SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Qept. review completed
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December 9, 1975
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 9, 1975
Brezhnev's Speech in Warsaw. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Arbatov on US-Soviet Relations . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Yugoslavia-USSR: Official Talks . . . . . . . . . 6
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Bulgaria Protests Yugoslav Allegations
on Macedonian Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Romania and the Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Hungary: Conversation with Kadar. . . . . . . . . 12
Czechoslovakia: Shades of Masaryk . . . . . . . . 14
Cadres Abroad Central
Committee Post Filled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Brezhnev's Speech in Warsaw
Brezhnev's speech at the Polish party congress
was short on substance, but, as is his wont in recent
months, bearish on the state of relations with the
West. As was appropriate to the occasion, Brezhnev
spent over half of his 30 minutes talking about the
steps taken toward closer economic and political in-
tegration between Poland and the USSR, and more gen-
erally, the beneficence of the socialist community.
In his encomium, Brezhnev referred to the norms of
"socialist internationalism"--words that in Yugoslavia
and Romania translate as Soviet hegemonism--but he
quickly followed with a sentence pertaining to the
independence and sovereignty of the states that make
up the socialist community.
CSCE was clearly on his mind, perhaps because
Warsaw offered an appropriate venue for repeating a
few "truths" about the Helsinki agreements. His de-
mand that no one aspect of the agreement be empha-
sized over another and his criticism of the West for
its failure to propagate the text sufficiently have
been said before; so, too, has his reference to
"ideological penetration" by the West.
Brezhnev made explicit reference to the follow-
up CSCE session in Belgrade in 1977 and spoke favor-
ably of the possibility of organizing European con-
gresses on such problems as the environment and
energy over the next two years. This clearly was
meant as a trial balloon, and more will probably
be heard from Moscow.
Brezhnev's speech, as is often the case, is
as interesting for what he chose not to say as for
what he said. There was no rejoinder, implicit
or explicit, to criticism in the US regarding So-
viet activities in Angola. He made no mention of
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the socialist duty to support "liberation movements,"
nor did he refer to the immutable continuation of
ideological struggle.
Brezhnev repeated the familiar formulation on
the need to move ahead with detente despite the ef-
forts of Western critics. He did not, however, say
anything explicitly about relations with the US or
about SALT.
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Arbatov on US-Soviet Relations
Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's most prominent academic
authority on the US, last week offered Ambassador
Stoessel his latest views on bilateral. relations. He
predicted that Soviet detente polciy would be reaf-
firmed at the party congress next February, but said
that criticisms were being heard in the USSR and that
there have been "discussions" about detente within
the Soviet leadership.
Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, implied
that Moscow was closely following the increased crit-
icism of detente in the US, especially as that issue
showed signs of becoming a center of debate in the US
election campaigns. Other Soviet commentators are
also speaking more frequently of the effect of the
presidential campaign on US policy, particularly
policy toward the USSR.
Arbatov acknowledged that there is uncertainty
about who would be the leaders in both the US and
the USSR a year from now. He was careful to point
out, however, that Brezhnev was in "good shape" and
would definitely be arouund for a while yet. He ad-
vised that both sides ought to strive for as much
bilateral progress as possible under the present
leaderships, succession uncertainties notwithstanding.
He singled out SALT as one "central" issue on
which he thought both sides could and should show
flexibility "before it is too late." He seemed
pleased about reports that Secretary Kissinger might
soon return to Moscow in an effort to break the
stalemate.
Responding to a comment about Soviet involvement
in Angola, Arbatov observed blandly that differences
between Moscow and Washington would inevitably arise,
but argued that these problems should not prevent
progress in other areas.
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Arbatov's views, frequently and freely conveyed
to Americans, are often plainly self-serving, intended
by warning or cajolery to influence US perceptions in
ways favorable to Soviet policy. He apparently en-
joys Brezhnev's confidence as a substantive expert,
however, and is evidently attuned to the mood in Mos-
cow. On occasion, as in his recent article in Iz-
vestia against Western critics of Soviet behavior, he
seems to serve as a quasi-official conduit for points
his patrons want made to the US.
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Yugoslavia-USSR: Official Talks
The Yugoslav ministers of foreign affairs and
of foreign trade are in Moscow to sign a long-range
economic agreement and to make a first-hand assess-
ment of pre-Congress politics in the Soviet capital.
The conclusion of a five year trade agreement
for 1976-80 will probably be the public highlight
of the visit.
On the political side, Foreign Minister Minic's
talks--possibly the final ones at this level before
the CPSU congress meets in February--promise to be
less :rewarding-. Belgrade clearly is not satisfied
with recent Soviet denials of involvement with
Cominformist subversives. The two countries are
also deadlocked over conflicting goals in the long-
postponed meeting of European Communist parties.
Belgrade and Moscow both support the MPLA in
Angola, but their stands on the last Sinai accords
are in conflict and could cause trouble. Similarly,
Minic could face Soviet displeasure over the Yugo-
slav premier's precedent-setting visit to China
this fall.
Yugoslav media are playing several tunes on
the Minic visit. For the benefit of the West, the
press is insisting that relations with the Soviets
are more or less normal--and thus not susceptible
to third party manipulation. A commentary broad-
cast to Moscow last week, however, reasserted Bel-
grade's nonaligned principles, including its con-
tinuing struggle against "hegemony" by either bloc.
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Bulgaria Protests Yugoslav Allegations
on Macedonian Issue
Sofia has reportedly made a formal protest to
Belgrade about Yugoslav propaganda claims that Bul-
garia has used terrorism to suppress its Macedonian.
Despite the protest, Yugoslav media are again step-
ping up the pace of anti-Bulgarian commentary.
According to press reports, the Yugoslav ambas-
sador in Sofia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry
last month to receive the protest. The Bulgarians
reportedly decried allegations that Sofia had ar-
rested numerous Macedonians and had deported them
to camps in the north (Staff Notes, November 17).
Neither side has publicly referred to the protest.
The Yugoslav media have nevertheless continued
to repeat and even embellish these same allegations
in the wake of the Bulgarian census last week. The
latest commentary flatly states there was no cate-
gory for Macedonians, and notes the survey only
served Sofia's political purposes by proclaiming
that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians.
The latest developments in the long-standing
dispute shatter the climate of uneasy calm that
lasted barely two weeks after Bulgarian Foreign
Minister Mladenov visited Belgrade last month.
Mladenov and his Yugoslav counterpart, Milos Minic,
reportedly discussed the issue of Belgrade's in-
flammatory polemics, but were unable to agree
muzzling Belgrade's outspoken nationalists.
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Romania and the Arabs
Romania's pursuit of a balanced policy in the
Middle East--maintaining relations with both Israel
and the principal Arab antagonists--continues to
cause problems between Bucharest and some of the
more militant Arab states. The US embassy in Romania
has provided a wrap-up of the current difficulties
Bucharest faces.
The Arabs are annoyed with the large volume of
business the Romanian national airline (TAROM) does
with Israel. Romania's repeated refusal to answer
Arab queries about its air service to Tel Aviv or
about how many Jews it is allowing to emigrate ap-
parently led to the current Arab boycott of TAROM.
More recently, Romania was absent when the UN voted
on the anti-Zionism resolution, and Libya reacted by
refusing landing rights to a TAROM plane. An Egyp-
tian official in Bucharest labeled this action par-
ticularly "dirty" because Tripoli had "bullied" Ro-
mania into setting up the air route in the first
place. The Egyptian did suggest, however, that if
Romania made some concession, such as discontinuing
TAROM's passenger pooling arrangement with El Al,
the situation might improve.
Romania's relations with Israel have blocked
Bucharest's attempts to improve relations with Kuwait
and the Persian Gulf states. Earlier, Kuwait had
floated a signed prospectus for a $100-million loan
to Romania on condition that the Kuwaiti parliament
ratify the Romanian-Kuwait trade protocol. Ceausescu
was apparently anxious for the loan to go through in
order to demonstrate that he is getting something in
return for recent Romanian aid credits and the dis-
play by Bucharest of some sympathy for the Arab cause.
Failure of the trade protocol to pass the Kuwaiti par-
liament not only killed the loan, but also caused
Ceausescu to scrub his late November visit to Kuwait.
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Bucharest has also had its problems with Algiers,
which has been unsympathetic to Romanian attempts to
gain observer status in the nonaligned movement. Dep-
uty Prime Minister Oancea's visit to Algiers from No-
vember 26 to 28 was, in part, designed to gain Alge-
rian support for Bucharest's overtures for admission
to the nonaligned summit in Colombo next summer.
Deputy Foreign Minister Pacoste reportedly will
set off soon on a tour of several Arab countries in
search of "oil and money." Pacoste's itinerary has
not been announced, but the cancellation of Ceau-
sescu's Kuwait trip probably means Pacoste will have
little chance of gaining either oil or money from
those Middle East states in the best position to meet
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Hungary: Conversation with Kadar
Hungarian party leader Kadar told Ambassador
McAuliffe last week that Budapest is prepared to
fulfill the "freer movement" provisions of the Hel-
sinki accord and that it hopes to expand trade with
the US.
Kadar characteristically hedged his statement
on European security. After some general observa-
tions on the utility of increased travel in correct-
ing illusions, he concluded that implementation of
the "freer movement" provisions has an "inevitabil-
ity" about it. He said this was so despite the fact
that "some" still entertain many reservations about
Basket Three and that the Communist countries may
not move as quickly and forthrightly as others
might, wish.
Kadar's statements on increased trade with the
US was more than the usual call for most-favored-
nation status. Apparently to dispel any Western
notion that Hungary's economic problems would cause
it to reduce economic ties with the West, Kadar
said that Hungary needs access to Western technol-
ogy, markets, and raw materials. He added that al-
though CEMA integration is important for resource-
poor Hungary, he disagrees with "theoreticians"
who argue for more economic integration solely for
integration's sake and that he likewise disputes
others who argue that Hungary should shift more
commerce to trade with other Communist countries.
Kadar, the consummate politician, could have
been tailoring his words for Western ears, calculat-
ing that hints of Hungarian dissent could yield im-
portant political and economic benefits. On the
other hand, some of his private words are in line
with his public admission last June that Hungary
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conducts one third of its trade with the West "of
necessity," not choice. His comments also jibe with
recent Hungarian foreign trade projections, which
show that Hungarian trade with the West during the
next five years is expected to increase at a faster
rate than total trade.
In a low-keyed manner, Kadar for the first time
personally raised the issue of getting back the
Crown of St. Stephen from the US. Last July, Premier
Lazar officially requested return of the crown, a
traditional symbol of political legitimacy for the
Hungarians.
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Czechoslovakia: Shades of Masaryk
The Husak regime has in recent weeks been paying
lip-service to the concept of continuity of Czecho-
slovak history.
The effort seems designed to reinforce the ac-
ceptance of the regime by its own population and to
promote its image in the diplomatic arena. The new
stress on links with the past may also be intended
to counter Prague's well-deserved reputation for sub-
servience to Moscow.
According to a Foreign Ministry official, party
chief and president Husak had the historical linkage
in mind when he recently invited foreign ambassadors
and chiefs of mission to the first presidential hunt
in almost 30 years. This traditional event of the
old republic was abandoned after the Communists took
power in 1948.
Foreign Minister Chnoupek is also promoting his-
torical continuity. In his address to the federal
assembly last month, he harked back to the founding
of the republic in 1918 and several times referred to
Czechoslovak diplomatic "firsts." He also dredged up
the appeal of medieval Bohemian King George of Pode-
brody for an integrated Europe.
In addition, Premier Strougal, during his cur-
rent trip to Yugoslavia, lauded the support of the
Yugoslavs for their Czechoslovak brethren during the
1938 Munich Diktat period.
To avoid possible charges that this kind of
stress on pre-Communist Czechoslovak history encour-
ages nationalism, the Husak regime has been careful
to pay proper obeisance to the Soviets and to con-
tinue to be one of the most vociferous proponents of
internationalism and bloc integration.
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Cadres Abroad Central Committee Post Filled
Diplomatic sources have confirmed earlier re-
ports that former deputy foreign minister Nikolay
Pegov, 70, has been appointed chief of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee Department for Cadres Abroad. In ad-
dition, Izvestia on December 4 identified Pegov as
"ambassador," not as deputy minister of foreign af-
fairs. The Cadres Abroad Department is rarely re-
ferred to by name in the Soviet press.
The department oversees--for the party--the
activities of Soviet foreign service personnel serv-
ing abroad. Pegov as a deputy foreign minister, was
responsible for personnel matters in the MFA.
Leaders of the department in the past have, like
Pegov, had diplomatic experience. Petr Abrasimov,
63, who apparently headed the department for a time
between 1973 and March of this year, served previously
as ambassador to France, East Germany, and Poland, and
is currently reassigned to East Germany. His predeces-
sor, the late Aleksandr Panyushkin, had been ambas-
sador to the US and China, and Panyushkin's first
deputy chief, Andrey Ledovsky, held diplomatic assign-
ments in the Far East for many years.
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