsaw on mass emigration of Germans
from Poland, and those portions of the European se-
curity documents calling for freer movements of people
and reunification of families.
Ceausescu's comments came on the eve of West Ger-
man Foreign Minister Genscher's visit to Bucharest
(December 4 and 5). Genscher raised the subject of
reunification of families. Ceausescu's earlier speech
notwithstanding, the final communique ending the
West German's visit pledges both sides to solve hu-
manitarian problems on a basis of mutual trust and
good will.
The director of the Romanian Institute of Polit-
ical Sciences has told an embassy official that Ceau-
sescu's remarks were Bucharest's way of emphasizing
December 10, 1975
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that no "mass" emigration would be tolerated. Ceau-
sescu also said there will be no further special "con-
cessions" to the minorities. Here, the embassy feels
the source had in mind the Magyars and their demands
for greater use of Hungarian language schools and
journals. The Romanian indicated that the location
of new industry and reassignment of cadres will be
used to intersperse Hungarians with Romanians. Such
a policy, however, would undoubtedly have negative
repercussions in Budapest, which is sensitive to the
fortunes of its fellow Magyars in neighboring Tran-
sylvania. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
25X1A
December 10, 1975
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USSR Academy of Sciences
Elects New Officers
By electing 72-year-old director of the Kurchatov
Atomic Energy Institute, Anatoly P. Aleksandrov, as
its new president on November 25, the USSR Academy of
Sciences resolved an apparently lengthy stalemate.
Aleksandrov is a competent, noncontroversial dark
horse who has clear party backing; he was rumored to
be a good bet almost a week before his election.
Moscow's scientific circles, however, still favored
the better known A. P. Kotelnikov, who had served as
acting president following the resignation in May of
venerable Mstislav Keldysh because of ill-health.
Aleksandrov, like Keldysh, is a full member of the
CPSU Central Committee.
The manner of Aleksandrov's election suggests an
increase in party control or at least influence over
the academy. Senior party ideologist Suslov, who had
also attended the May meeting of the academy (the
first time a full Politburo member has attended a
working session of the academy) , made a telling point
in his keynote speech when he referred to the Central
Committee's approval of Aleksandrov's candidacy. The
final tally of the secret ballot was not announced.
By contrast, the party evidently either did not
press for the revocation of dissident Nobel Peace
Prize winner Andrey Sakharov's membership or failed
to win its case. Published accounts of the proceed-
ings made no mention of Sakharov's case.
New faces on the presidium of the academy
include:
--Nikolay Inozemtsev, 54, director of the
Institute of World Economics and Inter-
national Relations. A Doctor of His-
torical Sciences, he became a correspond-
ing member of the academy in 1964 and an
active member in 1968. He was elected
December 10, 1975
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a candidate member of the CPSU Central
Committee in 1971, and may gain full
voting status at the 25th party con-
gress next February. On the academy's
presidium, he apparently replaces the
liberal, but aging, A. M. Rumyantsev,
whose name was dropped.
--Anatoly Yegorov, 55, rector of the In-
stitute of Marxism-Leninism since early
1974. He worked in the Central Commit-
tee apparatus, rising to deputy head of
the Propaganda Department. In 1965 he
became chief editor of the party jour-
nal, Kommunist, and the following year
became a candidate member of the Cen-
tral Committee. His name vanished
from the journal's editorial board
after its mid-January 1974 issue amid
signs of controversy, but the specific
problem has never been identified.
The Kommunist vacancy went unfilled
for six months, suggesting that
Yegorov's removal was sudden and un-
planned. Yegorov had--and presumably
still has--effective protection from
high officials, however, since he re-
appeared shortly thereafter at the Cen-
tral Committee's prestigious Institute
of Marxism-Leninism.
There are now eight full and candidate Central
Committee members on the academy's 43-man Presidium,
an increase of two. (UNCLASSIFIED)
25X1A
December 10, 1975
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Soviet Visitor Highlights During November
The number of Soviets authorized to enter the
US for commercial purposes during November totaled
136--a record high for the year and an increase of
more than 13 percent over November 1974. Visitors
during the month included a delegation of agri-
culture officials who came for a pre-shipment
inspection of recent Soviet grain purchases and a
communications group that visited US farms produc-
ing satellite communications equipment. Another
delegation was composed of officials associated
with the construction of Moscow's International
Trade Center, a Soviet-US cooperative effort first
proposed during the May 1973 summit talks.
There were few high-level representativesof the
Soviet bureaucracy. The most important were
Anatoly Reut, first deputy minister of the radio
industry, who headed a delegation that toured US
computer and radio equipment firms, and Deputy
Minister of Procurement Yury Shilkin, here to
acquaint himself with American livestock feed
equipment. (UNCLASSIFIED)
25X1A
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Secret
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