CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

. n
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Too Secret
2UIF~ Hour
Chinese Affairs
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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CHINESE AFFAIRS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
December 9, 1975
China-Vietnam: The Islands Dispute. . . . . . . 1
The Tachai Campaign:
Provincial Returns Come In. . . . . . . . . . . 6
Leadership Notes. . . . . . . . . . 8
France: No Plums for Sauvagnargues . 9
The Modernization of
Bureaucracy in the PLA. . 11
Afternoon Chats in Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Kwangsi Connection. . . . . . . . . 16
Setbacks on the Arabian Peninsula . . . . . . . . 18
CHRONOLOGY. . . . . . . . . .
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China-Vietnam: The Islands Dispute
Peking's sensitivity over the security of its
southeast flank, as well as its increasing impatience
with Hanoi, was vividly illustrated late last month
in a sharp People's Daily attack on "foreign aggres-
sors" in the South China Sea.
The question of sovereignty over two major is-
land groupings in the area--the Spratlys and the
Paracels--has been a major annoyance in Sino-Viet-
namese relations since the Chinese took the Paracels
from the former Saigon government in January 1974.
Both Peking and Hanoi have periodically reiterated
their claims to both island groups, but neither side
had openly pushed the issue in public. The Chinese
even declined to respond to Hanoi's announcement
last May that North Vietnamese forces had captured
several of the Spratlys--500 miles south of the
Paracels--from the former South Vietnam government.
In September, the Chinese turned up the heat
on the islands issue just prior to North Vietnam
party chief Le Duan's visit to Peking; they publicly
reiterated their claims to the disputed islands and
recalled for the first time in months the 1974 take-
over in the Paracels. Chinese diplomats abroad were
also instructed in September to acknowledge the dis-
pute with Hanoi over the islands and to vigorously
defend Peking's claims. Moreover, Hong Kong and
South China cadre were told that relations with Hanoi
were bad and to be prepared for the adoption of a
new slogan demanding the return of all the Spratlys
to China.
Last month's broadside was by far the toughest
Chinese statement on the dispute since early 1974.
It amounts to the first direct challenge of Hanoi's
claims to the islands and emphasizes the serious-
ness of Peking's determination to regain all con-
tested islands. The article asserted. that China's
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claims date back 2,000 years and cited archeological
and other evidence to support the claims. Chinese
sovereignty over all the islands was described as
both "sacred" and "inalienable." Peking's demand
that all the disputed islands must be returned to
Chinese control was juxtaposed with its long-held
pledge to "liberate" Taiwan, a clear indication not
only of the importance the Chinese attach to their
claims, but also a sign that Peking may be prepared
to wait some time for a final solution of the issue
--as it is in the case of Taiwan.
In an apparent attempt to avoid any confusion
about the primary target of Peking's blast, the ar-
ticle employed language that played down the signifi-
cance of claims other parties have to the Spratly
Islands. The Nationalist Chinese claim all of the
islands and maintain a military garrison on one, but
the People's Daily reference to the fact that many
of the islands are still not "in Chinese hands"
rules out the possibility that Peking was referring
to the Nationalist presence there. Peking is doubt-
lessly confident that Nationalist claims will be re-
solved when the much larger Taiwan question is
settled.
The Philippines also claim some of the islands
in the Spratly group. Peking has never made an is-
sue of Manila's claims, however, and, when diplomatic
relations between the two countries were established
earlier this year, both sides agreed to settle all
bilateral disputes without resort to force. Peking
seems prepared to put aside the disagreement with
Manila.
Although People's Daily left no doubt that Hanoi
was the major object of its wrath, its attack on Hanoi
was implicit: references to Moscow in the blast were
explicit and vituperative, leaving no question that
Peking believes the Vietnamese are abetting the So-
viets in an attempt to expand Russian influence into
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the region. Significantly the article was published
only two days after Le Duan returned to Hanoi from
Moscow--where he received a much warmer welcome than
he had in Peking, gained a Soviet agreement to pro-
vide substantial economic aid to North Vietnam, and
seconded Moscow's views on detente and on interna-
tional peace and security. Peking insists that both
detente and the recent Helsinki security pact are
Soviet "tricks" designed to facilitate what the Chi-
nese see as Soviet "expansionism." Le Duan's en-
dorsement of detente puts Hanoi squarely in Moscow's
camp on an issue of major importance to the Chinese
and was almost certainly read in Peking as a deliberate
provocation.
In fact, the treatment Le Duan received in Peking
last September contrasts sharply with the rousing
welcome he got in Moscow. There was no joint commu-
nique to mark his China visit, and the Hanoi leader
failed to tender the normal farewell banquet prior
to his departure for home. Moreover, Le Duan went
to Peking with the hope of signing several economic
aid agreements, including a five-year pact, and there
is ample evidence that the Chinese gave less than
Hanoi requested. The last working-level Vietnamese
negotiator left China in mid-November after three
months of talks--without any indication of further
progress. His departure virtually rules out the pos-
sibility of any additional economic agreements between
the two parties, at least for the time being.
The Chinese clearly see a correlation between
Hanoi's increasing tilt toward Moscow and the long-
range possibilities for Soviet "meddling" through
Vietnam in the South China Sea, as well as Southeast
Asia generally. It also is apparent that the Chinese
consider control of islands in the area vitally im-
portant to their security. The People's Daily ar-
ticle, in fact, refers to the region as "an important
gate of China" and to the islands as located on major
shipping lanes.
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For their part, the Soviets have been sharply
critical of the Chinese seizure of the Paracels.
Since early 1974, Moscow has routinely attacked
China's claims to all of the islands and its use of
force in the Paracels. The Soviets, however, have
stopped short of providing outright support to Hanoi's
counterclaims. Soviet maps still show the islands
as belonging to China, although recent press comments
have implied that they were Vietnamese. A Soviet
official recently said Moscow considers the status
of both island groups as "undetermined." Peking
ignored these attacks until last week. Then, the
People's Daily article asserted that the Soviet
Union, throwing aside earlier support for China's
claims, mounted a "venomous" assault on Peking
after the Paracels incident.
Peking's long-term concerns almost certainly
hinge on its view of Soviet intentions and activities.
Chinese leaders also seem persuaded, however, that
in the shorter run Hanoi could unilaterally disrupt
their hopes of developing a bloc of friendly countries
along China's southern border. The Chinese and Viet-
namese share very few common perceptions of Southeast
Asia. They are clearly on opposite sides in the cur-
rent dispute between Thailand and Laos. Hanoi has
vigorously defended the Lao side and has launched
frequent attacks on Thai "aggression." Peking, on
the other hand, has remained relatively quiet on the
subject, privately lobbying for a peaceful solution
to the disagreement and encouraging improved relations
between the two countries. The Chinese have been by
far the largest contributors to Cambodian reconstruc-
tion since the communists took over there last spring.
Peking has also made it clear that it was on Cambodia's
side in the border dispute with North Vietnam and ap-
parently encouraged the Cambodian Communists to open
diplomatic relations with Thailand.
On the Sino-Vietnamese border itself, there
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cadre are being advised to stand firm in the face
of alleged Vietnamese attempts to "occupy" Chinese
territory. Although these putative border incidents
have not been confirmed and there is very little
likelihood that a serious border dispute will develop,
the fact that the Chinese continue to talk about
such incidents suggests that Peking is determined to
maintain a degree of anti-Vietnamese feeling along
the border.
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The Tachai Campaign: Provincial
Returns Come In
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping reportedly described
the September-October "learn-from-Tachai" conference
as the most important meeting held in China since
the communist take-over. While Teng was obviously en-
gaging in hyperbole, his remark underlines the im-
portance that has been accorded to the Tachai campaign
in the last few months. Tachai now overshadows this
year's two other major campaigns--strengthening pro-
letarian dictatorship and criticizing the classical
novel "Water Margin." Reporting on virtually every
organization in China is now in terms of learning
from Tachai.
this mass campaign
will be further broadened with a convening of a
series of national meetings on other economic sectors
and on culture. A national coal conference has al-
ready been held.
Most provinces have held a series of mass ral-
lies and other meetings to publicize the major ad-
dresses at the conference by vice premiers Teng
Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng, and to send off youths
and cadres to rural areas. The New China News Agency
reported on November 25 that over one million cadres
from 12 provinces had already gone to communes to
engage in manual labor and to direct production.
Most of these cadres appear to be from the hsien
(county) level, although a number of provincial and
prefectural leaders have also gone to the country-
side. The function of the latter cadres seems to be
to ensure that local cadres perform their duties with
the necessary zeal. Morale among local cadres has
been badly shaken by a series of purges and campaigns
dating from the Cultural Revolution and their reputa-
tion has been tarnished by publicity accorded to ex-
amples of corruption, sexual indiscretions, and a
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lack of initiative. Domestic propaganda has made it
clear that the hsien, and especially the hsien-level
party committee, is the key level in administering
the campaign. Indeed, cadre rectification at the
hsien level and below is one of the emes of
the campaign. rural
cadres are alr y appre ensive over the potential
threat implied by "rectification," and the moderate
leadership in Peking and in the provinces will have
to monitor the campaign carefully lest criticism of
cadres leads to a rekindling of factional animosities
and the frustration of campaign goals.
On the whole, however, significant progress
has been made in curbing factionalism and increas-
ing production this year. Hong Kong leftists were
told that Teng said that the key to success in agri-
cultural work was reliance on old cadres. Recent
provincial rotations and new appointments seem to
confirm that Peking holds this view. Veteran cadres
such as Fukien First Secretary Liao Chih-kao are re-
portedly cracking down hard on factionalism and have
transferred a number of noncompliant cadres. other hand,
while v~urxers are ina y back-in the factories
in Kunming and minority unrest has abated, new First
Secretary Chia Chi-kun has not succeeded in getting
the workers to increase production.
The Tachai campaign already seems to be the
most clearly defined and well-orchestrated campaign
since the Cultural Revolution. Given its scope, am-
bitious goals, and rising volume of rhetoric, there
is at least some danger that things could get out of
hand. But if current moderate leaders remain healthy
and in agreement and can successfully manage the cam-
paign with other efforts to correct trouble spots in
the economy, fairly impressive gains may well be in
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Two top leaders have recently reappeared after
significant absences. Chiang Ching was present on
December 1 at the meeting and picture taking session
between President Ford and Chinese head of state Chu
Te. Her last appearance was on October 15 at the
closing session of the national Tachai conference in
Peking. Chiang's political power has been sharply
diminished this year, and her appearances now seem to
be under the control of regime moderates and designed
to promote an image of unity. In the past, Madame
Mao tended to punctuate periods of nonappearances
with public activities that were designed to raise
rather than lower political tensions. Her association
with the Tachai meeting was obviously meant to present
a united front for this major undertaking-
the circulation of a central
political left for Sino-US relations.
The other reappearance was Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying, who headed the Chinese representation at
the Peking celebrations of Albanian national day on
November 29. Yeh had not appeared since October 25
and is widely rumored to be ill. Surprisingly, Yeh
did not see President Ford even though he played an
important role in past meetings with ranking US of-
ample of Chiang and Teng Hsiao-ping who took time off
from the meetings to engage in manual labor. Her
presence at the meeting with President Ford is de-
signed to convey the same message--the support of the
document on the Tac ai movement that hails the ex-
ficials. Yeh's place seems to have been taken by
another Chou En-lai stalwart, Vice Premier and lead-
ing economic specialist Li Hsien-nien.
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France: No Plums for Sauvagnargues
French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues' five-
day visit to China last month was apparently less
than a total success from the French point of view.
Exploratory talks
during Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to Paris
last spring had apparently progressed to the point
where French officials felt that Sauvagnargues would
be able to wrap up negotiations on at least some
sales so that formal signing ceremonies could take
place during President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's
scheduled trip to Peking early next year.
The Chinese, however, were apparently not in
a buying mood. The French foreign minister told
reporters that he had been unsuccessful in his ef-
forts at reopening talks on the Concorde. Chinese
claims that French prices were "not competitive"
indicate that discussions on other sales were equally
unproductive. Officials in Sauvagnargues' party ad-
mitted that the only concrete result of the visit
was an agreement to expand cultural exchanges.
Despite their apparent disinclination to break
any new economic ground with Sauvagnargues, the Chi-
nese did express general satisfaction with Sino-French
relations--indicating that if President Giscard
d'Estaing's visit does not produce any pleasant eco-
nomic surprises neither will it be marred by any un-
pleasant political disagreements. Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua re-
stated familiar anti-detente, anti-Soviet themes
Conflicting assessments
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on Korea--which the Chinese held was not an urgent
problem--were also glossed over.
Both sides placed far more emphasis on congruent
views on such matters as the need for European mili-
tary and economic cooperation. Peking used the occa-
sion of Sauvagnargues' visit--coming as it did soon
after the Rambouillet summit and before the Paris
Conference on International Economic Cooperation--to
voice support for European efforts at easing economic
confrontation with the Third World. Peking has long
believed that further hardening of the confrontation
would work to Moscow's advantage and sees Paris--
with its strong residual ties to former colonial
clients--as having a special role to play in promoting
compromise between developed and developing nations.
A People's Daily editorial published a week before
Sauvagnargues' arrival in Peking stands as the most
explicit Chinese endorsement yet of the establish-
ment of a "Second World - Third World" dialogue
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The Modernization of Bureaucracy in the PLA
The Chinese are concerned about overstaffing
in the PLA bureaucratic structure, but this may
apply more to the lower levels than the upper reaches.
Central Directive 18, which was issued in the summer
and calls for modernization of the military, makes
pejorative reference to an excessive number of offi-
cers in the PLA. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping has
also chastised the army for having too many staff
positions and reportedly cited Mao as saying that
all PLA staff organizations below the division level
should beabolished. Such criticism may be related
to talk in Fukien about a new military regulation
specifying that each unit should have only one com-
mander and one deputy commander. There is some evi-
dence that an excessive number of officers in field
units has often resulted in contradictory orders.
In light of renewed emphasis on professionalism
in the PLA, those cut loose may be working in a non-
combat role. Indeed, a broadcast from Kansu in late
September praised a regiment which reduced the staff
of its political department. The cadres were sent
down to work at the company level and engage in pro-
ductive labor.
The "Learn from Tachai" campaign also seems to
be draining off quite a few officers. Hunan Military
District recently "transferred" 30 percent of its
cadres to Tachai-related work. In addition, 40 per-
cent of the cadres in the military subdistrict and
garrisons and 50 percent of the cadres in the people's
armed forces departments were sent off to the country-
side. It is unclear at this point whether these per-
sonnel are on a short-term rotational assignment or
for a longer term. The Tachai campaign, however,
probably has a certain amount of appeal to the mili-
tary districts as a means of satisfying Peking's
pressure for a reduction of staff slots.
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While the lower levels of the army may be
trimming their bureaucratic fat, the military struc-
ture at the higher echelons may be expanding. Most
striking is the increase in the number of deputy
chiefs of staff and deputy directors of the General
Political Department/General Logistics Department.
Number before Number at Number added
Cultural Rev- Present since Central
olution Directive #18
General Staff
Department
(deputy chiefs)
General Political
Department
(deputy directors)
General Logistics
Department
(deputy directors)
A significant number of these appointments have
been made since Central Directive 18 was issued in
July, which suggests that the document's concern about
overstaffing is not applicable at this level. It is
also quite possible that this staffing process has
not yet concluded. Furthermore, the unusually heavy
turnout at national day of personnel from the Na-
tional Defense Scientific and Technological Commis-
sion and the military academies indicates Peking's in-
creasing interest in enlarging the staffs concerned
with the technical aspects of warfare.
In addition to an increase of personnel, there
is also limited evidence pointing to the formation
of some new staffs.
"advisory groups" have been attached to important
units in the central military structure. The groups
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are reportedly authorized to make inspections and
offer suggestions, but are not empowered to issue
orders. Lo Jui-ching is said to have been appointed
chief of the advisory group appended to the General
Staff Department, and Chen Tsai-tao has been brought
to Peking to serve on this group. Presumably these
groups are concerned with purely military affairs.
This report seems to jibe with the grouping of Lo and
Chen together in the National Day name list. Their
placement on the list seemed to put them in a category
by themsleves, not clearly identified with any par-
ticular military body or responsibility. In the area
of strategic planning, a new directorate may have
been established recently to plot strategic and de-
velopment plans for the future.
Lo Jui-ching heads this unit.
These tenuous indicators of a new staffing pat-
tern gives some indication of how Central Directive
18 is being implemented. It seems likely that a
major effort to upgrade the professional quality of
the PLA would call forth more and larger staffs at
the higher planning levels of the military establish-
ment. Professionalization tends to demand special-
ization. This process in time will probably have
implications for the PLA's role. As modernization
moves forward and the army's command structure con-
tinues to expand, pressure from within this structure
may well be generated to reduce the PLA's involvement
in activities which do not contribute to military
proficiency.
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Afternoon Chats in Hong Kong
Fei I-min, publisher of the PRC owned Ta Kung
Pao, recently engaged in a tour d'horizon of the
Chinese leadership over lunch with US diplomats in
Hong Kong. Fei sometimes tailors his remarks to
suit his audience and is not a totally reliable
source; nonetheless, he does have access to a good
bit of information concerning the relationships of
regime leaders.
Fei began by noting that the health of the long
hospitalized Premier Chou En-lai had improved and
that he was seeing his private secretary and "making
decisions." Fei is a strong Chou supporter, and his
remarks must be taken with a grain of salt. While
Chou might have improved a little, he is not likely
to resume an active day-to-day administrative role.
More interesting and possibly more accurate
were Fei's remarks concerning Politburo member Wei
Kuo-ching, who was recently transferred from the
top party post in Kwangsi to the same post in Kwang-
tung. Wei was alleged to have had a long and inti-
mate relationship with ranking Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping, and the Hong Kong publisher implied that
Teng was behind the transfer (see following article).
Wei is now the second Politburo member to be sta-
tioned in Canton--Hsu Shih-yu was moved there in
the rotation of regional commanders in late 1973.
If Wei, who is the first political commissar of the
Canton Military Region, is close to Teng, his transfer
implies that the relationship between Teng and Hsu
may leave something to be desired. Wei could become
the most potent political figure ina.
L_ S Wei 's
y wi replace him as first party sec-
retary in Kwangsi, which suggests that Wei will re-
tain considerable influence there.
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Also of note were Fei's reservations about
Vice Premier Chang Chun-chiao. Despite the fact
that Chang is 63, Fei considered him too young and
inexperienced, but admitted that Chang is exercising
a great deal of responsibility. While Fei was ob-
viously expressing his personal views, his feelings
may be shared by some Chou supporters in Peking.
Fei added that Chang had a close relationship with
Hsu Shih-yu, whose former command bordered Shanghai,
but this assertion seems to be at variance with the
animosity between the two during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Fei went on to note that Chang had military
and administrative ties to the late foreign minister
Chen I, who like Teng was a Szechuanese--a state-
ment that seemed designed to imply a linkage between
Chang and Teng Hsiao-ping.
After standard remarks about several other top
leaders, Fei dropped one last bit of inside informa-
tion. Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei, whose politi-
cal fortunes have been rising slowly but steadily in
the last few years, was alleged to have been chief of
the party office responsible for coordination between
the party and the government in 1973. Pei added that
this amounted to liaison between Mao and Chou. If
true, such service would obviously have been of bene-
fit to Chi and may help explain his rising power.
However, Fei did not remark on any links between Chi
and Teng Hsiao-ping, which would seem to be the po-
tentially most rewarding personal political tie to
have at the present.
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The Kwangsi Connection
Ta Kung Pao publisher Fei I-min's assertion
that Party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping and new
Kwangtung First Secretary Wei Kuo-ching have had a
long and intimate relationship adds weight to a
large body of circumstantial evidence pointing in
the same direction. That Wei and Teng have long
known each other seems indisputable; in 1930 the
two helped to organize the 7th Chinese Peasants'
Red Army in Kwangsi. They were survivors of the
force that eventually joined Mao in the Kiangsi
soviet in 1931. Both took part in the Long March
(1934-35) but joined different units; Teng went
with Liu Po-cheng while Wei joined Chen I's forces.
Following the Communist victory in 1949, Wei
became mayor of Fuchou, while Teng assumed more sub-
stantial national and regional posts. The two may
have had an opportunity to work together riefly
in 1950. Teng was
the first secretary of the East China Bureau in the
first six months of 1950 before going to the newly
formed Southwest Bureau headquartered in Chungking.
Wei remained a relatively obscure official until
1954 when Teng, by then a vice premier, became sec-
retary general of the party. In that year Teng ap-
parently played a major role in the purge of Polit-
buro member Kao Kang and Organization Department
Director Jac, Shu-shih, alleged co-conspirators in
an anti-party plot. Wei, who was identified between
early 1953 and late 1954 only as a commander of
public security forces, may have assisted Teng in
the investigation of the conspiracy. Wei's election
to governor of Kwangsi in 1955, just before the plot
was announced, may in part have been linked to that
event. Teng, who has a reputation for bringing
friends up on his own coattails, may have been a
major sponsor of Wei for his first important provin-
cial assignment.
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In 1957, following two years of crop failures,
Wei survived the dismissal of three top Kwangsi of-
ficials accused of mishandling relief grain. The
defense that Wei was out of the province during the
period cannot be refuted but seems flimsy; his sur-
vival suggests high-level support in the party, per-
haps from Teng. As his survival of the Cultural Rev-
olution attests, Wei undoubtedly has had well-placed
backers other than Teng, but Teng's influence seems
paramount. Teng moreover, has championed minority
causes, and Wei is from the Chuang minority. In
his report on the 1953 Electoral Law and the 1957
Report on the Rectification Campaign, Teng made major
allowances for minorities. In the 1957 speech he
advocated a moderate approach to settling minority
problems--a stance criticized during the Cultural
Revolution.
Teng's support of Wei may have been returned in
kind. Wei, who joined the Politburo in August 1973,
four months before Teng was reinstated, has been in
a position to support an old ally's resurgence to
power while simultaneously advancing his own career.
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Setbacks on the Arabian Peninsula
Although the Chinese have not yet commented pub-
licly, Peking undoubtedly views recent Soviet mili-
tary dealings on the Arabian Peninsula as blows to
China's own regional inf-_ereqtq_ F_
The Chinese will regard any Russian arms sale to
Kuwait more as a symbolic setback than as a major gain
in regional influence for the Soviets. Peking knows
from its own dealings with the Kuwaitis that they are
not interested in what Moscow is selling ideologically.
Kuwait--with its massive oil revenues--can fill its
military shopping list without having to accept any
political strings from Moscow. Still, the symbolic
stakes are such that Peking would unquestionably be
pleased if the current Soviet-Kuwaiti negotiations
fall through.
If the sales do materialize, Peking's propa-
gandists will undoubtedly cite them as evidence of
Soviet efforts to fuel the regional arms race in
general and the border dispute between Kuwait and
Iraq in particular. Peking has been working hard
to undercut Moscow's influence in Baghdad--a major
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recipient of Soviet military assistance--and Russian
sales to Kuwait would clearly facilitate such Chinese
Chinese leaders probably take a much darker
view of the movement toward closer Soviet military
ties with the two Yemens. The Chinese have them-
selves paid more attention to the two mutually an-
tagonistic regimes since the reopening of the Suez
Canal earlier this year: Aden and Sana share control
over the Arabian side of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
through which all shipping between the Canal and the
Indian Ocean must pass. Coupled with recent French
moves toward granting independence to the faction-
ridden French Territory of the Afars and Issas--
occupying the opposite side of the Bab-el-Mandeb
Strait--and the steadily increasing Soviet naval
presence in neighboring Somalia, Moscow's maneuvering
in the Yemens can only have heightened Chinese paranoia
over Soviet designs for military dominance in the area
and broader Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean.
Peking has clearly been banking on closer re-
gional economic, political, and military cooperation
by moderate forces in the area--such as Saudi Arabia
and Iran--to dilute Soviet influence with the Yemenis.
Saudi policy toward North Yemen, how-
ever, was a prime factor in President Hamdi's deci-
sion to seek more military aid from Moscow, and a
Chinese official in Sana recently made no secret of
his government's consternation over this counter-
productive Saudi role. The official made a direct
linkage between the Soviet arms deal and President
Hamdi's displeasure over the abortive Saudi effort
last month to mediate between Sana and conservative
North Yemeni tribal leaders. The Chinese official
blamed the US for not warning Riyadh of the "probable
effects" of such Saudi "intervention in internal"
Yemeni affairs.
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There may also be more subtle. considerations
behind the Chinese bitterness. Peking was clearly
encouraged by the brief thaw in relations between
Sana and Riyadh this summer and may have been look-
ing to the day when President Hamdi could have been
used as an intermediary to gain Peking an opening
with the new Saudi leadership. China is well aware
that escalated oil prices have given Saudi Arabia
increased economic and political clout, and Peking
has been seeking some means of breaking ground with
the staunchly anti-communist Saudis. Any Chinese
hopes of working through Sana have been dashed by
the renewed freeze in Saudi - North Yemeni relations.
The Chinese almost certainly view the renewed
Soviet military deliveries to the maverick regime
in South Yemen as a reversal of what Peking has re-
garded heretofore as a favorable trend of events.
The recent improvement in relations between South
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the visit to Aden this spring
by World Bank President MacNamara--which the Chinese
read as a sign of more moderate US views toward
South Yemen--and the winding down of the Aden-sup-
ported Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman, all
fit well with China's own quiet efforts to promote
reconciliation and cooperation among the region's
moderates and radicals. While the recent Soviet
military assistance to Aden probably does not portend
any resurgence of activity by the Dhofar rebels, it
does carry the risk of a wider conflict between South
Yemeni and Omani units along the border. Moreover,
Aden's increased willingness to deal with Moscow may
prove to be an obstacle to any further moves toward
rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.
While all of this cuts the wrong way from Pe-
king's outlook, Chinese options for countering the
Soviet initiatives in South Yemen--or in Sana--are
=Limited. China has long been unwilling and--in
terms of its ability to match sophisticated Soviet
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equipment--unable to compete in the field of mili-
tary assistance. Peking does contribute substantial
amounts of economic assistance to both countries
and may increase such aid somewhat to sharpen the
impact of its anti-Soviet blandishments. In large
part, however, the Chinese will have to continue to
depend on less radical Arab states to prevent further
Soviet entrenchment on the peninsula, a prospect that
is probably unsettlina to Peking in light of the re-
cent events there.
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CHRONOLOGY
November 9 French atomic energy delegation ar-
rives in Peking at invitation of the
Academy of Sciences; feted by Vice
Premier Hua Kuo-feng on November 23;
departs for home November 24.
November 20 Chinese journalism delegation arrives
in Paris: meets with Prime Minister
Chirac on November 21.
November 21 26th anniversary of the establishment
of Sino-Albanian relations celebrated
with considerable fanfare in both Pe-
king and Tirana.
Scientific delegation begins
Austria and Italy.
November 22 Chinese advance team arrives in Japan
to open consulate general. in Osaka.
November 22-23 Chu Te sends official condolences on
death of Franco; congratulates Juan
Carlos on his proclamation as King of
Spain.
November 23 French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues
departs Peking following last-minute
meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping.
November 24 Peruvian trade delegation arrives in
Peking; feted by Foreign Trade Minister
Li Chiang; new trade agreement nego-
tiated which includes provisions for
export of 75,000 tons of rice to Peru.
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November 24 Rwandan education delegation begins
tour of China.
November 25 Surinam congratulated on independence;
official message sent in name of Chou
En-lai.
Angola.
Chinese representative Lai Ya-li ad-
dresses UN General Assembly plenary
session on Soviet interference in
for Cuba,
Iraq.
Panamanian Women's group arrives in
Peking; Bolivian youth group departs.
November 26 Sri Lankan trade delegation arrives
in Peking, greeted by Minister of
Trade Li Chiang. Trade protocol signed
on November 30.
November 28 Korean Workers Party delegation, led
by central committee member Kim Huan,
arrives in Peking; welcomed by Inter-
national Liaison Department Chief
Keng Piao.
visit.
Chinese industry and trade delegation
arrives in Singapore for "friendly"
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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