SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300140001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300140001-2
Secret
5ukTT HOUH)o
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
December 5, 1975
No. 0781/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consu Rants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
4 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on
date impossible to determine
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NOCONTRACT/ORCON
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 5, 1975
Some Political Implications of the Soviet's 1
Harvest Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . .
European Communist Conference: Ah Wilderness! . 3
Podgorny To Visit Kabul . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Poles Redistribute Sales of 6
Consumer Goods . . . . . . . ? . . . . . .
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Some Political Implications of the
Soviets' Harvest Disaster
The Soviet Union's harvest disaster and related
economic problems will complicate the leadership's
propaganda efforts before the Party Congress meets
in February. Politics could also be affected.
The regime's defensiveness is demonstrated by
the attempts to evade reporting harvest results at
the Supreme Soviet session this week. Early in his
report to the session, planning chief Baybakov turned
his attention to the alleged "economic crisis" in the
West in order to illustrate Soviet successes. Propa-
gandists will probably be making increasing use of
this device in coming months.
The hardships that the poor harvest will mean
for the population, however, will seriously under-
mine the leadership's efforts to clothe itself in the
mantle of policy success.
Another reason the leadership is treating eco-
nomic subjects gingerly is because it realizes the
potential for recriminations and policy disputes.
By stressing that the weather was the cause of the
poor harvest, the regime is trying to block attempts
to blame individuals or policies. Ukrainian party
boss Shcherbitsky, a protege of Brezhnev, warned this
fall that a "correct approach" must be taken in ap-
praising the harvest and that the work of the party
in agriculture "must not be belittled."
At the moment, the leadership seems to be stick-
ing with its past policies. Brezhnev's program of
heavy investment in agriculture will apparently be
maintained. References to Brezhnev's speech at the
Central Committeemeeting on December 1 suggest that
he offered hackneyed prescriptions such as "socialist
competition" for economic problems rather than new
approaches.
December 5, 1975
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Pressures may nevertheless build behind the
Scenes. The economy's poor performance will make
for tough choices in deciding on allocations and
major programs in the five year plan. Advocates of
limited reform measures and schemes to reorganize
agricultural and industrial management could find
their cause strengthened. In the end, it may be im-
possible entirely to suppress recriminations and to
avoid offering up a scapegoat or two. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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December 5, 1975
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European Communist Conference: Ah Wilderness!
As the dust settles from the abortive mid-November
editorial meeting to prepare for the European Communist
Party Conference, conflicting statements are being made
as to when, if ever, the conference will convene.
Among the most optimistic are the Yugoslavs, who
claim that if the mid-January meeting is able to wrap
up its business successfully,a conference could be
held within days. The Danes suggest that the confer-
ence could meet in Moscow in late February when every-
one is there to attend the Soviet party congress.
Others, including the Romanians, say the Soviets will
be content to postpone the conference until after their
party congress, especially as this could make the con-
ference appear to ratify the decisions of the Soviet
congress. Still others speculate that the date for
the conference has been agreed on in principle, but
that the independent-minded parties have not agreed to
the date being announced in order to win more conces-
sions from the Soviets. The Italian communists do not
believe the conference will ever take place.
the So-
viets thought that a breakthrough had been made in
October and that therefore the conference could be
held in December. The continuing dickering of the
independent-minded parties after the October session,
however, made Moscow realize even before the editorial
committee met last month that a conference this year
was out of the question. The Soviets hinted to their
allies that a post-February date might be a better
idea, since there would be more time for "preparation."
This suggestion was made concrete at the November meet-
ing, when the Soviets delivered a letter stating that
a postponement was necessary because of the press of
preparations not only for their own party congress but
for those of others as well. Given the scheduling for
December 5, 1975
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party congresses after the Soviet conclave, this could
delay a European Communist conference until late May
or early June.
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planation is merely an excuse.
0
be having second thoughts ut
the Soviet ex-
Moscow may
st year of
negotiations has wrought.
25X1 C
in the November talks, t e Soviets tried to
restore some of the positions conceded earlier, and
were trying to make the document binding on the sig-
natories.
Furthermore, differences are cropping up over con-
ference procedures. In order to get around their
earlier agreement th oceedinqs be open to the
public, the Soviets, are
insisting on prior coordination of the speeches that
will be made at the conference.
There is no doubt that the conference project has
been fraught with more difficulties than Moscow antici-
pated, and its opening date, already seven months past
its original deadline, is continuing to slip into the
future. Moscow is likely to persist, however, if only
because it sees its role in the international movement
as requiring it. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
December 5, 1975
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Podgorny To Visit Kabul
Soviet Chief of State Podgorny is scheduled
to arrive in Kabul December 9 on what appears to be
the annual exchange of visits by leaders of the two
countries. The fact that Podgorny is taking time
to go to Kabul during a busy period in Moscow demon-
strates the importance that the Soviets attach to
their ties to Afghanistan and other South Asian
countries.
One thing on Podgorny's mind will be Daoud's
recent purges of leftist officials in that govern-
ment. The Soviets have thus far said little about
them, but the Afghans have been sensitive to the
likelihood of Soviet misgivings and have moved to
assure Moscow that the purges do not mean any swing
away from the USSR. Thus, Daoud recently decided
to permit the long-delayed opening of a Soviet cul-
tural center in Kabul.
Podgorny probably will seek a stronger Afghan
endorsement of Moscow's Asian collective security
idea. President Daoud gave a very circumscribed
endorsement to the idea during his visit to the USSR
last June.
Podgorny's visit will probably not culminate
in any new large-scale aid agreements because the
Afghans have not yet used the $435 million Moscow
extended in January 1975. The two sides may, how-
ever, announce plans for specific projects with the
money already pledged
ize the Afghan armed forces with late-model equipment,
including aircraft, ground forces equipment, and
support material. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT)
December 5, 1975
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Poles Redistribute Sales of Consumer Goods
In an effort to ensure that stores are well-
stocked for the Christmas season, the Polish gov-
ernment on Thursday banned the sale by producers of
30 consumer items to administrative units, coopera-
tives, and social organizations. The list of prod-
ucts includes carpets, wooden furniture, television
sets, refrigerators, meat, and processed meat.
The ban is intended to ensure that consumer
goods in high demand actually reach stores for pur-
chase by the general public. Many such items are
now channeled into a "private" distribution net-
work including factory commissaries and similar
organizations.
Warsaw is, in effect, robbing Peter to pay
Paul. The move will please the average Polish con-
sumer who now cannot find certain items or must
stand in long lines to purchase them. On the other
hand, it will upset those consumers--not an insig-
nificant number--who have had access to the private
network.
The ban does, however, contain a loophole which,
if widely used, could negate the entire effort.
Province governors and town mayors have been in-
structed to set up special committees to issue per-
mits for the purchase of these items. The commit-
tees will undoubtedly come under heavy pressure
to circumvent the ban. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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December 5, 1975
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